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ABSTRACT  
 
The main purpose of this research was to understand the civil war in Sierra Leone 
and its antecedents, and to analyse the package of reconstruction reforms which came 
along in the post-war era and their relevance for and impact on the local challenges 
for longer term peace. Continued corruption among the political class, the persistent 
disenfranchisement of important social groups, and emerging tensions along political 
party lines suggested that, ten years on from the Lomé Peace Accord, there may have 
been a malaise in the peacebuilding plan.  
To investigate the complex issues, and to support the hypothesis that the 
model for reconstruction was not best suited to local conditions and local priorities, 
the work first made a deep interrogation of the historic political, cultural and 
economic factors which led to the violent conflict. This scrutiny of the local 
experience allowed the conceptualisation of a germane ‗framework for peace‘ which 
represented the most pressing priorities of the local community and the central 
challenges for peace. The framework reflected the main concerns of the local 
populace and was used as an analytical tool to better understand the relevance of the 
model for reconstruction vis-à-vis the local context. Through a critical analysis of the 
post-war reforms and their impact on the social dimensions of recovery, in particular 
macro-economic reforms and the promotion of democracy, conclusions were drawn 
about the appropriateness and efficacy of the model of reconstruction experienced in 
Sierra Leone and how it supported local priorities for peace.  
The enquiry found that, in general, the model for reconstruction was not best 
suited to the local context because of its inflexibility to support the local 
peacebuilding and its many challenges. In some ways the model for reconstruction 
heightened residual tensions from the conflict because it failed to address key issues 
for reform such as governance and social justice.  
 
Key words: peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction, democratisation, liberal 
peace, structural reform, Sierra Leone 
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INTRODUCTION 
0.1 - RATIONAL FOR THE STUDY: PROBLEMATISING THE PEACEBUILDING 
This research addresses the question: to what extent were local priorities for long 
term peace and stability addressed in Sierra Leone‘s model for post-conflict 
reconstruction? The purpose of the research is to discover what the local priorities 
were through a deep investigation of the conflict and its antecedents, and to provide a 
rigorous analysis of the efficacy and appropriateness of broad based international 
support for recovery and reconstruction in the context of the war history and 
priorities for building peace among locals. More specifically, the research presents an 
analysis of the interventions which influenced political and economic reforms to 
determine their impact on the social dimensions of recovery and their ability to 
address the challenges for sustainable peace. The focus on external interventions 
rather than local peacebuilding initiatives, NGO support for reconstruction, or other 
areas of reform, is because Sierra Leone was so dependent on multilateral and 
bilateral institutions and arrangements for the reconstruction of its state apparatus. 
The conditionalities attached to post-conflict support with regard to economic 
development and political reform are therefore key to understanding the shape of the 
new nation as it emerged after war and the choices made by political elites to 
progress the peacebuilding plan.   
The aims of the research are important and relevant because, over a decade 
from the negotiated peace settlement, the promised dividends from economic 
restructuring and political reform have generally not been realised; unemployment 
levels are unacceptably high, basic service delivery remains poor and most rural 
areas are still badly neglected; basic commodity prices are persistently unstable and 
foreign investment has failed to flow. There remain high levels of mistrust of 
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governing elites among citizens and rising tensions among the populace suggest that 
peace remains in a state of deep fragility. The objective of this research is to better 
understand why this is so.  
The politics of peace in Sierra Leone were determined by the norms and 
practices of contemporary international peacebuilding missions. Liberalising 
reforms, democratisation and civil society support were some of the central 
components of the statebuilding project but were not necessarily connected to the 
realities of post-conflict Sierra Leone - its complex political history, troubled 
national economy, deeply fractured society, and ruined environment. This work 
therefore investigates the progress of the reforms to determine what was achieved 
and what was not achieved, and the extent to which the model for reconstruction 
supported the longer term peacebuilding plan or influenced the disappointing 
outcomes outlined above.  
The issues are complex and interesting and there are several possible 
variables which emerge to explain the problematic nature of the Sierra Leone 
recovery. For example, was the longer term peacebuilding plan too ambitious? The 
multiplicity of activities and broad reach of reforms commonly associated with 
contemporary ‗transformations‘ may have put huge pressure on both external 
resources and local capacity. Were the resources for recovery sufficient; were the 
promises for support honoured; and was there enough local capacity to absorb the aid 
effectively? Did the activities, choices and decisions of peacebuilding actors, both 
local and global, hinder the progress of peace, or was the sequencing of reforms 
inappropriate? Was the programming problematic, particularly as it was devised with 
a Western state-centric approach and paradigm for peace?  Did the three key projects 
of the post-war era – peacebuilding, statebuilding and nation building – add to the 
burdens of sustainable peace by blurring the objectives of the post-war mission and 
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missing the point of peace? The aim of this research is to provide a better 
understanding of the role of all these factors in securing longer term peace in Sierra 
Leone. 
This work therefore presents a critical analysis of the role of international and 
domestic actors, and the influence of global and local structures, on attempts to build 
a peaceful nation. It is predicated on the supposition that the local society presents 
exceptional and nuanced vulnerabilities for the imposition of the current global 
model of peacebuilding and reconstruction, and that effective peacebuilding requires 
a sound understanding of the social history of war.  
0.2 - OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH  
The central argument is based upon the hypothesis that the most pressing concerns of 
the local populace in post-war Sierra Leone were not best served by the model for 
reconstruction. That the model was not well thought through in terms of local 
priorities for long term peace, and that the structures put in place may have 
inadvertently exacerbated some of the problems. It might be the case that solutions 
for peacebuilding in complex war torn states cannot be successfully constructed from 
outside because they fail in some way to address the challenges for peace. 
The research is guided by five secondary questions: 
1. What contributing factors led to the civil war? 
2. What were the challenges and local priorities for longer term peace? 
3. How did the peace process help to address the challenges? 
4. What programmes of reform were implemented for the post-conflict 
reconstruction? 
5. What impact did the reforms have on local priorities for peace? 
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The research is presented within six chapters and starts with a comprehensive 
investigation into the political history of Sierra Leone and the nation building project 
of the independence years to determine the complex contributing factors which led to 
the outbreak of war and the eventual collapse of the state. This investigation provides 
for a better understanding of the issues, their nuance and complexity, and exposes the 
particular vulnerabilities of Sierra Leone after war. It explains what the priorities for 
post-conflict reconstruction were, the many challenges involved, and the need to get 
the issue of governance right in the reconstruction to give long term peace the best 
chance of success.  
 In chapter two a close interrogation is made of the peace documents - the 
Lomé Peace Accord and supporting Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report 
(TRC-R) – to make a comparison between the findings made in chapter one and the 
package for reconstruction promised in the settlement, and to establish any synergy. 
Two further documents are examined – the National Recovery Strategy (NRS) and 
the UN‘s Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) – which are conceptualised 
as the ‗blue prints‘ for peace. The analyses of these documents will reveal the 
proposals and frameworks for the reconstruction project, and their relevance for the 
local challenges. 
Chapter three builds upon this theme by conceptualising the peacebuilding 
plan within a framework of statebuilding for security and development. This is 
because peacebuilding missions generally focus on the project of statebuilding. The 
chapter investigates whether the local priorities for peace could be accommodated in 
the larger statebuilding project and whether there was synergy between the promises 
made by government to externals and the promises it made to locals. This re-
conceptualisation of peace involves the analysis of several documents: the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), the Government of Sierra Leone‘s (GovSL) 
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Letters of Intent, and the documents of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
Initiative (HIPCI). The analysis helps to identify any points of departure between 
local and global ambitions in the reconstruction project. This chapter also helps to 
understand the conditionalities which came along with post-conflict support and the 
structural framework for the operationalisation of reforms, to see how they relate to 
the peacebuilding challenges.  
Chapters four, five and six represent the substantive body of evidence to 
support the central arguments. They present empirical data which reveals the 
outcome of key post-conflict reforms. Chapter four investigates claims for improved 
management of the economy brought about by broad based macro-economic reform 
to see how previous tensions around the share of resources were addressed. It 
engages with the government‘s pledge to give ownership of public goods to the 
people of Sierra Leone; in particular its pledges to redirect resources to impoverished 
and marginalised communities in diamondiferous areas, and to bring accountability 
and ‗good governance‘ into the economic sector. The analysis helps to understand 
the role of economic liberalisation in the challenge of resource distribution and high 
unemployment.  
Chapter five focuses on the post-conflict political process to determine the 
extent to which democratisation addressed old political fractures, provided for an 
inclusive society, and secured representative and accountable government for the 
populace. The central arguments are progressed in this chapter through a critical 
analysis of the efficacy of three key mechanisms of accountability - elections, the 
rule of law and civil society. An analysis is made of the role of both local and global 
actors in the process.  
Chapter six reconceptualises the peacebuilding project by investigating the 
social dimensions of recovery - the nature of the new state and its relationship with 
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citizens. An examination is made of the impact of reforms on former marginalised 
and vulnerable groups to identify the character of the social contract which emerged 
after war and how it was distinguishable from the old. The character of the new state 
is compared to that of the state as it emerged after independence to determine how 
post-conflict reform re-modelled the levers of power to enhance the capacity of 
government to respond to its citizenry. The chapter concludes with an exploration of 
possible alternative structures for governance.  
The concluding chapter explains the contrast between the needs of the local 
populace from their reconstruction project and what was delivered to them in the 
outcome. It summarises the findings against the theoretical framework and central 
hypothesis of the research, and explains its contribution to the body of knowledge on 
reconstruction in Sierra Leone. It moves the debate forward by taking a pragmatic 
approach to the issues which the research has raised, by suggesting areas for further 
research.  
0.3 - METHODOLOGY AND ITS CHALLENGES 
For reasons outlined above, this research is an inductive study which draws from the 
analysis of empirical data to form conclusions and enhance understandings about 
relevant theory in the area of peacebuilding. This is because the deductive approach 
to solving the problem of long term peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, - the application 
of pre-defined templates for recovery after war - is hypothesised here as being part of 
the problem (see Medawar, 1984:33). The study aims to contribute to the debate by 
deepening understandings of the complexity and diversity of the Sierra Leone 
conflict and the dynamic conditions of the post-war environment. The research is 
therefore a critical instance case study because of its depth of analysis and 
longitudinal focus, and because it investigates a universally understood assertion 
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(that of liberal peacebuilding) vis-à-vis its relevance for Sierra Leone. As a single 
case study, the conclusions are unique and any observations will be exclusive to it, 
but deductions may be drawn which challenge assumptions about the efficacy of the 
liberal model in the context of the collapsed state and post-war environs in other 
instances. The methodology for analysis of the peacebuilding environment may also 
be relevant elsewhere.  
The theoretical component of the work is based on the review and analysis of 
primary data sources including the peace documents mentioned earlier and official 
documentation between the Independent Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the GovSL 
including the PRSPs, statements and resolutions from the UN, DfID and other 
official sources, and legislation. These are rich sources for data on the country‘s 
peace process and reconstruction project. Secondary data for the theoretical analysis 
is also of a qualitative nature and is drawn from official and unofficial documentation 
and sources including academic books and articles, surveys and reports, working 
papers, forecasts, local literature and news commentary. This broad base of evidence 
produces good sources of information on war history, political history and challenges 
in the post-conflict environment. Evidence is also drawn from quantitative secondary 
data, such as economic performance statistics, and from qualitative primary data 
collected from field interviews and observation.  
In terms of the empirical analysis, the substantial amounts of material noted 
above are complemented by a qualitative approach to primary data collection which 
the flexible design of this study allows. This approach is important because the post-
war period provides such a dynamic environment for epistemology, and the qualitative 
approach to primary data collection enables more nuanced understandings of the 
impact of peacebuilding on the various actors involved and also assists triangulation 
(Harvey, 1990, Kvale, 1996). The primary evidence is collected from forty semi-
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structured and unstructured elite interviews with civil society organisations (CSOs), 
government ministers and members of the opposition (including the current president 
of Sierra Leone), and other members of the community. All but two interviews were 
tape recorded. They were coded and transcribed in full. The analysis did not involve 
any particular coding mechanisms but more a general summary of the issues raised 
which were of concern to the central tasks of the research. The outputs were stored 
electronically and in hard copy with the coding list stored separately, although most 
respondents were happy to have their names associated with their contributions. 
Empirical evidence is also drawn from observations during two official and two 
unofficial visits to the country (November 2006 and March 2007, June 2004 and 
May 2009 respectively). References to each source are indicated in the text. A list of 
interviewees and guiding questions can be found in Appendices 1 and 2.  
Reflections on the methodology and methods 
To achieve the aims of the study it was necessary to develop a deep 
understanding of the country‘s atrophy to war and state collapse involving a 
thorough examination of its political history, the socio-economic, cultural and 
regional dynamics of the war, and the role of the various actors involved. It required 
a sound understanding of what went wrong in the nation building project and what 
needed to be corrected in the peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. This 
was essential to understand the local challenges for peace. The selection of 
documents for this purpose was therefore crucial to the outcome of the research 
findings. The central quest was to locate the most legitimate local account of the war 
and the implications of that account for the reconstruction project.  
The report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was identified as being 
the central source for this legitimacy because of the limitations and omissions of the 
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Lomé Accord, and the mandate in the Accord for the TRC to compensate for its 
shortcomings (GovSL, 1999: Article IV, 2(ix)). There were, however, strong 
criticisms of the Commission including its delayed launch and chronic lack of 
funding, its uncomfortable relationship with the Special Court and the selection of its 
key officials who were appointed by the president (ICG, 2002, May, 2006). 
Triangulation with other sources, however, substantiated the TRC-R as a rich source 
of data to support the arguments and theoretical and empirical underpinnings of this 
work, and which gives voice to the local priorities for peace. 
There is an abundance of official documentation describing the conventions and 
conditionalities imposed on the GovSL for support in reconstructing the country, the 
impacts of those conditionalities in terms of local experiences and the implications 
for future peacebuilding policy. The focus of this research was generally on the 
documents which chronicled the conditionalities attached to financial and technical 
assistance (macro-economic reform) as well as documents which related to other 
external pressures around democratisation and its promotion. Positive assumptions 
were made about the veracity of the official documentation - the Letters of Intent for 
example - as it was impossible to unequivocally claim they were genuine 
representations of actual realities but only that they were the best sources available to 
work from.  
The body of literature in terms of official reports, statistics, surveys etc. produced 
a wealth of empirical data to support the investigation on structural reform and its 
outcomes. The challenge, however, was to determine what was realistic to expect in 
terms of peacebuilding gains in such a relatively short time frame. After all, 
peacebuilding is a long term project. It is at this point that the primary data, collected 
from local citizens, is invaluable in supporting the evidence that suggested the new 
nation state was constructed on weak foundations and that external priorities were 
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somewhat contrary to local needs. This primary data greatly enhanced the exposure 
of actual realities at the local/global interface. 
 The sampling of respondents was not representative in any way but supported 
the exploratory nature of the study; sampling methods included snowballing, 
purposive and, in some cases, convenience approaches. A larger sample and more 
structured sampling would have improved the data base and more could have been 
achieved by taking this methodology into the provinces to determine the similarities 
and differences between Freetown and rural experiences. This would have extended 
the scope of the work to unmanageable proportions, however. The author has no 
knowledge of the many local languages in Sierra Leone and this also constrained the 
choice of local respondent. The political situation in the country, especially during 
the second field trip which was conducted at the time of voter registration, meant that 
certain respondents were very keen to take part in the research: opposition 
politicians, for example, welcomed the opportunity to vent their frustrations at the 
incumbent party‘s ‗corrupt‘ or ‗inept‘ systems of governance, and other respondents 
thought the opportunity to talk to a British researcher might have a positive impact 
on the redistribution of donor aid. A more critical analysis of these responses was 
therefore required. 
Reflections on the field work 
The approach to field work was exploratory in nature, the aim being to provide 
a better understanding of some of the issues affecting democratisation in the 
country and the nature of the relationships between external and local actors. 
Respondents were chosen because of their relevance in this regard.  Civil society 
organisations were chosen because they were generally easy to access and 
because their responses would help to explain how civil society was being 
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supported vis-à-vis its role as a mechanism for holding government to account. 
The idea was to explore the extent to which local priorities for peacebuilding 
synergised with those of the international community.  Parliamentarians and 
other political elites were chosen to enable a better understanding of how the 
system was working with regard to representation and the parliamentary 
process. 
With regard to civil society, the first points of reference were the key 
CSOs which featured strongly in the peacebuilding literature on Sierra Leone: 
Campaign for Good Governance (CGG), the Civil Society Movement (CSM) and 
50/50 Group, for example. Snowballing followed from these respondents. 
Access to parliamentarians was gained through contacts in the political studies 
department of the University of Sierra Leone (Fourah Bay College) who had 
good working relationships with colleagues in Peace Studies at Bradford. One or 
two initial contacts allowed further snowballing. A total of nine 
parliamentarians were interviewed including two ministers from the ruling 
party, six members of the APC and the leader of the newly formed PMDC 
political party. Not surprisingly, the most forthcoming were opposition MPs 
who had a lot to say about the practices of the incumbents but who also had 
very interesting comments to make about the parliamentary process.  
Making contact with all participants was problematic. Due to the lack of a 
well functioning national telephone network, cell phones were relied upon 
heavily. It was common for locals to have at least two if not three or four cell 
phone numbers which allowed them to take advantage of the different charging 
structures of individual mobile operators, but this made contacting respondents 
and setting up interviews arduous and time consuming. 
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Field work was further challenged due to the difficulties getting around 
the capital. Taxi travel was the most convenient but severe congestion in most 
parts of the city meant a lot of wasted time stuck in traffic jams. Safe and reliable 
taxi vehicles were also at a premium and all drivers were regularly stopped by 
the police for bribes. Respondents themselves had transport issues getting from 
one location to another and, with heavy workloads, could sometimes only allow 
time for short interviews. In several cases (MPs), respondents had rooms full of 
local people waiting for an appointment. On one occasion, after several hours, 
the author had to leave for another appointment before the respondent became 
available for interview. Most interviews were conducted in extremely hot and 
uncomfortable surroundings; those offices with generator driven air 
conditioning drowned out some of the conversations and, in any event, street 
traffic made recording some interviews very difficult. Most were taped, 
however, and were transcribed using high quality audio equipment at the end of 
each day. This was quite an onerous task as some participants spoke English 
with very heavy colloquial accents and, coupled with the background noise of 
the city and generators, accurate transcription was a lengthy process. Waiting 
around offered other opportunities to talk to locals, however, and the author 
was well received by most people. At the time the UN still had a large presence 
in the country and many aid agencies were working in the area. Locals thought 
the author was part of the aid community and this may have explained the 
general attitude towards her. 
Women were generally more forthcoming with information than men 
and appeared to be quite comfortable talking to the author. In particular, 
conversations about marriage and children (the author is a mother of three) 
 26 
 
broke the ice on a number of occasions and helped to build some degree of trust 
with women participants. Younger male participants were more suspicious but 
the older generation were very relaxed and happy to talk about ‘old colonial 
times’ with the author. From broader discussions and observations, Sierra 
Leoneans seemed to fall within two general camps – those who thought the 
British should come back and rule once more, and those who thought the British 
had caused all their problems. More mature participants had fond memories of 
the British era and were most welcoming to the author as a British national, 
especially as she had some personal history with the country. 
The urban bias of the field work was mainly due to time constraints and 
some safety issues; due to personal circumstances, the author was unable to 
spend lengthy periods in the field. At the time of field work, it was safe to travel 
throughout the country in terms of security but the road infrastructure was 
such that any journeys up country involved many hours travelling on dangerous 
roads and several overnight stays to avoid journeying after dark; Sierra Leone 
has no road lighting, road markings, traffic signs or signals, and unenforced 
legislation on vehicle standards makes serious accidents commonplace.  
Despite the difficulties, good primary data was gathered in the field. This 
made a very useful empirical contribution to the work and helped to support 
the central argument.  
Reflections on the scope 
The potential scope of the enquiry is immense and justification for focussing on 
political and economic reforms has already been stated. It must be emphasised at this 
point, however, that there are other areas of enquiry which cannot be covered in this 
work but which have significant implications for the prospects of durable peace in 
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Sierra Leone. These include the reform of the armed forces whose problematic 
relationship with the state and history of coup d‘état warrant further research to 
understand the impact of security sector reform on the local political process; a 
gender study of the role of women and men in peacebuilding and their relationship 
with each other post-war; grassroots attempts at peacebuilding, in particular methods 
of traditional justice and reconciliation; civil society as defined by the ‗broader 
citizenry needs to be explored, and the role of religion in the peacebuilding project 
are just a few areas which require deeper investigation. 
0.4 - CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESEARCH 
There is a substantial body of literature in this area of research and the questions 
raised earlier, about the efficacy of liberal models for peacebuilding, are not 
exclusive to this work. Scholars and policy makers have engaged with the issues and 
produced various analyses on the subject (Newman et al., 2009). There is a lively 
debate around optimum sequencing of post-conflict reform, for example, the most 
notable being Paris‘ ‗institutions before liberalisation‘ thesis (Paris, 2004), see also 
(Fukuyama et al., 2007, Mansfield, 2005, Krasner, 2005); or the importance of the 
role of local stakeholders in the peacebuilding process (Chopra and Hohe, 2004, 
Pugh et al., 2008b, Lederach, 1997); or the dangers (in terms of renewed conflict) of 
importing neo-liberal Western models of state formation into fragile, complex and 
war-torn states and societies (Paris, 1997, Kumar, 1997, Mansfield, 1995). Certainly, 
the ideological underpinnings of contemporary peacebuilding have been highly 
contested because they reflect a new form of Western interventionism compounded 
by the requirements for global stabilisation after the events of 9/11 (Bellamy, 2004). 
What results is argued to be a ‗virtual peace‘ devoid of any real meaning to people 
living locally, which robs local societies of the capacity to self-govern (Chandler, 
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2006, Richmond, 2004). It is argued that this exercise in westernisation can exploit 
the weakness of war torn states attempting to recover in very challenging conditions 
(Jackson, 1990, Krasner, 2005, Keohane, 2003).  
The discourse claims that peacebuilding is, in fact, statebuilding involving all 
the accoutrements of restructuring sovereign entities which can ‗fit in‘ to the 
international system and enhance global security (Franks, 2009, Newman, 2009:29). 
In the case of Sierra Leone, there is evidence that peace may have been built upon 
such a narcissistic approach involving the reconstruction of the state by western 
actors to produce institutions of ‗good governance‘ which mirror established 
industrialised democracies and which overlook the more complex needs of the local 
populace for living peacefully together.
1
 Richmond describes these efforts as peace 
as governance because of the preoccupation of external interventions with governing 
structures rather than peacebuilding per se (Richmond, 2005).  
The issue of complexity in the multi-dimensional, multi-sector, multi-level 
and multi-staged dynamics of peacebuilding missions has provoked further 
commentary (Lund, 2003). Critics claim that the whole process of liberal 
peacebuilding is ambitious and ambiguous with a plethora of different ideologies and 
mandates among the various implementing bodies which engage in peacebuilding 
missions – an area which has evolved into a professional field of practice (Chetail, 
2009b, Barnett et al., 2007). These organisations range from world bodies such as the 
UN and the World Bank (WB), to regional organisations such as the European Union 
(EU) and the African Union (AU), to multinationals such as the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and to bilateral government 
arrangements between individual states such as Britain‘s Department for 
                                                 
1
 For a discussion on western hubris in peacebuilding see Duffield (2007), Chandler (2006), 
Turner and Pugh (2006) and also the United Nations A more secure world: our shared 
responsibility (2004) available from http://www.un.org/secureworld/, accessed on 21/01/10 
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International Development (DfID) and the government of Sierra Leone (GovSL). 
The ambiguity of peacebuilding missions has been manifest in the different 
terminology used by the various implementing bodies; terminology determined by 
the way ‗peace‘ is conceptualised and operationalised by the differing mandates of 
the diverse range of actors. These different conceptualisations have impacted on the 
coordination of peacebuilding programming but, more seriously, concerns have 
emerged as to whether there is actually a connection between external mandates for 
‗peace‘ and those of local peacebuilders (Barnett et al., 2007, Smith, 2004). For 
example, ‗deeply rooted organisational mandates‘ tend to define the strategies for 
peacebuilding rather than the adoption of best practice which is born of empirical 
realities (Barnett, ibid: 53). Something of a crisis of identity for international 
peacebuilding missions has emerged out of this confusion (Chetail, 2009a, Cooper, 
2007). 
What these arguments reveal is the need for a clearer definition of the aims and 
objectives of peacebuilding missions; a definition which can address the contextually 
specific dimensions of peace because the central challenge is to correctly identify 
‗peace‘ in any given context (Mac Ginty, 2006). The Peacebuilding Commission 
(PBC) conceptualised peacebuilding as follows: 
Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of 
lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all 
levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace 
and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the 
specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and 
should comprise a carefully prioritised, sequenced and therefore relatively 
narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives. (UNPC, 2007: 
2) 
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 The contestations are many and this brief overview presents only a part of the 
wealth of scholarly material engaged with the vibrant and dynamic discourse on 
liberal peacebuilding.  
There is, however, a dearth of scholarly material on single in depth empirical 
studies which can provide clearer definitions of what peace might mean in local 
contexts and how a more durable and positive peace might be secured. In the case of 
Sierra Leone, analysis has been mainly thematic. For example, Albrecht and Jackson 
have produced a lengthy evaluation of programming on Security Sector Reform 
(SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) (Albrecht and 
Jackson, 2009, Ginifer, 2004); further themes include the role of the Special Court 
and traditional justice (Kelsall, 2009, Kerr and Lincoln, 2008, Boersch-Supan, 2009, 
Dale, 2007); the youth issue (Peters, 2006, Christensen and Utas, 2008) or the 
reintegration of child combatants (Denov, 2005). 
It is at this point that this research makes a distinctive contribution to the 
debate because of the depth of its analysis of peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, in 
particular the role of liberal structural reform. It provides a unique addition to the 
body of literature in the peacebuilding domain. Scholarly analysis around 
international policy in peacebuilding, especially for individual case studies such as 
Sierra Leone, is uncommon. This is because the focus has been more on the 
mechanics of statebuilding than the local politics of peace (Zaum, 2007, Chandler, 
2006, Pouligny, 2006). The research therefore provides an empirical study against an 
established and dominant theory (albeit confused and complex) of peacebuilding and 
post-conflict reconstruction, and presents a sound analysis of the specific needs of 
Sierra Leone.  
Effective conflict transformation requires analyses which emphasises the 
structural causes of conflict and which also dig deep to extract ‗context specific 
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knowledge‘ which can inform peacebuilding strategies (Goetschel, 2009: 101, 
Galtung, 1996, Curle, 1971). This is the sort of analysis in peacebuilding research 
which has been recognised by scholars as imperative to understanding the 
complexity and diversity of contemporary violent conflicts, and to improving 
understandings of the dynamics of conflict and peace at the micro-level (Goodhand 
and Hulme, 1999: 23, Luckham, 2004, Richmond, 2008). Richmond and Franks have 
tried to correct this dearth of context relevant research and literature by interrogating 
the outcomes of ‗liberal peacebuilding‘ in five different environments – but none on 
the African continent (Richmond and Franks, 2009). Their volume is a step in the 
right direction but single chapters on complex case histories can only reveal so much.  
This research therefore makes a useful contribution to the critical analysis of 
liberal peacebuilding and contestations already in the literature; it also complements 
the emerging debate around ‗post-liberal‘ peacebuilding (Richmond, 2009b), and the 
possibilities for ‗local-liberal hybrids‘ to compensate for what Richmond has 
described as ‗backsliding‘ (Richmond, 2009a). 
0.5 - CENTRAL ARGUMENT AND ANALYTICAL FOCUS 
The central argument running through this research proposes that what Sierra Leone 
needed for building long term peace was not what it got when the state was 
reconstructed and that peacebuilding solutions are not successfully created from 
outside.  
This argument complements the school of thought which claims that 
peacebuilding initiatives must have their political roots in local societies; that policy 
makers must engage in ‗unscripted conversations‘ rather than assume peace is a 
normative concept by constructing solutions from outside (Pugh et al., 2008a, 
Duffield, 2007: 234). It develops the critique made by Chandler, and others, that 
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contemporary interventions after conflict present a serious disconnect between the 
demands of global actors and the needs of local people; that negotiation and policy 
making takes place between national and global elites, rather than local people and 
their government (Chandler, 2006, Richmond, 2008, Ignatieff, 2003). This is 
significant for this study because international peacebuilding endeavours claim that 
models for reconstruction are inclusive and that ownership of the process is located 
with the masses (Easterly, 2006, GovSL and IMF, 2008, UN, 2007, Stiglitz, 1998).  
The research develops conclusions by Pugh (et al) that a ‗paradigmatic shift‘ 
is required in the ‗negotiation of the political economies of peace‘, and that a new 
and contextualised definition of peace is needed to challenge the Western normative 
doctrine – sometimes known as the ‗liberal peace‘ - by introducing a range of 
discourses which might produce a more emancipatory peace (Pugh et al., 2008b, 
Jabri, 1996). It is therefore appropriate that the ‗liberal peace‘ thesis is central to the 
analysis in this research because it assumes the infallibility of a certain set of ideas 
which are non-negotiable and because of its power to influence the prospects for 
peace in Sierra Leone. The ‗liberal peace‘ involves the ‗scientific perfecting‘ of 
known strategies to form a readymade template for the deployment of ‗peace‘ in 
post-conflict zones (Richmond, 2008:106), and represents a western normative view 
of peace rather than nuanced interpretations born of local experiences and local 
knowledge (Mac Ginty, 2006). It holds that third party interventions which redefine 
the ‗discourses, practices and structures of the conflict environment‘ and replace 
them with the ‗liberal architecture of the modern state‘ are necessary for the business 
of peacebuilding (Richmond, 2008:106). The theoretical underpinnings of this 
research present an opportunity to take a critical approach which complements 
previous contestations of the ‗liberal peace‘ in terms of its component parts, the 
methods used to build it, and the legitimacy of its universal claims for the peace and 
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stability of the developing world (Richmond, 2008: 7, Duffield, 2001, Call and Cook, 
2003, Paris, 2004).  
There are several analytical foci for the research. The first critiques the 
‗liberal peace‘ as a relevant, efficacious or plausible model for peace by analysing 
the local political culture, social, economic and physical environments and 
determining what programming was operationalised; what worked and what did not 
work, what was prioritised and what was sidelined, and for what purpose. The 
originality of this analysis is in the search for empirical evidence of the extent to 
which a ‗liberal peace‘ exists in Sierra Leone. By getting to grips with empirical 
realities some suggestions can be made as to optimum models to address the local 
challenges. 
A second focus for analysis centres on the theoretical and philosophical 
premise of ownership in the liberal peacebuilding project; that the model for 
reconstruction is ‗inclusive‘ and locally owned because the process involves 
widespread consultations with local stakeholders for ‗emancipatory‘ peacebuilding 
(Richmond and Franks, 2009:12). The aim is to establish whether external 
interventions on predetermined templates for predetermined purposes related to local 
people and the local context, and their impact on local accountability mechanisms. 
The academic analysis focuses on the conflation of democracy, a central component 
of peacebuilding missions, with the politics of intervention to determine whether or 
not the two are mutually exclusive. 
A third focus empathises with the contestation that statebuilding is central to 
the liberal peacebuilding project and has replaced peacebuilding concerns with those 
of development (Duffield, 2001, Herbst and Mills, 2003, Carmody, 2005, Goodhand, 
2006). The analysis centres on the institutional apparatus constructed with 
development aims in mind and its capacity or ability to deliver on the peace so as to 
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determine any areas of synergy between development goals and peacebuilding 
priorities. This work argues that development is not the same as peace. 
0.6 - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: PROBLEMATISING THE ‘LIBERAL 
PEACE’ 
The theoretical underpinnings for the arguments in this research are drawn from the 
large body of literature on peacebuilding and the so called ‗liberal peace‘.  
The search for empirical evidence of the ‗liberal peace‘ at work in Sierra 
Leone is relevant because, although identified as in a state of crisis, its rhetoric does 
have primacy in the area of conflict resolution and societal reconstruction and 
peacebuilding experiences in the country were framed by the neo-liberalising agenda. 
It is therefore important to understand the genesis, premise and central components 
of the ‗chief organising idea‘ behind building the peace to analyse the nature, success 
or failures of the peacebuilding mission there (Mac Ginty, 2006).  
The starting point for the ‗liberal peace‘ consensus was the end of the Cold 
War when communism had been defeated and any opposing model for post-conflict 
support was eliminated (Fukuyama, 1989, Fukuyama, 2004, Diamond et al., 1990). 
This consensus meant that a specific form of governance was required to secure 
durable peace in states affected by conflict and that a formulaic approach to 
peacebuilding and reconstruction, imposed from outside, was required for successful 
state ‗transformation‘ (Richmond, 2005, Duffield, 2001). This ‗urge to engineer‘ 
troubled societies through interventions revealed the hubris of external actors 
convinced they knew what local peace might look like (Pugh, 2005). The ‗liberal 
peace‘ involved the use of certain mechanisms and tools for ‗building peace‘ which 
were deployed by an epistemic community within the troubled locale where the 
peace was ‗done‘ through a predefined process. This involved the pursuit of 
constitutional democracy, the promotion of human rights, liberal development of the 
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economy, civil peacebuilding and the promotion of the rule of law; an echo of the 
characteristics of like-minded liberal states and a complex and ‗eclectic‘ approach to 
peace (Goodhand and Hulme, 1999). Despite its critics, the doctrine has support from 
analysts who judge positively its credentials for returning conflict torn states to 
stability (Fortna, 2004, Doyle and Sambanis, 2006). Certainly this paradigm 
appeared to be reflected in efforts to reconstruct Sierra Leone.   
The ‗liberal peace‘ reflects a Western subjectivity of what peace should be, 
based loosely on Kant‘s expression of the democratic peace (Kant, 1796, Barash, 
2000, Jabri, 2007: 127). Kant‘s thesis argued that shared international norms and 
practices could solidify democratic consciousness and that nation states could be 
unified through economic interdependency and shared security interests. It was 
influential in building the global consensus around liberal reconstruction of collapsed 
or fragile states so that ‗rogue‘, failing or failed sovereign entities could be brought 
into the global system to fulfil their international obligations, and also their local 
obligations. States like Sierra Leone. 
Conditional relationships were central to the process of the ‗liberal peace‘. 
Notions of sovereignty and respect for nation states meant that interventionist politics 
had to be balanced by consent and through coercion (Ceadel, 1987, Clark, 2001) - 
although it was the case that collapsed states such as Sierra Leone had virtually no 
leverage or room for manoeuvre on negotiations. The main players in this global 
enterprise were states, donors, international and regional organisations. They formed 
multi-level and non-territorial decision making networks which embodied a complex 
system of authority and power brokering zones (Duffield, 2001, Richmond, 2006, 
Held et al., 1999). Consequently, the ‗liberal peace‘ involved both an explicit and 
implicit consensus amongst a myriad of international actors that liberalism was the 
key to peace and stability. This enquiry investigates whether this consensus was 
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operationalised in the policy programming of donors and the conditionalities of 
lenders in the reconstruction of Sierra Leone and challenges the notion that the 
concept is any more than rhetorical. The enquiry does not take as given that what 
was created in Sierra Leone in the peacebuilding enterprise was anything akin to a 
genuine liberal polity.  
With regard to practical implementation, what was to be ‗done‘ in Sierra 
Leone for peace, Richmond‘s conceptualisation of the ‗third generation‘ approach to 
peace – the ‗liberal peace‘ – explains the consensus between the UN, the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). The ‗blue print‘ for peace first emerged in the historic document Agenda for 
Peace where peacebuilding was described as ‗action to identify and support 
structures which… [would] tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a 
relapse into conflict‘ (Ghali, 1992: II); a statement which was further credited by the 
subsequent recommendation that interventions should involve a stronger emphasis on 
building state institutions and state capacity, based on the rule of law (UN, 2004). 
Integrated operations such as these, whose goal is to transform societies, adopt a 
‗multidimensional‘ approach to peace which claims to address the causes of war as 
well as stop the fighting (Pouligny, 2006).  
Richmond identified four components parts of the ‗third generation‘ approach 
to peacebuilding (Richmond, 2008:7), and there is evidence of these components 
parts being operationalised in Sierra Leone. First, the ‗victor‘s peace‘, which 
necessarily involves some form of militarisation and securitisation. In Sierra Leone 
this came in the form of the UNAMSIL (although initially unsuccessful in securing 
the country), and also military interventions by the Nigerian led ECOMOG and the 
British Armed Forces, along with attempts by various mercenary groups such as 
Executive Outcomes to defeat the rebels. Security sector reform (SSR) was 
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successful and involved  a major undertaking to retrain and re-equip the Sierra Leone 
Armed Forces (SLAF) by the British Ministry of Defence in collaboration with 
IMATT (Ginifer, 2004). The second component, the ‗institutional peace‘, involves 
international governance and conditions on lending and guarantees etc. Embedding 
Sierra Leone into the international system of global governance included 
commitments by the government of Sierra Leone (GovSL) to uphold and respect 
international law, for example, and to this end the government made guarantees to 
respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples‘ Rights by passing relevant laws such as The Child Rights Act 
(2007) (GovSL, 1999: Article xxiv). The third component of the ‗liberal peace‘ is the 
‗constitutional peace‘ witnessed by the democratisation and trade liberalisation 
which took place in the country. Finally, the ‗civil peace‘ - this promotes and 
guarantees individual freedoms and rights. The ‗civil peace‘ is central to the 
peacebuilding project because the paradigm claimed that there could be no ‗liberal 
peace‘ unless there was a strong civil society which participated in the process 
(Lederach, 1996, Lederach, 1997, Richmond, 2008: 105). Support to civil society 
and its inclusion in ‗consensus‘ building was an important part of the post-conflict 
endeavour in Sierra Leone (GovSL, 1999, GovSL, 2001, IMF/IDA, 2006).   
The above sketch is evidence that the peacebuilding plan in Sierra Leone 
included all four components of the ‗third generation‘ approach yet conceptualisation 
of the ‗liberal peace‘ carries several basic assumptions; that peace, democracy and 
free markets are a viable combination, and that this combination is unproblematic 
and acceptable to those working and living in post-conflict Sierra Leone, citizens 
who lived through the war and understood its antecedents (see Richmond, 2006, 
Mandelbaum, 2002, Duffield, 2001, Cox, 1981); that the characteristics of ‗like-
minded‘ liberal states and norms of the international community can be mirrored and 
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absorbed by fragile states just emerging from war, or merged with political cultures 
born of specific local traditions and their history. The epistemic community appears 
to be empowered by the belief that it knows the precise processes and goals of peace 
which are relevant in the locale (Mac Ginty, 2008:34, Richmond, 2008:108).  
0.7 - CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 
The international community is conceptualised as a ‗body of actors with sufficient 
consensus and will to be able to bring about peace‘; the interaction and 
interdependence of a multitude of organisations‘ activities, and their shared norms 
and values (Zaum, 2007:9, Richmond, 2005:14). The concept has its critics, 
however, who argue it is imaginary or even fictitious (Ignatieff, 2003:2, Pouligny, 
2006:155-156, 161). In this work, the conceptualisation of the term is drawn from 
Ismail‘s idea of a ‗post-war reconstruction complex‘ (Ismail, 2008) and is defined as 
the body of external actors, with shared norms and values, who have influenced the 
liberalising trajectory of post-conflict Sierra Leone‘; diplomats, policy makers, 
governments, academics, practitioners, negotiators, NGOs, INGOs and the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs). This work therefore supports the view that 
an international community does exist, conceptualised by the interconnected 
presence of like-minded and influential internationals (Richmond, 2005:115). 
Interventionist politics are defined in this work as the conditionalities 
imposed or promoted by external actors for assisting post-conflict recovery and the 
politics involved in brokering peace. The term is helpful because it identifies external 
policy making as opposed to local policy making which is relevant here because such 
actions have the potential to constrain national government‘s responses to local 
citizenry and ‗crowd out‘ the popular voice (Richmond, 2005, Duffield, 2001, 
Chandler, 2006, Pugh et al., 2008b). The concept is most useful for developing the 
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argument about democratisation and the constraints of interventions which 
essentially present an exercise in contradiction (Ignatieff, 2003:113, Chandler, 
2006:69), and it also aids analysis of the political economy of peacebuilding. 
Peacebuilding - as distinct from peacemaking and peacekeeping - is about 
long term security and development. The analysis in this work draws from 
definitions by Galtung and Lederach which emphasise the need to address the root 
causes of war such as cultural or structural violence (Galtung, 1975, Lederach, 
1997). Peacebuilding is therefore conceptualised here as the activities involved in 
securing a positive peace, including efforts to build durable peaceful relationships 
among communities in troubled societies (UN, 2000, Annan, 2000). As noted earlier, 
the concept of peacebuilding is deeply problematic and contested (Chetail, 2009); in 
this work it is not to be confused with local efforts of reconciliation and trust 
building an investigation of which is beyond the scope of this enquiry. 
Statebuilding – these are the technical activities involved in reconstruction 
after war with the purpose of rebuilding or reforming institutions of governance to 
maintain physical and economic security, and legitimise the global system of states 
(Chandler, 2006:1). The concept is relevant because state-centric reform can be in 
tension with the provision of security for citizens, such as welfare provision, which 
has implications for peace (Schwarz, 2005: 22, Fukuyama, 2004). 
Nation building is defined here as the continuous process necessary to 
prevent the re-emergence of old political tensions which could threaten the unity of 
the state and lead to renewed conflict; it is ‗the product of social, cultural, historical 
and political factors which coalesce around local identities‘ (Newman, 2009:30), and 
the concept is utilised to describe community building in this work (Etzioni, 2004). 
This is because, in Sierra Leone, it is important for peacebuilding to assimilate and 
mobilise previously marginalised groups into the political process, to find a way for 
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previously hostile groups to get along and to create solidarity. The concept of nation 
building is central to peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, but the notion that this can be 
achieved by external actors is highly contested (Newman: ibid).   
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CHAPTER ONE 
HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 
In order to put the peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction into context and to 
compare the characteristics of the modern state in Sierra Leone with those of the pre-
war state, a detailed account is given here of the political history of the country; the 
ethno-regional dynamics; the nature of colonial rule and its influence on the nation 
building project; the independence era and the ‗hijacking‘ of the nation; the gradual 
atrophy of the state and decent into war. 
1.1 - COLONIAL ERA:  MEDIATED HEGEMONY  
The Commission finds that the seeds of discontent of the late 1980s and early 
1990s can be traced to the colonial strategies of divide and rule and the 
subversion of traditional systems by the colonial power and successive 
governments.  (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 2, Primary Findings, 19) 
Sierra Leone was made up of 17 ethnic groups but the Temne in the north and Mende 
from the south and east were the most dominant groups. They made up around 60% 
of the population and exercised some influence over smaller ethnic groups, yet the 
minority northern Limba, around 8% of the population, were influential among the 
governing elite. Three of the four presidents of Sierra Leone were ethnic Limba: 
Siakka Stevens (1971-1985), Joseph Momoh (1985-1992) and the current president 
Ernest Bai Koroma elected in 2007. During the colonial period, however, the 
minority Creole of Freetown were the most dominant among all ethnic groups 
(Kandeh, 1992a, Alie, 2006). Although the ethnic mix was complex, there were no 
serious issues among them during the early years. 
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Figure 1 – Ethnic map of Sierra Leone c.1969 
 
 
Image sourced from NationMaster.com 
In 1787 the British established the capital, Freetown, as a settlement for freed slaves 
who became known as the Creoles, but it wasn‘t until a century later, in 1896, that 
the wider hinterland became a British protectorate (Fig.1) (Porter, 1963). Subsequent 
tensions emerged between the Creoles of the colony, who were British subjects, and 
the indigenes of the protectorate whose boundaries enclosed a number of different 
ethnic groups and tribal affiliations, including the large majority in Mendeland (Kup, 
1975). Mendeland, in the south and east, provided lucrative mineral and agricultural 
resources for British colonists, including high grade cocoa, coffee, and diamonds, 
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and this region was therefore prioritised for development (Lewis, 1954: 207). The 
Mende people enjoyed strong influence in the rest of the protectorate. This was 
evidenced by the common use of their language throughout the country and across 
the border into Liberia to the south east. Their religion was mainly traditional and 
expressed through animalist or pagan practices. The Islamisation of the north during 
the eighteenth century therefore gave the Temne people a distinct identity of their 
own (Fyfe, 1964). The Temne were known for their warrior histories and their 
centuries old trade connections via routes across their northern provinces to 
Timbuktu in Mali. Of all the peoples which populated the area which came to be 
known as Sierra Leone, the Temne were the most resistant to colonial rule (Kup, 
1975: 41, Little, 1967: 27). Generally, the Temne and Mende peoples lived 
peacefully together and benefitted mutually from trading activities between their 
populations. It wasn‘t until the transition to independence that tensions emerged 
between these two dominant protectorate groups. 
Creole was a constructed identity made up of a fusion of new ‗settlers‘ and 
‗liberated Africans‘ who were generally confined geographically to the Freetown 
peninsular. The first settlers, in 1787, were made up of a small group of white male 
colonists, a group of unmarried white women commonly understood to be 
prostitutes, and a larger group of black Africans who had previously worked as 
slaves in America and elsewhere, and who were living in London. Added to this first 
group of settlers were the blacks who had been formerly rehabilitated to Nova Scotia, 
loyal to Britain in the American war of independence and around 1000 in number, 
who arrived in Freetown in 1792. A third group, the Maroons, were ex slaves from 
Jamaica, arriving in 1800. Together these three groups made up the settler 
community.  ‗Liberated Africans‘ arrived in Freetown after the abolition of slavery 
(1807) and were ‗rescued‘ from the middle passage of the Atlantic Slave Trade 
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during the first half of the 19
th
 century (Falconbridge, 1794, Porter, 1963: 35). 
Indigenes also occupied this space, as did ‗tribal immigrants‘ from the interior, but 
they were mostly ignored and excluded by the settler community and lived in 
separate settlements where assimilation was not encouraged (Kandeh, 1992). This 
segregation and identification of ‗tribal‘ groups during urbanisation over time 
became a stimulus for the future ethno-politicisation of Sierra Leone society when 
different interests became more apparent as people lived in close proximity. For 
example, in 1891 Creoles made up 58% of the Freetown population but by 1947 that 
proportion had reduced to 27% (Jusu-Sheriff, 2000).  
In nineteenth century Freetown the Creoles represented an elite, educated 
group who were appointed to high ranking positions in the colonial administration 
and who developed their own language known as Krio. Their Western education, 
knowledge of the English language and allegiance to Christianity were significant 
factors for colonial favours but the Creoles also became independently powerful in 
their own right through a variety of successful trading activities and substantial 
landholdings (Porter, 1963). Any ambitions of Creole self-rule were thwarted during 
the twentieth century, however, when immigrant competitors – Europeans and 
Syrians – took over their trade and ruined them economically (Fyfe, 1964:295).   
In the colonial era tensions mainly centred on the colony/protectorate fault 
line, between the Creole of Freetown and the combined indigenous African elite 
whose interests were served through a separate administration system in the 
hinterland. Creoles were subject to direct rule and the ‗non-native‘ British based 
judicial system, whereas the ‗natives‘ of the protectorate were ruled by indirect 
‗mediated hegemony‘ and subject to traditional judicial practices (Kandeh, 1992, 
Kup, 1975). (Mediated hegemony involved the cooption of protectorate elite, through 
bribes and other favours, in exchange for control of their populations.) These two 
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separate legal systems were to persist into the post-conflict era making reform of the 
judicial sector rather problematic (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 1:11).  
The declaration of the Sierra Leone protectorate in 1896 aimed to unite the 
country politically, but cultural and ethnic divisions remained strong (Porter, 
1963:61). There were two issues; the continued practice of allocating prestigious 
administrative positions to Creoles in the protectorate and a parallel system of 
administration where chiefs and headmen were used by the British to control their 
populations through a system of indirect rule, but with no protectorate representation 
at the centre. As Porter noted, ‗Creoles were in… demand as clerks and as artisans 
and generally in a variety of positions of minor responsibility for which uneducated 
‗natives‘ were unsuitable‘ and by the 1920s considerable polarities were evident 
between the Freetown Creoles and the tribal Africans of the interior whose social 
value was judged to be inferior (Porter, 1963:14, 52). This was politicisation of 
ethnicity by the British but, at the same time, traditional leaders from all ethnic and 
regional backgrounds were also privileged. This introduced a class dimension to the 
ethno-political dynamic (Kandeh, 1992b). By 1924 protectorate elite – three 
paramount chiefs - were appointed to central colonial institutions in Freetown giving 
the peoples of the protectorate central representation for the first time, but Creole 
domination remained strong. The privileged status of the Creoles as an ethnic group 
was only seriously challenged by indigenes after 1945 when industry brought 
increased development to the hinterland and a greater sense of entitlement to the 
locals. British education in the protectorate also had a growing impact on the ‗social 
value‘ of the tribal population who emerged to challenge the superiority of the 
Creoles at the same time their (Creole) trading endeavours were beginning to 
diminish, and the Constitution of 1951 gave protectorate elites new opportunities to 
challenge the power structures of the past (Porter, 1963:64).  
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After independence the fault line between protectorate and colony altered 
dramatically as indigene elites jostled among themselves for political power and its 
associated privileges, and the Temne/Mende rivalry emerged as the most salient 
ethnic dynamic (Kandeh, 1992a:81). This was because the British colonial 
administration had played a major role in the ethnicisation of politics in Sierra Leone 
first through their polarised administration structure, pitting Creole against indigenes, 
and then through their uneven development of the country, provoking tensions 
between north and south.
2
 A strong sense of ethnic consciousness was produced by 
the colonists but this focus on ‗tribalism‘ was a reconstruction of the social reality 
which crystallised more around class formation than tribal affinity (see Mafeje, 1971: 
253-261). The use of local elites meant that ethno-politics provided a platform for 
class formation, which was hitherto unknown, and which emerged at the top levels of 
elite professionals and bypassed the masses (Kandeh, 1992b, Saul, 1979). To serve 
their hegemonic ambitions, the British strengthened what they believed to be ‗tribal‘ 
patriotism through their education policies which claimed to promote the 
preservation of local customs, language and cultures (Keen, 2005: 15, Kandeh, 
1992a, Fyfe, 1964: 304). Indeed, so well did the British protect indigenous tribes‘ 
cultural and traditional norms with their ‗no interference policy‘, that it wasn‘t until 
1927 that traditional slave practices in the protectorate were outlawed (Banton, 1957: 
cited by Kandeh, 1992a: 85). The provision of education, however, was not even, 
and this was to be influential in the emergence of the Mende as the more prestigious 
class at independence. Due to strong opposition to colonial rule in the north and the 
presence of Islam, Christian missionary schools were concentrated mostly in the 
south; by 1938, 80% of all schools in the protectorate were in Mendeland (Kilson, 
                                                 
2
 See Young (1994:232, 236) for an account of the colonial state‘s ‗compulsion to classify‘- not 
necessarily the same classifications as the indigenes themselves who acquired an ‗array of ethnic 
fault lines far more pronounced that those in the pre-colonial world‘ sometimes subsequently 
restructuring established ethnic groupings for their own purposes. 
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1966: cited by Kandeh, 1992a: 86). Although the intention of the British was to 
educate future chiefs for the protectorate, not to build a homogenous group of 
educated elite or make a new society of Creoles, Creoles themselves found the 
emerging educated elite indigene a new threat that challenged their comparative 
advantage - ‗cultural capital‘ (Fyfe, 1964:304). Within the education system itself, 
where Temne and Mende pupils attended the same school, children were segregated 
and taught by Temne and Mende teachers, and sporting events were divided along 
ethnic lines. This had the effect of creating enmity and friction and the consolidation 
of ethnic identity among different groups of young people (Kandeh, 1992a: 86). 
Special care will be taken to strengthen the tribal patriotism natural to the 
pupils. Mendi pupils will be taught in such a manner as to make them prefer 
Mendi land to any other country, so with the Temne and all the various other 
tribes represented in the school.
3
 
Although ethnicity played an unsubstantial role in the war insofar as rebel 
demographics were concerned, tensions among the three main regional groups were 
to influence the nation building project after independence and the multi-party 
systems which emerged after war.   
The economic development of Sierra Leone was based on the extraction of 
unprocessed raw materials - such as diamonds and iron ore - which were channelled 
for export through trade and administration areas in the larger towns and the capital.  
Consequently, rural economies in the protectorate were neglected and this created a 
skewed topography of development which was biased towards the urban centres, 
particularly Freetown. Because of the concentration of natural resources in the south, 
road and rail infrastructure serviced Mendeland and, again, northern areas were 
neglected (Keen, 2005, Kandeh, 1992a, Richards, 1996, Cartwright, 1978, Lewis, 
                                                 
3
 Extract from Bo School Prospectus (para.8), C.O.271/11 Sierra Leone Royal Gazette, 29
th
 
September 1905 (drawn up by James Proudfoot) and reproduced in Fyfe (1964:306) 
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1954). The railway, built by the British in the 1890s but problematic because of its 
narrow gauge design, linked Freetown to main towns in the country‘s areas of cash 
crop production: Moyamba, Bo, Kenema and Pendembu with only a small spur to the 
town of Makeni in the north (Kup, 1975: 188, Gberie, 2005: 33). This uneven 
development increased the sense of relative deprivation among northerners and was 
to encourage the politicisation of ethnicity around access to services. This dramatic 
urban/rural divide and sense of marginalisation deepened throughout the 
independence period and, in the post-conflict settlement, the issue of rural 
development was prioritised to address not only historic deprivation in the 
countryside but the intensified atrophy of the countryside due to the destructive 
nature of the war. 
The colonial relationship with traditional chiefs was to have a major impact on 
the nature of ‗democracy‘ as it emerged after independence. As noted, mediated 
hegemony involved co-option of the protectorate elite by the British to control the 
potentially unruly hinterland population (Kandeh, 1992a, Fyfe, 1964). The British 
system of indirect rule through their ‗intermediaries of hegemony‘ meant that 
chieftaincy became a direct route to acquisition for rural elites, a practice which was 
to persist into the post-war era causing serious concerns around decentralisation of 
state power (Lewis, 1954: 68, Bangura, 1997, Chazan, 1999: 87, Fanthorpe, 2005, 
Jackson, 2005). The Native Administration System (1937) allowed for generous 
salaries to be paid to Paramount Chiefs (Keen, 2005:10); they were also entitled to 
take a percentage of taxes or fines collected from their communities and were given 
licence to solve local disputes. Such wealth, an addition to the traditional advantages 
of chieftaincy such as status, power and influence, provided new opportunities to 
develop patronage systems among elites and their subordinates. Development 
programmes, such as they were, provided additional sources of patronage and chiefs 
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captured these initiatives to fend off any potential challenges to their authority (ibid). 
This abuse of chieftaincy power bred resentment and discontent among community 
members, especially the youth, a structural dynamic which was to influence the 
successful recruitment of rebels during the war (Fanthorpe, 2001, Abdullah, 1998). 
Not all chiefs were co-opted in this way. Tamba Mbriwa, a progressive chief and the 
founder of the rebellious Kono Progressive Movement (KPM) in the 1950s which 
demanded fair benefits for the community from diamond mining in the region, 
succinctly explained the relationship between paramount chiefs and the British: 
It was a happy lot for Paramount Chiefs. Everyone obeyed. A man couldn‘t say 
things or reason. The chief had the full backing of the government. This was 
colonist tactics. People couldn‘t report Paramount Chiefs. They had all these 
powers.
4
 
Social mobility became dominated by access to the state and state resources, 
and exploitation and corruption became not only the norm, but a moral obligation for 
many elites who were locked into the system of lineage kinship. This practice 
persisted throughout the war years and into the post-war era. For example, in the 
1996 elections, the incumbent Sierra Leone Peoples‘ Party (SLPP) depended on 
traditional leaders to secure their victory at the polls (Zack-Williams, 1999: 151, 
Jackson, 2007, ICG, 2007). As well as manipulating the chieftaincy system as a tool 
for control, the British also exercised their power through the security services, 
practices which were to be reinforced during the independence era and which 
prompted a concerted effort post-conflict for widespread and penetrating reform of 
the armed forces (Gberie, 2005: 41, Sesay, 1993: cited by Keen, 2005: 9, Ibrahim, 
2003). 
                                                 
4
 Chief Tamba Mbriwa quoted by Fred Hayward in his article on the formation of the KPM in 
Lewis (1954)  
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1.2 - INDEPENDENCE – BUILDING A NATION 
At independence new fractures emerged between the former protectorate elites when 
northern Temnes became concerned over their lack of representation within the main 
political party, the SLPP, led by Dr Milton Margai. The SLPP was founded in 1951 
by the ethnically diverse, educated protectorate to thwart attempts by Creoles to 
exclude them from the political process, and it was successful in forcing the colonial 
authorities to grant the protectorate majority rule under the 1951 Constitution
 
(Gberie, 2005, Sesay and Hughes, 2005). This gave unprecedented opportunities for 
indigenes to bid for power in the newly forming state against the previously favoured 
and more powerful Creoles of Freetown who had upset the British with ideas about 
federal rule and strong criticisms as to the democratic credentials of protectorate 
representation through self-appointed paramount chiefs on the legislative council 
(Lewis, 1954:229, Alie, 2006, Fyfe, 1964:328). Creoles were fearful of majority rule 
by the protectorate and were outraged that, with 96% illiteracy, indigenes were to 
have more representatives at the centre than the colony (Fyfe, 1964:328). The 
Freetown based Creole party was known as the National Council of Sierra Leone 
(NCSL) and the following extract from its petition reflects the views of Creoles at 
the time: 
The right of a Protectorate Chief or persons to become members of the 
Legislative council of British subjects in Sierra Leone has always been 
questioned and repudiated by the [National] Council on the following grounds: 
(a) that the Protectorate of Sierra Leone is a foreign country outside the 
territorial dominions of the Crown ... 
 51 
 
(b) that a Protectorate Chief or person is an entire foreigner ...  
5
 
The National Council did not succeed in its protestations, however, and 
Creoles were absorbed into other political parties after independence. The distinction 
between the educated Creoles of Freetown and the rest of the populace diminished 
somewhat after independence but it remained an important dynamic when it came to 
a sense of ‗shared nationhood‘ (Keen, 2005:14).  
Nature of post-independence politics 
In the absence of any serious threat from the Creoles, Siaka Stevens‘ APC emerged 
at independence to challenge Mende dominance in the SLPP (Kup, 1975:209). The 
APC claimed to represent the interests of the marginalised Temne northerners, as 
well as being the party of the ‗common man‘ against traditional chiefs, and all those 
disaffected by the elite SLPP including some Creoles (ibid:211). The hierarchy of the 
APC consisted mainly of the smaller but very influential northern group, the Limba. 
Events on Independence Day (27
th
 April 1961) were indicative of the intense struggle 
for political power which was starting to emerge between the two main parties. 
Protesting against the birth of the new nation before democratic elections could take 
place and with the SLPP at the helm, the APC launched a ‗campaign of sabotage‘ by 
organising a general strike. The party went on to present a strong challenge to SLPP 
dominance at the first post-independence elections, in 1962, and the era of 
‗multiparty politics‘ was born. At the time party politics was narrow; it was 
regionally based and ‗with little or no national agenda‘ (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 
1:11).
6
  
                                                 
5
 Extract from the National Council Petition to King George VI, September 1950, Colonial 
Office Library and reproduced from Fyfe (1964:327/8) 
6
 See also archive BBC reportage, 27
th
 April 1961, ‗Sierra Leone wins independence‘, sourced at 
BBC Online ‗On this day‘ 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/27/newsid_2502000/2502411.stm, accessed 
on 27/05/09  
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There was some justification for APC concerns. The victorious SLPP, 
claiming to represent all Sierra Leoneans – whose motto was ‗one country, one 
people‘ - downgraded Temne appointments in favour of Creoles and as the political 
fracture widened, old allies were soon designated as new adversaries (Kandeh, 
1992:90, Fyfe, 1964:329). Temnes were purged from all but three ministerial posts, 
and the armed forces became ethnically Mendesized.
7
 Table 1 (below) shows how 
entho-politics worked in Sierra Leone in the post-independence era. In the 1960s 
under the SLPP government, Mende ministers had the majority of posts. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, not only did the APC appoint a much larger majority of Temnes to 
ministerial positions but the size of the cabinet was doubled to accommodate them. 
Notably, Limba ministers featured in the APC regime but not that of the SLPP. This 
ethnicisation of the political sphere also extended to the broader bureaucracy and the 
security services (Kandeh, 1992). 
Table 1 – Ethnic composition of Sierra Leone cabinets  
 
Ethnic composition of Sierra Leone cabinets 
Ethnic group 1962 1964 1973 1988 
Mende 7 6 3 5 
Temne 4 2 10 12 
Limba 0 0 2 4 
Creole 5 4 5 3 
Others 2 2 4 3 
Total 18 14 24 27 
Reproduced from Kandeh (1992:93) 
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It is precisely the constant reordering of state-society relations along ethno-
clientelist lines ... that has been the bane of Sierra Leone politics since 
independence (Kandeh, 1992a:93) 
After a marginal victory in 1967, the APC eventually took control of the country but 
it was to take two military coups to extract Albert Margai from state house (Sesay 
and Hughes, 2005). The roots of the emerging patrimonial state were secured 
through existing structures of indirect rule left over from the colonial administration 
(Richards, 1996). Over the next twenty five years the APC had an unbroken era of 
government which evolved a de facto single party system through co-option of many 
of the opposition (Forna, 2002). In the House of Representatives, the practice of 
‗crossing‘ (moving allegiance from APC to SLPP, and vice-versa in the Stevens era) 
enabled certain members to advance to status of Paramount Chief – this would have 
been very unlikely for members opposed to the government of the day (Kup, 
1975:214). Multi-party politics therefore became more aligned to class politics; the 
political elite forming a united front at the centre to personalise the benefits of the 
state to the detriment of the rest of the population. 
In the countryside, traditional rule continued because no other form of local 
government had been successfully established. Extending APC rule through grass 
roots organisations into the rural areas was stymied by lack of infrastructure and 
communications systems which rendered most villages fully dependent upon local 
traditional politics. Paramount chieftaincy elections were held on a spasmodic basis 
when vacancies became available through the death or removal from office of the 
incumbent chiefs, but the franchise was narrow and limited to mostly male members 
of recognised ruling houses (Kup, 1975:221). This marginalisation meant greater 
opportunities for chiefs, loyal to patrimonial networks, to manipulate their subjects 
(Bangura, 2000). Thus, it was essential for the APC to co-opt chiefs as part of their 
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political apparatus in the same way the British exercised control (Kup, ibid). This 
was somewhat ironic considering the historic resistance of northerners to colonial 
rule and to the chieftaincy system itself which had been so strongly represented 
through the opposition SLPP, but it illustrates well the fluidity of politics in the post-
independence era. 
There was no clear picture of the role of ethnicity in the Sierra Leone conflict, 
but evidence suggests that it was minimal. The rebel forces, the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF), aimed to overthrow the APC government but the party 
affiliation of RUF combatants included both APC and SLPP with more support from 
APC affiliates. Foday Sankoh, leader of the fight against the APC government, was a 
northern Temne. Further, the war continued despite a change of government and 
despite the overall ethnic make-up of the RUF being 50-60% southern Mende. There 
was noticeably hardly any representation of the Creole within the warring factions 
(Alie, 2006). 
An important point about ethno-politics at state formation was that it served as 
a vehicle for the consolidation of upper strata class formation within Sierra Leone 
society (Kandeh, 1992b). Although there was no real sense of class consciousness in 
Sierra Leone, the British had created structures where modern and traditional elites 
(Creoles and protectorate chiefs) occupied ‗upper strata‘ positions and the rest of 
society unconsciously occupied the lower stratus (see for example Young, 1994: 229, 
Kandeh, 1992b, Sklar, 1979, Saul, 1979). The frustration of the relatively 
impoverished northern elite compared to the educated and professional southerners 
who dominated the SLPP and had become so influential, led to the emergence of the 
APC at independence. The bourgeois elements in the north of the country used the 
newly formed APC as an instrument to transform themselves into distinct elite - 
determined not to be sidelined in the transition to statehood – and determined to 
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benefit from the privileges state power could provide. At the same time, the APC 
claimed to represent the ‗masses as opposed to the privileged few‘ and campaigned 
on a populist ticket to challenge the conservatism of the SLPP (Saul, 1979:405, cited 
by Kandeh, 1992a: 82).
8
 This claim was to prove as shallow as the SLPP‘s ‗one 
country, one party‘ because cultural politics was only successful in shaping and 
mobilising ethnicity to serve elite interests, not those of the masses (Saul, 1979, 
Sklar, 1979, Kandeh, 1992a:83, Alie, 2006:19, 20).  
Herein lay the roots of the problems which were to characterise multiparty 
politics in Sierra Leone. Politicians mobilised the public by manipulating their ethnic 
consciousness, not class consciousness; but the reality was to create a strong sense of 
class consciousness solely at the upper strata, where elites jostled to compete for the 
dividends of state control.   
Multiparty politics became a distorted interpretation of the unified state. In the 
outcome, multi-partysm in Sierra Leone represented neither class nor ethnic politics. 
Ethnicity was relevant but not particularly divisive; the most serious fracture would 
emerge between the politicians and their electorate. This was not the only cleavage. 
Tensions also emerged between unpaid professional people up country and their 
government, a rural/urban divide where the state itself had little relevance to the 
majority of the population living outside the main metropolis. People living in 
Kailahun near the border with Liberia, for example, lived ‗beyond the state‘ and 
associated themselves more with Monrovia than Freetown because of the difficult 
bush track journey to their own capital and the easier taxi ride into Monrovia (Alie, 
2006:20, Gberie, 2005:34, Richards, 1996:43). In short, the nation building project 
produced a multiplicity of discontent with serious potential to challenge the state. 
                                                 
8
 Quote taken from Ibrahim Tagi writing in We Yone (1966) and reproduced by Kandeh (1992) 
 56 
 
Nature of the state 
Richards described the character of the ‗emerging democracy‘ in Sierra Leone as 
façade politics – a polity which showed good credentials at independence but which 
deteriorated rapidly (Richards, 1996). The nation building project seemed to have 
disappeared, crushed by the predatory tactics of a small, dominant, self-interested 
elite who subjected all the institutions of the state to strict party control (TRC, 2004: 
Vol.2, Chapter 1:11). The centralised APC government, first under Stevens and then 
under Momoh, ‗sustained itself through corruption, nepotism and the plundering of 
state assets‘ to the exclusion of the majority of its citizens and the leadership of the 
APC was condemned by the TRC for the country‘s decent into war (TRC, 2004: 
Executive Summary, para 14). The Stevens‘ administration marked the beginning of 
continuous systematic political violence which accelerated the downward trend of 
electoral quality but secured his position as national patriarch (Keen, 2005:16, Zack-
Williams, 1999:144). The ‗staggeringly corrupt patrimonial system‘ was exclusive of 
anyone outside Steven‘s personal network including the workerist associations his 
APC party had claimed to represent (Adebajo, 2002, Keen, 2005: 16, Richards, 1996: 
40). Strong resistance to Stevens‘ regime from opposition parties, the press or civic 
groups resulted in their intimidation or co-option. Unions, agricultural cooperatives, 
businesses, professional organisations, and the judiciary were all brought into the 
patrimonial system, and the subsequent foreign migration of many radicals eased the 
pressure on government and paved the way for the dearth of human capacity after the 
war (Adebajo, 2002, Bangura, 2004). This politicisation of the bureaucracy was to be 
a challenge for peacebuilding. In 2007, there was still evidence that the politicisation 
of workers unions was being practiced and a report on the flagship Anti-Corruption 
Commission concluded that the judiciary was still serving the interests of the 
governing elite (DfID, 2007). 
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1.3 - ATROPHY OF THE STATE 
Although the TRC-R condemned the APC leadership for the atrophy of the state and 
the war which eventually led to state collapse, the role of external forces and actors 
was also acknowledged (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 1, Executive Summary: 7). 
Global conditions were also a factor as price fluctuations on the international markets 
meant a steep decline for the mineral economy in the late 1970s when mining 
activities were halted and overseas investors withdrew. For example, Marampa iron 
ore mines in 1975 and Yengema diamond mines in 1982 (Richards, 1996). This was 
disastrous because the extractive industries were the engine of the formal economy; 
in particular, mineral resources dominated trade and were the main source of foreign 
exchange. Concentration on mineral extraction was at the cost of a properly 
developed agricultural sector or light industries, and the country‘s dependency on 
primary commodity exports made it very vulnerable to external shocks or 
fluctuations on the market. This dependency may have made the country more 
vulnerable to an increased risk of conflict (Collier, 2007: 21). Falling prices of other 
exports such as iron ore, coffee and cocoa and the oil crisis of 1973 meant a serious 
emergency for the patrimonial state in respect of revenue generation, and this 
provoked the discounted sale of some of the country‘s highly prized foreign assets so 
that loyal supporters could continue to be rewarded through the usual patronage 
systems (Bangura, 2004).
9
 The main source of wealth generation became the illicit 
mining of alluvial diamonds which involved pre-industrial methods of mining by 
hand, informal licensing arrangements and clandestine deals which prioritised 
foreign traders over locals. This meant the privatisation of the Sierra Leone state as 
                                                 
9
 See report from the African Development Bank Group ‗Combating Corruption in Africa‘ 
January 2003 from www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/queries/queryattach/q44Addisreport.pdf, 
accessed on 06/03/08 
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national revenues were absorbed into informal networks which enhanced personal 
enrichment (Reno, 1998). As the mining industry was criminalised, locals were 
actively discriminated against on the issue of mining licences in favour of Lebanese 
traders. This meant that opportunities to sustain already meagre livelihoods for locals 
diminished considerably (ibid). The APC management of the national economy was 
to be a travesty for the security of the country and its citizens. 
Economy 
What became known as the shadow state economy was indeed the consequence of a 
broader global economic malaise and poor practice on the domestic front, but the 
rapaciousness of the political class and its (mostly) Lebanese clientele in the 
systematic pillage of the country‘s diamond wealth was to bring catastrophic 
consequences for the national economy (Adebajo, 2002: 81). The shadow economy 
was facilitated through a network of transactions outside the country‘s formal legal 
frameworks which processed the looting of the country‘s natural resources by 
powerful politicians and business elite. Those networks were still in place and 
operational well into the post-war era.   
Figure 2 (below) shows how official exports of diamonds dropped 
dramatically during the mid 1970s and remained low for a decade. The peak around 
1985/86 was due to attempts by the new President Joseph Momoh to get state 
resources under state control in response to pressure from the IFIs and local 
residents. 
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Figure 2 - Sierra Leone diamond exports 1975-1987 
 
 
Data sourced from the Sierra Leone Ministry of Mineral Resources http://www.mmr-sl.org/ 
 
Because political leaders had an interest in the clandestine diamond trade they 
expropriated civil servants to their shadow networks through systems of bribes and 
rewards (Keen, 2005:21). Membership in patron networks had a serious impact on 
the legitimate functioning of the state, the health of the national treasury, and the 
capacity and will of the government to deliver public goods, and public services 
diminished considerably during this period. Alliances with politicians meant that 
multinational corporations with an interest in mining activities, for example Sierra 
Rutile and SIEROMCO, avoided taxes by massaging the figures on the quantity and 
quality of exports (Keen: ibid). The APC government, complicit in these 
arrangements, thus denied the local populace its legitimate right to profit from the 
extraction of national resources and the Lomé Accord committed future governments 
to rectify this malaise.   
By the mid 1980s, around the time Stevens appointed his successor Joseph 
Momoh (1985-1992), domestic revenue collection had plunged to 18% of the levels 
in 1977/78 (Reno, 1995: 131, cited in Keen, 2005: 23), and the national economy had 
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reached crisis point. This was the era of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) which 
increased the pressure on an already weak state to reform and expose its fragile 
economy and diminished markets. With the onset of harsher economic conditions, 
most jobs were to be found in the informal sector or the bureaucracy – both areas 
targeted by SAPs - and many jobs disappeared, swelling the numbers of unemployed 
and disenfranchising a large section of the community. For example, the World Bank 
insisted on the privatisation of customs and fisheries to improve royalty collections; 
instead of reform of the bureaucracy, ‗trimming‘ was recommended. Further, to 
attract foreign investors and please the IFIs, President Momoh attempted to formalise 
the economy through initiatives such as ‗Operation Clean Sweep‘ in the mining 
sector which put 25,000 unskilled workers out of work (Hayward, 1972). The arrival 
of SAPs brought opportunities for wide ranging economic reform; conditionalities 
from the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) meant the 
reduction of state activity and the privatisation of state-run trading operations but 
these initiatives, which had potential for increased revenue collection, were 
‗hijacked‘ by Lebanese businessmen and political elites who were keen to replenish 
their meagre stockpiles. Many parastatals were sold off to ‗undesirable‘ 
entrepreneurs (Reno, 1995). Despite pressure for economic reform from the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), President Momoh‘s predicament was that 
he did not have control of government institutions in order to reform them (Richards, 
1996: 41). As the chosen successor of Stevens, his mandate was to cooperate with 
the outgoing administration in order to avoid any coups, and so the proceeds of the 
country‘s mineral wealth continued to be  personally delivered by Stevens to his 
allies long after succession by Momoh to the detriment of the country‘s development 
and the development of its people (Reno, 1998). The situation went from bad to 
worse; between 1980 and 1987 state spending on health and education declined by 
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60% with large disparities between the rural areas compared to those in the Freetown 
peninsula. People in the Mende south were especially neglected because of their 
problems with the Temne leadership (Reno, 1998: cited in Adebajo, 2002:81). 
Instability and insecurity in rural areas had a major impact on the economy when 
large amounts of FDI were withdrawn. In 1994, for example, Sierra Rutile and 
Sieromco withdrew their operations from the country taking with them 15% of GNP 
(Reno, 1998:126).  
People 
What this account illustrates is the nature of bad leadership in Sierra Leone, cited by 
so many observers as a key factor in the eventual outbreak of war because of its 
consequences for local people, local conditions, national security, and building a 
common sense of national consciousness and belonging (TRC, 2004). The APC 
government continued the trend established by the SLPP, hijacking the nation 
building project in the quest to capture the state and its lucrative resources for 
themselves. The practice of ethno-politics, however, would still necessitate tangible 
benefits penetrating to grass roots constituents as well as across the broad spectrum 
of elites yet the post-independence political economy created ‗pronounced and 
obscene elite-peasant disparities‘ as the masses sunk deeper into poverty, suffering 
terribly from the economic decline whilst their elite plundered the country‘s wealth 
(Riddell, 2005, Gberie, 2005: 32). The urban bias for development reflected the 
politicians‘ concerns that the close proximity of the population in Freetown could 
present a physical challenge to their authority, and they ignored the threat from the 
countryside (Riddell, 2005, Herbst, 1996:130). The phasing out of the strategic 
railway link across the southern and eastern regions in the early 1970s was to have a 
marked effect on the economic and social activities of many rural communities there 
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(Riddell, 2005, Zack-Williams, 1999, Gberie, 2005:34). A National Health Survey 
published in 1978 showed that infant mortality in Freetown was 20% compared to 
33.3% for the rest of the country and the proportion of chronically undernourished 
children in Freetown was 10.3% compared to 26.6% of children elsewhere. The 
proportion of children who were ‗significantly underweight‘ in Freetown was 
estimated at 18.3%, compared to 32.4% across the rest of the country and the 
incidence of malarial parasites in the blood was vastly skewed towards the rural areas 
– 36.3% compared to 4% in Freetown.10 Figure 3 (below) indicates that the 
Freetown/province divide was still acute in the post-conflict era despite promises in 
the peace settlement for the redirection of resources to neglected rural areas (GovSL, 
1999: Article VII: 6). 
Figure 3 – Freetown/ province poverty disparity (2005) 
 
 
Source Africa Development Bank, Country Strategy Paper, Sierra Leone 2005-2009, http://www.afdb.org 
 
                                                 
10
 All data from the Government of Sierra Leone and United States Agency for International 
Development, Sierra Leone: National Nutrition Survey, 1978, University of California quoted in 
Gberie (2005:33) 
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This account shows the incompetence of government in the independence era and the 
nature of the state as it emerged under the APC. When it came to unifying the nation 
to cohere a sense of national consciousness, how could the populations of the 
disenfranchised areas offer a sense of loyalty to the state when the state had 
neglected them so badly? The reality was the state had little meaning to people living 
on the edges of survival in remote rural communities. 
The military 
As noted previously, a characteristic of government which transferred from the 
colonial era and which became a significant contributing factor for state atrophy was 
the politicisation of the security forces. The political history of the country was 
littered with coups, counter coups and attempted coups, and the armed forces were to 
play a major role in the trajectory and longevity of the war.   
Table 2 – Chronology of post-independence politics in Sierra Leone 
 
1961-1967 Democracy 
1967-1968 Military Regime 
1968-1971 Emerging Democracy 
1971-1978 Restricted Democratic Practice 
1978-1991 One Party State – All Peoples‘ Congress 
1991-1992 Multiparty Transition 
1992-1996 Military Regime 
1996-1997 Emerging Democracy 
1997-1998 Military Regime 
1998-2002 Emerging Democracy 
2002 -  Democracy 
 
Sourced from African Elections at http://africanelections.tripod.com/sl.html - accessed on 03/03/08 
 
Table 2 chronicles the role of the military in Sierra Leonean politics since 
independence. There were three successful coup d‘états - 1967, 1992 and 1997; a 
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counter-coup in 1968, and an attempted coup in 1971.
11
 The coup culture was not 
limited to assaults on civilian regimes as it continued during the reign of the National 
Provincial Ruling Council (NPRC) when there were several attempts and one success 
in 1996.
12
  
Stevens privatised the armed forces to defend the interests of the APC and not 
those of the state or its civilians; this entailed de-Mendecizing the troops and 
selecting senior officers from the ranks of northern loyalists (Keen, 2005:15). This 
tradition resembled the army‘s ‗historic role as an instrument of colonial repression‘ 
(Ibrahim, 2003, Gberie, 2005:41). The military exercised extraordinary brutality 
against citizens; for example 18 unarmed protestors were killed and 121 wounded 
when the army used automatic weapons to control protesting civilians during riots 
which broke out in February 1955 (Gberi, 2005:41). In addition to the regular army, 
Steven‘s ‗Special Security Division‘ operated as a private security force whose 
mandate was to intimidate the opposition. By the late 1980s, the privatisation of parts 
of the army weakened the formal troops and command structure so that, when the 
conflict started, the state security apparatus had no capacity, skills or resources to 
cope. What followed was a mass recruitment drive by President Momoh, and later 
President Strasser, which attracted thousands of ‗hooligans, drug addicts and thieves‘ 
from the streets in Freetown. Their indiscipline, unprofessionalism and general lack 
of purpose, left them indistinguishable from the rebels they were sent to defeat 
                                                 
11
 It was during this failed coup of 23
rd
 March that Foday Sankoh (leader of the RUF) was 
arrested and charged with failing to report a coup plot. This resulted in his imprisonment for 
seven years at the harsh Pademba Road gaol, an internment which would lead to the hardening of 
Sanko and his resolve for revolution (Gberie, 2005:42). 
12
 The National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) took over government in 1992, after war had 
broken out, and a palace coup led by Julius Maada Bio, eventually overthrew the military 
president Valentine Strasser.  A counter coup in 1997 against Major Johnny Paul Koroma‘s 
APRC was foiled. See New York Times, published 19/11/97, Sierra Leone Makes 10 Arrests In a 
Reported Coup Attempt, accessed on 04/03/08 from 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A05E0D71F38F93AA25752C1A961958260 
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(Koroma, 1996, Gberie, 2005). The dubious demography of the SLAF terrorised 
local communities rather than reassured them.  
Unprotected from the economic downturn, poorly equipped, underpaid and 
underfed, the lower ranks of the military became bitter at the disrespect shown them 
by their government (Adebajo, 2002, Gberie, 2005). Little of the monthly 
government spend of 250 million Leones was getting to the front line because it was 
being embezzled by senior officers (Koroma, 1996). This was bad news for civilians 
as the rank and file of the SLAF saw the profitability of looting, being amply 
demonstrated by their RUF counterparts in the countryside, and informal 
collaboration with the RUF resulted in aggressive exploitation of the civilian 
population (Gberie, 2005:64).   
In 1992, after suffering heavy casualties, young and rebellious junior officers 
rallied their troops under the leadership of Strasser and mutinied against their seniors 
in a successful coup attempt in Freetown (Koroma, 1996). The coup was executed by 
the ordinary rank and file who had been despatched to deal with the rebels. The coup 
had strong support from the citizenry because, after thirty years of misrule by the 
APC, citizens were desperate for change especially as the NPRC promised an end to 
the war, a reenergised economy and a return to multi-party democracy (Abdullah, 
1998). Abdullah described the 1992 coup as a revolution in the city to match the 
RUF revolution in the countryside – both had the same ‗revolutionary script‘ and 
were products of a rebellious youth culture which was searching for a radical 
alternative to decades of corrupt rule (ibid:204). In this ‗strangely co-operative 
conflict‘ rebels and soldiers had similar goals (Keen, 2005). 
The NPRC junta soon squandered the goodwill of the citizenry, however, 
through random acts of terror and human rights abuses, corruption and plunder, and 
by subjecting poverty stricken Sierra Leoneans to flamboyant displays of lavish 
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lifestyles
 
 (Gberie, 2005:76, Keen, 2005:100).
13
  Some critics argued that the NPRC 
was even complicit in prolonging the war for its own enrichment (Abdullah and 
Muana, 1998, Abraham, 2004a) and by 1995 the country had reached a stage of 
‗anarchy and dissolution‘ as the junta failed to take control of the rebel areas and lost 
many recruits to the sobel phenomenon – a leaderless army, increasing in size and 
running amok in the countryside, murdering and looting indiscriminately.
14
 In 
December 1994, for example, government soldiers murdered a prominent lawyer in 
Kenema who had been appointed as Director of Public Prosecutions by the NPRC.  
This was possibly in protest at their continued disenfranchisement and the execution 
of twelve of their soldier colleagues by the NPRC for ‗banditry‘ the previous month.  
It was around this time that Major Johnny Paul Koroma joined the sobel hierarchy, a 
union which was to lead to the state-breaking coup of 1997 (Gberie, 2005).  
The NPRC regime was looked upon favourably, however, by the IFIs due to 
its cooperation under SAPs: 
The government of Sierra Leone is carrying out a comprehensive programme of 
economic growth aimed at achieving sustainable growth and reducing poverty.  
World Bank, Judicial and Legal Reform Project, October/November 1993 (cited 
in Keen, 2005: 166) 
This statement was somewhat ironic considering the trajectory of the economy noted 
in Table 3 (below). Other economic successes during that time were influential; for 
example inflation fell sharply from 115% in 1991 to 18% in 1993, and military 
spending was cut back (Keen, 2005:166-167). These small successes were in contrast 
to the previous Momoh era when in 1988 inflation reached triple figures and the 
country was unable to pay its debt arrears (Reno, 1998).  
                                                 
13
 For example, Gberie describes the incident when Strasser rounded up the mentally ill from the 
streets of Freetown and incarcerated them in a remote area of the country under harsh conditions 
where most died (Gberie, 2005). 
14
 Sobel - soldiers by day and rebels by night – see Gberie (2005:91) 
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Whilst the national economy contracted, the war economy flourished. 
Instability in the region provided ideal conditions for proceeds from the conflict in 
Sierra Leone to mesh with other criminal agendas such as those of Charles Taylor. 
An unstable Sierra Leone allowed Taylor to take control of the diamond mines and 
run a lucrative market of arms for diamonds to fund his own rebel war in Liberia. 
Although there was no consensus among analysts as to how much influence Taylor 
had in the vanguard rebellion, there is little doubt that his supply of weapons and 
other goods prolonged the war for several years (Campbell, 2004, Gberie, 2005).l, 
2004). Other regional actors such as those in Burkina Faso, Cote D‘Ivoire and Libya 
also colluded to promote and fund the RUF (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 3, 
Recommendations: 412). 
Table 3 – Sierra Leone exports, 1991 and 1995 (in US$ millions) 
 1991 1995 
 
Agricultural 
 
10.40 
 
2.700 
      Palm kernels 0.05 0 
      Cocoa 2.30 0.006 
      Coffee 
 
 
2.40 1.300 
Minerals 134.00 0.900 
      Diamonds 20.60 0.800 
      Gold 0.50 0.013 
      Bauxite 26.00 0 
      Rutile 69.10 0 
 
Reproduced from Reno (1998:127) 
 
By 1995 the Sierra Leone state had no loyal army so private mercenary units 
including the British-based Ghurkha Security Guards, Nigerian and Guinean forces 
and eventually Executive Outcomes were procured to secure the state. Although 
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international and local pressure had combined to influence the return to multi-party 
democracy, the government of President Kabbah produced no significant change in 
the political landscape and, in the absence of a national army, a coup quickly 
followed (Kandeh, 2004). Rank and file soldiers arrested their senior officers and 
freed jailed colleagues from Pademba Road prison, among them Major Johnny Paul 
Koroma, who was to appoint himself chair of the newly formed AFRC which did a 
deal with the RUF to form a joint regime. The new junta alleged that the civilian 
regime was once again undermining the army, this time through its support of the 
Kamajor militia and Civil Defence Force whose compliance to the ceasefire had not 
been stipulated in the Abidjan Accord and who were continuing their attacks – as 
were the RUF. Operation Pay Yourself, which followed the coup, involved sustained 
waves of looting both in the capital and in the countryside, and propelled the country 
to a state of crisis and the final stage of state collapse (Gberie, 2005:96, Abdullah, 
1998). The coup brought about a total collapse of military cohesion and command: 
What happened on 25 May 1997 was a complete collapse of the command 
structure of the Armed Forces.  The subsequent effort to overthrow the 
democratic order was only a by-product … soldiers daily humiliated the entire 
Officer Corps 
15
 
 Thus for the first seven days after the takeover there was widespread anarchy.  
It was not a case of collapsed state structures that could be revived; the state 
had become non-existent; the rule of law an abstraction   (Abdullah, 1998) 
What this account illustrates is the extent to which the military in Sierra Leone 
contributed to the political destabilisation of the country, at first acting as an 
instrument of state aggression, and then the economic downturn and neglect of 
serving soldiers transforming the military into the de facto opposition. In both 
                                                 
15
 Khobe, Brigadier-General Mitikishe Maxwell (1998)  Anatomy of the Sierra Leone conflict 
and its resolution by ECOWAS.  Paper presented to the ECOWAS regional forum on conflict 
management and resolution, Ouagaduogou, Burkina Faso, 7-11 July cited in Keen (2005) 
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scenarios, the army bred mistrust and fear among citizens.  Security sector reform 
was therefore paramount in the peace-building and reconstruction. 
1.4 - THE REVOLUTION FROM THE COUNTRYSIDE 
The youth 
The youth of Sierra Leone was also a key group which gave the conflict its distinct 
character and trajectory; a group which was the subject of extensive commentary in 
the conflict and post-conflict literature because of their importance for the future 
stability of the country (Richards, 1996, Bangura, 1997, Abdullah, 1998, Fanthorpe, 
2001, Adebajo, 2002, Kandeh, 2005). Ten years on from the peace accord, an army 
of unemployed youth is still evident on the streets of Freetown. This was 
documented by analysts as a serious threat to sustainable peace and security in a 
continuing climate of intense socio-economic pressure and high unemployment 
which was provoking an upsurge in violent protests and criminality (UN, 2005, ICG, 
2007, Meyer, 2007, Thomson, 2007, UNSC, 2008). Many of the post-war youth were 
ex-combatants experiencing no means to support themselves and no prospects for the 
future (Ginifer, 2003, McIntyre, 2003, Hanlon, 2005, Christensen and Utas, 2008).  
It was the systematic marginalisation of this group from the political process 
and their socio-economic discrimination which impacted on the ideological rhetoric 
of the elite uprising and the successful recruitment campaigns among the 
unemployed during the war (King, 2007). This group were made up of the urban and 
rural poor and disenfranchised and they were to constitute the rank and file of both 
warring factions in the armed conflict (Abdullah, 1998, Fanthorpe, 2001). The term 
‗youth‘ in Sierra Leone is loosely linked to the age group 15 and 35 years and 
considering life expectancy in the country is around 40 years this group represents 
the majority of the population. A more accurate distinction is to describe those 
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citizens with no access or entitlement to land or wives; a group which was 
marginalised and powerless. (Girls and women did not feature strongly in this 
group.)  
Youths in Sierra Leone could not acquire farmland unless they were married, 
and yet polygamy was widely practised in the country. Marriage is very important 
for the status of both men and women in the country (Keen, 2005:73), and limited 
access to women was a cause of deep resentment. Many young men were subjected 
to demeaning traditional practices within village communities which included 
reparations for ‗woman damage‘. Woman damage is a form of tax levied by chiefs 
on young men who take advantage of their wives or concubines; compensation can 
be in the form of payments but more often is associated with tied labour (Lewis, 
1954, Dale, 2007, Richards et al., 2004). ‗Youth‘ constituted a political label which 
symbolized both resistance and a distinct social position, yet youths were also to play 
a significant role as the ‗pawns and navigators‘ in Sierra Leone‘s political game as 
agents of the state apparatus (Christensen and Utas, 2008: 516, 517).   
During the 1930s a youth rebellion emerged from the difficult sociological 
conditions in the country at the time, and when the APC came to power in 1968, the 
leadership promised a revival of the popular Youth League tradition (Spitzer and 
LaRay, 1973). These promises were quickly forgotten when the government 
centralised power and patrimonial networks became the modus operandi for 
governing the country (Abdullah, 1998, Richards, 1996). When a culture of thuggery 
became associated with national politics it presented a rare economic opportunity for 
some of the country‘s youth. The infamous red-shirted APC Youth League, whose 
sole purpose was to violently suppress any opposition to the government, became a 
common option for the urban and rural poor (Gberie, 2005, Abdullah, 1998, Zack-
Williams, 1999, Forna, 2002). The practice of using the youth for political 
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intimidation re-emerged during the elections of 2007 when political parties recruited 
unemployed youth, many of them ex-combatants, to coerce support among the 
populace during election ‗campaigning‘ (Christensen and Utas, 2008: 535).   
Throughout independence, the youth of Sierra Leone lost its voice and any 
form of legitimate vehicle for protest. Although university students played an 
important role in challenging the APC regime against corruption through a mass 
protest in 1977, by 1985, student radicals were being ejected from the country 
(Ibrahim, 2003, Abdullah and Muana, 1998). In the events of January 1977 
university students had mobilised to protest against the alleged theft of $40 million 
by President Stevens from the national treasury. In the following government 
clampdown, forty students were killed but the protest continued until elections were 
held in June of the same year (Ibrahim, 2003). The disenfranchisement of urban 
students resonated with the youth in the countryside who had been excluded from 
local politics because of historic informal and oppressive power structures within 
rural chiefdoms. This marginalisation of a large and important group created a 
‗cauldron of disquiet‘ up country (Jackson, 2005, Fanthorpe, 2005, Meyer, 2007). 
Meanwhile, in the city, a homogenous youth constituency was evolving made up of 
university students and the lumpen, illiterate, urban masses. An important dynamic 
for this homogenous uprising was access, or lack of it, to education (Wright, 1997: 
cited in Keen, 2005: 72). The neglect of the education sector and its deterioration 
through the independence years meant a growing number of young people outside 
the school system had few opportunities to find work or leave home (Banya, 1993, 
Skelt, 1997 cited in Keen, 2005: 72, Richards, 1996: 174). Over 30% of RUF and 
CDF combatants had never attended school (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2004: 19), 
and low education levels were still preventing employment opportunities for much of 
the youth in post-war era (ENCISS, 2007). 
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This mass disillusionment and its subsequent protests influenced both the RUF 
revolution from the countryside and the NPRC revolution from the city (Richards, 
1996, Abdullah, 1998). It seemed that the youth had become maladjusted to peace 
and better adjusted to war (King, 2007: 30). As Bright argued, the war was a ‗family 
war‘ borne out of common backgrounds of social and economic deprivation; the 
RUF, Kamajor and AFRC all displayed similar tactics and unified ambitions - such 
as access to diamonds, previously the domain of the privileged elite. Despite being at 
war with each other, rebel factions mined diamonds peacefully together (Bright, 
2001). For many of the rural and urban poor, the war economy was a welcome 
opportunity to amass wealth and transform their status, and the inability of the 
governing class to secure compliance from these subordinate groups (and 
subsequently the armed forces) was a major contributing factor for the war (Zack-
Williams, 1999, TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 2, Findings: 455).  
Character and genesis of the war 
Clearly Sierra Leoneans were let down by the national project and the authoritarian 
politics of the independence era, but their interests were equally thwarted by the 
‗revolution‘ which rose up against their government. From the birth of the nation to 
the outbreak of war, the neglect, intimidation and violence of the state was to be 
nothing compared to the brutality and terror inflicted upon the civilian population by 
the revolutionary warriors. The undisciplined, disorganised and deadly combination 
of both RUF rebels and the government troops sent to defeat them was to inflict 
untold fear and misery on millions, and to reduce the country to a state of anarchy 
and eventual collapse. Over the course of eleven years, amidst coups, failed peace 
accords, intermittent ceasefires and democratic elections, there were around 50,000 
fatalities, mass amputations and mutilations, displacement of the majority of the 
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population and incalculable numbers of physically and psychologically damaged 
citizens and combatants (Reno, 2004). The toll was particularly heavy for women 
and children (TRC, 2004). 
The conflict lasted from April 1991 to January 2002 and became famous for 
its blood diamonds and child soldiers phenomena, where drug crazed gangs of 
Rambo type revolutionaries - including young children – murdered, raped, tortured, 
and looted their way across the country in a ‗senseless‘ frenzy of violence pursuant 
of a handful of diamonds (Abdullah, 1998, Gberie, 2005). The conflict was more 
complex than that, however.  
There were several armed factions involved in the fighting:   
 The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) which represented the vanguard of 
the ‗revolution‘. Made up of combatants of diverse ethnicities and 
nationalities, and influenced by external actors, the RUF was led by Corporal 
Foday Sankoh, a northern Temne;   
 The Kamajor militia, the indigenous army of local warriors, also known as 
the ‗Mende Militia‘ who were aligned to the SLPP after elections in 1996 and 
who were considered an instrument of ethnic aggression, feared by many in 
the north. They provided support for UN and British troops during the latter 
stages of the war (Keen, 2005:206); 
 The Civil Defence Force (CDF), a paramilitary organisation which supported 
the civilian government elected in 1996 and which was also Mende 
dominated. Favoured by the governing SLPP over the northern dominated 
SLAF (although the majority of CDF combatants had no political affiliation), 
the CDF fought in close collaboration with the Kamajor and other smaller 
civilian militia. The force was led by Chief Hinga Norman (Alie, 2006, 
Gberie, 2005:100, 107); 
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 The Sierra Leone Armed Forces (SLAF) were government troops, many of 
whom joined the rebels to fight as sobels especially after the military coup of 
1992 (Abdullah and Muana, 1998:182, 183);
16
 
 The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) represented a union of 
RUF, remnants of the NPRC military junta and disgruntled factions of the 
SLAF. Led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, the AFRC overthrew the elected 
government in a coup in 1997 (Abdullah and Muana, 1998, Gberie, 
2005:101). 
At the outbreak of war, President Joseph Momoh was in power, but the RUF 
‗revolution‘ against the civilian APC regime emerged with no clear political 
ideology. Its leader, Foday Sankoh, an illiterate opportunist, had produced a vague 
populist document about injustice and exploitation - essentially a critique of 
colonialism – which was based on a document produced by radical exiled university 
students who were later to withdraw their support for the emerging armed revolution 
(Abdullah, 2004: 3, Gberie, 2005: 49). Sankoh, a man with a history of political 
agitation and support for attempted coups, a prison history and a grudge against the 
APC, emerged from prison in 1978 with ideas about an armed revolution. He tapped 
into a rebellious student culture whose discontent with the political hierarchy, and 
whose pan-African ideas and allegiance to Gadhafi‘s Green Book would support his 
political challenge to the status quo (Gberie, 2005: 78).
17
 Ethnicity played no part in 
the dynamics of the warring factions. The ethnic breakdown of the RUF and 
opposing CDF, for example, was nearly identical with respect to the two major 
                                                 
16
 Sobels: soldiers by day, and rebels by night 
17
 The Green Book: ‗a document which extols an assortment of ideas of naive humanism, anti-
capitalist rhetoric and charismatic rule‘ (Gberie, 2005:49).  In the late 1980s, there was evidence 
of a Green Book Study Group located at Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone which 
was dedicated to the socialist ideology of this publication (Abdullah, 1998). 
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ethnic groups in the country: 50-60% of the membership was made up of Mende, and 
20% Temne (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2004:18).  
Figure 4 - Map of Sierra Leone showing strategic towns and borders with Liberia and 
Guinea 
 
 
 
The violence started with a cross-border incursion from Liberia into the 
villages of Bomaru and Sienga in Kailahun district – the furthest Eastern point in 
Sierra Leone close to the borders with both Liberia and Guinea (Abdullah, 2004). 
Mass looting took place along with killings of government military personnel and 
civilians. The majority of the rebels were former members of Charles Taylor‘s 
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National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) whose national demographics included 
Liberians, Sierra Leoneans and Burkinabes (Keen, 2005:39, Gberie, 2005:59). 
External actors were to subsequently capture the ideological impetus of the war 
(ibid). Covert allegiances with Charles Taylor and his civil war in neighbouring 
Liberia, and support for rebel training from Colonel Gadhafi in Libya, gave the 
revolution an international dynamic which was to be influential in the protraction of 
the war and the escalation of violence after 1996 because unhindered access to 
valuable mineral resources secured by rebels in the Eastern provinces were to fuel 
the war economy through Taylor in Liberia (Gberie, 2005:96). This area of the 
country, historically neglected and exploited, was a key target for reforms in the 
plans for peace. 
The invasion force and the rebels they recruited have tortured and slaughtered 
hundreds of civilians (Amnesty International, 1992: cited by Keen, 2005: 39) 
Warfare involved first capturing strategic towns in the remote Kailahun district 
and then pushing north to the main diamond centre, Koidu in Kono district (Koidu-
Sefadu on map in Fig.4). Here the rebels were successful in capturing the diamond 
mines from the government by the end of 1992 (Gberie, 2005: 77). The conflict took 
the form of guerrilla warfare, where rebels moved along isolated bush paths 
capturing villages, territory, and terrified recruits through hit and run raids. These 
raids reached all parts of the country by 1994/95. There was no front line and 
government troops were scattered thinly across the country (Abdullah and Muana, 
1998:184). Major offensives included attacks on the provincial capitals of Bo and 
Kenema in the South (1994), the university campus of Njala, and the strategic 
economic targets of the bauxite and rutile mines (ibid). Attacks on smaller towns and 
villages were carried out by small raiding parties who also set up ambushes on the 
main roads leading from the provinces to Freetown. 
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 Civilians were subjected to unprecedented barbarism both by the rebels and 
government forces, which targeted women and girls in particular, children, elders, 
professionals, and often whole communities with indiscriminate executions and mass 
mutilations. This was retaliation for civilian reticence to support the revolution. Later 
on in the war it was retaliation for civilian support for democracy. Gang rape was 
commonplace. Amputation (including of infants) and mutilation of pregnant women 
was the trademark of the RUF who also used a method of ‗branding‘. This involved 
carving the initials of the rebel militia into the bodies of both recalcitrant combatants 
and reluctant recruits, tactics which were replicated by the AFRC later in the conflict 
(Richards, 2005, TRC, 2004: Vol.3, Chapter 3). Looting, arson and terrorisation 
formed the modus operandi for both rebels and disenfranchised government troops 
alike, whose purpose was to extract as much as possible from the war economy, and 
whose tactics became indistinguishable from each other as the war in the countryside 
developed (Adebajo, 2002, Abdullah, 1998, Keen, 2005, Gberie, 2005:118). Children 
were abducted to carry looted items back to the rebel camps but were quickly 
absorbed into the rank and file of the RUF to boost dwindling combatant numbers 
(Abdullah and Muana, 1998:184). Children were also recruited by government forces 
(ibid).  
The treatment of children during the ten year war resulted in a ‗lost generation‘ 
of young people for the country, a generation which became the youth in the years of 
post-conflict recovery. They were violated and abused by all armed factions (TRC, 
2004: Executive Summary). They suffered abductions, forced recruitment and sexual 
slavery; rape, amputations, mutilations, displacement (many becoming separated 
from their parents and ending up as refugees), drugging and torture. Children were 
also forced to become perpetrators, compelled to violate the rights of others. 
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Thousands of children were killed during the conflict in Sierra Leone (TRC, 2004: 
Executive Summary: 56). 
There were several different theses to explain the causes of the war but no 
dispute about its nature or purpose. Despite its revolutionary script which promised 
the ‗second liberation of Sierra Leone‘, there was nothing revolutionary about the 
aims of the RUF which took control of the country‘s diamond resources and attacked 
any civilians who stood in its way (RUF/SL, 1995). Mass atrocities committed by the 
RUF against the very civilians it claimed to represent negated any claim the rebels 
had made to being a coherent and credible political movement for change, although 
their continuous advance on Freetown implied a determined quest to capture the state 
(Keen, 2005:41). The RUF offensive progressed across the country with the aim of 
seizing power in the capital but it had to forcibly recruit combatants along the way 
because of the dearth of popular support for its campaign (Richards, 1996, Abdullah, 
1998, Keen, 2005:42). Forced recruitment often involved ideological brainwashing 
or coercion using alcohol, drugs, food or women. Often drugs were administered 
forcibly (Bangura, 2004, TRC, 2004, Keen, 2005:54). Looting and smuggling 
diamonds helped fuel the war economy as weapons were procured from government 
troops and also from across the border in Liberia and Guinea (Keen, 2005:51). 
I was captured in Freetown during the AFRC coup by the Sierra Leone Army 
and taken to Kono where I was trained to use a gun – an AK-47 … … …  We 
also smoked marijuana and cooked for the squad ... …  I was given cocaine on 
my forehead every day and asked to kill people who I thought were enemies. 
Cocaine was also put into our food when we cooked. [My squad] killed 35 
ECOMOG soldiers during the January invasion.   Jusu, aged 10.
18
 
                                                 
18
 Interviewed by Ambrose James of Talking Drum Studio, Freetown March 2000 and 
reproduced in Rashid (2000), available from http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sierra-
leone/lome-negotiations.php, accessed on 01/07/09. 
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The rebels‘ tactics of indiscriminately targeting civilians, including widespread 
sexual violence, slavery and abduction, encouraged the emergence of ‗peoples‘ 
militias‘ such as the Kamajor. Their superior bush knowledge gave them a crucial 
advantage over the rebels. Their counter attacks with a strengthened CDF, military 
assistance from mercenaries such as Executive Outcomes, and strong support from 
civilian negotiators, allowed them to push back the rebels and force peace talks 
(Abdullah and Muana, 1998:184). By 1996, the failure of the NPRC to end the war 
provoked a strong uprising from civil society which mobilised to hold mass rallies 
and a national referendum to return multiparty democracy to the country.  By the end 
of 1996, elections had been held, a civilian government installed, and the Abidjan 
Peace Accord drawn up.   
Despite the Accord, fighting continued unabated amid reduced capacity of the 
armed forces and weak commitment to the settlement both locally and internationally 
(Jusu-Sheriff, 2000, Keen, 2005). Large amounts of donor funding for DDR failed to 
materialise and Sankoh‘s obduracy precluded commitment by the UN to send a 
peace-keeping mission to the country (Keen, 2005:203). The main bilateral partners, 
the US and the UK, gave minimal response to the government‘s request to re-train 
the army and at the same time insisted that all mercenary forces be removed from the 
country (Kargbo, 2006). Reduced spending on the military as a result of SAPs 
compounded this security vacuum and essentially the government was left with no 
national army to control its territory or protect its citizens (Keen, 2005). Tensions 
emerged because the ‗favouring‘ of the Kamajor militias at Abidjan meant that there 
was a perceived international bias towards Kabbah‘s SLPP government. The security 
vacuum which followed the Abidjan Accord allowed the RUF to regroup with the 
disillusioned SLAF to launch their successful coup attempt in 1997. 
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Until that point, Freetown had remained generally untouched by the impact of 
the war which had been raging rampant in all parts of the provinces, but a second 
coup by the AFRC in 1997 brought the rebel war centre stage to Freetown as rebel 
prisoners were released from jail by mutinous factions within the armed forces and 
the destruction commenced. External interventions and the support of ECOMOG 
removed the junta, produced a new ceasefire agreement at Conakry and allowed a 
quick return to civilian government which was to hold until the next elections in 
2002.  
The coup of 1997, which was to awaken Freetown to the violence already 
experienced by millions in the countryside, was to signify the apex of a complex 
political emergency which was to lead to state collapse (Abdullah, 1998). In January 
1999, Operation No Living Thing, involved unprecedented atrocities in Freetown 
committed by returning rebels and the ousted military junta. This tragedy re-focussed 
world attention on the war in Sierra Leone and the heroic efforts of civil society 
organisations, in particular religious groups and women‘s organisations, to end the 
fighting (Hirsch, 2001: 40). Talks for a comprehensive peace agreement in Togo 
brought about the signing of the Lomé Peace Accord in June 1999 (Gberie 
2005:118). Again, the fighting continued through a further ceasefire at Abuja - 
signed in November 2000 - but eventually ended after military intervention by the 
British and others, and peace was declared in January 2002.
19
 
This account of the war illustrates the complexity of issues which faced the 
country during the independence years and many theses have been proposed to 
explain the fighting. Arguments included the ‗excluded intellectuals‘ thesis which 
claimed that marginalised professionals became disillusioned with the state, 
                                                 
19
 Speech by the President of Sierra Leone His Excellency, Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah at 
the ceremony marking the conclusion of disarmament and the destruction of weapons Lungi, 18 
January 2002 available from http://www.sierra-leone.org/GOSL/kabbah-011802.html, accessed 
on 15/06/09.  A full analysis of the Lomé Peace Agreement is presented in Chapter 2. 
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especially after the collapse of the patrimonial system, and the frustration of this 
‗disaffected intelligentsia‘ emerged in the form of a revolutionary movement for 
political change (Richards, 1996, Zack-Williams, 1999: 147). A further thesis 
claimed that the shadow economy, which emerged in the 1980s, deepened corruption 
in the APC regime and let to the gradual breakdown of state structures (Bangura, 
1997, Zack-Williams, 1999, TRC, 2004, Reno, 2004). Rampant criminality which 
centred on the capture of the nation‘s diamonds was also blamed for the war (Gberie, 
2005, Campbell, 2004); or intolerant political culture, greed and grievance (Collier, 
2000, Abdullah and Muana, 1998, Rashid, 1997). Most commentators acknowledged 
the problem of a predatory and ineffective state, alienated and unemployed youth and 
the role of external actors (Gberie, 2005, Bangura, 1997, Rashid, 1997, Zack-
Williams, 1999, Reno, 2003, TRC, 2004). 
1.5 - CONCLUDING STATEMENT 
I ask you to ... strive actively for peace, friendship and unity in our country. 
You are seeing history made this day.  Work hard, for you are the future leaders 
of our country.  We will lay traditions of which you will be proud.  It will be for 
you to uphold them and to build upon them in the future. 
20
 
The civil war in Sierra Leone could not be characterised by the greed and grievance 
thesis because the realities were much more complex than that (Humphreys and 
Weinstein, 2008). First, the notions of greed and grievance were not mutually 
exclusive; both could be asserted in the case of Sierra Leone at different stages of the 
conflict. Rural youths, for example, easily recruited at the start of the war due to their 
marginalisation and exploitation by traditional chiefs soon found that the war 
                                                 
20
 Extracts from Sir Milton Margai‘s message to the people of Sierra Leone on independence day, 
27
th
 April 1967, reproduced from Fyfe (1964:342/343) 
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economy had significant benefits to that of the peace (King, 2007). The armed 
forces, acting as sobels, found similar benefits from war which their government had 
failed to provide in peace. Second, the war was extremely complex and nuanced and 
was sparked by a combination of socio-political, cultural and historic factors as well 
as the very clear inequalities of economic distribution, and other strategic factors in 
the region which were exploited by externals such as Charles Taylor. Third, the 
greed and grievance debate assumed that the state itself was exempt from predation 
practices but the evidence from Sierra Leone shows that state greed was a very 
significant factor in the country‘s atrophy to war.   
This chapter has explained the complexity and nuance of the civil war and 
state collapse which was set against a background of historical structures and their 
legacies. The birth of the nation was supposed to represent a new era of democratic 
self-government but instead reproduced a predatory state. Bad governance which 
characterised the post-independence era was a dramatic example of democratic 
failure, but leadership during the previous colonial regime also had a profound effect 
on the country‘s susceptibility to civil war. In the absence of any alternative models 
of statecraft, the emerging authoritarian regime reproduced the previous colonial 
system of indirect rule, and the fixation on the state as the only unit of political 
authority robbed Sierra Leone of the chance to develop its own indigenous methods 
of population control (see Young, 1994). Due to unnatural constructions of identity 
by retreating colonists, Sierra Leone had the potential to split into at least two, if not 
three, different nations yet the introduction of multi-party democracy held 
assumptions that the Sierra Leone state was a tangible and effective unit, 
uncontested, with a populace who shared common goals and interests, and where 
citizenry was expressed as a ‗collective self‘ (Young, 1988). Yet there was no 
‗pristine meaning‘ of a single national cultural community and efforts at 
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democratisation led to a destructive bid for power among competing elites (Young, 
1994: 32). 
The consensus was that bad governance, endemic corruption and mass abuse 
of human rights had plagued the nation building project, and that this failure of 
leadership had stripped the country of its dignity and was the precursor for war. 
Quotes taken from the TRC-R illustrate the historic feelings of disconnect between 
state and society:   
The entire political elite collectively placed their personal and political 
interests above those of the nation (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, C.2:68) 
The people had lost all faith in the ruling class to act with integrity and to 
deliver basic services to the nation (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, C.2:60) 
The exclusionist actions of the APC led to a complete loss of faith in the 
political system and ultimately gave rise to a general belief that only a 
revolutionary movement could bring about change (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, C.2:66) 
Corruption, nepotism and the widespread theft of state assets were characteristics of 
the state post-independence where political elites hijacked the nation building project 
and all the benefits that went with it. Marginalisation of the masses continued 
seamlessly as the new body politic replaced the old in a disastrous façade of 
democratic process in a myopic attempt at building a nation. ‗Terminal colonial 
politics‘ in Sierra Leone had created a warped combination of colonial autocracy and 
constitutional polity (Young, 1994). Once again, ordinary people were left out of the 
body politic with no channel for effective representation; uneven development 
remained a serious issue, as did the marginalisation of groups such as the youth or 
disenfranchised rural professionals, and the politicisation and patronage of the armed 
forces.  
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Changes on the international markets brought the systematic and prolonged 
neglect of the state into sharp relief; the state eventually collapsed because it had no 
money, no security, no institutions and no authority, and by 1997 its role as 
sovereign ceased due to its inability to control its territory or protect its citizens, 
deliver services or unite loyalties (Herbst, 1996, Zartman, 1995a).  
It was not realistic to expect democracy to work when the nation building 
enterprise was incomplete or faulty, or in a system which centred politics on 
patronage. These construction issues and historic tensions had to be corrected after 
war to give the post-conflict peacebuilding the best chance of success yet, post-war, 
persistent powerful undercurrents around the issue of ethnicity had the same 
implications for national unity and coherence as at the time of independence (Ayissi 
and Poulton, 2006, Alie, 2006: 26). New fractures, which appeared as a result of the 
conflict, also had to be accommodated in the reconstruction.  
Chapter two now analyses the official documentation produced from the 
peace negotiations to see what new mechanisms, structures or processes were to be 
put in place to address the enormous challenges facing the country for the post-
conflict reconstruction and for building a peace that would last.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE ARRIVAL OF PEACE 
MY SIERRA LEONE, a new chapter and era has opened with  
Awareness at every door 
We must not let go 
Because we‘ve known the causes of our woes 
It keeps us conscious and awake at all times 
With the past we know the present and combined we make the future 
Our mistakes have opened the doors of discoveries and our 
Discoveries must lead to recoveries 
 
Extract from the poem ‗Who will make Sierra Leone?‘ 
RUFP Prisoners at Pademba Road Prison (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 3, Recommendations) 
 
The poem reproduced above was indicative of the desire of ordinary Sierra Leoneans 
to take responsibility for the problems of their past and the prospects for their future, 
and to build a new nation together. The text reveals an acceptance and understanding 
of the mistakes which had led to war and a strong desire to take ownership of 
recovery.  
The analysis of the peace process which follows aims to determine its 
credentials to help address the complex contributing factors which led to war and the 
many challenges for peace; in particular the political fractures which had thus far 
failed to unite Sierra Leoneans, and the chronic lack of good leadership and effective 
governance which had so bedevilled the independence years for the majority of the 
population. What Sierra Leone needed badly was a new social contract which could 
give citizens a stake in governance and which could help to repair the historic and 
problematic relationship between the populace and the state. What were the 
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commitments made in the peace settlement which could help to address these 
burning issues, and what were the longer term ramifications of the wording of the 
convention for recovery and long term peace?  
To facilitate this analysis an interrogation of the documentation is made: the 
Lomé Peace Accord, the conclusions of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Report (TRC-R) and the ‗how to‘ plans for recovery – the National Recovery 
Strategy (NRS) and the UN‘s Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). This 
interrogation aims to discover the strengths and weaknesses of the peace talks, and 
the plans to reconstruct the country vis-à-vis local priorities for peace, and provides 
key pointers to potential future challenges for stability. It also investigates how the 
dialectic of the ‗liberal peace‘ helped to frame the peace talks and the negotiated 
settlement, and therefore the future structure of the Sierra Leone state.  
The chapter first explains the methods for the analysis of the peace 
documents. In section 2.2 an examination is made of salient sections of the Accord to 
draw out the promises for peace, and additional ‗proxy‘ promises from the TRC-R. 
These promises for peace, which are conceptualized to help the analysis, can be 
described as those commitments made by government to the general populace of 
Sierra Leone rather than the promises made by the rebels to end the violence - this is 
elaborated upon later. A deep analysis of the peace process is then presented in 
section 2.3, and the plans for implementation of the peace in section 2.4. The chapter 
concludes with an analysis of the relevance of the peace settlement and recovery 
strategy for longer term stability, and the challenges for its implementation. 
In order to aid the analysis of the peace documents, some clearer definition of 
the local priorities for peace is required which is relevant to Sierra Leone‘s war 
history, political and cultural background. The summary of the priorities set out 
below is derived from the conclusions made in chapter one. It is described here as the 
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conceptual framework for peace and is visualised in Figure 5. It must be noted at this 
point that no claim is being made as to what a peaceful nation would look like, only 
suggestions as to what a helpful model for reconstruction might look like given the 
history of the country and the peacebuilding ambitions of local people. The 
conceptualisation of peace presented below is therefore useful only to codify the 
main priorities locally, and present a framework for analysis in the chapters that 
follow. 
 Good leadership and good governance 
 Economic opportunities 
 Respect for and protection of human rights 
 Inclusion of marginalised groups 
 Resources diverted to the rural areas 
 
Figure 5 – A conceptual ‘framework for peace’ 
 
2.1 - LEGITIMACY OF THE METHODOLOGY OF ANALYSIS 
Two key peace documents are at the centre of this analysis – the Lomé Peace Accord 
(Appendix 3) and the TRC-R. Although fighting continued after the 1999 ceasefire, 
the Lomé Peace Agreement is the starting point because it established the genesis of 
the peace process which was to follow and defined the shape of the nation building 
project as the country emerged from war. As the legal document, backed by the UN, 
Good leadership and good governance 
Economic 
opportunities 
Respect for and 
protection of 
human rights 
Inclusion of 
marginalised 
groups 
Resources 
diverted to the 
rural areas 
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which framed the conditions for the cessation of hostilities and the package for 
reconstruction, and which was authorised by the signatories of the two main 
protagonists – the GovSL and the RUF – and witnessed by various senior 
representatives from the international community and in the presence of four African 
heads of state,
21
 the Lomé Accord is the legitimate starting point for this enquiry. As 
a document which emerged from a negotiated peace, there were serious omissions 
and inclusions. The second document therefore represents a critical supplement 
which protects the interests of the majority population not the elites who negotiated 
at Lomé.  
the Commission came to the conclusion that it was years of bad governance, 
endemic corruption and the denial of basic human rights that created the 
deplorable conditions that made conflict inevitable  (TRC, 2004: Vol.1, 
Introduction: 11) 
Published by the Commission in 2004, the TRC-R produced findings and 
conclusions about the causes of the war. Its core objective was to promote national 
reconciliation and the consolidation of peace, to bring about restorative justice and 
address impunity following the blanket amnesty agreed at Lomé (GovSL, 1999: 
Articles VI and XXVI).
22
 The Commission did not have the capacity, resources or 
longevity to respond to the needs of all the victims in respect of tangible reparations, 
so it focused more on truth telling for reconciliation of individuals and communities. 
Although criticised for its efficacy as mechanism for ‗reconciliation‘ (Huyse and 
                                                 
21
 Gnassingbe Eyadema, President of the Republic of Togo and Chair of ECOWAS; Francis G. 
Okelo, special representative of the UNSG; Adwoa Coleman, Representative of the Organization 
of African Unity; the Reverend Jesse Jackson, US Presidential Special Envoy; President 
Obasanjo of Nigeria, and Presidents Taylor of Liberia and Compaoré of Burkina Faso who had 
both allegedly supported the rebels 
22
 TRC-R (2004), Vol.3b, Chapter 6 (5) and The Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000, article 6.(1) 
‗The object for which the Commission is established is to create an impartial historical record of 
violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed 
conflict in Sierra Leone, from the beginning of the Conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lomé 
Peace Agreement; to address impunity, to respond to the needs of the victims, to promote healing 
and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered.‘ 
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Salter, 2008) its recommendations for longer term peacebuilding through justice for 
those most affected by the war was paramount for a sustainable peace (Pettersson, 
2005, Sesay, 2007). Its final report was a legal document with local legitimacy. Its 
findings, conclusions and recommendations to address the social, political and 
economic changes necessary for peace reflected a legitimate and legal framework for 
post-conflict recovery.
23
 Subsequent documents, making all kinds of promises to 
financial institutions based loosely on ensuring durable peace, were not sufficient to 
indentify or promote local priorities for peace and the many nuances associated with 
them.
24
 By drawing from the TRC report - a lengthy document chronicling the results 
of extensive nationwide consultations with the people who lived through the war and 
its antecedents - the framework for peace, outlined above, assumes local legitimacy. 
If the TRC‘s recommendations… are fully implemented, they would without 
doubt act as catalyst for the social and legal reform required to address 
impunity and establish a culture of respect for human rights in Sierra Leone, as 
well as helping the social regeneration of battered communities. (Huyse and 
Salter, 2008: 131) 
To determine the most relevant parts of the Lomé text to analyse, five categories 
of reform were identified from the Recommendations of the TRC which synergised 
closely with the conceptual framework for peace. These categories were all aligned 
to specific areas of failed governance (TRC, 204: Vol.2, Chapter 1, Executive 
Summary and Vol.2, Chapter 3, Recommendations: 43), and guided the structure of 
the matrix of peace promises (Table 4). Failure of leadership was manifest in several 
ways: through bad governance, through widespread corruption, through the abuse of 
human rights and failures in the rule of law, and the misappropriation and 
                                                 
23
 The Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000, Article 5(17), is the legal instrument for this process 
and charges the government to ‗faithfully and timeously implement the recommendations of the 
report‘. 
24
 For example, iPRSP (2001), PRSP (2005) and various Letters of Intent to the IMF 
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management of national mineral resources. These failures form the five categories 
for analysis of the Accord: 
 
1. Good governance (youth, security services) 
2. Anti-corruption measures 
3. Promotion and protection of human rights (women, children) 
4. Adherence to the rule of law 
5. Control and exploitation of national mineral resources 
 
In the Commission‘s recommendations, youth, women and children represented 
specific groups for special attention. For the purpose of this analysis, these groups 
have been subsumed within the five categories noted above, along with the 
recommendations concerning the security services. This is because the 
Commission‘s recommendations for women and children generally fell into the area 
of human rights; for example, the recommendation to ratify the Protocol to the 
African Charter on the Rights of Women and the recommendation for the enactment 
into law of the Child‘s Rights Bill. Similarly, the recommendations for youth were 
generally around inclusion and representation so they have been included in the good 
governance category noted above. These recommendations for the youth exceeded 
the usual provisions of democratisation and focused on a much broader engagement 
of government to cultivate ‗political responsibility‘ in the youth and to develop other 
proactive programming. Recommendations about the security services have been 
subsumed within the category of good governance because of the local culture of 
politicising the military and the historic failure of government to provide independent 
and loyal state security institutions. 
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When identifying the promises in the Lomé Accord which fell within each 
category, some were ambiguous in the sense that they could have been identified in 
two categories, or more. For example, the promise for delivery of basic services such 
as education and health could be identified as a good governance issue, but the 
analysis has been guided by the framework of the Peace Agreement and this promise 
has been categorised under human rights. The management of strategic resources 
(Article VII) can also be described as a good governance issue, especially 
considering the historic consequences of economic mismanagement, but this is 
identified in a separate category (5, above) guided by the recommendations of the 
Commission‘s report. 
2.2 - ROAD MAP FOR PEACE? 
The Lomé Peace Agreement was a compromise document which aimed to be 
inclusive, but was not. It followed the power sharing paradigm of peace negotiations 
because neither side had the military capacity to defeat the other (Rothschild, 2002, 
TRC, 2004: Vol.3A). No blame was apportioned to either party and no explicit 
acknowledgement was made as to the causes of war, so the analysis which follows 
generally focuses on the latent rather than manifest content of the document; the 
unwitting rather than witting promises. What is meant by this is that manifest items 
are those which are physically present in the document such as a reference to ‗good 
governance‘ – this was not present in the Lomé document other than in the preamble. 
Latent content is an item from which an inference can be drawn or interpreted; for 
example, a reference to ‗full public disclosure‘ of agreements and transactions infers 
a reference to the ‗good governance‘ agenda (Robson, 2002: 354). To some extent, 
the interrogation of Lomé is inferred and interpretative but the interpretation is 
legitimised by the recommendations of the TRC-R. 
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The following phrases in the Lomé Accord identify the vocabulary of the peace 
promises: 
―shall accord, shall enable, shall be established, the parties agree, shall 
be set up, have agreed, will be carried out, agree to, shall be, pledge to, 
shall provide, shall design and implement‖ 
 
Table 4 – Peace matrix: a summary of the peace promises made at Lomé 
 
Area for reform 
(category) 
Peace promise Parties Action 
Good governance Transformation of the RUF/SL into a political 
party – Article III 
GovSL P 
Enable members of the RUF to hold political office 
– Article IV 
GovSL P 
Enable members of the RUF to join a broad-based 
government of national unity through cabinet 
appointments – Article V 
GovSL P 
Establishment of a Constitutional Review 
Committee – Article X 
GovSL C,L,P 
Commitment to constitutional elections – Article 
XI 
GovSL P 
Independent National Electoral Commission – 
Article XII 
GovSL L, P 
Restructuring and retraining of the Sierra Leone 
Armed Forces – Article XVII 
GovSL P 
 Commission for the Consolidation of Peace – 
Article VI 
  
Anti-corruption - - - 
Human rights Guarantee and promotion of human rights (UN 
and OAU) – Article XXIV 
GovSL/RUF P 
Human Rights Commission –  
Article XXV 
GovSL/RUF P 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission to address 
Human Rights violations -   
Article XXVI 
GovSL/RUF L, P 
Post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction, with 
special provision for women – Article XXVIII 
GovSL/RUF P 
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Special fund for war victims –  
Article XXIX 
GovSL/RUF P 
Child combatants – Article XXX GovSL/RUF P 
Education and health – Article XXXI GovSL/RUF P 
Rule of law - - - 
Mineral resources Commission for the Management of Strategic 
Resources, National Reconstruction and 
Development – Article VII 
GovSL/RUF C, L, P 
 
Coding for Action 
C Constitutional change 
L Legislation 
P Process 
 
Some of the peace promises involved constitutional change or new 
legislation, and all involved new practices or processes. Most in the good governance 
category were about power sharing arrangements and were concessions for 
immediate RUF gains in the transitional phase of government. Articles III to V were 
concerned with the inclusion of the RUF in governance, the freedoms associated with 
political party formation in a democratic polity, and the legal steps necessary for this 
process. Analyses of these arrangements and promises and the abuse of the peace 
process by the RUF leadership have been well documented elsewhere (Rashid, 2000, 
Bright, 2000, Abraham, 2004b, Abdullah, 2004), but the promises in this category 
which were relevant for positive longer term reform included the establishment of a 
new NEC and the reform of the security services. Articles XI and XII confirm the 
commitment of the government to continue with free and fair constitutional 
elections, supported through the creation of an independent body (the NEC) with the 
express mandate of creating a ‗level playing field‘ for all parties (Article XII (2)). 
Unsurprisingly, there was no reference in the Agreement to corruption but, bearing in 
mind the historic reputation of the old NEC as a clientele outfit, the phrasing ‗No 
member of the NEC shall be eligible for appointment to political office by any 
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government formed as a result of an election he or she was mandated to conduct‘ 
might be interpreted as a nod in the direction of anti-corruption efforts.
25
 So too 
might the promise of ‗full public disclosure‘ of all ‗correspondence, negotiations, 
business transactions‘ with regard to the government‘s exploitation of the country‘s 
mineral resources (Article VII (10)). With regard to military reform, the point of this 
was to create ‗truly national armed forces, bearing loyalty solely to the state of 
Sierra Leone, and able and willing to perform their constitutional role‘. Lessons had 
been learned from the failures of the 1996 Abidjan Agreement and the following 
security vacuum which allowed the RUF to regroup with the SLAF and launch their 
successful coup in 1997. The promise to reform the military may also have been 
influenced by the historic politicisation and ethnicisation of the military under the 
APC regimes which had been contributing factors for political instability and for the 
disastrous counter insurgency. Consequently, the Agreement promised to recruit 
members of the armed forces in a way that would ‗reflect the geo-political structure 
of Sierra Leone‘ and would include ex-combatants of the RUF, CDF and SLA.   
The Accord did not include the interests of all groups involved in the 
fighting. The views of the key combat group, the AFRC/SLA, and its leader Johnny 
Paul Koroma were not represented at Lomé. This was due to the common negotiation 
position of the RUF/AFRC, headed by Sankoh, which had ‗pruned‘ AFRC 
representation at Lomé to those most amenable to RUF interests (Rashid, 2000). A 
statement signed by the AFRC/SLA later in the year (September 1999) requested that 
their interests be included in the peace process. These interests included 
                                                 
25
 In the Accord, there was only one mention of corruption which appeared in the preamble: 
‗Committed to promoting popular participation in the governance of the country and the 
advancement of democracy in a socio-political framework free of inequality, nepotism and 
corruption;‘ The Kabbah government had already expressed a commitment to anti-corruption 
measures prior to the peace deal and the Anti-Corruption Act of 2000 mandated the creation of 
the Anti-Corruption Commission. More details of the activities of this Commission are presented 
in Chapter 5. 
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compensation for war widows and access to economic activities such as carpentry, 
agriculture, and small-scale industry to improve the economic opportunities of ex-
combatants.
26
 
In the ‗good governance‘ category, the Commission for the Consolidation of 
Peace (CCP) (Article VI) was to be set up to ensure the implementation of the 
Agreement and to focus specifically on the needs of the victims of war, women and 
child soldiers in particular. To alleviate marginalisation of the AFRC leadership, Lt 
Col Johnny Paul Koroma was offered chair of the CCP in his absence. The irony of 
appointing the leader of the AFRC, accused of war atrocities comparable to the RUF, 
as chair of the Peace Commission was not lost on the international community. The 
Commission was subsequently politically and financially marginalised by both 
national government and international community, but despite this, Koroma achieved 
a lot in respect of immediate post-war confidence building which included mass 
voluntary disarmament in the provincial capital Bo (Bright, 2000: 38). 
Two relevant promises have been identified in this analysis. The promise to 
create an independent National Electoral Commission was a significant development 
for the political landscape in Sierra Leone. The NEC was a key institution for 
democracy because it enabled multi-party elections to be held in a free, fair and 
peaceful environment; it controlled the excesses of the incumbent and opened up the 
whole process to external and internal scrutiny. The NEC was therefore a key 
institution for the ‗good governance‘ agenda. So too was a reformed military; to 
neutralise a powerful state security institution and institution of democracy was a 
major step forward to correct the troubled political history of Sierra Leone.  Both 
                                                 
26
 Position Statement of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and the Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC) dated Saturday, 18
th
 September 1999, located at Sierra Leone Web: 
http://www.sierra-leone.org/AFRC-RUF/AFRC-091899.html, and accessed on 01/07/09 
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these promises had sound resonance with the recommendations of the TRC and the 
framework for peace (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 3: 232-239, 201-202). 
PEACE PROMISE 1 – INDEPENDENT NEC 
PEACE PROMISE 2 – REFORM OF THE ARMED FORCES 
 
Promises for the protection of civil, political and human rights – drawn from 
the Sierra Leone Constitution, the UN Declaration on Human Rights and the AU 
African Charter on Human and People Rights, were detailed in Articles XXIV to 
XXVI. Given the systematic abuse of human rights by successive governments in the 
post-independence years and the gross abuses committed by both government and 
rebel forces during the conflict, these promises were fundamental for both the 
immediate reconciliation process and longer term peace-building. The imperative 
was to build trust between ex-combatants and civilians, but also to build trust 
between the state and its society (Bright, 2000, TRC, 2004).  Promises under the 
human rights section (Article XXIV (2)) included detail such as the ‗protection of 
freedom of expression and association‘ and the ‗right to a fair trial‘ and 
‗participation in governance‘ – this had resonance with the past and the one party 
state, and the intimidation and oppression of political opposition under the APC 
regime. The promises to create two new Commissions; the ‗autonomous quasi-
judicial‘ Human Rights Commission and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
tapped into post-conflict imperatives to address grievances stemming from atrocities 
committed during the war, but there were longer term implications too. The promise 
to ‗promote Human Rights education throughout the various sectors of Sierra 
Leonean society‘ and the request that local civil society and human rights groups 
‗help monitor human rights observance‘ show a longer term commitment with 
potential for much greater awareness about human rights and new channels to 
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process complaints. This sort of language reflected the rhetoric of the ‗liberal peace‘ 
where governments were expected to respect the rights of their citizens as a sign of 
commitment to ‗good governance‘ and the international norms of state behaviour. 
There were other significant promises under the Human Rights section. The 
Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction was to provide 
‗special attention‘ to the needs of women; there was to be a special fund for war 
victims and ‗particular attention‘ accorded to the issue of child soldiers. Finally, the 
government promised to provide free primary school education but was more 
cautious in its ‗endeavour‘ to provide extended schooling or ‗affordable primary 
health‘ care. 
There were two important findings in the analysis of the human rights section 
of the Agreement. First, despite many promises associated with ‗human rights‘ there 
was no mention or promise of judicial reform to secure the most fundamental of 
human rights – access to justice.27  Indeed, the TRC-R stated that ‗The starting point 
in establishing the rule of law is the creation of an independent, impartial and 
autonomous judiciary‘, and wide ranging and far reaching reform of the judiciary 
was recommended by the TRC-R to secure and guarantee human rights protection 
and also to control discretionary governmental power (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 3: 
131).    
Inequitable law, separate court systems, lack of access to courts, few lawyers, 
and a confusion of administrative and judicial roles all conspired to prevent the 
application of the rule of law in Sierra Leone. Courts rarely protected human 
rights or policed administrative irregularity.  (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 3: 
130)   
                                                 
27
 Unlike the former Abidjan Agreement which included in Article 24 - ‗The Parties agree that 
the independence of the Judiciary shall be strengthened in accordance with its role of ensuring 
the fair and impartial dispensation of justice in a democratic order.‘ A copy of this agreement 
can be found at Conciliation Resources - http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sierra-
leone/abidjan-agreement.php, accessed on 28/12/09 
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Despite the absence or reference to the rule of law at Lomé, there was an unwitting 
acknowledgement of the weakness of the country‘s judicial systems in Article VII, 
para.7 (management of mineral resources); that the government may (if necessary) 
‗seek the assistance and cooperation of other governments and their instruments of 
law enforcement to detect and facilitate the prosecution of violations of this article‘.   
The second important finding was the explicit promise by the GovSL for the 
‗immediate implementation‘ of the TRC‘s recommendations. This was of paramount 
importance for peace because the weaknesses and omissions of the Lomé Peace 
Agreement, such as the absence of a commitment to judicial reform, mentioned 
above, were to be corrected and supplemented by society-wide consultations through 
the TRC.   
PEACE PROMISE 3 - PROTECT AND PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The management and exploitation of national mineral resources was another 
key point of analysis. This was because, although there were disputes about the role 
of diamonds as a key factor for the war, what was agreed was that the historic 
mismanagement and exploitation of the nation‘s wealth by corrupt political elites led 
to collapse of the economy and ultimately collapse of the state (Gberie, 2005, Zack-
Williams, 1999, Richards, 1996, Fanthorpe, 2001, TRC, 2004). Agreement to secure 
and monitor mineral extraction; ‗the legitimate exploitation of Sierra Leone‘s gold 
and diamonds, and other resources‘ was therefore highly contested at Lomé (Rashid, 
2000: 26). The decision to offer Sankoh leadership of the new Commission for 
Strategic Mineral Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD) 
was regarded as the biggest concession made by the government (Bright, 2000: 39). 
The broader context for the management of mineral resources, however, had direct 
relevance for peace: 
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The proceeds from the transactions of gold and diamonds shall be public 
monies which shall enter a special treasury account to be spent exclusively on 
the development of the people of Sierra Leone, with appropriations for public 
education, public health, infrastructural development, and compensation for 
incapacitated war victims as well as post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction.  
Priority spending shall go to rural areas. (Article VII:6) 
Additional promises were made for a transparent and accountable process (Article 
VII, paras.10 and 11) ‗to make the exploitation of gold and diamonds the legitimate 
domain of the people of Sierra Leone‘ (para.14). Together, the various promises 
made under Article VII provided a framework for better management of the 
economy, the accountable exploitation of natural resources and their proceeds, and a 
commitment to the transfer of ownership of these resources from rebels and political 
elites to the citizens of Sierra Leone.   
PEACE PROMISE 4 – PUBLIC OWNERSHIP OF PUBLIC GOODS 
 
Lomé and the accompanying TRC-R can now be reduced to the principal 
promises for peace which provide a comprehensive blue print which has the potential 
to address some of the challenges for building long term peace. 
1. The promise to create an independent NEC 
This addresses the issue of equal participation and access to government, 
political freedoms, a level playing field for all political parties and a 
commitment to democratic processes and institutions 
2. The promise to reform the Sierra Leone Armed Forces 
This is important because of the historic tendency of the armed forces to 
destabilise government and terrorise citizens. 
3. The promise to protect and promote human rights 
This had potential to address government‘s propensity to disrespect civil and 
political rights, and to promote a society wide acceptance of the rights and 
dignity of all individuals especially women and children.  
 100 
 
4. Public ownership of public goods 
The effective and transparent management of the national economy, the 
exploitation of mineral resources for the sole good of the civilians of Sierra 
Leone, improved economic opportunities for marginalised groups 
Additional proxy promises through the TRC, are as follows: 
5. Judicial reform and the rule of law 
Essential for the protection of human rights and for the division of powers in 
a democratic polity – democratic institutions to check the excesses of the 
executive and failed leadership of the past 
6. Anti-corruption 
To address the many imperative recommendations of the TRC-R in respect of 
bad leadership and the behaviour of political elites 
7. Good governance  
The imperative recommendations in the TRC-R on good governance were 
almost exclusively concerned with the behaviour of political elites and 
establishing an ethos of good, impartial, accountable leadership to improve 
the relationship of trust and reciprocity between citizen and state, and in 
addition to that was the ‗national emergency‘ of youth unemployment 
2.3 - ANALYSIS OF THE LOMÉ PEACE ACCORD 
The Sierra Leone government was under a moral obligation to lead the way in 
the search for peace – an obligation it did not always fulfil (Bright, 2000: 41) 
Compromise agreement 
In contrast to the previous peace deal brokered in Abidjan where the RUF was under 
pressure to compromise, at Lomé they were on the offensive (Abraham, 2004b) 
which was, in part, due to the increased international interest in the cessation of 
hostilities, at any price (Keen, 2005). The compromises at Lomé, however, involved 
unconstitutional ‗political surgery, done in the name of peace‘ and an explicit 
disregard for the wishes of the electorate (Bright, 2000: 39). The ‗despicable 
amnesty‘ scandalised Sierra Leoneans and was greeted with condemnation by 
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international human rights organisations (Gberie, 2005: 51). The feeling of injustice 
was aggravated by the slow start of the TRC due to lack of funding and the various 
ceasefire violations.
28
 The local reaction to power sharing and a blanket amnesty for 
RUF atrocities prompted a series of public strikes (Abraham, 2004b). The protests, 
organised by the Civil Society Movement, reflected public outrage at the challenge 
power sharing posed to their hard won fight for democracy. ‗We‘re fighting for 
democracy. We cannot see democracy being tampered with by rebels who have 
destabilised the nation‘.29    
The outcome of the promises 
The short term compromises made by the government at Lomé were never intended 
to come to fruition. The RUF was not offered a ‗senior‘ cabinet position or the 
parastatal and diplomatic jobs promised in the Agreement. Further, the unclear 
wording of Article VII meant there was great confusion as to the role of the CMRRD 
and it was never fully constituted; the Council of Elders (Article VIII), whose 
mandate was to manage any conflicting interpretations of the Agreement, was never 
set up (Bright, 2000). These failures  may have been due to lack of finances and 
other resources as well as the lack of will, the expectation that Sankoh did not intend 
to keep his promises, or the priorities of the international community which meant 
uneven application of the peace plan (Bright, ibid). Control of mineral resources 
through the CMRRD meant that the RUF still had the means to prosecute the war 
(Gberie, 2005: 51). Although the RUF had promised a ceasefire in exchange for 
control of natural resources, almost immediately it broke this promise by kidnapping 
UNAMSIL troops and murdering peace protestors (Rashid, 2000, Bright, 2000).   
                                                 
28
 See Steve Coll, The other war, Washington Post, 9
th
 January 2000 and Human rights Watch 
Letter to Kofi Annan, 6
th
 July 1999, http://hrw.org/english/docs/1999/07/06/sierra5754.htm  
29
 Sierra Leone News, 17/06/99, available from Sierra Leone Web: http://www.sierra-
leone.org/Archives/slnews0699.html, accessed on 06/06/08; see also Abraham (2004) 
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Both protagonists were not fully committed to their short term peace 
promises and those who were excluded appeared to behave with more dedication to 
the peace process, Johnny Paul Koroma of the AFRC, for example. Vice-president 
Soloman Berewa admitted later that no-one expected Sankoh to show any 
commitment or respect for the peace deal and that, sooner or later, he would commit 
crimes outside his amnesty period and could be re-arrested and stripped of his 
cabinet post and all other entitlements under the deal (Berewa, 2001: 55-56). The 
pressure from the international community to broker a deal was immense. Signing 
the deal, under whatever conditions, was imperative to secure international support 
for reconstruction even at the expense of justice and democracy for the local 
populace. The weakness of the Agreement was its ‗elitism‘; the exclusion of the 
historically marginalised and disgruntled mass of youth who had been victims or 
perpetrators of the war, and the AFRC leadership. There were no promises or 
commitments to the youth of Sierra Leone as a specific marginalised group. 
Prioritising the RUF leadership reflected a myopic approach to the complexities of 
the conflict and the role played by government forces and other rebel groups.  No 
representatives of the renegade soldiers were present at Lomé and although civil 
society was present, no provision was made for the youth (Gberie, 2005:157). In the 
Abidjan Agreement (1996) provision was made for this group under Article 26(e) to 
‗provide job opportunities in a systematic and sustainable way for the people, 
especially the youth‘. The machinations of Foday Sankoh were all about securing the 
best deal for himself not the thousands of loyal combatants under his command who 
faced uninspiring reintegration into a hostile society and collapsed economy. But the 
‗revolutionary script‘ of the war had long since been diminished to that of greed and 
the quest for power at the centre.  
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A further weakness of the Accord was the lack of focus on the socio-economic 
dimensions to the war - a departure from the promises at Abidjan for reconstruction, 
substantive parts of which were not replicated at Lomé. For example, the promises of 
equal opportunities for the rural and urban poor, equitable distribution of the nation‘s 
resources and job opportunities for the youth, judicial and police reform and ‗probity 
in government‘ were all absent from the second peace plan (see Gberie, 2005).  
Although Lomé was weak in its exclusionary process and contained promises 
for a ‗quick fix‘ peace deal so as to engender the flow of international aid, the longer 
term peace promises made by the government to its citizens were important. Bright 
described these as embodying ‗the hope of millions if respected and which in essence 
addresses the major issues which are at the bottom of the conflict‘. Bright argued 
that Lomé was far more than a dispute solving mechanism. The potential 
beneficiaries also included ex-combatants, war victims and the wider citizenry 
because the deal was to ‗encompass the setting up of solid and secure socio-
economic structures in post-war Sierra Leone as a factor of security‘. (Bright, 2000):  
The proceeds from the transactions of gold and diamonds shall be public 
monies which shall enter a special Treasury account to be spent exclusively on 
the development of the people of Sierra Leone, with appropriations for public 
education, public health, infrastructural development, and compensation for 
incapacitated war victims as well as post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction. 
Priority spending shall go to rural areas. (GovSL, 1999: Article VII, 6) 
This promise alone had the potential to correct, or at least assuage, the deep societal 
grievances which gave fuel to such a destructive war.   
The recommendations of the TRC 
In all the analyses on war in Sierra Leone, and the official and unofficial 
documentation which supported peace, the question of tackling bad governance and 
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failed leadership was compelling. Failed leadership was described by the TRC in the 
following terms: 
 Unrestrained greed, corruption and bad governance 
 Undemocratic practices such as obstacles to participation, lack of 
accountability, discrimination and marginalisation of certain groups, 
outlawing political expression 
 Poverty, deprivation, economic marginalisation 
 Uneven development policies for the Western area compared to the provinces 
 Abuse of human rights and contempt for the rule of law 
 
In the absence of many tangible ‗good governance‘ promises in the Accord, the 
recommendations of the TRC-R were crucial because the continuation of corruption, 
discrimination and marginalisation could reinforce historic power struggles among 
the elite and the rest of society which had previously ‗suffocated the growth of 
democracy and good governance‘ and ‗nurtured a rebellious attitude among the 
youth‘ (TRC, 2004: Vol.3A: 212).30 The TRC-R reinforces the framework for peace 
with a specific vision of good government which would:  
 
1. protect the rights of all citizens through an independent and professional 
security sector and justice system with strict adherence to the rule of law;  
2. rule through transparent and accountable democratic processes allowing 
equal access to public goods and public resources for the benefit of both 
citizens and nation, and being responsive to demands from civil society and 
the broader citizenry at large 
3. secure and exploit all proceeds from mineral extraction for the sole purpose 
of improving the lives of all Sierra Leoneans through development in all parts 
of the country, equally 
                                                 
30
 See also the UNAMSIL submission to the TRC, Vol. 3A (70) 
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4. provide economic opportunities to citizens through good management of the 
state and endeavour to protect the national economy from the consequences 
of global fluctuations and crises 
5. control its territory and borders through an efficient and loyal military 
2.4 - PRIORITY INTERVENTIONS  
The National Recovery Strategy (NRS) was the short term plan to stabilise the 
country after the arrival of peace. Its mandate was to produce an overview of the 
post-war recovery needs in Sierra Leone and to lay the foundation for the 
consolidation of peace and a transition towards sustainable development (Moore et 
al., 2003). Three main components for recovery were identified: government, civil 
society and the economy. Good government, a civil society which could monitor and 
challenge it, and an economy which could support its functions were prerequisites for 
the sustained peace and development of the country (GovSL, 2002: 12). Based on 
needs assessments around the country, strategies were included which would address 
short term emergency interventions as well as long term development goals. This 
document was the central point of reference with regard to practical, benchmarked 
objectives for peace and in 2003 the official assessment of the NRS concluded that it 
had ‗all the needed interventions to address the key causes of the conflict‘ (ibid: 
Executive Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations). The following areas were 
priorities for the reconstruction: 
1. Restoration of State Authority 
The rebuilding of government infrastructure and institutions at all levels including 
district administration and councils, police, courts and prisons, and native 
administration i.e. the reconstruction of state machinery to restore its sovereign 
legitimacy throughout the country. 
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2. Rebuilding Communities 
For example, resettlement of IDPs and refugees, the reintegration of ex-combatants, 
health, water, sanitation, education, child protection, social services and shelter; 
essentially providing the very basic conditions necessary for people to reconstruct 
their communities and survive. 
3. Peace Building and Human Rights 
The two central components being the TRC and Special Court; but also the 
mainstreaming, sensitisation, education and training on HR issues into all aspects of 
governance and society.  The specific nature of the war - the gross abuses of human 
rights and the culture of impunity - were seen as a serious issue capable of restricting 
the sustainable reconstruction of communities. 
4. Restoration of the Economy 
The main priorities identified were the agriculture sector for food security; increased 
production from the mining industries; transport and communication infrastructure; 
and improved access to micro-finance. Micro-finance was identified as a potential 
mechanism for absorbing significant numbers of the unemployed into the country‘s 
large informal economy.  
There were many short and long term benchmarks under the four main pillars 
for recovery. Table 5 (below) summarises the plans relevant to the framework for 
peace. 
Table 5 - National Recovery Strategy: priorities for long term peace-building 
 
Priority area of 
intervention 
Description Peace 
Promise 
 
(1)  
 
consolidation of 
 District council elections 1, 7 
 Increased strength and presence of police 
2, 5 
 JPs and magistrates courts throughout the country 
5, 7 
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state authority  Rehabilitation of provincial prisons and increased 
number of prison service staff 
5, 7 
 Rehabilitate court barries and chiefdom police 2, 5, 7 
 
(2) 
  
re-building 
communities 
 Child protection and social services to vulnerable 
groups – child soldiers, disabled and handicapped 3, 7 
 Establishment of basic services: primary 
education, primary health care, access to water 
and sanitation, home rehabilitation 
3, 4, 7 
 
(3)  
 
Peace-building and 
human rights 
 
 
 Human rights sensitisation and training 3, 7 
 
(4)  
 
restoration of the 
economy 
 Food self-sufficiency, surplus, trading and 
economic opportunities 
 Increase official diamond exports and start 
production of rutile 
 Increase micro credit loans, especially to rural 
areas 
 Improved and sustainably maintained road 
network throughout the country 
4, 7 
 
4, 7 
4, 7 
 
4, 7 
 
There was clear potential in these benchmarked objectives to address the 
longer term issues for peace; for example, extending the reach of the state to all areas 
of the country and introducing local elections and the rule of law into all provinces 
would go a long way to improving security and appeasing citizens who felt that their 
needs were not represented due to the previous centralisation of state authority. In 
addition, the delivery of basic services and infrastructure to all areas of the country 
would go somewhere to redress the urban bias of previous governments and would 
support implementation of the Lomé promise to direct resources to the rural areas. 
The combination of human rights sensitisation and the strengthening of law 
enforcement provision had potential to encourage the return of a sense of dignity and 
security among communities, and ideas around the restoration of the economy also 
had great potential to address mass unemployment through increased micro credit, 
expansion of agricultural activities and reform of the mining sector.  
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The plans for restoration of the chieftaincy tradition, however, had potential 
to reconstruct a historically contentious system as far as the youth of Sierra Leone 
was concerned. The TRC-R, which was published after the NRS, called for a 
national dialogue on the chieftaincy system so that chiefs could return to their pre-
colonial traditional roles and functions because the colonial system which abused 
traditional rule was deeply resented by traditional long-standing hereditary houses. 
The TRC-R therefore called for a return to chiefs‘ first and primary loyalties – their 
subjects - not to political parties or the state (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 6, 
Recommendations: 256).  
The NRS was something of a hybrid document combining the local 
vernacular with global terminology. This was not surprising as the document was to 
inform the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (iPRSP) which was wedded to 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). There were numerous references to 
‗good governance‘, for example, and the inclusion of ‗human rights‘ and ‗civil 
society‘. The benchmarked objectives in the NRS stopped short of tackling the issues 
of good leadership, which were more difficult to quantify, by focusing on capacity 
issues rather than good governance benchmarks. Good governance, corruption and 
capacity were, however, ‗cross-cutting‘ themes in other official documents written to 
engage the international community and this more than made up for the lack of 
commitment made to good governance elsewhere in the UNDAF or iPRSP for 
example.  
The benchmarks of the NRS were supported and supplemented by the 
‗expected outcomes‘ of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework 
(UNDAF) which focused on long term recovery through international engagement 
for development in the country. Drawing from the national priorities outlined in the 
NRS, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the Millennium 
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Development Goals (MDGs), the UNDAF was a blueprint for long term 
development and peace and included policy targets which could support the 
framework for peace. The UNDAF was the operational framework for the UN‘s 
Peace-building and Recovery Strategy and was engaged with the issues of corruption 
and lack of capacity (human, community and state) which cut across all co-operation 
strategies. Additional strategies for gender equality, women‘s rights, youth education 
and empowerment were also included. The main UNDAF target areas were similar to 
those of the NRS and synergised with the peace promises, but they went further to 
include ‗poverty reduction and integration‘ outcomes linked to the iPRSP and the 
global targets of the MDGs. In Table 6 (below) the UNDAF has been reduced to the 
‗outcomes‘ for peace which were relevant for the framework for peace. 
Table 6 - United Nations Development Assistance Framework: selected outcomes 
 
Area of Cooperation Expected Outcome NRS 
Benchmark 
Peace 
Promise 
(1) 
Poverty reduction 
and reintegration 
Increased access to employment and 
income generation opportunities for poor 
people 
4 7 
Increased access to quality social services, 
including shelter 
2 4, 7 
Increased food production, household food 
security and farm incomes 
4 7 
 
(2) 
Human rights and 
reconciliation 
Increased awareness and respect for 
human rights at national level, including 
the adoption/amendments of national laws 
as per international obligations 
3 3 
Improved capacity of law enforcement 
agents in the respect and protection of 
human rights and in conflict resolution at 
national and local levels 
1 3, 5 
(3) 
Good governance, 
peace and security 
Decentralisation policies adopted and local 
government restored and effectively 
functioning 
1 1, 7 
An effective, efficient and accountable 
justice system established 
1 5, 7 
Public sector reform for efficient and 
accountable service deliver 
2 4, 7 
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Security institutions and personnel 
strengthened 
1 2 
(4) 
Economic recovery 
Stabilised and competitive economy 4* 4, 7 
Increased private investment and 
employment 
4 7 
 
In most areas, the UNDAF reflected the declared objectives of the NRS. For 
example, the delivery of basic services to ‗priority areas of need‘ in the provinces 
and improving road infrastructure to stimulate rural markets and assist agro-based 
livelihoods including assisting the implementation of micro-credit schemes (UN, 
2003: Table1, Programme Framework: 9). But the key departure of the UNDAF 
from the NRS was its plans for economic recovery (ibid: Table 1, Programme 
Framework: 13). These focussed primarily on macro-economic reforms and 
employment generation from the private sector. In contrast, the NRS included great 
detail about the need for reform of the mining sector to reduce illegal activity and 
provide new employment opportunities. In particular, the NRS described in detail the 
strategy required to kick-start and support the rural economy, to ensure food security, 
promote surplus and increased economic opportunities for trade through agriculture.   
What this analysis shows is that there were major areas of synergy between 
local plans for recovery and development and those contained in the international 
community‘s blue print, yet assumptions were made about the method required to 
deliver the outcomes. Market economics was the model for reconstruction and, like 
multiparty democracy, was assumed to be the solution for the recovery of the nation. 
This was indicative of the ‗liberal peace‘ in action as a framework for national 
recovery; a framework which made flawed assumptions about fragile and 
challenging local conditions and the ability, capacity and will of the Sierra Leone 
state to adopt widespread liberalising reforms. 
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Another interesting point about the UNDAF was its preoccupation with 
monitoring the various outcomes because a significant portion of the budget was 
enveloped for this. For example, the budget for monitoring poverty reduction was 
US$5m which represented around 40% of the overall budget in this area ($12,600m). 
The post-conflict challenges for implementation – environment, capacity 
and dependency 
the challenge is enormous, as are the financial and human capacity constraints  
(GovSL, 2002: 3) 
the physical devastation within the country, the exodus of skilled Sierra 
Leoneans, the disruption of schooling, high numbers of traumatised war 
victims, the destruction of authority systems, and deeply rooted social problems, 
particularly the neglect of youth, were all part of the environment in which the 
Lomé agreement was to succeed or fail  (Bright, 2000: 40)   
In reconstruction, the tendency of the international community was to ignore 
the limited capacity of the state and to push ahead with overambitious programming 
((Moreno, 2000,  cited by Cheru, 2002: 215). In the Peace Agreement, at least eleven 
Articles mandated the support of the international community for their 
implementation giving some indication of the poor capacity of the Sierra Leone state 
to instigate and sustain its own peace process. There was therefore great pressure on 
the government to come to any sort of deal which would end the fighting and secure 
external support (Keen, 2005, Gberie, 2005). Despite chronic capacity issues, the 
Lomé Agreement committed to establishing no fewer than thirteen new 
Commissions or Committees: 
New Commissions 
 Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) 
 Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP) 
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 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
 The Human Rights Commission (HRC) 
 National Electoral Commission (NEC) 
 The Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National 
Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD) 
 National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
 National Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction 
New Committees 
 Ceasefire Monitoring Committee 
 Constitutional Review Committee 
 The Committee for the Release of Prisoners of War and Non-Combatants 
 The Committee for Humanitarian Assistance 
 The Provincial and District Cease-fire Monitoring Committees 
Additional Bodies (macro-economic reform) 
 National Revenue Authority 
 National Commission for Privatisation 
These extra burdens were to put a huge strain on the limited human, technical 
and financial resources of the state. The bad governance preceding the war and the 
destruction caused during the conflict meant that the state faced severe problems for 
revenue collection and the effective utilisation of resources. The failures of 
leadership had been manifest at all levels of public life including throughout the civil 
service and bureaucracy, and this had stripped the state of its capacity to effectively 
collect revenues or pay wages (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 2: 67). Figure 6 shows 
how government revenue failed to keep up with expenditure especially during the 
two years after Lomé where the deficit rose to an average of around 16% (2000 and 
2001). The civil service, police, army and judiciary all felt the impact of low 
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revenues post-war (Reno, 2003). State infrastructure; buildings, equipment, 
technology, skills and human resources had all been severely damaged by the war; 
capital flight had removed potential revenue flows associated with commercial 
enterprise, and the criminalisation of the mining sector had depleted the national 
treasury still further. This crisis of capacity and resources meant greater dependency 
on the international community for aid, most of which could not easily be absorbed 
and channelled into peacebuilding projects. 
These realities of the post-conflict challenges failed to resonate with the 
decision making process for recovery which included widespread programming for 
liberalising reforms. 
 
Figure 6 – Sierra Leone revenue to expenditure 1996-2001 
 
 
Sierra Leone interim PRSP and PRSP (2005-007) 
 
Recovery … is seen as the process of building capacity, both human and 
economic, for the Government and Civil Society to be able to take responsibility 
for all aspects of the future development of the country. (GovSL, 2002: 11)  
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This emphasis on capacity building was the philosophy of the NRS and was echoed 
in the UNDAF. It was repeated in all official documentation concerning the recovery 
and development of the country (World Bank, 2006, GovSL, 2001, Moore et al., 
2003, IMF, 2007).
31
 In the aftermath of war, Sierra Leone was a state almost totally 
dependent on the international community to fund and resource its recovery and this 
dependency had implications for the local integrity of the peacebuilding project and 
the ability of the state to act independently. 
Good governance is dependent on … the available of appropriate human 
resources, means of service delivery, effective mechanisms for paying salaries 
… outreach to district and chiefdom levels, and communication (GovSL, 2002: 
12) 
2.5 - CONCLUDING STATEMENT 
This chapter has made a thorough analysis of the peace documents to investigate 
their credentials for correcting the problems of the past to face the challenges of the 
future. The Lomé Accord had something to offer for the long term peacebuilding, but 
not much. It was an exclusionary document, constructed to stop the fighting. Some of 
the promises it contained were steps in the right direction but in the absence of any 
radical change to the existing structures of government and in the presence of vastly 
reduced state capacity to deliver much of anything at all, they were rather shallow. A 
highly controversial compromise document, Lomé excluded the voice of the broader 
citizenry and was unconstitutional in its promise to appoint potential war criminals to 
public office and to offer blanket amnesties.  
                                                 
31
 See also Letters of Intent to IMF (2002, 2003, 2005, 2008) available from IMF website at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/cpid/default.aspx?gType=CPID&selCountry=Sierra+Leone&DT
ype=Letters+of+Intent+-
+Memoranda+of+Economic+Policies&selLang=Select+Language&selMonth=Month&selYear=
Year&selMonth1=Month&selYear1=Year, accessed on 07/07/09   
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In contrast, the TRC-R represented the local voice on post-war priorities. 
More plausible in its conclusions about the peacebuilding project, it was a legal 
document which legitimately and comprehensively ‗filled the gaps‘ left from Lomé. 
The TRC-R was more realistic about the capacity of the state to reform quickly and 
focussed primarily on the behaviour of political elites. Although challenging, the 
solutions for a peaceful Sierra Leone drawn from the TRC-R were much less 
complicated and ambitious than those recommended in the documents produced to 
garner international support and feed into the PRSPs. The wish lists in the blue prints 
for peace were unrealistic by any standards and the project of capacity building was 
not a natural partner to quick win reforms expected by external actors, because the 
quick win reforms required significant state capacity in themselves. The NRS and the 
UNDAF combined to form a comprehensive blue print for recovery, but despite their 
similarities there was some departure in the focus on reviving the economy. The 
main contradiction was the emphasis on growth for poverty reduction and the 
alignment of recovery with the MDGs. This was to involve a statebuilding enterprise 
which was to smother any notions of local ‗discoveries‘ informing the local recovery. 
A strategic deficit had emerged as ownership of the peacebuilding seemed to have 
shifted from the broader citizenry to internal and external elites who were involved in 
constructing new promises to secure assistance for recovery. The local plan for peace 
appeared to be absorbed into a bigger, more complex paradigm for peace amidst pre-
determined norms and values of the international system which were unable to 
engage with the local challenges because of their inflexibility. The emerging tensions 
between the external and internal priorities for reconstruction meant the relocation 
and re-identification of the political economy of peace. Lomé had secured the 
consolidation of governing structures which had failed to serve the populace in the 
past but without a radical change post-war, was it realistic to assume that familiar 
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liberalising policies would unite a nation and produce a more equal and fair society? 
Was it possible that the new model, on an old theme, would have the flexibility to 
address the local challenges for peace as well as the many global expectations? 
Something was already looking a little faulty with the blue print for peace. The 
claim of liberal peacebuilding - that it was inclusive and locally sensitive - was rather 
shallow in the trajectory of the reconstruction of Sierra Leone. What was imagined to 
be a home grown project morphed into something different and the vocabulary of the 
Lomé Accord was just the genesis of dialectic on recovery which was to create a 
strategic deficit in the location of the political economy of peace.  
…distressingly, the Commission did not detect any sense of urgency among 
public officials to respond to the myriad challenges facing the country.  Indeed, 
the perception within civil society and the international community is that all 
efforts at designing and implementing meaningful intervention programmes, 
such as the National Recovery Strategy … … are driven by donors rather than 
the national government. This is lamentable.  
(TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 1, Executive Summary:  21). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
REFORM AND INTERVENTIONIST POLITICS 
 
Chapter two conceptualised a working framework for peace which illustrated the 
local priorities for long term peace. To understand the interventionist politics 
associated with the peacebuilding and reconstruction, and the impact of those politics 
on local peacebuilding priorities, chapter three now makes an investigation into the 
model for reconstruction and the programming involved to see what new 
mechanisms were put in place to help support local needs and local concerns and the 
many local challenges for peace.  
To facilitate the analysis, an interrogation is made of various documents 
including the PRSPs, Letters of Intent and HIPC to ascertain what conditionalities 
were attached to loans, and for what purpose, so that a comparison can be made 
between the government‘s promises to the IFIs, and those made to local citizens. The 
analysis draws on work by Luckham which claims that the goals of international 
actors may be ‗mutually incoherent or may conflict with those of national 
stakeholders in post-conflict states‘ (Luckham, 2004: 501). What follows, therefore, 
is an investigation into potential areas of dichotomy or contradiction, 
complementarity or consistency, between international goals and those of local 
people. 
The information is organised loosely around two themes; macro economic 
reform and ‗good governance‘, and the chapter opens by presenting the history of 
conditionalities in Sierra Leone. Section 3.1 explains the concept of statebuilding in 
terms of its relevance for peace and the delivery of development and security. 
Section 3.3 goes on to analyse the politics of reconstruction and engages with the 
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concept of ‗good governance‘ to determine its relevance to the governance 
challenges of the local peacebuilding plan. Section 3.4 analyses the politics of donor 
intervention in the promotion of democracy and the chapter closes with an analysis 
of the main priorities for the reconstruction. 
3.1 - HISTORY OF CONDITIONALITIES IN SIERRA LEONE  
Similar to most impoverished nations whose national economies were imploding 
under the weight of debt repayments, Sierra Leone undertook structural adjustment 
programming to secure additional loans from the IFIs during the 1980s. SAPs 
represented conditional lending which demanded increased government support to 
agriculture but at the same time the ‗rolling back‘ of the state through the 
liberalisation of its economy (Thomson, 2004: 183). Conditional lending meant that 
the IFIs became the dictators of Sierra Leone‘s public policy, exposing the fate of the 
local economy to the global market. SAPs became very controversial across the 
continent as countries paid out more in debt servicing than they received in foreign 
exchange leaving no funds to reinvest in state infrastructure, industry or services. 
The result was increased unemployment and reduced public goods (ibid: 187). 
Poverty deepened in Sierra Leone. The imposition of cuts in rice subsidies were 
described as ‗political suicide‘ by Siaka Stevens who handed over power to Joseph 
Momoh the same year (Stevens, 1985). SAPS had a detrimental effect on political 
stability across the continent and Sierra Leone was no exception. As noted earlier, 
they hastened the crisis of patrimonialism which threatened the legitimacy of the 
state. The country was subjected to further substantial structural reforms under 
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) from 1991-1998 but the 
intensification of the war stymied the completion of those reforms (IMF/IDA, 2002: 
C9). 
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New thinking on conditionalities blamed the failure of SAPs on the inability 
of nation states to ‗own‘ their development because policies were imposed from 
outside without local consultations. A post-Washington consensus emerged in the 
late 1990s which claimed to be not only a ‗new theory‘ of development, but a ‗new 
process‘ for development by involving wide ranging consultations with local people 
to establish local ‗ownership‘ of the project (Stiglitz, 1998). The plan included the 
notion of ‗democratic, equitable and sustainable development‘ which was something 
of a departure from the former Washington consensus because the idea was to raise 
living standards as well as GDP, standards which could be measured using health 
and literacy indicators (ibid).
32
 Thus the MDGs were born; concerned with political, 
social and environmental stability as well as economic stability, they aspired to 
produce a multisectoral, intersectoral, holistic, balanced and humanist approach to 
development (Cheru et al., 2005: 2/3).  
The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPCI) was the mechanism 
designed to correct the ownership issue around national policy for development. New 
conditionalities on loans shifted the emphasis from policy modality to policy 
processes and their outcomes. It was believed that process conditionality would 
succeed where policy conditionality had failed because drawing local stakeholders 
into consultations would legitimise the reforms (Foster et al., 1999: cited by Booth, 
2003:7, Easterly, 2006, Stiglitz, 1998). Recognising that SAPs had failed and 
national governments needed to be involved, the HIPCI therefore became the new 
instrument to legitimise debt relief. The key element was submission by national 
governments of PRSPs setting out a country led strategy for development and 
poverty reduction although these strategies had experienced very mixed outcomes 
                                                 
32
 ‗higher GDP is not an end in itself, but a means to improved living standards and a better 
society, with less poverty, better health, and improved education.‘ GBERIE, L. (2000) First 
stages on the road to peace: the Abidjan process. London: Conciliation Resources.  
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previously across the continent (Booth, 2003). In Sierra Leone, writing the PRSPs 
involved the participation of a broad range of local stakeholders who were invited to 
‗buy in‘ and ‗take ownership‘ of the liberalising agenda (Paris, 2004). The GovSL 
was to engage widely with its society to produce tangible ownership of its 
development policy. This was good news for the peace given the exclusionary nature 
of politics in the past, and yet the purpose of consultation was to establish how best 
to implement an already agreed template of reform not to encourage fresh thinking 
by locals on the pressing issues facing the nation. 
The Sierra Leone PRSPs set out the government‘s wide ranging pledges to 
secure lending from the IMF and credits from the WB, and also support from 
development agencies (Booth, 2003). They also contained various promises for 
‗good governance‘. The argument went that ‗good governance‘, of which democracy 
was a central tenet, meant that those in positions of responsibility would be held 
accountable for their actions, or inactions, and citizens would have a voice in 
decision making and programme implementation (World Bank, 2005: 5).  
The documents did not represent a ‗blue print‘ for peace but a blue print for 
reform which could garner international assistance for recovery. Crucial for 
stabilising the national economy was securing substantial debt relief under the 
HIPC2 therefore the PRSPs made the right pledges to mainstream anti-poverty 
measures into national policy through a system of ‗good governance‘. The iPRSP 
was required for HIPC Decision Point and the PRSP, which involved broader 
consultations with stakeholders and the government meeting critical ‗performance 
criteria‘, was required for Completion.  
The papers were deeply problematic in respect of their potential to divert 
national resources away from pressing local concerns, and also in their assumptions 
that ‗democracy‘ would bring good government. Further, the consultations did not 
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leave room for debate about the structures within which reform would take place; an 
export oriented and open economy, for example, and a multi-party system of 
democracy. The PRSP process was not without its critics who argued that PRSPs 
generally consisted of ‗vague statements of aspirations‘ not based on any assessment 
of previously failed policies, and were garnered through a consultation process ‗less 
than completely inclusive of interest groups‘. The consultation process also included 
no mechanism to deal with contentious stakeholders who might fail to agree on the 
way forward (Booth, 2003: 15, Easterly, 2006: 127). Others noted that HIPC 
‗performance criteria‘ put too much strain on the economies of weak states especially 
at a time of ‗make or break‘ in fragile post-war transitions (Castillo, 2008: 92, 
Fayolle, 2006), a point taken up by Keen who explained the impact of economic 
structural reforms on the DDR; absorbing former combatants into communities, for 
example, was undermined by reduced economic opportunities brought on by 
adjustment (Keen, 2008: 188, Hanlon, 1996). The first twenty six countries to qualify 
for debt relief under HIPC went on to spend more on debt servicing than health care 
and most countries never reached the point where they could sustain their debt. Many 
were servicing debt at the cost of widespread malnutrition reflected in poor social 
indicators such as premature death and excessive morbidity (Cheru, 2007: 76). In the 
case of Sierra Leone, channelling national wealth out of the country in debt servicing 
did not help the recovery effort. This was a serious issue for peacebuilding, a point 
acknowledged by the World Bank which argued that in post-conflict states, the 
documents should ‗look and feel very different from other countries‘ because of the 
priority to consolidate peace, and ‗development strategies should look different in 
countries facing a high risk of conflict, where the problems and priorities are 
distinctive‘ (World Bank, 2003: 14, Collier et al., 2003: 6). 
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Despite the critique of the HIPC process, the analysis in this chapter centres 
on the conditionalities of the IFIs because these institutions held the key to vast flows 
of aid for Sierra Leone‘s post-conflict recovery and exercised a powerful and broad 
sphere of influence. They had preferred creditor status and without their approval it 
would be hard for a country like Sierra Leone to obtain finance from other sources or 
secure private investment (Thomas and Allen, 2000). The conditionalities attached to 
their loans far outweighed the demands of bilateral and multilateral donors although 
IMF prioritisation of macro-economic reform within the broader framework of ‗good 
governance‘ influenced donors‘ areas of policy too (Cheru, 2007). For example, 
Britain gives aid conditional upon IMF policies (Stiglitz, 1998) and most Overseas 
Development Assistance (ODA) was associated with the conditionalities of ‗good 
governance‘ and ‗sound economic practices‘.  
Figure 7 gives an overview of the levels of assistance received by the GovSL 
from the major donors and financial institutions in the post-conflict period, and 
shows the split between grants and loans where relevant. Grants to Sierra Leone 
outstripped loans by a ratio of around 3:1 (Fig.8) but, despite this, it was the 
conditions imposed on loans by the IFIs which took precedence. Such 
conditionalities defined the model for rebuilding state institutions and improving 
methods of economic management, the logic underpinning the reform being that 
states could export themselves out of a crisis by integrating their economies into 
world markets. Exports also produced dollars to repay loans, important for servicing 
debt (Cheru, 2007). The GovSL had little alternative but to buy in to the liberalising 
agenda and in doing so to get its ‗house in order‘. Its Letter of Intent (2006) made a 
point of thanking the IMF and World Bank for their support, ‗which was 
instrumental in garnering assistance from the international community for... 
development efforts‘ (GovSL, 2006). For these reasons the following analysis of 
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interventionist politics is centred on governance reforms stipulated by the IMF and 
WB and includes data retrieved from the PRSPs, Letters of Intent and HIPC 
documentation. 
Figure 7 – Summary of grants and loans to Sierra Leone 1999-2006  
 
 
All data sourced from OECD - http://stats.oecd.org and Sierra Leone Development Assistance 
Coordination Office - www.daco-sl.org on 08/08/08.  
*data for 2006 only for Islamic Development Bank but further loan of $10million approved in 2007 
sourced from Islamic Development Bank direct (accessed on 12/08/08) at: 
http://www.isdb.org/irj/portal/anonymous/idb_news_details_en?mcpFlag=MCP&NE_MCPCountry=
Sierra%20Leone&idbNews=IDB%20extends%20US_%2010%20million%20for%20food%20security
%20and%20poverty%20alleviation%20in%20Sierra%20Leone.xml&fileTitle=IDB%20extends%20U
S$%2010%20million%20for%20food%20security%20and%20poverty%20alleviation%20in%20Sierr
a%20Leone.xml 
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Figure 8 - Total loans and grants to Sierra Leone 2000-2006 
 
 
 
sourced from Sierra Leone Development Assistance Coordinating Office, accessed on 12/08/08 and 
available at:  http://www.daco-sl.org/encyclopedia/5_part/5_1idb.htm:  
 
 
3.2 - LIBERAL STATE BUILDING AND ITS CRITICS 
The IFIs‘ conditional loans complemented ‗liberal peace‘ philosophising. No 
recovery could be made without the strong state institutions to deliver it, so the 
Western model of liberal democracy was marshalled in for the state building project 
to re-establish workable political institutions, to re-build the national economy and to 
regenerate civil society - central goals in UN multi-dimensional peace operations. 
The chronic incapacity of state institutions in Sierra Leone, the result of previous 
regimes and the civil war, was a case in point for the institution building enterprise as 
was the legal justification for building the capacity of the state – generically known 
as jus post bellum – which was concerned with the capacity of local government to 
fulfil its international obligations. Global instruments such as International 
Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights Law, International Criminal Law, 
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International Refugee Law, International Development Law and International 
Economic Law allowed external actors the legitimacy required to set conditionalities 
for post-war support and allow broad based interventions (Chetail, 2009a, Stahn, 
2007). The argument that to establish durable peace it was necessary to build up 
government institutions legitimised the reconstruction. Thus peacebuilding became 
associated with the state building project as the foundation for war to peace 
transitions and influenced policy at the UN, World Bank, IMF and OECD 
(Fukuyama, 2004, Paris and Sisk, 2007).  
Fukuyama‘s three phases of statebuilding is a useful framework to explain 
the process in Sierra Leone (Fukuyama, 2004: 135-136). The first phase - post-
conflict reconstruction - centred on the twin concerns of stability and security, 
essential for a nation emerging from violent conflict where state authority had 
collapsed. Activities included the co-ordination and reform of the security forces and 
police, humanitarian assistance and technical assistance to restore electricity and 
water supplies, and build bridges etc. As already noted, the UNAMSIL, British 
military training and the activities of many other local and global actors were very 
successful in completing this first phase. The second phase involved the 
strengthening of state institutions, in particular those institutions which could collect 
and process taxes to channel into development, apropos the peace agreement. Reform 
of the institutions which supported the national economy was therefore prioritised. 
Fukuyama describes a good state institution as one which is transparent and which 
efficiently serves the needs of its ‗clients‘ – the general populace.  Therefore 
institutions also needed to be democratic.  Indeed, democratisation was a principal 
component of reconstruction efforts and democracy assistance in Sierra Leone 
received healthy funding from various donors who introduced a myriad of 
democratising initiatives and programming. The third phase of state building aimed 
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to strengthen weak states by supporting the provision of various state functions such 
as education or the rule of law.  
The notion of state reconstruction from outside was not without its critics.  
Focussing on reconstructing the Sierra Leonean state without the simultaneous 
reconstruction of its social fabric (which collapsed at the same time) would not 
correct the ‗long term degenerative disease‘ of state failure, for example (Zartman, 
1995b). Reconstruction would require a ‗keen sense of indigenous orders, customs, 
and ways of doing things‘ rather than predesigned templates from outside (ICG, 
2004, Kumar, 1997, Zartman, 1995a).
33
 There was also the danger of resuscitating 
dysfunctional states (Kraxberger, 2007, Hanlon, 2005). Paris described the 
liberalising model as an ‗all purpose elixir‘ and ‗universal antidote to conflict and 
misery‘ (Paris, 2004: 37). Even the concept of the state itself was highly contested, 
especially on a continent with colonial arbitrary state boundaries which bore no 
resemblance to the natural and historic topography of communities, cultures or 
religion. The Western notions of ‗good governance‘ and ‗statehood‘ could therefore 
be irrelevant to some local populations; indeed, there were no examples of sovereign 
entities in the African context with any ‗empirical statehood‘ (Clapham, 2002, Ellis, 
2005, Ayoob, 2001).  
Significantly, the ‗intellectual logjam‘ involved in reconstructing nation states 
- which had previously proved to be unviable as a units for development - stifled 
indigenous African plans for more meaningful units of social interaction and 
cohesion (Herbst, 1996). This theme is echoed in the work of Krasner and Fukuyama 
who questioned the idea of prioritising effective stateness over ‗self-determining‘ 
states, the irony being that reconstructing a state which is ‗politically independent 
                                                 
33
 ‗In general, restoration of stateness is dependent on reaffirmation of the pre-collapsed state‘ 
(Zartman, 1995b:268) and see Fukuyama (2004) for a discussion about weak states and their 
international legitimacy 
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and autonomous, self-governing and geographically distinct‘ involves predetermined 
models imposed from outside often producing ‗quasi-statehood‘ lacking efficacy and 
legitimacy (Krasner, 2005b, Fukuyama, 2005, Bell and Freeman, 1974, Jackson, 
1990). In sum, there was no consensus about what a state was, was not or should be, 
and therefore no consensus on the state-building project.  
Given this lack of consensus, faith in post-conflict liberalisation was 
something of a leap in the dark; a theoretical leap which assumed a successful 
western model could be transposed to any society, even fragile states emerging from 
conflict. Further, there was little global evidence of any successful state 
reconstruction projects implemented by the international community (Fukuyama, 
2004) and lessons learned from previous attempts were as ‗enlightening in the 
negative as in the positive‘ (Zartman, 1995: 267).  
Within the liberalising framework for state reconstruction, ‗governance‘ 
became the new vocabulary of interventionist approaches to successful 
peacebuilding. This was to involve a top down, multi-layered, multi-level process 
incorporating civil society as well as state and global politics (Richmond, 2005: 178). 
Richmond encapsulated this notion with his concept of ‗peacebuilding as 
governance‘ (ibid). Post-SAPs documentation reflected the new rhetoric as 
democracy and good governance emerged as key elements for building strong 
economies (Southall, 2006: 163, Ghali, 1992, Stiglitz, 1998).
34 
It could even be 
argued that the international debate on governance has been reduced to little more 
than what kind of state is required to support the global markets (Taylor, 2007). The 
IMF embraced this notion of liberalisation because it was presupposed that market 
oriented economies and political democracies were mutually reinforcing, but this 
                                                 
34
 See also the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), available from 
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html, 
accessed on 23/09/08 
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oversimplification of the notion of governance tended to discount the impact of 
situational and historic factors for the nation building project (Brinkerhoff, 2005).
 
 In 
addition, this simple marriage of liberal ideologies sidelined the interesting debate 
about how best to govern states with ‗limited statehood‘ – those which had collapsed 
after war or which had failed in some way. Governing such geographical areas was a 
complex process which necessarily involved state and non-state actors (both local 
and global) and which could be better described as ‗governance without government‘ 
than ‗good governance‘ (Risse, 2006).  
Nevertheless, the WB considered ‗good governance‘ to be an essential part of 
the strategy for raising living standards, and a primary requirement for economic 
recovery, a view supported more locally by the Organisation of African Union 
(Harbeson, 1994: 7, Ake, 1993: 242).
35
 The rhetoric also influenced many bilateral 
arrangements; the long term partnership agreement between the UK and Sierra 
Leone, for example, included the Poverty Reduction Framework Arrangement and 
the Improved Governance and Accountability Pact (IGAP) which committed to 
priority governance reform in ten key areas, (DfID, 2004).
36
 Throughout the 1990s 
and 2000s, ‗good governance‘ vocabulary gradually became more visible in UN 
documentation, and the promotion of ‗good governance‘ an acknowledged part of 
UN conflict prevention strategies when the concepts of democracy, development and 
peace became conjoined in the rhetoric.
37
 This theme is expanded upon later after a 
presentation of the detail of macro-economic reform.  
                                                 
35
 Bretton Woods Committee Conference, Africa‘s Finance and Development Crisis, Washington, 
April 1990 
36
 These were: anti-corruption; auditor general and PAC reports; procurement; civil service 
reform; service delivery; Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI); decentralisation; 
non-state actors; money laundering and elections (DfID, 2004)  
37
 Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: Reinforcing the Key Role of the United Nations 
Parliamentary Hearing at the United Nations, 13–14 November 2006, United Nations, New York 
– General Assembly Document A/61/703 accessed from the United Nations Official Documents 
System on 18/09/07, http://www.un.org/documents/   
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3.3 - THE MODEL FOR RECONSTRUCTION 
The politics of macro-economic reform 
For Sierra Leone to achieve long-term debt sustainability, it is of the utmost 
importance that the country achieves high and sustained growth through the 
maintenance of macroeconomic stability, continued pursuit of structural 
reforms, ...  prudent debt management policies and avoiding a new build-up in 
debt. (IMF/IDA, 2002) 
What was needed to address the priorities for peace in the economic domain was 
improved management of the national economy, good governance and leadership, 
with the goal of creating jobs and extracting profits from national wealth to 
redistribute to local citizens, equally. 
Under the IMF‘s Post Conflict Programme, $50.7m was loaned to the country 
for resettlement, rehabilitation of infrastructure, and administrative and institutional 
capacity building essential for effective economic management (Riddell, 2005: 121). 
The World Bank loaned $238.62m between 2000 and 2004 for the country‘s 
HIV/AIDS crisis, economic recovery, administrative restructuring, social action, 
privatisation, institutional reform and the rehabilitation of its educational and health 
sectors.
38
 The politics which came along with this assistance included reducing the 
role of government in the economy, improving the environment for the private sector 
and the private management of public enterprises (IMF/IDA, 2002). These 
penetrating macro-economic reforms were lauded as the best way forward for 
economic stability, growth and the reduction of poverty (IDA, 2005, IMF/IDA, 2002, 
DfID, 2004). 
                                                 
38
 Information available from World Bank at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/SIERRALEONE
EXTN/0,,menuPK:367829~pagePK:141159~piPK:141110~theSitePK:367809,00.html, accessed 
on 30/07/09 
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Cheru (2008) gives more detail on the various reforms deemed necessary for 
‗exporting oneself out of an economic crisis‘ - summarised as follows: 
Sierra Leone – summary of macro-economic reform for recovery 
 The reduction or elimination of price controls and subsidies 
 
 The removal of trade barriers and opening of the local economy to global 
competition 
 Increasing interest rates to fight inflation and attract savings 
 The privatisation of public enterprises (or the privatisation of their 
management) 
 The reduction of the role of the state in the economy and public services 
 Devaluing the local currency to promote exports 
 
The promises made in the iPRSP and National Recovery Strategy were successful in 
bringing about positive decisions in respect of the country‘s eligibility for HIPC 
status and also in expediting assistance under the PRGF (IMF/IDA, 2002). The 
Letter of Intent issued in conjunction with the iPRSP reaffirmed the commitment of 
the GovSL to prioritise economic growth and the reduction of poverty (goals which 
are believed to be complementary), to contain inflation and to improve gross external 
reserves. Growth was expected to be supported by the reopening of rutile mining, the 
recovery of agricultural production, the expansion of industry, services and through 
construction, and the expansion of the fishing and mining sectors. This was to 
involve both public and private investment (GovSL, 2001). The government 
committed to good fiscal policy and fiscal management, open and transparent 
processes, the creation of a social security system and increased incentives for 
private sector investment and production to drive economic growth (ibid:19). New 
trade policy would reduce state protectionism and be enhanced by a liberal trading 
and exchange system, and also privatisation. All these assurances secured US$21 
million in emergency funds from the IMF in 1999/2001, the approval of a further 
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US$169 million over three years from 2002 to 2004 and US$46.3 million over three 
years from 2006 to 2008 under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), 
with a further $18.8 million disbursed in 2009.
39
 In November 2006, Sierra Leone 
reached HIPC Completion Point and qualified for debt relief.  
The IMF‘s three key measures of macro-economic stability were sustained 
economic growth (between 6-7%), inflation below 5%, and 1.9 months import cover 
in reserves.
40
 Table 7 shows the country‘s record on these measures during the post-
conflict period. The country did well in sustaining economic growth but failed to 
achieve the stated inflation levels which rose to around twice the target by 2004 
impacted by rising prices on the global markets, particularly rice and fuel.   
Table 7 – Sierra Leone performance criteria indicators 2000 – 2009 41  
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
GDP 
Annual  
% change 
3.8 18.2 27.4 9.5 7.4 7.3 7.4 6.8 5.5 
4.5e 
Average  
consumer 
prices  
-0.9 2.6 -3.7 7.5 14.2 12.0 9.5 11.7 14.8 10.6e 
Gross 
international 
Reserves 
49.6 52.0 84.6 59.4 124.9 168.3 184.2 207.7 209 
- 
 
e = estimate 
The package of reforms was designed to protect debt servicing not necessarily the 
peace but the documents also contained commitments by the GovSL which would 
not only please the lenders but could also support the framework for peace (GovSL, 
                                                 
39
 IMF Press Release 99/62, IMF Press Release 01/39, IMF Press Release 06/94, sourced at 
http://www.imf.org/external/country/sle/index.htm?type=9998#8, accessed on 09/09/08  
40
 In 2007, for example, Sierra Leone had 4.6 months of import coverage: Letter of Intent (2008) 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2008/sle/120508.pdf, accessed on 03/08/09 
41
 data from IMF Data Mapper http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php and World 
Bank 
 132 
 
2001: Memorandum). For example: the improvement of tax administration, service 
delivery and establishment of mechanisms to track public expenditure (III/17, 
IV/21); the commitment to a ‗substantial increase in outlays on services targeted to 
the poor, especially in the areas of education, health and rural infrastructure‘ (III/17); 
a new salary and benefits package for the SLA to help secure the peace, including 
benefits for the relative of the killed, the wounded or missing (IV/20); and provision 
of regular economic activity for ex-combatants (IV/41) (ibid).   
In the rhetoric, the reforming agenda of the IFIs complemented many of the 
goals in the peace documentation. The issue was the structural framework to deliver 
those goals – indistinguishable from that of old. A further problem was capacity; the 
broad reach of reform was well beyond the scope of the weakened government, 
especially as the main priority was to maintain performance indicators to secure debt 
relief. As a framework for peacebuilding, the PRSPs had severe limitations. The 
priority remained the servicing of external interests not those of the local community.  
The politics of ‘good governance’  
The strategy will emphasise the continued implementation of sound economic 
policies to attain macro-economic stability within an overall framework of good 
governance (GovSL, 2001)  
The concept of ‗good governance‘ and, in particular, democratic ‗good governance‘ 
was central to peacebuilding because violent conflict was often the result of political 
repression and dysfunctional governance systems. In addition, ‗good governance‘ 
was required to absorb large amounts of aid in order to satisfy development 
outcomes (Mani, 2009). The concept was problematic, however, because it did not 
necessarily fit with local ideas of good governance and the danger was that external 
social engineering risked rupturing local ideas and modes of political process 
(Krause, 2005). 
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In Sierra Leone what needed to be corrected in the post-war programming 
was the issue of bad government and corrupt leadership, the legitimacy of 
government, the lack of mass participation and the absence of a strong society. 
Because of the link between governance and peace which influenced the 
programming of reconstruction in Sierra Leone, and because of recommendations in 
the TRC-R for good governance and good leadership, some generic definition is 
required to analyse the relevance of the concept for peace in the locale. The World 
Bank‘s project, Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), included six dimensions 
of governance designed to indicate how ‗good‘ it is: voice and accountability, 
political stability and the absence of violence, government effectiveness, and 
regulatory quality, the rule of law and control of corruption.  Figure 9 (below) 
compares the indicators of 1998 with those of 2003 and 2008: 
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Figure 9 - World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators – selected dates42 
 
 
The indicators show that between 1998 and 2008 Sierra Leone experienced a 
remarkable improvement on two ‗good governance‘ indicators. The indicators for 
‗voice and accountability‘ reflected the return to multi-party democracy, 
decentralisation, peaceful transfer of power, and the improved freedoms of both the 
print and broadcast media as well as a firmly established and growing civil society. 
Political stability improved due to the end of war and with the emergence of free, fair 
and peaceful elections in 2002, 2004 and 2007. There were also smaller 
                                                 
42
 World Bank - http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_chart.asp, sourced from 
Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2007: Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators 
for 1996-2006 Note: The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality 
of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in 
industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, 
think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. The aggregate 
indicators do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the 
countries they represent. Countries' relative positions on these indicators are subject to indicated 
margins of error that should be taken into consideration when making comparisons across 
countries and over time. 
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improvements for both ‗government effectiveness‘ and ‗regulatory quality‘. ‗Rule of 
law also improved slightly over the post war period recovering from signs of 
deterioration in 2003. The area of most concern was ‗corruption‘ where the figures 
show a significant deterioration over the period selected.   
The international community decided what ‗good governance‘ looked like by 
creating a system of measures to monitor it (Fig.9), so what were these 
conditionalities associated with? The IMF emphasised the need for ‗good 
governance‘ in economic management, public financial management and regulatory 
control for example, and these desirable qualities of governance were promoted 
when providing policy advice, financial support and technical assistance. The IMF 
limited this conditioning to the economic aspects of governance, however - the 
aspects that could have a positive macroeconomic impact as far as performance 
indicators were concerned.
43
 For example, ‗transparency and accountability‘ were 
required solely for monitoring the progress of macro-economic reform. Similarly, the 
World Bank had a non-political approach to conditionalities on governance 
(Marquette, 2003: 61). Conditionalities for economic reform were particularly 
successful in stabilising macro-economic performance and strengthening public 
financial management (IMF/IDA, 2006: 9), and a more detailed account of the 
outcomes of this area of reform is presented in Chapter 4. 
In contrast to IFI conditionalities, donors took a more holistic approach by 
aligning policy programming to broad democratisation efforts which included all 
manner of activities such as anti-corruption, human rights, judicial reform and multi-
party elections (Marquette, 2003: 62). The Cotonou Agreement, which shaped the 
                                                 
43
 These are ―improving the management of public resources, and supporting the development 
and maintenance of a transparent and stable economic and regulatory environment conducive to 
efficient private sector activities‖ - see the IMF's Approach to Promoting Good Governance and 
Combating Corruption — A Guide, http://www.imf.org/external/np/gov/guide/eng/index.htm, 
accessed on 01/04/08 and see also The Role of the IMF in Governance Issues: Guidance Note, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/govern/govindex.htm, accessed on 01.04.08 
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development relationship between the EU and the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries (ACPs), was quite robust in its emphasis on ‗good governance‘ in the 
political sphere, for example the Agreement included a procedure which could 
quickly deal with violations of ‗good governance‘ objectives - such as corruption 
(Article 97). Serious cases would be referred to the Joint Parliamentary Assembly 
and could involve suspension (EC, 2000). The Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (2005) committed both developed and developing countries to ‗good 
governance‘ and mutual accountability for development aid, along with the more 
predictable commitments to local ownership and donor alignment of all policy 
programming (OECD, 2005). The rhetoric on ‗good governance‘ became central to 
aid planning and its delivery, and had an influence on the willingness of donors and 
lenders to commit resources to Sierra Leone. Democracy became synonymous with 
good governance and anti-corruption, as did development (Abdellatif, 2003, 
Marquette, 2003). This was most apparent in the type of activities donors were 
willing to support. Figure 10 (below) gives an overview of DfID‘s assistance for the 
period 2002-2007, and shows the political nature of aid to Sierra Leone; around $69 
million targeted at governance reforms – 41% of the total spend. 
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Figure 10 – DfID 2002-2007: summary of programme resources to each sector by 
percentage  
 
 
All data sourced from Evaluation of DfID country Programme (DfID, 2008)  
 
Across all definitions of ‗good governance‘ the consensus was that it represented a 
process of exercising power rather than a list of expected outcomes or ‗ends‘ 
(Abdellatif, 2003: 4), yet the local definition was more concerned with the people 
who exercised power rather than the process per se.   
What was the local definition? 
The concept, broadly defined by the EU to include the principles of openness, 
participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence, was hotly contested 
among the ACP countries generally and no clear or universally accepted definition 
was agreed (House of Lords, 2006: 233). Because of the difficulties measuring it, 
there were objections to its admission as a conditionality from the EU (EC, 1998, 
cited by Crawford, 2000: 96). The World Bank‘s conceptualisation was heavily 
criticised by African intellectuals who questioned its relevance locally (Mafeje, 
2002: 15, Mkandawire, 2003, Hyden, 2000).  
The local definitions from Sierra Leone are drawn from the NRS and the 
TRC-R. 
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National Recovery Strategy  – Good Governance  
Enhancing financial management 
Institutional restructuring:  NRA, civil service reform and divestiture of state 
firms 
Reforming government procurement procedures 
Combating corruption through the ACC 
Re-activating local government administration 
Strengthening the judiciary and legal system  
Implementing the national Strategic Planning and Action Process 44 
 
The lengthy wish list of the NRS very much aligned with that of the main financial 
institutions and donors, and resembled the sort of ‗ventriloquism‘ or ‗guessing game‘ 
played by national governments to secure much needed assistance (van de Walle, 
2005, Easterly, 2006: 129). The TRC-R picked up on this distorted vernacular when 
it referred to the ‗lamentable‘ lack of urgency to respond to local challenges in the 
attempts to align requests for support with donor priorities (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, 
Chapter 1, Executive Summary: 21). The concept of governance as envisaged by the 
TRC-R was predicated on the fact that Sierra Leoneans yearned ‗for a principled 
system of governance (TRC, 2004: Vol. 2, Chapter 1, Governance). It produced a list 
of imperative recommendations including fifteen areas for governance reform, all but 
one involving the behaviour of political elites and corruption. This was a simple 
model aligned more to a reformed attitude of political elites than reformed 
government institutions. The definition of ‗good governance‘ among ordinary people 
in Sierra Leone was a responsive state, under their control. 
The iPRSP contained much to support this vision: 
                                                 
44
 A consultative process which engaged more than 2,000 citizens across the country in a 
structured dialogue on national vision and development priorities, with the aim of fostering 
participatory and development policy-making and feeding into the major document for long term 
development, Vision 2025: available from http://www.daco-
sl.org/encyclopedia/4_strat/4_1v2025.htm, accessed on 22/07/09 
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―[to] ensure that transparency and accountability is an integral part of the 
culture in Sierra Leone. The Good Governance programme will put in place a 
more decentralized, transparent and proactive system of governance with built-
in checks and balances to minimize, corruption in government and public 
administration with civil society playing a key role in the planning and 
monitoring of policies and budgetary oversight ... ...  The thrust will be on 
grassroots participatory democracy ... ... decentralisation of functions and 
authority, respect for human rights and checking abuse of power.‖ (GovSL, 
2001: 71) 
In contrast to the simple local notion of good governance, what was the feasibility of 
implementing the more ambitious reforms of the international community? The 
framework in the PRSPs consisted of three central pillars; good governance, revival 
of the economy and pro-poor growth, and human and social sector development 
(GovSL, 2001, GovSL, 2005). The commitments of the PRSPs bore close 
resemblance to the vision of peace outlined in Chapter 2, but compared to the 
simplicity of the TRC-R, the promises represented huge undertakings on the part of 
the government and international community. For example the commitments on 
expenditures on education, health and sanitation (IV/42) and the commitments to 
build democratic institutions and embed democratic procedures, including the 
strengthening of the judiciary and rule of law, and the establishment of an Anti-
Corruption Commission (IV/43) (GovSL, 2001: Memorandum). There remained 
serious issues around capacity. The NRS repeatedly stressed the point that none of 
the reforms could take place without enhancing human capacity within government, 
rebuilding government infrastructure and increasing government income base 
(NRS:12) and these points were acknowledged throughout the IFIs documentation. 
The government could not have been clearer about the urgent need for extensive 
technical assistance to re-establish the efficacy of institutions for planning and 
implementation of development programmes (GovSL, 1999a:39, 40). In particular, 
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assistance was requested for training and capacity building for revenue collection – a 
requirement which was acknowledged by the IMF.
45
 The government specifically 
requested assistance in statistical database monitoring, public sector reform 
programming and building capacity in the provinces (GovSL, 2001). 
3.4 - THE POLITICS OF DONOR INTERVENTION 
The process of state reconstruction in Sierra Leone was supported by a multitude of 
bilateral and multilateral aid agency and NGO initiatives (Riddell, 2005). By far the 
biggest contributor during the immediate post-war period (1999-03) was the United 
Kingdom with a contribution of around $245,820m.
46
 The 2002 elections were a 
central point of reference for most of the activities and programming of donors, and 
the consolidation of multi-party democracy in the country was a priority both locally 
and globally to ensure legitimacy of the post-conflict government.
47
 The major 
international donors for these activities were the UK‘s DfID, USAID, the European 
Commission, UNDP and the Commonwealth, who channelled most of their 
assistance through intermediary INGOs due to the belief that most local 
intermediaries did not have the capacity to absorb, manage or utilise the support of 
donors (Sesay, 2005: 20). Despite claims of ‗capacity building‘ not much was in 
evidence. Intermediaries such as the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD), 
the International Foundation for Electoral Assistance (IFES) and the National 
Democratic Institute (NDI) among others, were recruited by donors to implement 
their programming.  
                                                 
45
 ‗the strategy of supporting the authorities‘ program is predicated on the need to rebuild Sierra 
Leone‘s administrative and institutional capacity‘, IMF Press Release 99/62, IMF Press Release 
01/39, IMF Press Release 06/94, sourced at 
http://www.imf.org/external/country/sle/index.htm?type=9998#8, accessed on 09/09/08 
46
 Source www.oecd.org/dac/stats/crs 
47
 Article XI, Lomé Peace Agreement 
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The data on financial estimates of international assistance for the 
democratising project are difficult to assess but total aid flows from the major donors 
amounted to over US$361m in 2002 alone (Sesay, 2005). New democratic state 
institutions to be constructed and supported included the SLAF, the NEC, the 
judiciary and parliament, local councils, the Anti-corruption Commission, Human 
Rights Commission, civil society and free media. At the same time, the restructuring 
of the economy included a new National Revenue Authority, Institute of Public 
Administration and Management and National Privatisation Commission in line with 
IMF conditionalities. The Democracy Template sets out the state institutions which 
need to be reconstructed in the project: 
Figure 11 - The Democracy Template 
 
Democracy Template 
Sector 
Sector Goal Type of Aid 
Electoral 
Process 
Free and fair elections Electoral aid 
Strong political parties Political party building 
 
 
State 
Institutions 
Democratic constitution Constitutional assistance 
Independent, effective judiciary and other 
law-oriented institutions 
Rule of law aid 
Competent, representative legislature Legislative strengthening 
Responsive local government Local government development 
Pro-democratic military Civil-military relations 
 
Civil Society Active advocacy NGOs NGO building 
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Politically educated citizenry Civic education 
Strong independent media and unions 
Media strengthening, union 
building 
 
Reproduced from Carothers (1999:88) 
 
There was a significant burden of responsibility on the donors who committed to 
assist the post-war reconstruction. Caution was needed because the speed of 
reconstruction could put too much load on a fragile and fledgling political system or 
reconstruct the problems of the past (Ayoob, 2001, Riddell, 2005, Jackson, 2007, 
Hanlon, 2005). As noted earlier, donor programming involved a complex array of 
financial and technical support to all the main functions of national and local 
governance and Figure 12 (below) summarises the democracy assistance 
programming to support the 2002 elections. 
Figure 12  - Summary of democracy assistance activities in Sierra Leone - elections 
2002      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reproduced from (Cubitt, 2006) 
 
As promised at Lomé, the national election body was to take on conflict management 
as part of its mandate by creating a level playing field for full representation in 
government. It was to contribute to democratisation, rather than de-rail it by 
operating in former biased and unaccountable ways, so in 2002 an Act of Parliament 
Democracy Assistance 
Institution building:   
Judiciary, NEC, SLAF, 
Local councils 
(2004), Legislature 
Human Rights: 
security, justice, 
TRC, SC, 
education, health, 
rule of law 
SSR:       
transparency, 
independence, 
accountability 
Civil society:  
free media, 
support for 
pressure groups 
 
Elections:                 
NEC reform, DDR, 
voter education, 
monitoring, security, 
political party support 
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was signed into law by President Kabbah to set out the ground rules (The Electoral 
Laws Act, 2002). Historically, the NEC had a reputation for corruption; infiltrated by 
APC cronies it was mistrusted by civilians and opposition parties alike, and so the 
creation of an independent and professional body was an important component of the 
peacebuilding. Corrupt and threatening behaviour within the NEC had been rampant 
because there had been no external or non-partisan monitoring of its activities but 
this situation changed dramatically in the post-war era (Sesay, 2005). Led by IFES, 
assistance included the training of staff, IT support, the supply of printed materials 
such as ballot papers, the procurement of equipment such as ballot boxes and the 
computerisation of voter registration.
48
 The Commission relied heavily on technical 
and logistical support from UNAMSIL for the 2002 elections because it lacked the 
necessary vehicles and communications to deliver an election to international 
standards (Europa, 2002: 9). Despite very difficult conditions and high numbers of 
refugees and IDPs, the NEC successfully completed the registration of voters. As 
part of the reforms, a voter education programme was launched and new electoral 
laws drawn up to include specific codes of conduct for political parties. All parties 
were supported through computer training, poster campaigns and civic education 
programmes, and additional funding was given to civil society organisations to help 
with voter education and monitoring activities (Sesay, 2005). 
In the outcome, however, the reformed NEC was heavily criticised as inept and un-
cooperative, and serious irregularities were unearthed. Complaints were made by 
civic groups about under age and double voter registration; the rural districts of 
Bonthe and Pujehun recorded a 100% voter turnout, for example (Europa, 2002). 
There were further complaints over partisan tactics of the NEC; the main grievance 
being the bias shown towards the government - partisan tinkering reminiscent of the 
                                                 
48
 International Foundation for Election Systems http://www.ifes.org/ 
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past - and political parties were frustrated with the lack of support (CarterCentre, 
2002, Europa, 2002). In Bombali, for example, parties did not receive information on 
the location of polling stations until the morning of the elections and as a result they 
were unable to send party agents to monitor the process (Europa, 2002:20). Rural 
communities were neglected in voter education, awareness raising and monitoring 
activities, and the change in electoral system and poor education meant that even 
some political party candidates failed to understand the process, confused by the new 
multi-member status of constituencies (Europa, 2002, Sesay, 2005: 47). NEC 
performance in the subsequent local elections of 2004 (the first for over thirty years) 
brought universal condemnation of the newly reformed commission. 
Ahead of the 2007 elections the UNDP launched an Electoral Reform Project 
aimed at completely restructuring the NEC and recruiting staff through a rigorous 
selection process.
49
 A clean sweep of the commission left all but two members of 
staff (experienced officers in field operations and coordination) still in their posts.
50
 
This rigorous exercise was successful in producing a competent and independent 
Commission solely responsible for organising and supervising elections across the 
country. Widespread global and local praise for the NEC indicated a successful 
transformation of a once corrupt and patronage outfit into an independent and 
professional national institution. 
The NEC has so far organised the elections in a transparent and impartial 
manner. It has managed the challenges posed by these elections in a proficient 
and competent manner. This has resulted in credibility for the institution across 
the political spectrum as well as from national observers and civil society 
groups. (Europa, 2007)  
                                                 
49
 United Nations Development Programme, Sierra Leone - http://www.sl.undp.org/contact.html 
50
 Personal interview with representative of the NEC, Freetown, 23
rd
 November 2006 
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Reform of the SLAF was undertaken through intensive re-training and re-equipping 
programmes (Ginifer, 2004), the idea being to create a new army, properly screened, 
and trained to respect the ethics of soldiery and civil authority (Bangura, 2000). This 
programming was spearheaded by the British Ministry of Defence in collaboration 
with IMATT to produce a national military defence force; effective, accountable and 
professional, at an appropriate size thus transforming the dangerously violent and 
political nature of the SLAF with its associated propensity to destabilise 
government.
51
 IMATT was scheduled to remain in Sierra Leone to undertake this 
rigorous and thorough programming until 2010, reflecting the commitment made by 
the international community to centre military reform in the peacebuilding and 
reconstruction. Some concerns remained about the lack of democratic accountability 
within the military and also the sustainability of the forces when aid withdrew and 
the government had to maintain the successful reforms from its own meagre budget 
(Ginifer, 2004). Subsequent reports suggested, however, that improvements to the 
professionalism and accountability within the armed forces remained strong with few 
incidents of indiscipline.
52
 Both NEC and SLAF successes were heavily subsidised 
and managed by the international community and, as stand-alone projects, were 
universally praised (ICG, 2008). 
There was, however, a distinct lack of funding in respect of human rights, a 
key component in the framework for peace and documented as an essential part of 
the democratisation/good governance programming. Consequently progress was very 
slow with grave concerns about human rights abuses still remaining in 2007 (Human 
Rights Watch, 2007). Figure 13 (below) shows the proportion of the UNDAF‘s 
                                                 
51
 A potential coup plot involving the former leader of the AFRC Johnny Paul Koroma was 
discovered by British military personnel in April 2002 (ICG, 2008) 
52
 Human Rights Watch, Sierra Leone Country Report 2006, available from 
http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/11/sierra14713.htm, accessed on 28/09/08 and  
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annual budget which was spent in the area of human rights: just over $5m which 
represented only a small fraction of the total which was mostly targeted towards 
poverty reduction programming. Debt servicing was also criticised for redirecting 
funds which could support human rights, but concessions were not made by the IFIs 
for countries emerging from war with pressing human rights concerns (Cheru, 2007: 
69).  
Figure 13 - UNDAF Programme Resource Framework 
  
 
 
Data sourced from UNDAF (UN, 2003) 
 
The passing of the ‗Gender Bills‘ in June 2007 was a positive, if delayed step 
forward in respect of women‘s rights although there was still underrepresentation of 
women in government (EU, 2007).
53
 New legislation was adopted to protect children 
through The Child Rights Act 2007 which fell in line with the international norms of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child, but legislation outlawing certain forms of child labour 
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 The Gender Bills 2007: The Domestic Violence Act, The Devolution of Estates Act and the 
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remained elusive by 2009.
54
 The low priority afforded human rights meant long 
delays in setting up a Human Rights Commission (GovSL, 2006a, IMF, 2007)..  
Strengthening the rule of law and reform of the justice sector was an area 
which received considerable donor funding but most of this was spent on the creation 
of the Special Court set up jointly by the Government of Sierra Leone and the United 
Nations to compensate for the blanket amnesties granted at Lomé. Its mandate was to 
try those who bore the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law, and Sierra Leonean law, from 30 November 1996 and by 2007, 
eleven people stood indicted.
55
 This was one of two key projects spearheaded by the 
international community in respect of justice and reconciliation. The second was the 
TRC. These two vehicles for transitional justice were very controversial.   
In 2000, the TRC was set up with a budget of around $6.5 million but was 
suspended after the abduction of UN peacekeepers by the RUF later that year. It 
wasn‘t until after the 2002 elections that the commission resumed business. Most 
sessions of the TRC were poorly attended by both the general public and those 
people who were expected to testify as more media coverage was given to the 
activities of the Special Court (Grant, 2005). Although the TRC had no powers to 
prosecute or punish, there were concerns that any investigations undertaken by the 
TRC on evidence submitted at the sessions might lead to witnesses being subpoenaed 
by the Special Court (CarterCentre, 2002). This highlighted the problematic nature of 
transitional justice in peace-building - a highly contentious component of 
interventionist policies (Baker, 1996). In contrast to the TRC, the Special Court was 
inaugurated in 2002 with an initial budget of $58 million, later increased to $80 
million, and had a mandate to run for three years, although war crimes were still 
                                                 
54
 The convention on the Rights of the Child adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on 20
th
 November, 1989, and its Optional Protocols of 8th September, 2000; 
55
 See The Special Court for Sierra Leone, http://www.sc-sl.org/index.html, accessed on 29/09/08 
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being tried in 2009. Most of the main war criminals never came to trial because they 
were either dead or unaccountable.
56
 Chief Hinga Norman, however, the leader of the 
CDF and a much revered figure in Sierra Leone, was being tried at the Court for 
atrocities committed under his command when he died in custody in 2007. The trial 
was controversial locally; in some parts of the country Norman was remembered as 
the CDF chief who collaborated with the Kamajo and supported the successful 
British deployment against the RUF. In contrast to this controversial arrest, Charles 
Taylor was taken to the Hague for prosecution due to security concerns but even this 
indictment caused ambivalence among Sierra Leoneans.
57
 Taylor had his loyalists in 
both Monrovia and Freetown. The Special Court‘s mission, the arrest of high profile 
suspects, aimed to show that a culture of impunity was no longer to be tolerated in 
Sierra Leone and yet the Court failed to increase local confidence in the justice 
system as resources to reform the local justice system were mostly inadequate 
(Stone, 2005, Ginifer, 2004). 
 Is the world only interested in the prosecution of a handful of notorious 
criminals while people in the country must continue to make do with a collapsed 
judicial system and the same venal petty officials who compounded the 
problems that plagued civil society in the country before, during and after the 
war? (Gberie, 2005:212) 
The justice system needs a complete overhaul, from laws through judges.(ICG, 
2003)  
The ACC was a joint initiative between the GovSL and UK-DfID. Set up as the 
flagship mechanism for improved transparency and accountable in government post-
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 For example, Foday Sankoh died in hospital whilst in UN custody in 2003; Sam Bockerie (a 
member of the RUF high command) was murdered in Liberia shortly after his indictment the 
same year and Johnny Paul Koroma of the AFRC fled to Liberia and his whereabouts remained 
unknown SFCG (2007a) Elections special: Sierra Leone. Freetown: Search for Common Ground. 
. 
57
 This ambivalence among citizens reflected the worry that the Court may bring to justice too 
few of those who committed the most serious crimes and yet other citizens feared the Court 
would jeopardise the fragile peace by stirring up memories of the war (Gberie, 2005) 
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war, it aimed to put a stop to rampant corruption but by March 2007, DfID had 
withdrawn all funding for this initiative following a damning report on its efficacy 
and the commitment of the government of the day to assist its function. Bearing in 
mind the importance placed upon anti-corruption measures by the TRC, this failure 
was a major setback for peacebuilding. A full analysis of the failure of the ACC is 
presented in Chapter 5. Another area which attracted substantial technical and 
financial support was decentralisation. Decentralisation of central government 
functions was an important area of reform for peace and was documented as a 
priority in both the NRS and TRC-R as part of good governance. Promises in the 
iPRSP pre-empted the recommendations of the TRC but the commitments were 
consistent with the local vision and the promises made for socio-economic reform in 
the Peace Agreement. Decentralisation of authority was a significant change and a 
direct response to the problems of central government and urban bias which so 
bedevilled governance in the past. The PRSPs contained strategies to reactivate local 
government administration and decentralise central government functions (GovSL, 
2001: 3.2, a/112, GovSL, 2005: 5.2.1/b). The lack of voice at local level was 
acknowledged by internal and external policy makers as an important contributing 
factor for war, the TRC-R also called for the principles of local government to be 
enshrined in the Constitution and the NRS stated that ‗the elected government must 
be extended throughout the country in order to effectively exert its authority and 
improve its provision of services to the people of Sierra Leone (p.12). Local council 
elections were held in 2004 under a project to decentralise governance spearheaded 
by the World Bank (World Bank, 2005). This included the Rapid Results Initiative 
(RRI) which planned to ‗boost and empower‘ local councils in the districts, yet the 
funding structure of the new councils ensured that political power remained at the 
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centre (Fanthorpe, 2005). This point will be returned to in Chapter 5 where a 
thorough analysis is made of the local government project. 
3.5 - ANALYSIS: PRIORITIES, CAPACITIES AND STRUCTURES 
Richmond‘s argument that the contemporary peacebuilding project has been 
subsumed within the liberal statebuilding enterprise is supported by the analysis of 
the official documentation presented above (Richmond, 2008: 105, ICG, 2003). The 
local rhetoric on the peace morphed into the larger and much more challenging 
project of statebuilding legitimised by internationally agreed goals on poverty 
reduction (PRSPs) and the need for national governments to service debt (HIPC). 
Essentially, peacebuilding was about the implementation of an ‗operational checklist, 
involving fixes to various institutions and processes, without tackling underlying 
political dynamics‘ (ICG, 2004). Peacebuilding was certainly formulaic and the 
model for reconstruction promised little change to historic structures, apart from 
perhaps, the programme for decentralisation.  
Liberalising checklists had the potential to redirect limited local resources - 
human, technical and financial - to areas which were not priorities for local 
peacebuilding, and this complicated the process of national recovery after war 
(Cramer, 2006, Ottaway, 2002, Talentino, 2002). Despite the lack of consensus on 
peacebuilding among both policy makers and opinion formers the liberal set of 
assumptions about how to end conflicts prevailed (Richmond, 2004). Given this 
global template for reconstruction after war, were the interventionist politics relevant 
for the framework for peace? 
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Complementarity 
There was a degree of complementarity between the conditionalities imposed by the 
IFIs, the objectives embedded in donor programming, and the pressing local need for 
change. Much of the PRSP dialogue conflated well with the framework for peace and 
even the commitments of the Letters of Intent held much promise to address local 
imperatives - for example, the improved and transparent management of the 
economy. The reforms dramatically increased revenue flows to the national treasury 
(see Chapter 4) which vastly improved the prospects of war reparations to the poor 
and vulnerable. Reforms also brought about sustained growth in GDP, closely 
associated by theorists with increased economic opportunities for the previously 
unemployed. Commitments for judicial reform, found everywhere in the 
documentation, could strengthen the rule of law for the protection of human rights. 
This was central to peacebuilding because it synergised not only with the explicit 
promises made in the Peace Accord but also with many of the TRC 
recommendations. The Anti-Corruption Commission also had potential to improve 
the transparency and accountability of government, and to reform the bad practices 
of political elites which had become inherent in the body politic.  
Reform of the NEC and the SLAF had a profound impact on the durability of 
the peace as many combatants were successfully demobilised and integrated into a 
modern force, and free and fair elections brought about the installation of a 
legitimate government. Decentralisation was also a major step forward because it 
could help address the historic tensions around over-centralised power and the 
marginalisation of the countryside. The challenges lay in the weakness of the state, 
its chronically low capacity and the prioritising of reforms. Assumptions about the 
reformed behaviour of political elites and the ability of the liberal model to 
effectively deliver the peace were also of concern given the leap of faith required to 
 152 
 
believe in the transformation. Liberal statebuilding is a slow process. In the best of 
circumstances it requires capacity and commitment. Slow progress can undermine 
peacebuilding by failing to produce a social contract relevant in the locale  
(Richmond, 2009: 181). 
The character of the new state ... the same shape, but better governed 
All the positive goals and objectives listed in the documents were framed within the 
paradigm of liberal theorising. This theorising held assumptions that growth would 
lead to job creation; democracy would secure good government; elections would 
bring meaningful participation and responsive political elites, and transparent 
processes would lead to transparent practices (Cooper, 2008). Liberalising of the 
economic and political spheres would be complemented by the presence of a 
dynamic civil society.  
The aim of all this was to build a functioning single unit from a fractured 
nation state to absorb the country into the international system of states, enmesh its 
economy into global markets and embed international norms and values in its society 
(Pugh, 2005, Duffield, 2001). Yet these aims were based upon shallow knowledge of 
the country‘s political history and its priorities for peace: 
The strategy of supporting the authorities‘ programme under the emergency 
post-conflict assistance policy is predicated upon the need to rebuild Sierra 
Leone‘s administrative and institutional capacity, which was disrupted by the 
civil war.
58
 
This statement makes the assumption that war reduced the capacity of the state not 
two decades of corrupt miss-rule which was followed by a war. The new structure of 
the state was to be almost indistinguishable from that of old. The same shape, but 
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 IMF approves US$21 million in emergency post-conflict assistance for Sierra Leone, 17/12/99, 
sourced at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1999/pr9962.htm, accessed on 09/09/08 
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better governed. And better governance would come through multi-party democracy 
- through the old and unworkable system of ethno-politics turned upper class rule. 
Liberalisation for peace might just have missed the point in Sierra Leone.   
External constituency – ownership     
The conditionalities for reconstruction not only placed extra burdens on the state but 
constrained its choices for reform. Despite claims of local ownership attached to 
PRSPs, the GovSL had limited scope to design its own recovery and meet local 
demands for peace. Despite the claims of IFIs that ownership was secured through 
‗consultation‘; Sierra Leoneans did not own their reconstruction, or their 
peacebuilding because ‗consultations‘ were garnered for ‗clearly agreed international 
development goals‘ (Cheru, 2007, Easterly, 2006).  
tying debt relief to conditions determined by creditors undermines African 
priorities and initiatives and afford creditors an inordinate degree of control 
over the running of African countries (Cheru, 2007:79) 
The idea behind the PRSPs was important for Sierra Leone given the exclusionary 
forms of politics which characterised the country‘s history. The PRSP process meant 
that the government was obliged to discuss poverty issues and plans to tackle it with 
local citizens; in so doing, politicians would be more likely to take the issues 
seriously because their future careers depended on it (Booth, 2003:25). But the 
externally driven template for reform rather scuppered this objective because it 
undermined sovereignty and had consequent implications for democracy; the choices 
of democratically elected leaders were dictated by a powerful external constituency - 
a constituency which was not accountable to the local citizenry and yet the intended 
target of peacebuilding was the masses not the elite (Cousens et al, 2001, Lederach, 
1997).
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The political economy of peace was therefore detached from the influence of 
grass roots stakeholders and had a dangerously familiar structure to the political 
economy which led to war when local people had no influence on the shape of or 
benefits from the national economy. If the PRSPs successfully opened up new spaces 
for domestic policy dialogue, where some local stakeholders got the chance to voice 
their opinion and defend their interests, what could happen when, in the outcome, 
nothing changed?   
Capacity 
State capacity was a further issue. The post-war physical and political environments 
presented significant limitations for the reconstruction project yet the wish list of 
post-conflict reform contained in the reconstruction blue prints, and the additional 
conditionalities from donors, overburdened the weak state which had pressing local 
concerns. The ambitious list of reforms required capacity to deliver them and yet 
constrained capacity was an issue which littered the documentation and was, in itself, 
the subject of interventions. Interventions to build capacity were patchy and often 
involved embedding international staff in state ministries. For example, the UK‘s 
Department for International Development (DfID) funded the position of the 
Director General at the Ministry of Mineral Resources, this position was held by a 
consultant Canadian national provided by Adam Smith International (Cooper, 2008). 
The extent of the commitment of external actors to building local capacity was 
summarised by the NRS Assessment which noted that, in the area of economic 
reform, no sustainable local capacity had been created to implement existing projects 
‗let alone implement new ones‘ (Moore, 2003). Without effective capacity building 
across sectors, dependency would remain and local needs would not be met. Eight 
years after Lomé and despite repeated acknowledgments of the weak institutional 
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and administrative capacity of the government, the Letter of Intent (2008) describing 
economic and financial developments under the 2007 programme highlighted the 
continuing challenges of weak institutional and human capacity (GovSL, 2008). This 
was supported by the findings of the IMF‘s Poverty Reduction Strategy review of 
2008 which stated that: 
The lack of a comprehensive civil service reform continues to pose a serious 
challenge to Government as the required capacity to implement, monitor and 
evaluate programmes is still lacking in line ministries. (IMF, 2008)  
Despite the dearth of capacity building over time, the government made ground in 
economic recovery and improved fiscal management. As early as 2001 the 
government had exceeded the prime target for revenue collection: ‗fiscal 
performance ... was marked by excellent performance on the revenue front‘. The 
government‘s lack of capacity, however, prevented it from reaching the target for 
capital outlays which were ‗substantially below budget‘ (IMF/IDA, 2002: 17).  This 
highlighted the IFIs priority of collection over delivery. Some capacity was being 
built; but to do what? 
3.6 - CONCLUDING STATEMENT 
This chapter set out to investigate the reforms which came along with interventionist 
politics to determine how they could help address local challenges for long term 
peace stability (Newman, 2009: 29). Although the global model of peacebuilding and 
reconstruction could be more accurately described as statebuilding, was there enough 
flexibility in the model to accommodate local priorities for peace? The investigation 
found that external support for recovery significantly influenced the nature, 
sequencing and trajectory of local reforms within quite a rigid structure of 
governance. 
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Through the package of reforming policies based on a donor driven approach 
to peace, it was found that the new model aimed to build a state which was hardly 
distinguishable from the old (Cheru, 2007). This was problematic because, in Sierra 
Leone, statebuilding could not be peacebuilding unless something radical changed in 
the governing structures which had led to state collapse; changes which could relieve 
political tensions and lead to more equitable allocation of resources (Ballentine, 
2005). The statebuilding project was legitimised and justified by the acceptance of 
poverty reduction strategies into domestic policy and restructuring the national 
economy to service debt. The nation building project, a central prerequisite for peace 
in the country, appeared to have been hijacked by external agendas which involved 
the imposition of a western notion of good governance measured on predetermined 
development indicators. Although some of the promises and commitments made by 
the national government to external actors were complementary to those made to its 
citizens, the sheer breadth of reform required enormous local capacity for its 
delivery.  
Consequently, burning local concerns were somewhat de-prioritised because 
the state lacked the capacity to honour all the commitments for reform requested by 
the lenders and the donors. Some were prioritised over others; debt servicing and 
poverty reduction taking precedence over human rights and justice, for example, as 
scarce resources were redirected to comply with conditionalities. The preparation of 
the PRSPs involved the creation of several new committees: the Inter-Ministerial 
Committee, the Poverty Reduction Steering Committee, the Poverty Reduction 
Working Committee and the Poverty Alleviation Strategy Coordinating Office. 
Power therefore became located external to the locale making the process of 
participation rather futile; this had potential to profoundly affect democratisation 
when local people believed their democratically elected government was accountable 
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to them. It was conceivable that the demands of a powerful external constituency 
were adding to the challenges for peace.    
Various assumptions were made about the statebuilding project and its 
peacebuilding potential. That democracy would bring inclusive and good 
governance, for example or that ‗good governance‘ meant good government and 
responsible leadership; that better economic management would come through 
export oriented reforms; that growth would bring jobs and that decentralisation 
would redirect resources to the impoverished and marginalised rural areas. 
The following chapters analyse empirical evidence from the locale to see how 
the statebuilding project worked out in practice. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PUBLIC OWNERSHIP OF PUBLIC GOODS  
Chapter four investigates how macro-economic reforms and liberalising policies 
helped to deliver the peace by supporting local priorities for resource redistribution 
and engaging with the challenge of poor economic management. More specifically, 
the chapter investigates the role of interventions in the creation of new and 
sustainable job opportunities, improvements to the delivery of services, in securing 
sound economic management and the redirection of resources to rural areas (GovSL, 
1999b).
59
 
There were various promises for reform in the iPRSP which could directly 
address the concerns of the TRC-R and support the promises at Lomé (GovSL, 2001: 
paras.113-121). The analysis which follows therefore centres on the PRSPs and 
official reports on their progress; it includes other government documentation and 
new legislation, and various unofficial documents from the mining sector including 
commentary on conditions in diamondiferous areas of the country. The analysis takes 
as its starting point for analysis the commitments made for the ‗Medium-Term 
Phase‘ of reform in the iPRSP because this was less centred on stability and security 
(known as the Transitional Phase) and more centred on longer term development 
(GovSL, 2001: Chapter 3.2).  
The chapter opens with an investigation of the progress of macro-economic 
reform to see how well the government did vis-à-vis better management of the 
economy in general. The analysis deepens the good governance theme by 
investigating the role of political elites in transforming their economy, the challenges 
they faced in the post-war environs, and the costs of liberalising reforms on the 
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peacebuilding project. In section 4.2 there follows an investigation into the efficacy 
of the state in controlling production, trade and exports in the mining sector and the 
extent to which the proceeds of mining were redirected to the local community. An 
interrogation is made of the relevant government initiatives to reform the mining 
sector and a summary of post-war revenue flows - from natural mineral resources to 
the national treasury - is presented, in particular the revenues from diamonds and 
gold as identified by the government at Lomé (Article VII, 6). Finally an analysis is 
made in section 4.3 of the impact of reformed economic management on key 
development indicators such as poverty, education, health, infrastructure and 
economic inequalities. Special focus is drawn to the livelihoods of artisanal and 
small scale miners, and development in rural communities to determine the extent to 
which economic opportunities and general conditions improved in those areas.   
4.1 - MANAGING THE ECONOMY 
Their commitment to the PRGF-supported program remained unwavering and 
all quantitative PC for end-June and end-December 2007 were met, except 
those related to domestic revenue and concomitantly their poverty related 
expenditure. (IMF, 2008:81) 
General Trends 1999-2007 
The two key aims for the post-war economy were stabilisation and growth (Castillo, 
2008:4). The GovSL stuck to its commitments for macro-economic reform in line 
with interventions from the IFIs, and legislation abounded so as to create an 
‗enabling‘ environment for private investment and to address historic issues of bad 
economic management. For example, the Investment Promotion Act (2004) was 
designed to attract foreign investment in all sectors and help to create employment 
opportunities, and the Core Mineral Policy (2003) aimed at encouraging value added 
activities to the mining sector industries (DDI, 2008). Further legislation was passed 
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which was to have an impact on regulating public financial management; the 
National Anti-Corruption Strategy (2005), the Public Budgeting and Accountability 
Act (2005), the Public Procurement Act (2004) and the National Revenue Authority 
Act (2003).  
Significant progress was made in the quest for stability over the post-war 
period with ‗rapid economic growth‘ resulting from buoyant activities in the 
agriculture, mining, construction and service sectors (IMF/IDA, 2006). This growth 
may not necessarily have been directly attributed to macro-economic reform 
(although Kimberly may have made an impact) 
60
, because the absence of war on the 
economy was bound to have huge benefits and the rehabilitation of agricultural land 
vastly increased production in that sector making an important contribution to 
economic growth.
61
 Although levels of inflation began to rise towards the end of 
2006, partly reflecting global price rises and the depreciation of the Leone, fiscal 
performance improved with respect to IFI targets (ibid). In a summary of the 
country‘s performance under the PRGF 2002-2006 it was noted that, despite capacity 
constraints, the government had ‗generally met‘ the quantitative performance criteria 
with regard to payment arrears, international reserves and external debt, but not for 
domestic financing of the budget (IMF/IDA, 2006: 7, Box 2). A gradually 
deteriorating situation with regard to domestic revenue collection gave cause for 
concern but not enough concern, however, to delay the HIPC completion point when 
the country‘s $1.6 billion external debt was forgiven (ICG, 2007).62 Low domestic 
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 The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: an internationally recognized certification 
system for rough diamonds which established national import/export standards aimed at 
combating the illegal diamond trade. In November 2002, 52 governments ratified and adopted the 
Scheme, which was fully implemented in August 2003. 
61
 In 2003, for example, agriculture contributed approximately 47% of GDP (although it started 
from a very low level). This compared very favourably with a 20% share from mining and a 23% 
share from services (DfID, 2008).  
62
 See Jubilee Debt Campaign, Sierra Leone gets debt cancellation, finally, 18
th
 December 2006, 
from 
 161 
 
revenue collection was blamed on several factors: inadequate tax enforcement and 
the inability of governing authorities to broaden the existing tax base especially from 
customs and excise (GovSL, 2006); expenditure overruns on the wage bill; and 
shortfalls or delays in external budget support (IMF/IDA, 2006: 7). The 
government‘s perspective was different, blaming the delayed flows from donors on 
reduced capacity to collect revenue. 
‗by the time the donors came up with the funds ... we had lost a lot in terms of 
revenue we could have collected ... and [we then had to pay] arrears that had 
collected in that year‘ 63  
After a high of 15.4% of GDP in 2003, domestic revenues fell by a third to 10.8% of 
GDP in 2007, falling short of the target figure by 2.4% GDP (IMF, 2008: Table 2.3). 
The shortfall led to severe cuts in government expenditure on poverty reduction 
related activities (ibid: 35). After increasing to 4.4% of GDP in 2006, poverty 
reduction expenditures fell to 3% in 2007 against the target of 5%; this followed 
previous ‗significant‘ shortfalls in poverty outlays in 2005 amounting to Le 34 
billion (around $11.5 million or 1% GDP) (GovSL, 2006). The GovSL gave ‗weak 
planning‘ in the priority areas of education and health as an explanation for this 
(ibid) although the IMF blamed inadequate collection efforts across revenue 
departments and ‗uncertainties created by the election process‘ (IMF, 2008b).  
Inadequate spending on poverty related programming meant that few of the MDGs 
would be reached and several were already seriously off-course, for example child 
mortality and maternal health (EU, 2007).  
Despite capacity constraints, the necessary Performance Criteria (PC) for 
continued funding were generally met even during the radical deterioration of 
                                                                                                                                          
http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/Sierra%20Leone%20gets%20debt%20cancellation,%20f
inally+2801.twl, accessed on 12.08.09. 
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 Personal telephone interview with the SLPP Minister for Finance, Mr John Benjamin, 11/12/08 
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performance during the fiscal year 2006. This success contrasted markedly with the 
inability of the government to achieve the ‗performance criteria‘ for peace summed 
up by DfID:  ‗There has been a positive trend in pro-poor policy formulation but with 
substantially less progress on implementation (DfID, 2008: 5.15). Assuming that 
poverty related expenditure would help the progress of peace, which as discussed 
previously is a tenuous and contested link, the failures of government to target 
revenues to pro-poor activities mean that this hypothesis cannot be tested. This is a 
point to which we shall return in the Conclusion. 
The Progress of Good Governance 
 The goal of a PFM system is to support the achievement of fiscal discipline, 
strategic and efficient allocation and use of funds, value for money and probity 
in the use of public funds. (IMF, 2008a: 39).   
Although the quantitative indicators of economic management revealed a mixed 
performance it was possible that the process of economic management had improved 
as a result of reforms. With support from the international community, various 
programmes and initiatives were launched to improve management of the economy 
within the ‗good governance‘ framework.  
DfID, the country‘s largest bilateral donor, committed over £160 million 
between 2002 and 2007 to programming in Sierra Leone and around 41% of that 
spend went on governance reforms (around $69 million); this was an exceptionally 
high proportion compared to DfID‘s expenditure allocation in other parts of Africa 
(DfID, 2008: Table 5), despite delays in getting any sort of official country strategy 
signed and in place until February 2008 (DfID, 2008: 3.3). A management team was 
trained specifically to use the Records Management Capacity Assessment System 
(IMF, 2008a) and good progress was made vis-à-vis the payment of civil services 
salaries helped by donor funding of key positions such as Inspector General of 
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Police, Accountant General, and High Court Judges etc. Through the creation of a 
‗Civil Service Training College‘, the World Bank helped to support capacity building 
for the Institute of Public Administration and Management. Institutions such as the 
National Revenue Authority were strengthened which helped the government 
become much more effective at revenue generation and collection (ICG, 2007, 
Brown et al., 2005) and the National Privatisation Commission became operational 
(GovSL, 2003).   
These are examples of the type of technical, logistic and financial support 
afforded the GovSL for capacity building and reform in the economic domain but the 
actualisation of this programming was often problematic. The Senior Executive 
Service Programme for example, supported by UNDP funding, stalled because of 
disagreements between government and donors as to the preferred implementation 
strategy, and funding was subsequently withheld (IMF, 2008a:16). To counter the 
lack of capacity within the government structure for programme implementation, 
DfID established Project Independent Units (PIUs) which had the effect of drawing 
qualified and competent middle level bureaucrats away from the state into better paid 
jobs, further diminishing its capacity (DfID, 2008: S22). The EU Joint Strategy 
Report (EU, 2007) noted serious capacity constraints in all line Ministries which 
prevented the government from delivering the Poverty Reduction Strategy across all 
areas. This was a serious challenge for peace because the implementation of 
development programmes relied heavily of the efficacy of the bureaucracy and the 
capacity of line ministries to deliver. For example, the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry was ‗unable to formulate or implement effective trade policies‘ and the 
impact of this was the inability to co-operate with other government ministries or 
sustain an effective dialogue with the private sector, and also the incapacity to 
effectively represent Sierra Leone‘s interests at regional or international negotiation 
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forums (DfID, 2008). Lack of human capacity and weak institutional arrangements 
for project implementation mean that large amounts of aid are difficult to administer 
and absorb, this presents increased opportunities for corrupt activities (Castillo, 
2008: 25). In the final evaluation, there was ‗little evidence that donor support to 
building capacity within government has been effective‘ (DfID, 2008: 5.21) but 
conversely, the creation of a monitoring and evaluation unit within the Development 
Assistance Coordination Office (DACO) was fully operational by the end of 2007. 
This is relevant because, despite the serious capacity constraints on domestic 
functions, the main fiscal targets set by the IFIs were generally met and reporting 
mechanisms for macro-economic activity were functioning. Departments and 
agencies had improved their methods for strategic planning which meant that 
proposed budgets could be presented and approved by parliament with the minimum 
delays. Although there was little evidence of the implementation of reform 
recommendations, internal audit units for all key ministries were established by 2007 
and annual accounts, although suffering from previous backlogs which had delayed 
external budget support in 2006 (IMF/IDA, 2008), were almost up to date at the end 
of the period under study. This success can in part be attributed to the close working 
relationship of the World Bank with key ministries in its mission to promote 
development (Stiglitz, 1999: cited by Harrison, 2004). However, there were other 
concerns especially over the identification and elimination of corruption, and 
procurement procedures, but also the late publication of full audited accounts, the 
appropriate use of competitive tendering and the willingness of the government to 
hold their agencies to account for mismanagement misdemeanours (EU, 2007; IMF, 
2008a).     
Despite the passing into law of various instruments to improve financial 
management and, in particular, to curb the serious problem of corruption, in 2006 
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Transparency International downgraded Sierra Leone from 126
th
 out of 159 countries 
in 2005 to 142
nd
 out of 163 countries which reflected growing impatience and 
frustration both locally and internationally on the inability of the government to get 
this problem under control.  International Crisis Group did not pull any punches: 
Stop-gap measures focus on trying to insert accounting mechanisms at the final 
stages of the revenue process, by which time much has already disappeared. 
(ICG, 2004) 
The civil service is massively politicised and opaque. It has no code of conduct 
or asset disclosure requirements. Poor pay and conditions provide little 
motivation for change. (TIRI, 2007) 
Reform in the civil service was also disappointing and government struggled to 
control expenditure in the pay-roll (Letters of Intent, 2003 and 2005). The problem 
was that lowering of the government wage bill entailed job losses or reduced wages 
for lower ranking officials so as to protect the wages of higher ranking staff. Around 
14,000 of 16,000 members of the civil service remained on the lowest grade which 
meant greater incentives for corruption (IMF/IDA, 2008). Skilled professionals from 
all sectors were in very short supply and the best were tempted to move to NGOs 
where the pay was better; ironically, donors were by-passing ministries in attempts to 
keep the government wage bill down. As a result, there was no evidence of 
successful capacity building projects for the central civil service despite repeated 
reviews and recommendations; progress towards transparency and accountability 
was also stymied (DfID, 2008: 5.22, IMF/IDA, 2008). Despite the government‘s 
explicit claim to ‗reinforce the fight against corruption‘ (GovSL, 2003) there were 
continuous promises for more transparency and accountability in all sectors (GovSL, 
2006).  The conflation of ‗lack of capacity‘ with the ‗fight against corruption‘ 
produced a prominent argument in the rhetoric between GovSL and IFIs. For 
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example, in the GovSL‘s Letter of Intent 2003 lack of capacity in the ACC was 
blamed for its inability to bring cases to litigation. In 2008 there was still no agreed 
reform strategy or clear vision of the future size and shape of government, and many 
reforms had not been implemented (Thomson, 2007, EU, 2007). Mismanagement in 
public spending remained a serious problem which ultimately hurt the 
implementation of reform.
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Private Sector 
Another criticism levelled at the government was that it was not fully committed to 
its promise to improve the climate for the private sector (GovSL, 2001, GovSL, 
2005: 5.3.3). In a 2007 report, the World Bank judged Sierra Leone to be one of the 
‗worst regulatory environments in the world for business and the private sector‘ (EU, 
2007: 11), and on its ‗ease of doing business index‘ the country was ranked 168 out 
of 175 in 2006.
65
 Both foreign and local investment was stymied by conditions in 
Sierra Leone. Levin and Gberie listed a catalogue of serious impediments not least 
that it was a very expensive place to register a business. Legislation was confusing, 
building permit processes were problematic and the taxation system discriminated 
against non-nationals or small companies. Further, they argued that ‗pervasive 
corruption increases invisible costs and corporate risk‘ (Levin and Gberie, 2006). 
This marginalisation of the private sector had dire consequences because it limited 
economic opportunities for the unemployed youth and any associated revenue 
generating opportunities for the government. It also eliminated increased revenues 
from corporate taxation. The informal sector thrived as the cost of doing business 
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 2009 Index of Economic Freedom from the Heritage Foundation, detail on Sierra Leone 
available from http://www.heritage.org/Index/Country/SierraLeone#financial-freedom, accessed 
on 12/08/09 
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 World Bank, Doing Business Data Sets, from http://www.doingbusiness.org/, accessed on 
15/10/08.  It should be noted that by 2008 the country had a made a considerable improvement 
on this, moving to 156 position out of 181 countries. 
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legitimately in Sierra Leone made it more profitable for small enterprises to be extra-
legal (Brown et al., 2005). In the government‘s defence, being a post-conflict country 
with the reputation for ‗blood diamonds‘ it was difficult to attract private investment 
to the sector (Cooper, 2008). Koidu Holdings, for example, was granted tax 
concessions to tempt further investment in the country. Delayed donor support also 
didn‘t help; DfID‘s Private Sector Development Plan, for example, was postponed 
from 2005 to 2007 due to problems appointing a coordinating consultant and ‗the 
elections‘ (DfID, 2008).  
Liberalisation of the Sierra Leone economy was frustratingly stymied. 
Privatisation, a key reform under IFI provisions which prompted promises by the 
government to target twenty four state-owned enterprises to ‗enhance the efficiency 
of government operations and collection of additional revenues‘ (GovSL, 2006: 19), 
failed dramatically perpetuating the ‗critical mass‘ of inefficient and unaccountable 
parastatals with huge debts (Jabbi and Kpaka, 2006). Sierratel, for example, the state-
run tele-communications company was ‗so riddled with corruption‘ that employees 
salaries were repeatedly delayed prompting a sit down strike in 2006 (ibid). The 
service of this state-owned provider was equally inefficient and this was reflected in 
the unprecedented growth and success of mobile networks throughout the country. 
The promised privatisation of three state-owned enterprises for 2007, including two 
banks, did not materialise (GovSL, 2008: 35). The assumption that private 
investment could be drawn into failing national authorities was rather missing the 
point of local conditions and the challenges the country faced for development.  
Privatising the National Power Authority, for example, would involve investing 
‗millions of dollars to get the infrastructure right ... it is not just a question of 
producing power for someone to buy‘; because of the large amounts of wastage 
along the collection and distribution lines, the charges of private power would be so 
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high ‗nobody could afford it‘.66 Added to this, international companies cited 
corruption in all branches of government as an obstacle to investment.
67
 This was not 
the sort of climate to tempt private investors into state owned enterprises. 
Summary 
The analysis of the medium term macro-economic and structural reforms in this 
section reveals a mixed picture. The IFIs were happy with general trends in the 
economy and, despite some shortfalls towards the end of the period with regard to 
revenue collection, the situation generally improved and was considerably more 
effective than it was previous to or during the war due to the successful work of the 
National Revenue Authority (Brown et al., 2005).
68
 Trade increased in line with 
World Bank conditionalities for an export oriented economy and this brought 
sustained growth and economic recovery. In addition to this, the shadow economy 
was reduced, channelling extra revenues into the treasury. Although there were 
problems with corruption, transparency and procurement etc. good progress was 
made on reporting mechanisms such as the monitoring and evaluation of 
programming and also on general auditing. The government was therefore successful 
in meeting the IFI‘s performance criteria to secure continued funding for 
reconstruction, but not the performance criteria necessary to honour the 
commitments made in the post-conflict political settlement (section 4.2 below). 
Several years on from Lomé there remained grave concerns about the 
efficacy, accountability and transparency of governance (Brown et al., 2005, 
Thomson, 2007, ICG, 2004, Zack-Williams, 2008). The donors themselves also had 
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on the index put the country 156
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 For example in 1991 tax revenue collection amounted to 6% of GDP and in 1997 the figure 
was 5.4% sourced from UNHDR and IMF 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1999/pr9962.htm, accessed on 01/12/08 
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questions to answer. Relocating valuable local human resources for the 
implementation of externally driven programming added little to the wider capacity 
building project and this fed into the government‘s proclamations of inadequate 
capacity to deliver the peace. Important questions remained about the ultimate 
beneficiaries of improved revenue flows and increased aid and about the genuine 
commitment of local elites to reform their procedures and behaviour (Thomson, 
2007, Brown et al., 2005). For example, new legislation appeared to have little 
impact on full liberalisation and improved management of the economy and there 
were more serious concerns about the government‘s ability to maintain macro-
economic stability and pro-poor growth, especially in the wake of inflated world 
food prices which would have an impact on consumption. This would put pressure 
on government to lower taxes thereby reducing revenues not increasing them 
(IMF/IDA, 2008). The sudden drop in the value of the Leone in August 2009 caused 
greater hardship to consumers who were already suffering from high global prices 
for rice and fuel. The Leone had remained fairly stable in the post-war war era at 
around 3,000 to the US Dollar, or 5,000 to the British Pound. In August 2009 the 
Leone lost significantly against both currencies.
69
 Exposure of the fragile local 
economy to the global markets had a heavy toll on the poor. 
4.2 - GOVERNING MINERAL EXTRACTION: THE RESOURCE CURSE? 
The Government commits itself to propose and support an amendment to the 
Constitution to make the exploitation of gold and diamonds the legitimate 
domain of the people of Sierra Leone, and to determine that the proceeds be 
used for the development of Sierra Leone, particularly public education, public 
health, infrastructure development, and compensation of incapacitated war 
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 The Leone dropped to around 5700 to the Pound and 3400 to the Dollar in August 2009 due to 
increased world demand for the dollar, see Standard Times Press 
http://standardtimespress.net/cgi-bin/artman/publish/article_4103.shtml, accessed on 10/08/09. 
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victims as well as post-war reconstruction and development. Lomé Agreement, 
Article VII (14) 
Reform of the mining sector is at the centre of this analysis because of the role it 
played in fuelling and prolonging the war, its significance in the settlement package, 
its relevance for economic growth and stability as the main driver of the economy, 
the livelihoods it provides and impact it has on rural communities, and because it was 
a central goal of both the NRS and the iPRSP. The main concern was to get mining 
operations functioning and contributing to national coffers, and to improve 
accessibility to the diamondiferous areas following their control by rebels during the 
long period of war. The promise was to make the process more transparent and 
accountable, and to improve the livelihoods and conditions of the returning 
population of small scale miners and artisans (GovSL, 2001: 91). This development 
was to take place alongside increased efforts to open up the sector to private 
investment and capital intensive large-scale mining with the view to forming an 
‗integrated mining economy‘ (GovSL, 2001: 116). The purpose was to reinvest 
diamond capital back into the local economy to provide impetus for development 
(Maconachie and Binns, 2007a).  
The Resource Curse 
The political history of Sierra Leone and the eventual collapse of the state indicated 
that the country‘s wealth of natural resources had been somewhat of a ‗resource 
curse‘.  This was because it had helped induce and perpetuate patronage politics, and 
had contributed to underdevelopment, corruption, political instability and eventually 
violence and war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005, Brown et al., 2005, Collier, 2007). The 
‗lootability‘ of diamonds in Sierra Leone meant that the war cost very little to the 
rebel forces and this engendered a prolonged insurgency. Indeed, the war was 
lucrative for those involved at all levels, the economy of war being more rewarding 
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for many people than the dividends of peace under the previous APC regime. 
Therefore, control of diamond mining in the post-war era was an imperative for the 
future stability and security of the country.  
Much has been written on the political economy of diamonds in Sierra Leone 
and its relationship to the ‗greed and grievance‘ thesis (Keen, 2005; Smillie, 2000; 
Richards, 2003; Maconachie and Binns, 2007a; Berdal, 2001) and that easy access to 
natural resources fuelled conflicts because there was no cost to rebels who had 
‗opportunist‘ motives; this situation is distinct from rebel ‗idealists‘ who are prepared 
to bear the costs of war for the benefits of longer term reform (Weinstein, 2005; 
Elbadawi, 2002). The characteristics of the war in Sierra Leone indeed became more 
criminal than idealistic. The nature of the war was more complex than that but these 
arguments are profoundly relevant for peace in Salone first, because of the ‗lootable‘ 
nature of alluvial diamond mining in the country and second, because of the presence 
of a number of ex-combatants who did not take part in the DDR and who were 
potentially still at large in the countryside, such as the Kamajor militias (Grant, 
2005). Lootability refers to the high value-to-weight ratio of diamonds and the ease 
of access to their geographical deposits. For example, diamonds were found on the 
ground after heavy rain or could be extracted using tools as simple as sieves and 
shovels. With alluvial mining there were relatively few diamonds per hectare and 
therefore areas were not fenced off; people often found themselves living among 
potential finds. Consequently, it was almost impossible to control the production and 
trade of this type of mining compared to Kimberlite mining, for example, which 
involved heavy machinery extracting from deep reserves within Kimberlite pipes 
(Maconachie, 2008).  
In 2003/04 Kimberlite diamond production came into force in Sierra Leone and 
contributed to the sharp rise of export earnings around that time, although alluvial 
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mining continued to be by far the most lucrative form of extraction. In 2006, for 
example, the value of rough diamond exports from alluvial digging by small scale 
artisans and small scale companies amounted to around 90% of official diamond 
exports; of the 604,000 carats valued at US$125.3 million, 492,000 carats valued at 
US$101.9 million were extracted from alluvial mining (DDI, 2008). However, the 
country‘s Kimberlite reserves were estimated to be worth over US$2 billion (ibid) 
and these were mined by the only company using deep excavation techniques, Koidu 
Holdings. Kimberlite reserves were good news for Sierra Leone because of the 
prospects for the type of diamond mining which was much less problematic for 
government to control and tax, and the connection between ‗lootable‘ precious gems 
and political instability (Maconachie, 2008; Olsson, 2006). However, in the 
immediate post-conflict environment, artisanal diamond exports were considered to 
be the primary avenue for ‗direct poverty reduction through trade‘ (DDI, 2008), and 
the consensus was that better governance in the sector would fix the problem 
(Ocheje, 2006, ODI, 2006). This conflated with the view that the main development 
issues in Sierra Leone were accountability, transparency, corruption (Maconachie, 
2008); that the most potent curse was bad government itself. 
 
Governing Mineral Extraction 
The proceeds from the transactions of gold and diamonds shall be public 
monies which shall enter a special Treasury account to be spent exclusively on 
the development of the people of Sierra Leone ... Lomé Peace Accord, Article 
VII (6) 
For the export or local resale of gold and diamonds by the Government, the 
CMRRD shall authorize a buying and selling agreement with one or more 
reputable international and specialized mineral companies. All exports of 
Sierra Leonean gold and diamonds shall be transacted by the Government, 
under these agreements. (ibid) (5) 
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Figure 14 (below) gives a clear indication of how exports from mining were skewed 
towards diamond production and how diamond revenues dominated the economy in 
the years immediately after the war although by 2006 good revenues also began to 
flow from gold, bauxite and rutile production (Table 9, below). Increased annual 
mineral revenues were forecast from the planned modernisation of gold and diamond 
mines; this was predicted to raise revenues to over $370 million compared to around 
$215 million in 2007 (Table 9) (World Bank, 2005). Some analysts believed that 
there was potential for gold mining to overtake diamonds as an economic currency 
and export material because of large, uncovered deposits;
70
 a belief which was 
supported by new finds in 2007 when deposits of gold-bearing hard rock were 
discovered after sampling in Canadian laboratories.
71
 This was very good news for 
the country as analysts concluded that productive alluvial mining could soon be 
exhausted but would be replaced by different forms of mineral extraction (Cooper, 
2008).  
Figure 14 – Sierra Leone mining exports 1999-2007 
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The GovSL planned to regulate the extractive industries through new initiatives and 
legislation, and to build on its own Certification Scheme – in 2000 the country had 
initiated a scheme in accordance with UN-SCR1306. The main purpose of reform 
was to encourage more production through legal channels so that subsequent revenue 
flows could be redirected back into local communities. Key initiatives included the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), the Diamond Area Community 
Development Fund (DACDF) and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) which the government passed in 2007 enabling receipts to be open to public 
scrutiny (DDI, 2008). 
The KPCS, the ‗gold standard‘ mechanism for voluntary corporate social 
responsibility supported by over 70 governments worldwide, was adopted in Sierra 
Leone in 2004 and the reformed National Revenues Agency was given responsibility 
for implementing the scheme (Maconachie, 2008: 7). Although other factors played 
their role, it was possible that the KPCS was influential in the context of growth in 
the diamond economy as official exports of rough diamonds increased markedly after 
2003 (Table 9) (Cooper, 2008). More recent reports concluded that although 
Kimberley had in part been successful in increasing revenues to the national treasury, 
there was still an extensive illicit trade in rough diamonds taking place in parallel 
with the certification scheme (GlobalWitness/PAC, 2008).  
To support the certification schemes, The Banking Act 2000 aimed at broader 
reform; for example, to create a more efficient banking and financial system, to 
support the valuation work of the Gold and Diamond Office (GDO), to facilitate the 
export of rough diamonds and the payment of the 3% export duty. There were 
several legislation changes with regard to reform in the governance of the mining 
sector. The Mines and Minerals Amendment Act 1999 was an attempt to gain control 
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of the mining, dealing and exporting of ‗precious minerals‘ and to reduce the 
incidence of smuggling by tightening up the licensing process.
72
  The Commission 
for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and 
Development Act, (1999) brought into law the promises made at Lomé, and was 
designed to bring all activities in the gold and diamond mining sector under 
government control and to commit to the exclusive appropriation of monies for 
development from the Special Treasury Account (Part V, 14:1). The Mines and 
Minerals Amendment Act 2004 increased the prison term penalties for unlawful 
possession and smuggling of mineral resources, although the fines for such offences 
were repealed.
73
 The Investment Promotion Act (2004) was passed to attract 
domestic and foreign capital into the industry and also allow development of ‗value 
added‘ industries such as cutting and polishing (The Core Mineral Policy, 2003).74 
Although the Diamond Cutting and Polishing Act came into force in March 2007, it 
wasn‘t until 2008 that these value added activities were put firmly on the agenda to 
improve growth of revenues from the sector and to create new job opportunities.  
Additional legislation included The National Commission for Social Action 
Act (2001);
75
 this was a new commission to oversee reconstruction and sustainable 
development, and consolidated the activities of the former National Commission for 
Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation as created by the Lomé Accord 
(Article XXVIII, 1). This raft of new legislation indicated that the government was 
                                                 
72
 GovSL, The Mines and Minerals Amendment Act 1999, being an Act to amend the Mines and 
Minerals Act 1994, 22/07/99, available from Sierra Leone Web at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/Laws/1999 and accessed on 27/10/08 
73
 GovSL, The Mines and Minerals Amendment Act 2004, being an Act to amend the Mines and 
Minerals Act 1994, 01/07/04, available from Sierra Leone Web at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/Laws/1999 and accessed on 27/10/08 
74
 The Core Mineral Policy (2003) was designed to align laws and regulations to international 
standards and improve the conditions of small-scale miners 
75
 Available at Sierra Leone Web, http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/2001-13.pdf, accessed on 
31/10/08 
 176 
 
committed by law to improve governance of the mining sector and to actively 
encourage private investment for growth. 
A further initiative in this regard was the DACDF. Introduced in 2001, its 
main purpose was to reduce the number of illegal transactions in the alluvial sector 
by returning a percentage of the diamond revenues back to the diamondiferous 
communities and to improve conditions in the mining areas which were particularly 
hard hit during the war. Kono, for example, suffered greatly from the damage caused 
to infrastructure and from land degradation as the rebels, seeking to maximise their 
war dividend through open alluvial mining, caused rampant destruction across the 
countryside. The DACDF initiative was a practical response to the Lomé promises 
and an incentive for diamond sector workers to barter their gems through legal 
channels. The scheme aimed to be ‗participatory‘ in nature by including mechanisms 
for local consultation in diamondiferous communities; this would allow people to get 
involved in resource management and take on responsibility for decision making 
about their community‘s development (Maconachie, 2008: 10). Mining chiefdoms 
benefited commensurate with the number of mining licences issued and the value of 
gems recovered from their territory (Maconachie and Binns, 2007a). The funds were 
targeted at the development of infrastructure such as schools, clinics, markets, roads, 
bridges, water supply, waste disposal, community centres or court houses; also, 
community agriculture, especially post-harvest crop processing (drying floors and 
storage facilities) and vocational skills training centres.
76
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http://www.slmineralresources.org/docs/DACDF_Background.pdf, accessed on 30/10/08 
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Table 8 – Number of mining licences issued to end of 2004 by province 77 
 Northern Province Southern Province Eastern Province 
No. of licences 143 372 1798 
No. of chiefdoms 9 24 21 
Due to the structure of the funding, beneficiaries of the DACDF were localised; 
around 60 chiefdoms were eligible but most were located in the Eastern Kono district 
due to high density artisanal mining there. By the end of 2004, 1798 licences had 
been issued in the Eastern Province compared to 143 in the Northern Province, for 
example; the average per chiefdom in the Eastern Province was 85 compared to an 
average of 16 for diamondiferous chiefdoms in the North (Table 8, above). 
Consequently, large areas of rural Sierra Leone were left out of the deal. Of those 
that weren‘t, there were problems with the management of the funds and many of the 
intended outcomes for development did not materialise.
78
 Whole communities failed 
to benefit from the DACDF because of its narrow target, however individual 
members of other communities, including chiefs, did benefit and due to irregularities 
and concerns raised by the GovSL High Level Diamond Steering Committee, 
disbursement of funds was suspended during 2004, although around $850,000 was 
still paid to mining chiefdoms in that year (PAC and NMJD, 2006). A major 
shortcoming of the DACDF was that it was not implemented for large industrial 
ventures despite the fact that they had the largest socio-environmental ‗footprint‘ and 
owed a lot to local communities (Le Billon, 2008).   
The allocation of the DACDF, to be returned to mining communities for 
development, represented 0.75% of the 3% export tax on diamonds. This figure was 
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and accessed on 29/10/08 
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therefore only 25% of government revenue accrued from diamond exports. The 
decision to allocate this proportion to local communities was agreed at a government 
cabinet meeting on 20
th
 December 2001 by the political elite of the day.
79
   
From 2001-2004, a total of nearly $1,923,000 was paid out to mining 
chiefdoms.
80
 The impact of this was mixed; there were positive accounts as well as 
negative such as the successful construction of a multi-purpose community complex 
in the Lower Bambara Chiefdom of Kenema District. No funds were disbursed in 
2007 owing to ‗the elections‘; it is not clear why this should be the case although 
local cynics suggested that election year was an expensive year for the government in 
respect of bribes and vote buying.
81
 Decentralisation meant that local authorities also 
became beneficiaries of the fund; by the end of 2005 around US$2.8 million had 
been allocated to over 60 chiefdoms and also 13 district and city councils.
82
 For 
example, in 2005, 455 mining licences were issued to the Sandor Chiefdom in 
Eastern Province and an amount of Le 525,131,769 (around $175,000) was disbursed 
including 20% due to the District council. Reports from the chiefdom indicated that 
the money was used to rehabilitate the Native Administration police quarters and 
lock-up - a contentious use of community funds decided upon by local elites and 
resulting in the strengthening of chieftaincy power - and the less contentious 
community health centre (Maconachie, 2008; Maconachie and Binns, 2007a). 
There were various problems officially associated with the implementation of 
the DACDF.  These included the method of determining who got what in the process 
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and whether the main decision maker on development agendas should be the local 
council, city council or the chiefdom. Also, the precise constitution of the Chiefdom 
Development Committee was contested; there were no project selection criteria or 
application guidelines. The lack of oversight mechanisms meant it was impossible to 
discern whether funding reached the intended beneficiaries and there was minimal 
reporting or monitoring of the project implementation.
83
  
In addition to these concerns over the official mechanisms of the project and 
despite the ‗participatory‘ nature of the initiative, there appeared to be a general lack 
of awareness among the regular population of their purpose. This meant there was 
limited contribution to the decision making process, especially among the women 
and the youth (Maconachie and Binns, 2007a). The lack of reporting vis-à-vis which 
projects (if any) the funds had been spent on meant that the quest for transparency 
and accountability was profoundly compromised, but this was not altogether 
surprising as capacity at the micro-level for the implementation and monitoring of 
complex local initiatives was conspicuous by its absence. The DACDF initiative had 
made the assumption that local people had the necessary skills for official reporting; 
Chiefdom Development Committees (CDCs) were supposed to monitor the process 
but these were made up almost entirely of rural elites yet concerns were rife among 
local people that some chiefs were pocketing the funds themselves (Temple, 2005: 
cited by Maconachie and Binns, 2007, Jackson, 2007, Maconachie and Binns, 
2007b). 
 
The Shadow Market 
Most reports on the KPCS in Sierra Leone concluded that smuggling and illegal 
mining continued apace (DDI, 2008, Levin and Gberie, 2006). Despite a ‗monitoring 
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unit‘ in the Ministry of Mineral Resources, consisting of poorly paid monitors, 
attempts to control smuggling and illicit trade were largely ineffective; violation of 
the regulations continued and smuggling remained rife as studies found that a large 
percentage of Sierra Leone‘s diamonds continued to be handled through illicit 
channels and old patrimonial networks (GlobalWitness and PAC, 2004, Maconachie, 
2008, Jackson, 2007). There was evidence that a shadow economy still existed 
despite the KPCS. In 2006 it was estimated that around 50% of diamonds were 
leaving the country illegally (PAC and NMJD, 2006). This figure represented the 
value not the volume of trade; the caratage of illegal trade was much higher 
involving larger and better quality gems (Levin and Gberie, 2006). After an 
examination of the artisanal sector in 2005, Peace Diamond Alliance (PDA) 
estimated the real value of diamond production to have been in the region of US$400 
million compared to the official figure of US$142 million (Table 9) (PAC and 
NMJD, ibid). This is unsurprising bearing in mind the ‗lootability‘ of the diamonds, 
the lucrative international market, the system of bribes involved in legal chains and 
the complex and costly business of acquiring licences (ibid). An artisanal mining 
licence cost around $270 but after ‗hand-shakes‘ the price could exceed $330 (Levin 
and Gberie, 2006). Motivations for redirecting diamonds away from licit channels 
were dependent upon a ‗range of risk/reputation/opportunity cost calculations‘ that 
local actors made on a day to day, diamond to diamond, basis (Cooper, 2008). 
Although illegal mining had been curbed somewhat through the KPCS, smuggling 
remained a big problem and some reports suggested there was also significant 
smuggling of gold (World Bank, 2006). 
In addition to the DACDF, another initiative to curb smuggling was to give 
tax incentives; this meant that producers could save 0.5% of export tax for values 
over $10 million (foreign nationals) or $1 million (Sierra Leone nationals). This 
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regressive taxation system aimed to increase the amount of diamonds being exported 
legally rather than increase government revenues from greater volumes of natural 
resources leaving the country and was the direct opposite of usual progressive 
taxation systems; an indication of the size of the problem facing the Sierra Leone 
government (GlobalWitness and PAC, 2004). With regard to efforts to reduce 
corruption, these met with resistance in some quarters because conflicts of interest 
still existed among some government officials, and also among some chiefs. Land 
rents were subject to non-transparent and sometimes self interested ‗handshakes‘ by 
some chiefs who were also unable to account for their spend from DACDF (DDI, 
2008, Maconachie and Binns, 2007a). This continuation of old practices was 
problematic and was assisted by the restoration of the chieftaincy system in the 
reconstruction process (Jackson, 2005, Fanthorpe, 2005, Maconachie and Binns, 
2007a, Peters et al., 2003). This had an impact on the youth  because the relationship 
between the chieftaincy administration and the community remained unequal and the 
decision making exclusive, practices similar to the past (Maconachie and Binns, 
2007b). Land rights also remained elusive to most of the returning youth population 
and this further strained their relationships with local chiefs. Diamond related 
corruption remained widespread at higher levels too, as witnessed by the arrest of 
Minister for Transport, Momoh Pujeh, for illegal diamond dealing by the Anti-
Corruption Commission (Jackson, 2005).  
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Revenue Flows from Mineral Resources 
Table 9 – Value of Sierra Leone mining exports – US$ 000s 84 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Diamonds 1,245 10,067 26,023 41,732 75,970 126,653 141,834 125,305 141,566 
Gold 6 - 3 31 54 162 264 1,063 2,985 
Rutile        28,501 38,146 
Bauxite        23,573 32,706 
Ilmenite        1,063 1,201 
Total 1,251 10,067 26,026 41,763 76,034 126,815 142,098 179,505 216,604 
 
Over the post-war period, alluvial diamonds provided by far the greatest proportion 
of mining revenue to the National Treasury. The country‘s diamonds were of a very 
high quality with the potential to produce outstanding stones such as the 969 carat 
‗Star of Sierra Leone‘ discovered in 1972. The average ‗run-of-mine‘ carat value was 
higher than almost any other diamond producing country in the world and diamond 
production was the country‘s major source of foreign exchange, important for debt 
servicing (GlobalWitness and PAC, 2004). It provided work for more people than 
any sector after subsistence farming and was credited with the responsibility for half 
a million livelihoods (Jackson, 2005). As a sector, mining and quarrying employed 
about 14% of the total labour force, between 200,000 and 300,000 people (World 
Bank, 2006). 
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statements of account accessed on 19/10/08 from http://www.bankofsierraleone-centralbank.org/; 
Rutile, Bauxite and Ilmenite figures: sourced from Bank of Sierra Leone annual report and 
statements of account accessed on 19/10/08 from http://www.bankofsierraleone-centralbank.org/ 
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Figure 15 – Value of rough diamond exports 1999-2008 85 
 
 
As Figure 15 illustrates, revenues from the export of rough diamonds rose 
dramatically from a low of just over US$1 million in 1999 to a high of around 
US$142 million in 2005; high levels were sustained for the following two years. The 
discrepancy between the 2006 and 2007 figures reflects the global market value – 
US$208 compared to US$235 – because the caratage output was almost the same for 
both years (Table 11). The Kimberley Process was credited with the increased 
revenue flowing into the national treasury but mining companies, including Koidu 
Holdings, also boosted revenues by providing royalty payments from artisanal 
miners which were not previously collected.
86
   
                                                 
85 Data for 1999 – 2003 sourced from Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) at 
http://www.pacweb.org/e/images/stories/documents/2006-03%20ddi-
dealing%20for%20development-full%20report.pdf, accessed 09/11/09 and data for 2004-2009 
sourced from Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) at 
https://mmsd.mms.nrcan.gc.ca/kimberleystats/publicstats.asp , accessed 09/11/09 
The KPCS production and trade statistics might not be comparable to respective national statistical 
agency‘s production or trade data due to differing conceptual and methodological practices employed 
in gathering and reporting these data.  Also, there is no guarantee that data are reliable and error free 
because governments submit their own data, but every effort is made to ensure that it is 
https://mmsd.mms.nrcan.gc.ca/kimberleystats/public_tables/ExplanatoryNotesforPublicReleaseofKPC
SInformationVersion4%200.pdf. 
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 Diamond Intelligence Magazine, ―Sierra Leone's diamond export values rise but volumes 
remain constant‖ , accessed from 
http://www.diamondintelligence.com/magazine/magazine.asp?id=5916 on 28/01/08 
 184 
 
The total value of mining exports for the nine year post-war period was over 
US$820 million.  This could have been higher if tax concessions were not given to 
companies such as Koidu Holdings. In the diamond sector the value of exports was 
almost US$700 million producing government revenues from the 3% export tax on 
diamonds of around US $21 million. This is calculated as an estimate of the possible 
maximum because of the regressive taxation system mentioned earlier, but it is 
justified because of other revenues on diamonds for example fees for licences; 
export, mining, dealers and dealers‘ agents. An export licence was $40,000 and a 
dealer licence between $2,000 and $5,000 dependent upon the applicant‘s nationality 
(GlobalWitness and PAC, 2004). This meant that revenues from licences could 
effectively double the revenue into the treasury from diamond mining. For example, 
in 2004 export taxes on diamonds amounted to $5.2 million of which $2.9 million 
represented licence fees (PAC and NMJD, 2006). In addition to export tax and the 
licensing system, there were other methods of taxation for diamond industry 
activities including income tax at corporate level (30%). Exporters and dealers paid 
income tax, and holders of mining leases paid a minimum of 3.5% although the 
government found collection of some of these taxes very problematic (Levin and 
Gberie, 2006). Dealers and agents also paid taxes to local councils. For example, in 
Kono district these amount to around $167 per annum being a town council tax on 
the dealer‘s office and a tax on the diamond scale (Levin and Gberie, 2006). 
What this summary reveals is that, given the various taxation demands 
imposed on the sector, a potential figure of $40 million dollars revenue from 
diamond mining over the period would not be unrealistic. A large part of the tax, 
however, was taken up on expenditure for maintaining the Kimberley Process itself 
and for the regulation and management of the licensing system (GlobalWitness and 
PAC, 2004). Table 11 gives the breakdown. The 0.75% disbursement to the Gold and 
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Diamond Office (GDO) was used to pay staff; $1 million was allocated in 2004, for 
example (PAC and NMJD, 2006). As the value of exports grew over time, the 
disbursements to each area increased proportionately. Staff at the GDO received 
salary increases to around $5,100 per annum (2005) considerably reducing the 
temptation for workers to engage in corruption or unethical practices; but this trend 
was in marked contrast to the conditions afforded the lowest level mine workers in 
the remote areas of rural Salone. 
Table 10 – Breakdown of 3% export revenue by beneficiary 
 
DACDF Special 
Account 
GGDD General Revenue 
Account 
External valuator Monitoring 
0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.4% 0.35% 
Mining communities continued to experience the greatest poverty and social 
exclusion despite the increased wealth being extracted through diamond mining 
(Thomson, 2007, Brown et al., 2005, GlobalWitness, 2007). By 2007, exploitation, 
poverty and poor working conditions were still characteristics of the industry 
(GlobalWitness, 2007). Environmental rehabilitation and land reclamation both 
remained remote aspirations despite clauses in the Core Mineral Policy to protect the 
environment from the impact of mining (PAC and NMJD, 2005). Although child 
labour had been reduced somewhat, the incidence of child workers in the mining 
sector remained problematic due to the absence of other livelihood opportunities in 
the area; large numbers of children, many living independently, continued to be 
exploited by miners and exposed to the dangers of hazardous and sometimes illegal 
work (Boas and Hatloy, 2006, Thomson, 2007). The emergence of Kimberlite 
mining in 2003/04 held better prospects for control of the sector but big corporate 
operations meant different problems for the locals. Community members protested in 
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response to Koidu Holdings‘ attitude to an environmental impact assessment in 2004, 
for example, the perception being that of a ‗large foreign company trampling on the 
rights of poor and unprotected indigene‘ (PAC and NMJD, 2005: 9). More recently 
police opened fire on demonstrators seeking compensation from the company, killing 
two locals.
87
 Subsequent to this incident mining was halted but resumed shortly 
afterwards when the company was cleared of all charges after an ‗amicable 
discussion‘ between the government and the company when Kono residents and 
interested civil society organisations were not invited.
88
 
The point to be made here is that reform of the mining sector had very little 
tangible benefits for the local community despite increased exports and the DACDF. 
It also led to deforestation across large areas, in some cases whole districts, which 
led to health problems, the loss of biodiversity and alternative livelihoods (ibid). 
Most benefits went to chiefs or foreigners and growing frustration was detected 
among mining communities by researchers working in the Kono District (ibid); even 
through legal trade local people benefited far less than other nationals. For example, 
according to government figures in 2007, Hussein Makie, a Lebanese ‗diamantaire‘, 
exported the greatest amount of diamonds from Sierra Leone with more than 269,499 
carats worth US$55 million while Koidu Holdings occupied second place with 147 
376 carats valued at US$28 million, a company whose shares are solely owned by an 
Israeli national, Beny Steinmetz. Whatever the final amount of taxation revenues 
from mineral resources, and it is impossible to quantify the exact figure, 75% of the 
proceeds did not go to local communities.  
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 Sierra Leone Police Open Fire on Locals Protesting Mining Practices (2007), sourced from 
Voice of America News at  http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2007-12/2007-12-14-
voa41.cfm, accessed on 04.11.08 and Diamond Mining halted at Sierra Leone‘s Koidu mine but 
only after two protesters die (2007), sourced from Mines and Communities (MAC) at 
http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=8351, accessed on 04.11.08 
88
 Campaign for Just Mining Press Release, 23
rd
 May 2008, available from 
http://www.nmjd.org/press%20releases/CJM%20PRESS%20RELEASE%20MAY%202008.pdf, 
accessed on 18.08.09. 
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Table 11 - Diamond export revenue flows -1999-2008 
89
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
89 Data for 1999-2003 sourced from Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) at http://www.pacweb.org/e/images/stories/documents/2006-03%20ddi-
dealing%20for%20development-full%20report.pdf.  Data for 2004-2008 sourced from Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) at 
https://mmsd.mms.nrcan.gc.ca/kimberleystats/publicstats.asp.  The KPCS production and trade statistics might not be comparable to respective national 
statistical agency‘s production or trade data due to differing conceptual and methodological practices employed in gathering and reporting these data.  
Also, there is no guarantee that data are reliable and error free because government submits its own data, but every effort is made to ensure that it is 
https://mmsd.mms.nrcan.gc.ca/kimberleystats/public_tables/ExplanatoryNotesforPublicReleaseofKPCSInformationVersion4%200.pdf.  
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Value US$ 000s 1,244.8 10,066.9 26,022.5 41,732.1 75,969.8 126,652.6 141,833.6 125,304.8 141,565.7 
 
98,772.2 
Tax Revenue  
3% US$ 000s 37.3 302.0 780.7 1,252.0 2,279.1 3,799.6 4,255.0 3,759.1 4,247.0 
 
 
2,963.2 
Volume/Carats 9,320 77,372 222,521 351,859 506,723 691,757 668,636 603,566 603,623 371,261 
US$/Carat 134 130 117 119 150 183 212 208 235 266 
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Summary 
Government‘s policy is to continue to improve the livelihood of small scale 
miners and to provide a conducive environment to attract private investment 
into capital-intensive large-scale mining as well to ensure environmentally 
friendly mining practises.  (GovSL, 2001: 116) 
In response to demands for better governance, GovSL made creditable efforts to 
establish initiatives and legislation which could improve the management of the 
mining sector.  Substantially increased revenue flows from this sector indicated a 
good level of success in this regard. Legal channels of production became busier 
necessarily reducing illegal trade and contributing to growth and tax revenues. 
Despite this, government only regained partial control of diamond production and 
illegal channels continued to flourish and the perpetuation of patrimonial networks 
could only undermine government attempts to grow the formal economy.   
There are several issues that Section 3.1 raises in connection with the peace 
promises and the liberal peacebuilding project. The TRC recommendations called 
for a higher percentage of export taxes to go to local communities because it would 
bring genuine improvements to quality of life direct from diamond revenues, yet 
75% of mineral revenues were not directed towards development, large amounts 
being channelled into management of the KPCS and into government‘s central 
account (Maconachie and Binns, 2007a, Levin and Gberie, 2006: 36, TRC, 2004: 
Vol.2, Chapter 3, Recommendations: 471).  With a ‗net-negative‘ impact of mining 
on locals it is not surprising there was resistance to legalising activities when it was 
not in peoples‘ best interests to behave legally. 
Second, there was evidence that chiefs misappropriated part of the DACDF 
and continued to patronise old networks. Decision making tended to marginalise the 
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youth and some chiefs did not take on the responsibility of controlling mineral 
resources for the benefit of their communities. Chieftaincy politics appeared to be 
alive and well and undiminished by international intervention - corruption, 
inequities and mismanagement remained (Fanthorpe, 2005).  New laws did not 
address issues of land and property rights (see Section 4.3) and continuing 
traditional practices held potential to reignite conflict among the youth. In 2008 new 
legislation aimed at modernising and rationalising land and property rights was 
drafted but not passed by parliament and it was reported by Peters that many ex-
combatants ‗openly stated their readiness to return to the bush to fight if the 
democratic process does not result in a better deal for excluded youth (Peters, 2002). 
The pilfering tactics of local chiefs appeared to be replicated at higher levels in 
government in respect of diamond related corruption. In 2007 an ICG report stated 
that ‗significant official corruption and meddling still impede development of a 
rational and transparent industry‘ (ICG, 2007). 
Finally, a myopic focus on the diamond industry for development crowded 
out other potential development areas to generate alternate livelihood opportunities 
for locals such as agricultural or forestry. This was due to the ‗short termism‘ 
mindset of the private sector with regard to returns on investment, gains from the 
agricultural sector taking longer to materialise.
90
 Diamond industry development 
failed to hit its target for regenerating mining communities and although Kimberley 
was successful in decreasing illegal flows, the main purpose appeared to be 
securitisation not development (Cooper, 2008). Strong growth in the diamond sector 
did not benefit local communities or the workers themselves. In Section 4.3 the 
extenuating factors of this marginalisation are explained. 
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 Personal telephone interview with SLPP Minister for Finance, Mr John Benjamin, 11
th
 
December 2008 
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4.3 - DEVELOPMENT OF SIERRA LEONE 
‗When you are hungry you are tired. It is difficult to concentrate in school. You 
fall asleep.  Your stomach hurts like you have worms. You fight. It is so hard; 
you cannot do anything except think of food.‘ (A boy in Mathinka, a village in 
Bombali District, Northern Province, PRSP: 22) (GovSL, 2005: 22) 
There follows an analysis of the impact of macro-economic reforms vis-à-vis 
improved livelihoods opportunities and better living standards for the poorest 
members of the community (TRC-R, 2004). Various documents provide the data for 
this analysis including the PRSPs, the GovSL Letters of Intent, IMF and UNHR 
Reports, and unofficial reports from the diamond mining sector and elsewhere.  
 
General progress and how it is missing the poor 
Government will create ‗the basis for sustainable economic recovery and 
progressive improvements in living standards, especially for the poor. These 
policies will be backed by implementation of sector programmes in the key 
economic sectors including agriculture and mining as well as infrastructure 
development in the transport, energy and telecommunications sectors.‘ 
(GovSL, 2001: 113) 
The liberalising model for peace associates economic growth with reduced poverty 
over time but it is difficult to give an accurate measure of poverty in Sierra Leone or 
to detect any change in the incidence of poverty because the data is so variable. For 
example, HD Reports have used the concepts of ‗absolute poverty‘ or ‗poverty line‘ 
interchangeably over time, and other reports use definitions such as ‗food poor‘, 
‗total poverty‘ or ‗extreme poverty‘. In some instances, data for rural areas is 
available but not for the total population (UN-HDRs) and there seems to be no 
consensus across the data sets. For example, some reports indicate an increase in the 
incidence of poverty in Sierra Leone, and some a reduction (GovSL, 2007b).  
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Despite this confusion, certain statements can be made. An integrated 
household survey in 2004 carried out to inform the PRSP revealed that poverty 
remained widespread in Sierra Leone.  Twenty six per cent of the country‘s 
population was food poor (extreme poverty) which meant that they couldn‘t afford a 
basic diet. This meant 1,248,000 people could not afford the primary basic necessity 
of food, calculated in the report at less than a dollar a day or the lower figure of Le 
1,033 a day (PRSP:21). Other indicators of poverty remained alarmingly 
unsatisfactory despite substantial payments from the PRGF. When added to the 
number of people who lacked other basic necessities such as safe water, sanitation, 
shelter and education (calculated at a figure of Le 2,111 per day), the incidence of 
poverty rose to around 70% of the population (ibid). Income inequality also 
remained high - the lowest 20% of the population benefited from only 7% of 
consumption whereas the highest 20% accounted for 46%. 80% of people living in 
rural areas remained below the national poverty line compared to 15% in Freetown
 
 
so disparities between the peninsula and the provinces remained profound.
91
 There 
was also no change in gender disparities with women‘s earnings at around half the 
levels of men in 2005, consistent with same indicator figures over the previous four 
years (HDRs). More recent figures suggested that growth had not benefited the 
poorest eight years after Lomé. According to the GovSL‘s Letter of Intent (2006) the 
incidence of income poverty remained at around 80% (less than a dollar a day) and 
in 2007 poverty remained widespread as did high unemployment, poor infrastructure 
and weak institutional and human capacity.  
A government survey in 2007, supported by DfID and the World Bank 
reported that an increased number of the population were experiencing food 
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 GovSL Integrated Household Survey 2003/04, available from 
http://www.statistics.sl/SLIHS_REPORT.pdf, accessed on 12/11/08. 
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insecurity (food poor): 35.7% compared to 26% in 2004 (GovSL, 2007a). Here, it 
should be noted that this survey used different methodology to the 2004 survey 
when poverty was measured through consumer expenditure surveys. The 2007 
CWIQ survey gathered information on indicators of poverty i.e. access, utilisation 
and satisfaction with social services. For example, food insecurity was equated to 
having difficulty meeting food needs ‗often or always‘ rather than being calculated 
as a direct monetary measure. Among the regions, in 2007 the lowest incidence of 
food insecurity was Western (16.6%) and the highest was Northern (48.7%) 
(GovSL, 2007a: Table A2.1). This reveals a continuing large disparity between the 
peninsula and the provinces.   
On other indicators, 61% of the population did not have access to a safe 
water source; in the district of Moyamba, no pipe-borne water was available to any 
households. 55% of households had no access to safe sanitation including basic 
covered pit latrines. In Bonthe district this figure was exceptionally high at 75% 
(GovSL, 2007a). Over half the population had no access to medical services (54.5%) 
and the disparity between the Freetown peninsula and the rest of the provinces was 
again substantial; 75.2% compared to an average of 39% respectively (ibid). 
Enrolment in primary education, however, recorded a significant improvement; yet 
around 25% of children aged between the years of 6-11 had no access to primary 
education, the rural areas suffering most (IRCBP, 2008). For example, less than 50% 
of households in Bonthe and Pujehun had access to a primary school within 30 
minutes walk but all households in the Western area did (IRCBP, ibid). Out of those 
who did have access to primary education 62.4% were not satisfied with the service, 
mostly because of the inadequate supplies of teaching and learning materials and the 
high costs involved for poor parents (ibid).  
 193 
 
The poorest of the poor engaged in artisanal mining activities. The increase 
in diamond trade going through legal channels created wealth in that sector and was 
a main driver for economic growth but this did not benefit the diamond labourers, 
many of whom continued to live on less than a dollar a day - some diggers 
experiencing days without food (Levin and Gberie, 2006, DDI, 2008, PAC, 2008). 
There was no notion of ‗minimum wage‘ or ‗minimum working conditions‘ as 
normal remuneration for labourers was a ‗discretionary share‘ of the profits.  This 
varied dependent upon the individual digger‘s skills of negotiation which meant 
little livelihood security for them or their families (Levin and Gberie, 2006). 
Because there was no viable alternative to diamond digging in terms of livelihoods, 
labourers put up with the poor conditions and bad pay; most cited poverty and 
‗survival‘ as reasons they went into mining (PAC and NMJD, 2006, Maconachie 
and Binns, 2007b). The industry remained exploitative despite the serious 
consequences of such attitudes to local labour in the past; illness remained endemic 
and drowning or suffocation was not uncommon (Cooper, 2008, PAC, 2008).   
Nationally, income distribution was skewed against the mining areas. Kono 
district – at the heart of diamond production and home to the highest concentration 
of artisanal miners - had a poverty level of 79.6% compared to the agricultural area 
of Pujehun District which had a poverty level of 59.6%; and urban Kono 56.3% 
compared to Freetown 17.1% (PAC and NMJD, 2006). Despite promises ‗to 
improve the overall standard of living of miners – who are among the poorest people 
in the country‘ (GovSL, 2005, 5.3.4) reports from miners working in Tongo Field, 
an historically deprived area of the country, described their environment as a ‗slave 
field‘ (PAC, 2008). The town had ‗hardly any functioning medical facility‘ and 
women gave ‗birth on motorbikes‘ during the journey to the nearest hospital miles 
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away at Panguma (PAC, 2008). Visible evidence of the DACDF benefiting the town 
was a new office built for the Chairman of the local Chiefdom but most people felt 
the Fund had no relevance to them (ibid:16). As the most diamondiferous area of the 
country and therefore the most profitable, Kono had a ‗scandalously high‘ level of 
poverty and facilities such as roads, schools and clinics were the ‗worst in the 
country‘ (PAC, 2008). 
While mansions have been built in other places with resources from here, we 
live in squalor, with the basics being anything but basic. Emmanuel Murray 
(digger), Tongo Fields, Eastern Sierra Leone (PAC, 2008:16) 
 
Rehabilitation and reconstruction - agricultural Areas 
Food security was the central focus for programming in the PRSPs and with this in 
mind, the aim of the government was to prioritise investment in the agricultural 
sector.  The idea was to increase food cultivation and production, and promote the 
export of tree crops so as to improve the incidence of food security, create jobs, 
increase exports and help rural development (IMF, 2008, IMF, 2007). Agriculture 
was a major contributor to growth and employed the highest proportion of the active 
labour force; about two thirds. All farming was small scale using manual methods, 
and subsistence farmers were among the poorest of the population (IMF, 2008, 
GovSL, 2005). Between 2002 and 2005 support was given to farmers in the form of 
seed, fertilisers and some heavy machinery, and government expenditure on this 
sector remained robust throughout the period until 2007. Most heavy machinery was 
delivered in 2005 when donors acknowledged the investment the government had 
made in agriculture, which had risen from 2.7% to 5.6% of GDP over the period.  
Equipment was donated through bilateral arrangements with China, Iran and Libya 
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(GovSL, 2006) and by 2005 projects up and running in the sector amounted to $13.5 
million with further projects planned for 2006 amounting to $59 million (ibid). Up 
to 2006 there was a steady increase in agricultural production in most areas; rice, 
cassava, sweet potato, groundnut, livestock and fish and between 2002 and 2005, 
rice self sufficiency rose from 57.4% to 69%. Groundnut production was almost 
double its target in 2005 and in 2006 cassava production exceeded the target by half 
(IMF, 2008).
92
 Despite these successes, production was not sustainable contrasting 
dramatically with figures for the following year (2007) where most outputs failed to 
meet their targets, despite increased tractorisation and acreage for crop production.   
Table 12 – Percentage achievement of PRS target for four main crop areas – 2005-2007 
 
Crop 2005 2006 2007 
 
% achievement of 
target 
% achievement of 
target 
% achievement of 
target 
Rice 
(paddy) 
102 100 73 
Cassava 118 142 59 
Sweet 
Potato 
119 91 94 
Groundnut 175 104 103 
 
Table 13 shows the generally good performance of all main crops against the PRS 
targets during 2005 and 2006 but shortfalls in 2007 on three. This is particularly 
marked given the previous ‗over-performance‘ of crop production, especially 
cassava and groundnut. Figure 16 illustrates the dramatic reduction in the production 
of these two staples during 2006/2007. These falls were attributed to diminished 
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 Groundnut production achieved 175% of target figures in 2005, and cassava production 
achieved 142% in 2006 (IMF, 2008b) 
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budget allocation to the agricultural sector that year which resulted in reduced use of 
fertilisers and chemicals and lower numbers of farm holdings (IMF, 2008).   
Figure 16 – Cassava and sweet potato production 2002- 2007  
 
 
Data sourced from IMF, 2008 and from MAFFS Progress Report 2006 at http://www.daco-
sl.org/encyclopedia/1_gov/1_2/MAFFS/maffs_progress_report.pdf, accessed on 25/11/08 
 
Although domestic agricultural production was very successful, inadequate funds 
were made available for food security activities to capitalise on this success and the 
delayed disbursement of funds from donors did not help the situation (IMF, 2008: 
79). The EU criticised the lack of any ‗sound or comprehensive agricultural policy‘ 
which could be sustainable beyond the immediate post-war era (EU, 2007). Despite 
promises for increased micro-credit facilities to low income families (GovSL, 2005: 
5.3.2e) lack of credit for farmers and entrepreneurs in the sector thwarted economic 
opportunities and the expansion of livelihood choices in the countryside (IMF, 2008: 
79). There was no improvement to irrigation systems which meant that farmers 
relied on the periodic heavy rains to sustain their crops; limited post-harvest 
facilities such as grain stores, covered drying floors, refrigeration etc. stifled the 
maximisation of food security opportunities in the countryside. Further, the non-
existence of rural electrification was manifest in the inability of farmers to add-value 
to production through activities such as large scale processing and increased 
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numbers of effective labour hours each day. Weak feeder roads, vehicular and river 
transport meant extreme difficulties and expense in accessing markets and ports 
which means that local farmers could not take full advantage of high world prices 
for their products (IMF/IDA, 2008, IMF, 2008).   
Infrastructure 
The overall objective of Government Policy in this sector is to rehabilitate the 
transport infrastructure and transform it into an efficient, safe and reliable 
system. (GovSL, 2001: 118) 
The Dam is expected to provide reliable electricity supply to a greater 
proportion of the country, including a large number of rural areas. At the same 
time, donor financing will be sought to support rural electrification. (GovSL, 
2001: 120) 
That dam! It will never happen in my lifetime.93 
In the PRSP, the GovSL promised to invest in the supportive infrastructures of 
energy, power, road and transportation networks, and communications (5.3.2), and 
by December 2006 street lighting had been installed in Freetown – the first for 
decades (ICG, 2007). By 2009, major road junctions appeared to be lit but the rest of 
the capital was still in darkness.
94
 Attempts to improve general electricity supplies 
were not successful due to the delayed completion of the Bumbuna Hydroelectric 
project. The Bumbuna dam project, 200 km northeast of Freetown in the Tonkolili 
district was first started three decades ago.  Problems with its completion were the 
corrupt and ineffective practices of the previous APC regimes, the theft of 
transmission cables and extensive destruction during the war. The government 
entered into expensive contracts with independent suppliers to counter the failures of 
the National Power Authority which involved questionable procurement procedures 
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 Focus group discussion with members of the Sierra Leone Diaspora, Bradford, June 2007 
94
 Field visit to Freetown, May 2009. 
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(IMF/IDA, 2008). It took until late 2007 to secure alternative short term supplies to 
the capital; supplies to other provincial towns failed due to the unavailability or very 
high price of fuel (IMF, 2008: 58). An EC report in 2007 stated that less than 10% 
of the Sierra Leonean population had access to electricity and that this deficit had a 
detrimental effect on private investment as potential businesses had no assurance of 
supplies (EU, 2007). In addition, targets for the improvement of water and sanitation 
utilities were not met (IMF/IDA, 2008). 
The picture with regard to improved communications systems was much 
better. The liberalisation of the telecommunications industry had led to the 
establishment of five mobile ‗phone companies and the network grew to penetrate 
80% of the country helped by investments of over $125 (IMF, 2008). The 
availability of good internet connections and local services for access to the Net 
grew significantly in some areas outside the capital (ibid:59). There were also 
improvements to the road networks, but these were limited. 50km of gravel roads 
were rehabilitated and 1200 km of trunk roads constructed and maintained (IMF, 
2008), but the benefits of this did not reach many rural area 
Private investment and land reform 
Growth in the private sector is argued to be particularly important for reducing 
poverty (IMF, 2008). The inability of the government to attract private investment 
was compounded by persistent traditional land laws, and the collapse of production 
in 2007 was helped in part by minimal participation of the private sector in 
agriculture (GovSL, 2006). Rural land in Sierra Leone belonged to elite landed 
families and other lineage networks, and the customary system allowed paramount 
chiefs to approve all land issues in an archaic system of traditional law which 
essentially represented the country‘s land administration system (Unruh and Turray, 
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2006). Non-elite families had no secure land, labour or marital rights. Post-war this 
continued to be a major problem among young people in the countryside because it 
kept them poor and dependent and land reform is therefore an important part of 
peacebuilding as well as crucial for private investment (Richards, 2005, Fanthorpe, 
2001). Yet there remained a very strong sense of the ‗inalienability of land‘ even 
after ‗sensitisation‘ activities on civil and human rights among rural populations and 
their Paramount Chiefs. People did not want to give up that sense of security 
(Unruh, 2003). Consequently, trying to promote private investment and other 
interests outside the urban and peri-urban areas was nigh impossible to do (Unruh 
and Turray, 2006). Three pieces of new legislation were drafted for approval into 
law; The Land Policy, The Law Reform Commission and The Commercial Lands 
Act. At the time of writing, the issue of land and property rights had still to be 
addressed (DDI, 2008). 
Creating economic opportunities? 
There are no accurate or reliable figures on current unemployment levels in Sierra 
Leone although the consensus is that the issue is of growing concern, nationally and 
internationally (ICG, 2008, DfID, 2008, SLPP Manifesto 2007, APC Manifesto 
2007).
95
 But is it clear that economic growth did not equate to sustainable increased 
job creation (IMF, 2007). Figure 17 gives an indication of the type of economic 
activities which people engaged in, either part time or full time, paid or unpaid 
(GovSL, 2007a). The illustration shows around 11% employed in the private sector 
compared to around 5.5% by the state and over 80% of economic activity in the 
informal/family/farm business. According to an EU Report, around 40% of the 
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 Elections 2007: A Comparison of Party Manifestos Against the Core Recommendations of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 28
th
 July 2007, from Sierra Leone Court Monitoring 
Programme available from http://www.slcmp.org/drwebsite/commentaries, accessed on 
13/08/09. 
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population was engaged in economic activity of some sort; opportunities lay in 
farming, fishing or mining, mostly in the informal sector,
96
 however, in certain areas 
of the country unemployment levels were estimated to be as high as 70-80%.  Of 
those in work, large numbers of young men in the artisanal mining sector often 
engaged in food for work exchanges (EU, 2007). Figure 18 explains the employment 
landscape vis-à-vis paid and unpaid work with the expected contrasts between 
Freetown (West) and the provinces. 
Figure 17  - Distribution of working population by employer 
97
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 GovSL Analytical Report on Employment and Labour Force available from Sierra Leone 
Statistics at 
http://www.statistics.sl/2004%20Census%20Analytical%20Reports/2004%20Population%20and
%20Housing%20Census%20Report%20on%20Employment%20and%20Labour.pdf, accessed 
on 13/11/08. 
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 Data retrieved from Core Welfare Indicator Survey (2007) GOVSL (2007) Core welfare 
indicator questionnaire survey: (CWIQ 2007). Freetown: Statistics Sierra Leone.  
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Figure 18  - Comparison between regular and salaried employees 
98
 
 
 
To counteract the dearth of job opportunities, projects through the Peacebuilding 
Fund reflected a very illiberal way of generating employment for the main target 
group. For example, under the Fund‘s ‗Youth Enterprise Development‘ project it 
was hoped to generate 1200 jobs or training opportunities through a Food for Work 
agreement concluded with the World Food Programme (UNDP, 2008). This 
reflected the failure of marketisation to create jobs through the private sector; even 
those created through the re-opening of bauxite and rutile mines in 2006 were 
financed by a €25 million grant from the EU to the GovSL which funded loans to 
rutile mining, and support for regeneration of bauxite mining also came through the 
GovSL (IMF, 2007, Peters, 2002). Table 13 summarises ‗artificial‘ job creation 
programming which is yet to be evaluated as to its efficacy or appropriateness 
(IMF/IDA, 2008). 
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Table 13 – Summary of job creation activities 
 
Scheme Organisation Potential Jobs Actual Jobs 
Micro-farms Ministry of Youth and 
Sports/UNDP 
48+ Unknown 
Agricultural Business 
Units 
Ministry of 
Agriculture/UNDP 
120+ Unknown 
Macro-farm 
(Newton) 
USAID 1500 Unknown 
Farms (young 
women) 
UNDP 120 120 
Girls off the Street UNDP Unknown Unknown 
Micro-credit USAID 1200 1200 
Palm kernel 
enterprise 
UNDP 30 30 
Pottery UNDP/SLADEA 20 20 
Road Works SLRA Unknown 3,618 
Various NaCSA 1950 1950 
Unknown KfW 1000 Unknown 
Peer Educators GTZ 160 160 
Unknown GTZ 2500/13500 Unknown 
Rutile and Bauxite 
Mining 
GovSL (Grant from EU) Unknown  1400 
 
Problems with private sector investment were widely recognised and new initiatives 
were launched to tackle the problem. A Diagnostic Trade Integration Study was 
commissioned and from that came an ‗Integrated Framework‘ which evolved into an 
‗Activity Matrix‘ to help enable an environment conducive to private sector 
development (IMF, 2007). The Matrix involved many projects and activities 
including new legislation - The General Law Act (2007) and the Business 
Registration Act (2007), public/private dialogues and formulating policy for SMEs 
(small-medium sized enterprises). The problem remained that Sierra Leoneans had 
little know-how or capital to effectively participate in private sector development. 
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Again, various activities were implemented to try and correct this including the 
creation of a Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights and a study 
commissioned into the administrative barriers to trade and investment (ibid). It was 
acknowledged that there were many obstacles to job creation including adequate 
access to appropriate technology, a poor investment culture and the lack of youth 
awareness of business opportunities. Add to this limited access to finance, youth 
employability (various issues with relevant qualifications), poor inter-institutional 
programming and coordination, and the usual capacity and resource constraints, and 
the picture looked rather bleak (UNDG, 2006, IMF, 2007). 
As late as October 2006 the government launched its Youth Employment 
Scheme (YES) whose objective was to provide around 135,000 jobs nationwide.
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Projects approved under the YES are detailed in Table 14. 
Table 14 - Projects approved under the YES initiative 
100
 
 
Area Ministry Job description Location No. of 
jobs 
created 
Tourism 
 
Tourism and 
Culture/National 
Tourist Board 
Beach wardens, beach 
combers, life guards and 
parking attendants 
Predominantly the 
beaches of the 
Western area 
198 
Health Health and 
Sanitation/District 
health medical officers 
Medical stock control 
clerks, community health 
registrars and promoters, 
medical and 
environmental waste 
management 
All 13 medical 
districts 
1271 
Youth 
action in 
community 
environ-
Youth and 
Sports/District youth 
committees, chiefdom 
youth committees, local 
Unknown Western (600)  
Bo (200) 
Kenema (150) 
Makeni (200) 
1300 
                                                 
99
 Awareness Times Newspaper, Freetown, Youth employment scheme on course in Sierra 
Leone, (2007) sourced from www.news.sl/drwebsite/publis/printer_20054975.shtml, on 
10/11/08 
100
 Report by YES. Youth employment scheme on course in Sierra Leone, 14 March 2007, 
Awareness Times Newspaper in Freetown, available from 
http://news.sl/drwebsite/publish/printer_20054975.shtml, accessed on 10/11/08 
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mental 
works 
councils and youth 
serving agencies  
Kono (150) 
Roads Sierra Leone Roads 
Authority 
Road rehabilitation, road 
cleaning etc. 
All 12 districts 1657 
Waste 
manageme
nt 
GTZ/Kline Salone101  Daylight workers 
and security officers 
475 
 
There were other projects on the go, for example the USAID Corad-Links project 
aimed at either improving livelihoods or increasing training opportunities but not 
directly creating jobs. These projects have therefore been omitted from this 
analysis.
102
 Youth agricultural farms were set up, again with donor assistance, 51 
micro-farms, 41 macro-farms and 700 agricultural business units were created for 
youth employment as well as initiatives for young women in the provinces. There 
have been some positive reports coming out of this venture.  For example, youth 
groups were able to lease land from landowners to grow trees for profits (Unruh and 
Turray, 2006).  
Summary 
In sum, the stated goals of macro-economic reform bore little resemblance to 
empirical realities on the ground in Sierra Leone. Although there was evidence of 
development in some areas, the general picture was one of continuing deprivation 
and deep poverty. As noted by the NRS, the task for reconstruction was enormous 
and the wish list for reform extensive, but eight years on from Lomé there was little 
evidence of a peace dividend and growing concerns for the future as inflation started 
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 Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit – a private company owned by the German 
Federal Government working on a public benefit basis for sustainable development and part of a 
long term partnership with the GovSL, see Sierra Leone Encyclopaedia at http://www.daco-
sl.org/encyclopedia/5_part/5_1german.htm, accessed on 16/11/08 
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 Report by YES. Youth employment scheme on course in Sierra Leone, 14 March 2007, 
Awareness Times Newspaper in Freetown, available from 
http://news.sl/drwebsite/publish/printer_20054975.shtml, accessed on 10/11/08 
 205 
 
to bite allowing some people to slip back into poverty (IMF/IDA, 2008). The issue 
of sustainability in respect of the small advances made was central to concerns. 
4.4 - ANALYSIS 
Promoting equitable relations between community groups is incompatible with 
free market reform which often increases income gaps (UNDG, 2006) 
The GovSL adopted liberalising reforms in the economy but despite good economic 
growth and substantial aid flows it failed to deliver much in the way of improved 
living conditions or economic opportunities to the majority of the population, and 
disparities between the peninsular and the rural areas remained acute with 
marginalised groups experiencing deeper poverty. There were several possible 
explanations for this. They included continuing patrimonial practices at all levels of 
government, corruption and lack of political will; low human, technical and 
financial capacity; inadequate funding; bad policies; the inability of line ministries 
to absorb aid; external constraints; or a complex mix of all. The pressing demands of 
macro-economic stabilisation appeared to clash with the pressing demands for peace 
(Berdal, 2009: 129; de Soto, 1994); exporting the country‘s wealth at the expense of 
creating sustainable livelihoods. 
The central issue for the peacebuilding model, however, was that liberalisation 
of the economy was only partially implemented. There were various factors which 
constrained liberalisation. Difficult post-war conditions were not attractive to private 
investors and traditional culture influenced the progress of reforms; for example, it 
was extremely challenging to liberalise an economy when traditional inalienable 
land tenure practices remained strong among powerful chiefs, and the local culture 
linked land security to food security. Because of low capacity and resources, and the 
 206 
 
inhospitable ‗terrain‘ of the post-war environment, the over-ambitious wish-list for 
reform had to prioritise some change over others and full liberalising reform did not 
prove to be essential as far as securing aid was concerned - although some 
deterioration in performance meant delayed flows from donors in 2006/07 (DfID, 
2008). The reforms necessary to achieve the IFI‘s PC were prioritised at the expense 
of improved economic management elsewhere; good progress on the PC was not the 
type of progress necessary to maximise the exploitation of natural mineral resources 
for local development or establish transparency and accountability in broader 
economic management which were key issues in the post-war political settlement.  
Certain statements can be made about economic liberalisation in Sierra Leone. 
Export oriented growth policies did not reduce the incidence of poverty in most 
cases and did not create jobs. Formal economic opportunities remained elusive to 
most Sierra Leoneans. Although the informal sector remained robust, exclusion from 
the formal sector meant substantial amounts of human capital were disengaged from 
the national economy by way of income and taxation. As well as having the obvious 
effects on morale and durable peace, this waste of human capital helped to 
perpetuate the dependence of the state on external revenue flows, disconnecting 
government from any obligations to please the populace because the populace was 
not paying its way. It was the external constituency which remained the central 
benefactor of economic growth through debt servicing arrangements. This had 
implications for democracy. 
Because there was only partial implementation of liberalising reforms, it is 
not possible to argue that this model of reform failed, it is only possible to argue that 
this model of reform was not conceivable within the post-conflict, cultural and 
political context of Sierra Leone. It is possible to conclude that, although full 
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liberalisation was illusive, the priority reforms that were made were not helpful with 
regard to addressing the challenges for peace. The so called ‗liberal peace‘ appeared 
to be rather patchy; which parts of liberalisation were most important, and who 
decided what they were?  
‗Good governance‘ appears to be measured by human development 
indicators aligned to the MDGs. Del Castillo describes this reconstruction of post-
conflict economies in terms of ‗development as usual‘ which deepens aid 
dependency and fails to consolidate peace (Castillo, 2008: 26). Indeed, Sierra Leone 
peace priorities were a bit more nuanced than the MDGs and the empirical evidence 
from the country confirmed that ‗reconstruction is fundamentally different from 
normal development‘ (Castillo, 2008: 304). Good governance as development was 
not necessarily relevant in terms of the pressing priorities for peace but in terms of 
local definitions, it was also an elusive goal. Promises were broken as 
diamondiferous communities did not get the funding or development they expected 
and although attempts were made at introducing new legislation and implementing 
new initiatives, the ‗good governance‘ project gained little traction; corruption 
remained rife and this reduced confidence still further with regard to private 
investment. Donors also had a case to answer in respect of their outstanding inability 
to improve local capacity so that government could take on responsibility for its own 
recovery. Severe lack of capacity in all government ministries and the broader 
bureaucracy made the ambitious reforms of the liberal peacebuilding project 
delusory; this is well documented elsewhere but lack of capacity afforded the 
government a reasonable explanation for non-delivery and poor performance. 
Shortfalls in funding were also an issue. The cost of implementing the PRSP was 
estimated at $1,624 billion, but commitments amounted to only $929 billion creating 
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a shortfall in funding of $695,000 (IMF, 2008); this meant that over one third of the 
cost of the PRSP was not forthcoming. Delays in donor flows towards the end of 
2006 impacted immediately on pro-poor spending (Table 15, below); this also had 
an effect on revenue collection from procurement activities and put the government 
further in arrears.
103
 This deterioration was largely blamed on the ‗political inertia‘ 
surrounding ‗the elections‘ and the nervousness of private enterprise at the potential 
for instability the approaching elections may bring (GovSL, 2008), but whatever the 
excuse, there was a clear issue around the sustainability of even the smallest positive 
advances. 
Table 15 – Poverty expenditures 2005-2007  
 
2005 2006 2007 
Target Actual Target Actual Target Actual 
154,000 151,724 208,058 186,017 240,600 153,553 
 
Sourced from the PRSP Progress Report 2008, IMF country Report No. 08/250, available from 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08250.pdf, accessed on 22/11/09 
 
4.5 - CONCLUDING STATEMENT 
The dire record of the GovSL for delivering on its economic promises for peace 
cannot be directly blamed on economic liberalisation because the picture was 
extremely complex, but what was clear was that the political and physical 
environments in post-war Sierra Leone were not at all conducive to the success of 
such reforms and that failures to fully implement liberalising policies were 
essentially overlooked by donors and funders. It is yet early to deduce whether this 
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th
 
December 2008 
 209 
 
is a deliberate tactic to allow time for the evolution of a fully fledged market 
economy, or whether some reforms were indeed irrelevant, but liberalising reforms 
exposed the fragile economy to external shocks such as rising food and oil prices, 
and the subsequent mitigating measures – the reduction of import tariffs - taken by 
the government meant a reduction in revenues to the treasury during 2008. In 
addition, the global financial crisis took its toll when, in 2009, there was a sharp 
drop in revenues from the mining sector and growth was forecast to fall to around 
5.75%.
104
 Environmental changes were also predicted to have an impact on the 
Sierra Leone economy as global warming was forecast to impact on the country‘s 
fish stocks.
105
 
In terms of contributing to local priorities, economic liberalisation cannot be 
described as the optimum model for peacebuilding in Sierra Leone because it 
assumes commitment and capacity, exposes a fragile economic environment to 
global risk and uncertainties, and at the same time marginalises local people not only 
from economic benefits but also from the political process. There is a contradiction 
in the liberalisation of post-conflict economies because shrinking the state does not 
conflate well with the enormous challenge of building state capacity to fulfil its core 
functions, including much needed welfare provision (OECD, 2007). This remains a 
serious challenge for peace. 
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 Samura Kamara, Finance Minister, quoted by Reuters on 4
th
 March 2009, at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL4380362, accessed on 14/03/09 
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 Study by internationals scientists at the World Fish Centre explained by Alister Doyle, 
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 February 2009 and available from 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
PROMOTING POPULAR PARTICIPATION 
The power of the state is invaluable when contained democratically.  If not, it 
always carries the risk of catastrophe. (Reychler and Paffenholz, 2001: 216) 
The analysis of the political economy of peace presented in the previous chapters 
demonstrates the affect on participation and ownership of disconnected and 
externally imposed economic policy. In chapter five the argument is presented that 
liberal democracy, as espoused through a multi-party political system, has done a 
similar job of disempowering rather empowering the masses. This is because the 
central tenet of democracy - participation by civilians in decision making for their 
futures – is stymied and distorted by the presence of a powerful external 
constituency which controls the political economy of their peacebuilding plan. Yet 
democratic elections are the primary tool for legitimising government after conflict. 
The central question this chapter aims to address is: how did political reform 
support the local priorities for peace? How did democratisation support the 
challenge of the nation building project by producing an egalitarian structure of 
representation and redistribution? How did the project for transparency and 
accountability empower the previously marginalised masses in their demands for 
better government, and how did democratic reform change the behaviour of political 
elites? 
The country had many priorities for political reform. The TRC-R produced 
the most pertinent recommendations including demands for a leadership which the 
citizenry could trust. This would involve establishing an ethos of impartiality and 
accountability, eliminating corruption, and reforming the judiciary so that the rule of 
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law could act as a counter-balance for any executive excesses. It would also involve 
building up the capacity of civil society or the broader citizenry to monitor 
government and drive through the recommendations of the TRC (TRC, 2004). These 
promises for peace synergised well with the various commitments made by the 
GovSL in the iPRSP (GovSL, 2001: 111,112). 
To investigate the political reforms, section 5.1 starts by analysing the post-
conflict electoral process to determine how elections and decentralisation helped to 
connect the general populace to the previously impenetrable levers of power. In 
Sections 5.2 and 5.3 investigations are made into the efficacy of the democratic 
mechanisms which claimed to allow citizens to hold government to account; the rule 
of law, the anti-corruption commission and civil society. Finally, an analysis is made 
of the behaviour of political elites in the context of traditional ways of doing 
politics, conceptualised as the culture politique.  
To facilitate the complex analysis, evidence is drawn from official and 
unofficial documentation as before, and also from primary data collected in the field 
during visits to Freetown in November 2006, and in March 2007 - during the period 
of voter registration prior to the elections in August 2007. The primary data consists 
mostly of semi-structured interviews conducted with civil society representatives, 
government ministers, political party members, and donors. The chapter opens with 
an explanation of why democracy was so revered in reconstruction efforts for Sierra 
Leone. 
5.1 – THE LOGIC OF INCLUSIVITY 
After war, multi-party elections were seen as the vehicle for delivering a stable 
political system by legitimising government (Wallensteen, 2002, Licklider, 2005). 
 212 
 
This involved the transformation of warring factions into political parties and the 
creation of an independent and mutually approved NEC among other broader 
reforms to ‗transform the conflict‘ (Lederach, 2003). The notion of democracy as a 
trust building mechanism was underpinned by its guiding principles of discussion, 
mutual respect and equal representation (Lederach, 1997). These concepts were not 
historically or culturally embedded in the political trajectory of Sierra Leone yet the 
damage caused by the war to the fabric of society needed to be repaired to prevent 
the ‗logic of war‘ replacing the ‗logic of peace‘ once again (Sisk, 2001). 
Democratisation – with its focus on the rule of law, justice and respect for human 
rights – was believed to be the panacea for healing Sierra Leone‘s broken society.  
In the liberal peacebuilding project, democracy was one of the key 
components of the ‗civilising mission‘ which set out to transplant western liberal 
values into post-conflict environs through the construction of democratic institutions 
(Paris, 2002). This reform was also part of globalisation because that process could 
only function through units of stable nation states. Post-Cold War, liberal democracy 
was projected as the optimum model for organising societies and for apportioning 
power within states (Fukuyama, 1989). The model of democracy was to be state-
centred, through liberal representation.  
As liberal democratic principles became the ‗global referent‘ (Southall, 
2006: 163), there was considerable paradigmatic investment by the international 
community for political reform which adopted this model. For example, US-AID are 
spending c.$1 billion a year on better governance promotion in the developing world 
and elsewhere (USAID, 2005). Thus, in the 1990s and 2000s, international 
democracy promotion actors proliferated and expanded their activities (Burnell, 
2006).  
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The democratisation project was not straightforward, however. Making 
peace through building democracy had a mixed track record and the efficacy of this 
approach was yet to be determined with any degree of accuracy (Sisk, 2001: 786). 
External support in the form of aid for democracy assistance had been mostly 
ineffective in persuading national governments to ‗do the right thing‘, for example 
(Easterly, 2006: 128). Britain, the biggest bilateral donor to Sierra Leone with long 
term commitments to the country‘s development and stability, directed 41% of its 
aid to governance reform projects over the period 2002 to 2007. This was compared 
to 11% in the social sector and 17% on the economy (DfID, 2008: 10, Table 4), yet 
despite this expensive focus on the ‗good governance‘ project - a spend of at least 
£65 million - there was no tangible progress eight years on: ‗the most significant 
failure… [being] in the area of corruption and integrity‘ (ibid:47). 
Although there was a vibrant debate among scholars and other commentators 
as to the efficacy of democracy promotion by the international community, 
participation in the body politic had long been an aspiration of the local citizenry in 
Sierra Leone (Table 16, below) (Kandeh, 2003, Kpundeh, 1994, Wai, 2008). 
Table 16 - Turnout for recent presidential elections in Sierra Leone 
 
Year %  turnout 
1996 106 60%  
2002 83% 
2007 75% (1st round)       68% (2nd round) 
 
Sourced from Africa Elections Database http://africanelections.tripod.com/sl.html on 12.12.08 and the 
CarterCentre (CarterCentre, 2002)  
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 This election was conducted at the height of the war when the country had no security in 
most of the provinces and conditions were very challenging for voters; the NEC voter register 
was severely constrained by large numbers of refugees and internally displaced people. 
 214 
 
Compared to the outcomes of elections elsewhere in Africa (Kenya 2007 and 
Zimbabwe 2008), and given the political history of Sierra Leone, the 2007 
presidential and parliamentary elections were of exceptional quality and a huge 
success for the country, its citizens and the community of external actors who had 
supported the process. This was particularly so as the aftermath of the elections 
involved the peaceful transfer of power from one incumbent to the next; almost 
unprecedented on the continent. In preparation for the elections, donors put efforts 
into strengthening institutional capacity through support to Electoral Management 
Bodies (EMB), the Political Parties Registration Commission (PPRC), the Election 
Offences Court (EOC) and of course the NEC. Civil society also played an 
important role in monitoring and sensitising people on their political rights and the 
importance of peaceful elections. The NEC accredited 35 civil society organisations 
(CSOs) to the monitoring task and 80 groups worked through membership of the 
local watchdog organisation - National Elections Watch (NEW) (EU, 2007b). The 
result was equality of access to the political space for competing parties, an 
informed electorate and a credible and transparent system of electoral management 
(Zack-Williams, 2008). This was a profound achievement for the country and its 
citizenry, and reflected the ‗new sophistication‘ of the Sierra Leone voter and their 
commitment to abide by the rules of democracy in difficult post-war conditions 
(Zack-Williams, 2008). The 2007 elections were a significant improvement on those 
of 2002 when widespread malpractice was discovered,
 
and the success of the 2007 
elections suggested that the democratic project gained real traction in Sierra Leone. 
As democracy was closely linked to peace and better governance, this was good 
news for the country.
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An investigation follows into the impact of democratic elections on the quest for 
meaningful participation and inclusivity, for representation and accountability, to 
establish the extent to which multi-party politics lived up to its claims.  
Electoral process – participation and inclusivity 
The first post conflict presidential and parliament elections took place in 2002, with 
substantial funding from international donors, followed in 2004 by local elections, 
the first for over thirty years. Paramount chieftaincy elections also took place in 
2002 to replace the 63 chiefs who had died or been exiled during the war as part of 
the project to restore the chieftaincy system which would include grass roots 
communities in the political process. In 2007, the determination of donors and the 
GovSL to have free, fair and peaceful elections came at a projected cost of $28 
million; $18 million was donated through the UNDP basket fund and $10 million 
was to be contributed by GovSL , although in the outcome this failed to materialise 
(Zack-Williams and Gbla, 2008, ICG, 2008). Around 8,980 election monitors from 
53 domestic civil society organisations and 144 international election observers from 
26 organizations took part and an unprecedented voter registration level of 91% was 
recorded by the NEC (Zack-Williams and Gbla, 2008). The eventual turnout of 
around 75% was partly influenced by the fact that voting took place at the height of 
the rainy season (August) compared to voter registration in the dry (March). Given 
the poor and often nonexistent infrastructure in more remote parts of the country, 
access to polling stations was considerably more difficult in the wet. 
Political parties formed around the usual regional and ethnic groupings as 
well as interest groups such as youth (Young Peoples‘ Party, YPP) and women 
(Movement for Progress Party, MOP) (Cubitt, 2006). Eleven parties took part in 
2002, five of which were ‗obscure or fringe parties‘ with no hope of winning. It was 
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the case that people with no qualifications for the job believed that even a ‗high 
school drop-out‘, was presidential material (Kandeh, 2003). When confronted with 
few alternatives in the way of viable money making opportunities such as the 
professions, industry, commerce or banking, politics seemed like a reasonable 
choice for all and sundry as access to state resources was considered to be the only 
sure means to secure wealth (Rose-Akerman, 2008). The proliferation of parties 
reflected what Kandeh described as the ‗opportunism of the country‘s political class‘ 
rather than the ‗flowering of democracy‘ (Kandeh, 2003), and yet it was also an 
indication of a more accessible political space and a much more tolerant 
government. The weakness in political parties was problematic for democratisation, 
however, and the post-war setting presented various challenges for the formation of 
effective parties (de Zeeuw, 2009). As expected, the RUF transformed itself into a 
political party for the elections of 2002. It gained virtually no support from the 
electorate managing only 1.73% of the vote in the presidential poll, and by 2007 the 
RUF had failed to sustain their rebel-to-party transition. Their leadership was either 
dead, behind bars or detained by the Special Court and there were no candidates 
submitted for the 2007 elections (Zack-Williams, 2008); due to lack of funding, the 
RUFP eventually merged with the APC and many of their number were hired as 
personal body guards for the party hierarchy.
107
 This failure of the RUF to garner 
any tangible support from the general populace somewhat delegitimized its 
‗revolutionary‘ war project.     
A second party to appear for the first time in 2002 was the Peace and 
Liberation Party (PLP) of Johnny Paul Koroma, the former head of the AFRC junta 
who had been excluded from the peace deal but who had gained some degree of 
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 Personal conversations with the Sierra Leone Diaspora, Bradford, September 2007 
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credibility as chair of the CCP, but his promise to ‗make Sierra Leone ungovernable‘ 
if he lost the election demonstrated his clear misconception of the democratic ideal 
and did little to endear him to the general populace.  He achieved only 3% of the 
presidential poll (Kandeh, 2003). In 2007, the PLP was still in contention but 
support had dwindled to less than 1%.
108
 The stronger parties with most support 
contained much of the form but less of the substance of Western party based 
democracy. This was because their political culture at the higher levels contained all 
the characteristics of the old patrimony and a continuing focus on personalities and 
regionalism rather ideology (Salih, 2006, Cubitt, 2006). 
The weakness of most political parties reflected the newness of multiparty 
politics in the country and the dearth of resources in post-conflict environs; never a 
good spawning ground for national political parties and an institution of democracy 
which generates little attention from donors (Zartman, 1995a, de Zeeuw, 2009, 
Reilly, 2006).
109
 The parties for women and youth could not fund serious campaigns 
and donors were reluctant to support individual parties because of the partisan nature 
of such activities,
110
 however by 2007 some support came in the form of generic 
training: ‗for capacity building processes, campaign methods or preparing political 
messages‘.111 The Westminster Foundation, for example, arranged visits by British 
parliamentarians to mentor local MPs at the national parliament. The Political 
Parties Registration Commission (PPRC) was a programme supported through the 
UNDP basket fund. It was mandated by the Political Parties Act 2002 and the 
Constitution of 1991 to monitor and mediate all parties and their membership on 
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2007 
 218 
 
behalf of the electorate, the idea being to promote political pluralism and the spirit of 
constitutionalism amongst political parties. Although this initiative was strongly 
supported by the international community, during field work interviews the PPRC 
respondent demonstrated great frustration at logistical constraints on his activities. 
The organisation appeared to lack all essential equipment to conduct business; 
furniture, stationary, computer or vehicle, and there was a sense of ‗unfinished 
business‘ with regard to donor interest in the project. Since the completion of field 
work, however, there were more positive developments; a new PPRC website with 
working links to the financial reports of all political parties was a good sign of more 
transparency in the system. The accuracy of the financial reports was unknown but 
accessibility to their content both via the web and the offices of the PPRC was a 
useful starting point for society to check out their party‘s financial activities.112 
There were also positive reports about the activities of the Code Monitoring 
Committees,
113
 an adjunct of the PPRC, which were successful in reconciling 
clashes between political parties during 2007 campaigning (EU 2007b).  
By 2007, there were three main party contenders in the elections, and voting 
patterns suggested that the country had settled back into habits of old where regional 
and ethnic ties dictated party allegiance - the northern aligned APC and the southern 
aligned SLPP (ICG, 2008), however, there were also some encouraging signs in 
respect of broadened participation. The split in the old political groupings of the 
APC and SLPP created a new party, the PMDC, headed by the old political 
protagonist Charles Margai but fielding many younger parliamentary candidates. 
                                                 
112
 The PPRC acknowledges ‗generous funding‘ from US-AID on its website at 
http://www.pprcsl.info/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=29 accessed 
on 07/02/09 
113
 See DACO at http://www.daco-
sl.org/encyclopedia/1_gov/1_3/PPRC/operation_modalities.pdf, accessed on 06/02/09 
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Around 65% of the PMDC candidates were young which gave the youth a fresh 
opportunity to find its voice and which perhaps heralded the evolution of a new type 
of identity politics in Sierra Leone which was not centred on ethnicity (ICG, 2008, 
Wai, 2008, Gaima, 2009). Some observers suggested that this was a cynical attempt 
to attract the youth vote; a tactic  also applied by the main opposition APC (Wai, 
2008).   
The results of the 2007 elections showed a much more balanced 
representation among parties in parliament compared to 2002 (Tables 17 and 18, 
below) and this was perhaps an indication of increased freedoms borne of greater 
security. Improved discipline and professionalism in the security sector, for 
example, allowed people to make more autonomous choices. Security and greater 
political tolerance were both very positive aspects of international intervention in 
Sierra Leone. 
Table 17 – Results of 2007 parliamentary election by party  
 
Party 
Percentage of 
vote 
Number of 
seats 
All Peoples’ Congress 52.68% 59 
Sierra Leone Peoples’ Party 38.39% 43 
Peoples’ Movement for Democratic Change 8.93% 10 
 
African Elections - http://africanelections.tripod.com/sl.html, and LeoneNet - 
http://www.leonedirect.com/marketplace/sierraleone_parliamentary_election_resultstable.jsp, both accessed on 
06/02/09 
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Table 18 – Results of 2002 parliamentary election by party 
 
Party 
Percentage of 
vote 
Number of 
seats 
Sierra Leone Peoples’ Party 67.6% 83 
All Peoples’ Congress 21.4% 27 
Peace and Liberation Party 3.6% 2 
 
Data sourced from the CarterCentre (CarterCentre, 2002) 
 
Further  positive developments included additional political space through media 
outlets which gave voice to alternative expressions especially among the alienated 
youth who were bold in their condemnation of corruption among elites (Zack-
Williams and Gbla, 2008). Some popular and politically charged music included 
songs with the titles Fat Cats, Those responsible for destroying the country, Time to 
go SLPP government, Corruption; it‘s enough. Music was a ‗powerful tool in the 
campaign for social transformation‘ because it allowed citizens peaceful expressions 
of their anger (Wai, 2008:57). The lyrics of songs  ‗inaugurated a national 
conversation … [and] … demand for social citizenship‘ (Abdullah, 2007: cited by, 
Wai, 2008). Youth played an important role in the elections - mobilising voters, 
observing, being voters and candidates themselves, or acting as election agents and 
cadres (Zack-Williams and Gbla, 2008). The youth also represented an important 
voting block; 56% of the country‘s registered voters were under the age of 32 and 
were therefore very significant players in the country‘s democracy (Wai, 2008). This 
energetic response by the youth of Sierra Leone to get involved in the election 
process was perhaps an indication of their high expectations from the democratic 
process.  
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On the down side, reforms in the electoral system failed to increase the 
number of female candidates nominated in 2007. Only 64 women, 11% of 
candidates, were nominated despite the rhetoric on gender equality from all political 
parties (EU 2007b). Although active in national observer groups, few women made 
it to key positions; in the new cabinet of 2007, out of 26 ministerial positions 3 were 
filled by women, the same number as the previous SLPP cabinet. Further, there was 
evidence that some traditional leaders continued with the partisan practices of old, 
actively supporting the incumbent and influencing campaign agendas (EU 2007b). 
Opposition members claimed that money was distributed among chiefs and others to 
buy support, in many cases state officials were accused of using national resources 
to garner support for the ruling party (EU, 2007b).
114
 In conversations, senior 
members of the opposition produced animated responses about the ‗politicisation‘ of 
donor funds during the campaign period where presidential candidates would use 
monies to buy support; the point was made that the local populace didn‘t know the 
money came from international funds for poverty alleviation.
115
 Democracy itself is 
an expensive process for local elites involving official campaigning and unofficial 
bribes (Branch and Cheeseman, 2009). 
You cannot really talk about a level playing field when political parties don‘t 
have the same capacity … when there is an abundance of advantages to the 
incumbent. In our situation we have abuse of the incumbency which will make 
the playing field not level.
116
   
Despite these comments about an ‗unlevel playing field‘ which was supported by 
EU observers (EU, 2007b), there was a peaceful transfer of power in 2007 indicating 
                                                 
114
 Various personal interviews in Freetown during the registration period, March 2007 
115
 Personal interview with three senior members of the APC, Freetown, March 2007 
116
 Personal interview with leader of the opposition APC, Ernest B Koroma, at his offices, 
Freetown, March 2007 
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that perhaps the populace had clear minds of their own, and freedom and security to 
express their views.
117
 In the light of more recent African elections, the SLPP 
regime was to be commended on its peaceful acceptance of the results although local 
evidence suggested that the incumbent did not have support from the vast majority 
of police and armed services.
118
  
The successful elections of 2007 showed how the combined effort of both 
local and global actors brought about great change as far as procedural democracy 
was concerned. The populace was able to peacefully choose the people they thought 
would best represent their interests in parliament. Parliament, however, was what 
Thomson described as the ‗Cinderella‘ of reform, receiving little support from either 
government or donors and having minimal efficacy as an institution (Thomson, 
2007, Southall, 2006). Critically weak, the national parliament was noted for its 
prevailing ‗bad governance‘ culture, a problem acknowledged by local 
commentators who urged the international community to help build knowledge in 
the areas of ‗integrity building, political stability, good governance, the theory of 
Separation of Powers and The Rule of Law‘. Many MPs were not cognisant of their 
functions or their powers. In 1991, Sierra Leone adopted the Washington model but 
there was evidence that MPs were unaware of the change and the extent of their new 
powers (WB, 2004). This had serious implications for law making, approving 
budgets or making senior appointments and therefore, as an institution of 
representation, parliament had minimal capacity and was unable to perform its 
primary function - the monitoring of the executive.
119
 
120
 It lacked the necessary 
                                                 
117
 Research into the impact of aid or the absence of aid to support political parties has emerged 
more recently in the literature, see: Burnell, 2006; Salih, 2006; King, 2006; Carothers, 2006 
118
 Personal interview with Charles Margai, leader of the PMDC, Freetown, March 2007 ‗85% 
of the police are not with the government and 75% of the military are not with the government‘ 
119
 From an article in AllAfrica dated 03.12.07 by Pel Koroma in Freetown entitled ‗Conduct 
Workshop for Parliamentarians‘ 
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staffing, secretarial support and computerised technology; research facilities such as 
libraries, buildings or meeting rooms, and the relevant knowledge and expertise 
among staff and MPs.
121
 This rather negated the purpose of elections because the 
primary mechanism to convert democratic choice into effective representation did 
not work; citizenship could only have meaning if local communities were integrated 
through their representatives into national institutions (Chopra and Hohe, 2004: 245-
246). The commitment of MPs to represent their constituents was also questionable, 
most being ‗too poor‘ to take a stand against the government.122 
These are people who do not even understand the parliamentary procedure and 
secondly they are poor, they cannot exercise a will of their own, they do not 
have the capacity to tell the government what they believe is right.
123
   
There was also the issue of ‗crossing the floor‘ as in the pre-war era, traditional 
politics prevailed (Kandeh, 2003: 197). Comments included:
124
 
 People are being bribed and given different incentives to act or not 
 If the president says this, you are tied … over the past ten years MPs have not 
uttered one word [original emphasis] 
 MPs cannot afford to meet their constituents 
In the first place, MPs are corrupt. They are part of the state infra structure. 
These are sycophants, they are hostile, these are people coming to parliament 
for themselves; they want … government contracts - nobody can actually 
depend on them. The people depend on civil society. 
                                                                                                                                         
120
 Personal interview with leader of the opposition APC, Ernest B Koroma, at his offices, 
Freetown, March 2007 
121
 Personal interviews Ernest B Koroma, Charles Margai, Freetown, March 2007 
122
 It should be noted that the 2002 ‗block system‘ of voting, similar to proportional 
representation at province level, was changed in 2007 to the system of constituency based voting 
and there were hopes that this would make representatives more accountable 
123
 Personal interview with Charles Margai, leader of the PMDC, Freetown, March 2007 
124
 Various personal interviews requesting anonymity in Freetown, March 2007, A4, B5, B7, 
C18, D3 
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The most worrying dynamic of the 2007 elections was the prevalence of old 
practices by political elites in manipulating the youth (Christensen and Utas, 2008). 
Many ex-combatants remained in Freetown or other larger provincial towns after the 
war involving themselves in petty trading and prostitution, drug peddling and theft. 
Vulnerable, they were willing to be courted by politicians to act as their election 
thugs (Zack-Williams, 2008, Christensen and Utas, 2008, Wai, 2008). Liberal 
representative democracy meant ‗shortened time horizons‘ for political elites to 
prosper from the benefits of office, and this had the effect of hastening the pilfering 
of state resources. Winner-takes-all scenarios were an unhelpful model of 
democracy in such a fractured and dysfunctional body politic.  
A further issue was the emerging ethnicisation of politics. Cheru argued that it 
was the politicisation of ethnicity, not ethnicity itself, which accentuated conflict 
and destruction and this thesis was borne out in the political history of Sierra Leone 
(Cheru, 2002: 197). The single party state of the Stevens era had ironically 
dissipated tensions around ethnicity. The concern in the post-conflict 
democratisation was that ethnic relations were being brought into much sharper 
relief through multi-party politics which was compounded by the ‗winner-takes-all‘ 
model of democracy. In 1996, ethnicity once again came to the fore as a tool of the 
upper strata political elite (Francis, 1999) and again, in 2007, the politics of ethnicity 
were the dominant determining factor in campaigning when citizens were mobilised 
around historic ties (Fakondo, 2009). In the 2008 local elections, partisanship and 
political polarisation around the north/western (APC) and southern (SLPP) divide 
became more acute, resulting in a contraction of support for the emerging PMDC in 
favour of old allegiances (Gaima, 2009: 143). 
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Decentralisation  
If central parliament wasn‘t up to the task of representing citizens‘ interests, the 
decentralisation initiative had potential to correct this dilemma of participation 
without representation. Devolution of power from central government was an 
important component of the GovSL reform agenda ‗to move away from the highly 
centralized system of administration … inherited from previous governments‘ 
(Kabbah, 2003).
125
 It was strongly supported by the international community, 
particularly the EU and DfID through the World Bank,
126
 as a mechanism to bring 
accountability and participation to the ‗local‘ and improve the impact of aid 
resources (EU, 2007a, DfID, 2008, Jabbi and Kpaka, 2007). Restoration of the 
chieftaincy system was part of this bid to give ownership to local people. In short, 
decentralisation was the mechanism to bring government to the people; the major 
trend during the 1990s for promoting participatory governance and for legitimising 
government by giving regional authority for decision making (Olowu and Wunsch, 
2003, Crawford, 2008, Brancati, 2008:9). 
In theory, local administration meant public service delivery was more 
closely scrutinised and monitored by the people who benefited from it. 19 local 
government councils in four administrative regions of the country were created from 
the Local Government Act and elections were held in 2004, including a quota share 
for women representatives in ward committees. Functions and finances were 
devolved to the local councils and staff made available, although severe delays in 
resourcing had an impact on the new councils‘ functions (EU, 2007a). This was 
unfortunate because improvements in demand side pressures, the local elections, 
                                                 
125
 Statement delivered by his Excellency the President at Kenema, Bo, Makeni and Pork Loko 
from 26-30 January 2003 and available from Sierra Leone Web at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/GOSL/kabbah-012603.html, accessed on 05/02/09 
126
 The Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project (IRCBP) 
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were not harmonized with service delivery or high expectations with local 
capacity.
127
 The Rapid Results Initiative (RRI), a joint GovSL and World Bank 
project, was designed to jump-start local council activities to produce ‗quick wins‘ 
and promote a ‗culture of performance, accountability and results‘ in local 
councils.
128
 The first wave brought encouraging signs for the local populace, and 
local teams felt empowered which unleashed ‗knowledge and capacity already 
available at the local level‘ (World Bank, 2006b). Each council was encouraged to 
set up a ‗high visibility, high impact project‘ within 30 days of receiving a grant 
($30,000). These projects were established in the areas of water, sanitation, feeder 
roads, traffic, rice production and for mitigating post- harvest loss. A team member 
in the Western Rural Area was quoted by the World Bank as saying: ‗The RRI 
project is exciting, because we know we are no longer at the mercy of the donor; we 
own it and we will finish it‘ (World Bank, 2006b). Examples of successful RRI 
projects are set out in Table 19 (below). 
Table 19 – Selected Rapid Results Initiative Projects  
 
District Project Result 
Sewafe and Kono Travel time between Sewafe and Kono District was reduced from 1 hour 
to 15 minutes and transportation costs were reduced from Le 5,000 
($1.75) to Le 2,000 ($0.70). 
Pujehun district High-yield quick-harvest Inner Valley Swamp Rice seeds increased yields 
by 4,000 bushels within 90 days 
Kenema The total volume of garbage in two lorry parks and two markets in 
Kenema Township was reduced by 90% within 95 days. 
Data sourced from World Bank, 2006b 
                                                 
127
 Encouraged by projects such as ENCISS (see section 4.3) which sensitised citizens and civil 
society on the decentralisation process 
128
 See Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project (IRCBP) at - 
http://www.ircbp.sl/drwebsite/publish/rri.shtml, accessed on 09/02/09 
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There were mixed reports about the efficacy of the local councils but these must be 
considered in the light of their very short period of operation. Overall there were 
improvements in service delivery although there were disparities across the country. 
The transfer of the education sector to rural councils was delayed, not starting until 
March 2007 but both health and agriculture were transferred with some 
improvements recorded in delivery. The health sector was the most advanced (EU, 
2007) with district medical officers (DMOs) ‗embracing‘ the decentralisation 
project. Services through the primary medical units (PMUs) did not deteriorate after 
reform (Zhou, 2007), and there was some improvement in access to care and 
satisfaction levels; in 2007 over half of respondents (53%) in a IRCBP survey had 
access to a clinic within 60 minutes of their home compared to 48% in 2005 (Table 
21, below).   
Table 20 – Access to government health care providers, comparison 2005/2007 
  
Time to government clinic or 
hospital 
% of households 2005 % of households 2007 
Less th n 15 minutes 18 18 
15 to 30 minutes 12 16 
31 to 60 minutes 19 19 
60 to 120 minutes 18 24 
Over 120 minutes 33 21 
None nearby 1 2 
 
Data sourced from (IRCBP, 2008) 
 
These improvements were significantly assisted by the efforts of donors who were 
involved in the construction of new clinics independent of the local council and also 
the introduction of the Direct Service Delivery policy for essential drugs which 
bypassed central government (DfID, 2006). Due to the autonomy exercised by 
DMOs and their participation at all levels including managing the health grant 
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account, morale was greatly improved in the sector.  Zhou recorded the following 
comments (WB, 2004): 
Decentralization has stopped the tide of brain drain among medical 
professionals because we now have interesting work to do. 
Decentralization allows us to quickly respond to disease outbreaks. We don‘t 
have to wait for the ministry. 
 Decentralization means if I have a problem I can knock on the doors of our 
council rather than sitting on a long bench in Youyi Building for a week and 
waiting for an audience with a ministry official.
129
  
The agricultural sector was also devolved to local councils but showed deterioration 
in some services over the 2005-2007 period; for example a decline from 23% to 
18% of people made contact with an agricultural extension worker.
130
 This was the 
only area of devolved activity, however, which actually deteriorated over the period. 
There were improvements in the sector in respect of increased drying and storage 
facilities but with large disparities across councils, some faring far better than others 
(IRCBP, 2008).
131
 Generally there was confusion as to which activities were 
devolved and the actual role of local councils in service delivery (ref) which 
supports comments made earlier about the lack of a ‗sound comprehensive 
agricultural policy‘ from the centre.  
It should be noted that although there were great disparities between the 
various local councils this was not necessarily a reflection on individual 
performances because donor activities associated with particular councils made a 
great impact. For example, strong improvements were recorded in Kambia district 
                                                 
129
 Central administrative building in Freetown 
130
 Agricultural extension workers provide advice and training on increasing production and 
income generating activities for rural farmers 
131
 For example an overall increase from 12% to 20% of people who had access to drying floors, 
and an overall increase of 8% to 12% of people who had access to storage  
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due to intensive efforts of the Japanese International Cooperation Agency where 
access to extension workers improved from 20% to 29% of the population (IRCBP, 
2008: 11).   
Despite mixed reports on performance, by 2006, three out of nineteen local 
councils achieved at least five out seven minimum standards for government 
practice and the majority of the rest were achieving four;
132
 only the Freetown urban 
and rural councils were achieving one or no minimum standards (Figure 19, below). 
As Zhou points out, many of the good governance practices adopted by the local 
councils were yet to be practiced by central ministries (Zhou, 2007). Given the short 
time frame of local council operations, these improvements were encouraging. 
Figure 19 – Performance of local councils on government practice   
 
 
Reproduced from Zhou, 2007: www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/Youngmei.ppt 
 
In a poll, on average 54% of respondents knew the name of their local councillor but 
this varied dramatically from district to district (IRCBP, 2008). In one of the high 
                                                 
132
 The seven include: financial management, development planning, budgeting and accounting, 
procurement, transparency and accountability, project implementation and functional capacity 
(Youngmei, 2007?) www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/Youngmei.ppt  
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performing councils (Pujehun), 65% knew the name of their councillor, compared to 
an extraordinarily low 5% in Freetown (a low performing council), however almost 
twice as many respondents knew the name of their traditional leader compared to the 
name of their local councillor; 82% compared to 44% (IRCBP, ibid) (Table 21, 
below).  
Table 21 – Percentage respondents with knowledge of political leaders by community 
type 
 
 Paramount chief Local councillor Member of Parliament 
Freetown  5% 3% 
Large town 85% 30% 9% 
Small town 85% 48% 32% 
Village 82% 43% 18% 
 
Data sourced from (Zhou, 2007) 
There was a much better perception of local council‘s responsiveness to the needs of 
the community if the councillor had visited to meet with the locals; 69% positive 
response compared to 25% for those who had never met their councillor. Further, 
although there was some worsening of perceptions about local councils due to strong 
campaigning by central government around the 2007 elections, this deterioration 
was non-existent for those respondents who were involved and knew about local 
projects and the problems associated with local delivery (IRCBP, ibid). With regard 
to forthcoming local elections of 2008, in a survey among local community ‗opinion 
leaders‘,133 17% said they thought the community would wish to re-elect their local 
                                                 
133
 Opinion leaders were people identified either by the survey team or the community as 
someone who was knowledgeable about politics and current events and influential in the 
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councillor compared to 35% who said they would not.  Opinion was divided in a 
further 23%, and 24% didn‘t know. Perceptions about the commitment of local 
councils to community needs varied widely across the country with Freetown having 
a figure of only 17% confidence in local councils compared to Makeni in the 
northern province which had levels of 68% (ibid). This disparity was closely linked 
to kinship ties. It was found that the benefits of decentralisation accrued primarily in 
the home villages or towns of local councillors (Zhou and Zhang, 2009: 104). This 
suggested that the concept of the broader constituency was still a mystery to many 
representatives of local wards but the profiles of most newly elected councillors also 
showed a desperate lack of education as well as non-existent experience of local 
government. These shortcomings were shared by the majority of their support base 
(Gaima, 2009: 139). In the outcome, around 60% of local councillors were returned 
to office for a second term in 2008 with an increase in women councillors from 
12.7% to 18.9% since the 2004 poll (Zhou and Zhang, 2009: 103, 105). In the 
IRCBP survey there was some correlation between communities knowing the name 
of their councillor, or having met their councillor, or being involved in local 
projects, and their perceptions about councillor‘s level of commitment for reform. 
What does appear to have emerged as a result of decentralisation is a greater 
tolerance of local councils performance if they are better understood by local 
populace; in addition, local councils may produce better standards of governance if 
their communities are working more closely with them. In a survey carried out by 
Search for Common Ground in 2007, it was found that generally more people had 
high levels of trust in local politicians than national politicians: 
 
                                                                                                                                         
community. 84% of the respondents were male, with an average age of 49.  20% represented the 
youth IRCBP (2008)  
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Figure 20 – Rating of trust placed in local and national politicians (SFCG, 2007) 
 
 
Local political culture remained a challenge for democratisation. Emerging tensions 
were recorded between the local councils and central government, as a new political 
class was being established in competition with traditional authorities where roles 
and responsibilities were being contested (DfID, 2008, Jackson, 2005, Jackson, 
2007, EU, 2007a). This raised concerns that corruption had been decentralised along 
with devolution (Jabbi and Kpaka, 2007); because decentralisation had brought 
about new opportunities for chiefs to co-opt the potentially very lucrative local 
councillors (Hanlon, 2005, Jackson, 2007). This situation was not helped by the fact 
that donors did not build close relationships with local councils; rather, they relied 
on relationships associated with the implementation of projects through 
intermediaries. 
The strong legacy of colonial indirect rule and romantic reminiscences by the 
SLPP and others about local and chieftaincy rule created opportunities for the 
dysfunctional systems of the past to be reinstated with the restoration of the 
chieftaincy system alongside decentralisation (Fanthorpe, 2005; Jackson, 2005; 
Thomson, 2007). Corruption, inequities and mismanagement abounded as post-war 
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efforts to replace chiefs succeeded in reigniting old grievances in the countryside 
(ibid). The International Crisis Group described interference by Paramount Chiefs as 
the ‗greatest threat‘ to the decentralisation project, and the situation wasn‘t helped 
by support given to Chiefs by parliamentarians who expected votes in return (ICG, 
2007). Well into the twenty first century, and in the post-conflict, externally 
constructed new state, old colonial practices of indirect rule remained a key part of 
national politics. This meant that ‗large groups of excluded citizens [had] no hope 
for advancement‘ as the ‗closed feudal approach to governance‘ was once again 
exposing the rural youth to traditional forms of exploitation (Jackson, 2007).  
Another problem with the decentralisation project was that it added extra 
burdens to the challenging agenda of public financial management, draining the 
already limited capacity of the bureaucracy (EU, 2007a). Decentralisation is a 
hugely costly process (Brancati, 2008: 228), but the World Bank reported that 
although local council transfers from central government increased from 3.4% to 
6.1% of domestic revenue between 2005 and 2008, there were consistent shortfalls 
on these targets and even if they had been met, they were woefully inadequate to 
cover the costs of effective devolution (World Bank, 2009: para.4). Suffering from 
severe overstretch, the government had difficult choices to make about its allocation 
of resources. 
5.2 – THE ACCOUNTABILITY NEXUS 
The natural progression of the electoral process is to have government accountable 
for the representation of citizens‘ interests. Being able to choose your candidate, 
albeit from a very limited pool of mostly undemocratic contenders, is irrelevant if 
there are no other mechanisms than future elections (fair or otherwise) to hold them 
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accountable. Proponents of democracy would argue that elections in themselves are 
a powerful mechanism against corruption, exploitation and general bad governance 
because elites know they can be removed from office. There is little evidence to 
support this, however, in either the general African context or in the context of 
Sierra Leone. There was no ‗good governance‘ in Sierra Leone for four decades 
despite multi-party elections, single-party elections, and recently two ‗free and fair‘ 
elections (1996 and 2002) (Transparency International, 2004). Replacing ‗bad for 
bad‘ was not an acceptable mechanism for accountability in a society which was 
recovering from civil war; in 2008 the country‘s CPI fell from an already low of 2.2 
in 2003 to 1.9, despite the government‘s Improved Governance and Accountability 
Pact of 2006 and peaceful elections which resulted in an historic change of 
government .
134
 
135
 This raises questions about the country‘s political culture and 
‗suitability‘ for the liberal democratic model, a point which will be revisited later in 
this chapter. 
Concluding that parliament was an ineffective institution in the chain of 
participation, representation and accountability, there now follows an investigation 
into the efficacy of two other mechanisms for reform. First, the justice sector is 
investigated to determine its credentials as a democratic institution for holding elites, 
and others, accountable for their actions; the rule of law being a central tenet of 
procedural and qualitative democracy (Diamond and Morlino, 2004, Huntington, 
1968, Doig and Marquette, 2005, O'Donnell, 2001, IDEA, 1998). Law and order 
were specific political goods recognised by citizens as critical for their own sense of 
                                                 
134
 Corruption Perception Index where 10 represents highly clean and 0 highly corrupt  - 
Transparency International 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008 accessed on 19/01/09 
135
 Available from DfID at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/sierra-leone-igap.pdf accessed on 
19/01/09 
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security and also for their own perceptions of the legitimacy of state officials 
(Bratton and Chang, 2006, IRCBP, 2008). In Sierra Leone the justice sector was a 
key area for reform recommended by the TRC-R.  
The second investigation concerns the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) 
which was to play an important role in supporting the judiciary in controlling 
corruption ‗in all its forms‘ and also to improve peoples‘ perceptions of the 
legitimacy of government (CGG, 2003). The following analysis therefore reveals the 
progress made in the implementation of peace promises 5 and 6 (GovSL, 2001: para. 
73, GovSL, 2005: 5.2.2.a) 
Reforming the national justice system: a missed opportunity? 
With a judiciary operating under two jurisprudential philosophies and 
exercising power according to the whims of an overreaching executive, the 
backbone of a Sierra Leonean democracy appears too weak to succeed 
(Bangura and Ganji, 2009) 
Notions of justice in peacebuilding were closely linked to mechanisms of 
accountability whether they were for war crimes and impunity, political violence 
and answerability, or bad governance and responsibility. All were associated with 
restoration of the rule of law in Sierra Leone. Post-war, the country was in the 
‗historically unique‘ position of locally mandating a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and at the same time being the recipient of an internationally 
sanctioned tribunal to adjudicate those ‗most responsible‘ for crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and violations of international law, the Special Court (Pham, 
2004, Alie, 2008).
136
 Transitional justice in peacebuilding is a highly contentious 
component of interventionist policies because of the implications of ‗getting it 
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 The Special Court of Sierra Leone a joint venture between the GovSL and UNHDR  - 
http://www.sc-sl.org/ 
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wrong‘ in fragile societies which are rebuilding trust after conflict (Baker, 1996). 
Some of the mechanisms for transitional justice, however, are a useful starting point 
for building an effective and impartial justice system which can restrain the excesses 
of political elites.   
The Special Court represented an ‗unprecedented opportunity to contribute to 
the restoration of the rule of law‘ but analysts concluded that it missed the 
opportunity to drive forward much needed legal reform in the country.
137
 This was 
partly due to the ‗de-linking‘ of its functions from the local justice system so as to 
secure its impartial credentials. The Court operated as an instrument of justice only 
for a handful of accused and did little to reaffirm the faith of local people in their 
justice system because of the contentious nature of some of the trials (Kerr and 
Lincoln, 2008, Alie, 2008).
 138 139 
 In some areas of the country there was outright 
hostility towards it (Ginifer, 2004), exacerbated by the lack of relevance of the 
Special Court‘s proceedings to local cultural practices and beliefs (Kelsall, 2009). 
The building itself, an impressive and towering edifice built on a local community 
centre in a prominent position on a hillside in Freetown, caused resentment among 
some locals because of the perceived waste of many millions of dollars in its 
construction (Penfold, 2009).
140
 Some of the Special Court indictments were also 
identified as a possible future security threat but long sentences for those convicted 
demonstrated that the culture of impunity for war crimes was at an end (ICG, 2008). 
The narrow mandate of the Court, however, meant that broader judicial reform was 
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 Third Annual Report of the President of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, January 2005-
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for a full discussion about local perceptions of the efficacy and role of the Court. 
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beyond its scope. In terms of improved capacity, the Court‘s legacy had huge 
potential to support local judicial reform:  
These lawyers, investigators, court administrators, case managers, witness 
protection managers, personnel and financial specialists, as well as physical 
plant technicians will stay and begin rebuilding the capacity of the judiciary to 
once again administer the law throughout the country. They will undoubtedly 
begin to train a new generation of legal specialists and support personnel.  
(Crane, 2005) 
The TRC-R recommendations for the reform of the justice sector included its 
independence and autonomy, the accountability of judges and the efficacy of the 
prosecuting authority (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 3, Recommendations). Achieving 
this was no mean task for local peace-builders faced with razed or dilapidated courts 
and a dearth of legal professionals, but considering the vital role of the local 
judiciary in providing the accountability of elites to the citizenry, its reform 
represented the foundation stone for better governance and the cornerstone of a 
stable state (Pham, 2004, Transparency International, 2008: 148).  Indeed, the 
UNHCR declared that ‗no foundation for peace and stability can be laid in a country 
emerging from conflict if it is not grounded on respect for the rule of law.‘141   
Despite various programming coordinated by the World Bank in 2002/03 
and proclamations from the government for reform of the judiciary, reform of the 
sector was an unmitigated failure (Gloppen, 2004). In 2007, the UN Peacebuilding 
Commission highlighted the justice sector as a key area for reform under the 
extended peacebuilding project because the government itself had not made this a 
priority (UN, 2007, ICG, 2008). In 2006, around 80% of the population still relied 
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 Office for the High Commission on Human Rights, ONHCR in Sierra Leone 2006-2007, 
accessed on 21/01/09,  
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on the traditional chieftaincy-based system of justice, problematic because of its lack 
of capacity, transparency and accountability, and its bias against women and young 
people (UN, 2007, Alie, 2008).
142
 The two-tiered system of justice in the country, 
the English Common Law and the local Customary Law, meant greater challenges 
for attempts at reform (Bangura and Ganji, 2009, Dale, 2007). The judicial branch of 
the sector was the main impediment for reform; its ‗corruption and incompetence‘ a 
consequence of magistrates and judges being the most poorly remunerated on the 
continent (ibid).
143
 The salaries of judges and magistrates were bankrolled by the 
international community but the quality of judicial delivery remained poor.
144
 The 
Bench had low levels of training and there was a dearth of court personnel such as 
registrars and stenographers, and minimal technical equipment including computers 
(WB, 2004). 
By 2007, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported ‗particularly striking 
deficiencies in the judicial system and ongoing corruption‘ and expressed growing 
concerns about ‗extortion and bribe-taking by court officials, insufficient judicial 
personnel, detention of hundreds of accused for extended periods without trial, and 
sub-standard prison conditions‘ (Human Rights Watch, 2007). This situation meant 
that the rights of both victims and accused were severely undermined (ibid). 
Extortion and bribe taking by court officials meant that justice was beyond the 
pocket of many ordinary citizens, and the lack of representation for those who had 
been accused meant that a fair trial remained elusive. Overcrowding was a serious 
issue in detention centres and pre-trial detainees were living in conditions described 
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in one report as constituting a de facto death sentence (ibid:2). The problem of 
inadequate prosecutorial and investigative staff was particularly acute in the 
provinces giving credence to the perception that the justice sector served only a 
small well-connected urban elite (WB, 2004).  
This desperate situation rather belied the various activities for reform being 
spearheaded by the international community; for example DfID‘s Law Development 
Project, which involved work on the customary legal system and activities such as 
refurbishment of the Law Courts in Freetown and other court buildings in main 
towns around the country, the provision of technical equipment and vehicles, 
stocking Law Courts Libraries and training support staff (ibid). There were various 
additional initiatives by other externals including USAID, ICRC, UNDP and 
UNAMSIL (WB, 2004: annex IV). Governing elites at the time had a serious case to 
answer as their failure to separate the powers of the attorney general and justice 
minister compounded the lack of transparency. These failings had implications on 
morale in the police force as there was little point having ‗Rolls Royce‘ institutions 
of security in the military and the police when justice reform lagged way behind 
(Stone, 2005; DfID, 2008: para.4.63, Albrecht and Jackson, 2009). A general culture 
of impunity remained and citizens found themselves at the mercy of public officials 
who opportunistically invented offences to extort funds (Rose-Akerman, 2008). 
There was ample evidence of this on the streets of Freetown where the police 
routinely stopped taxis to extort money.
145
 Further, public officials demanded bribes 
in order to negotiate the best ‗terms of trade‘ for international companies - such as 
reducing the minimum quota of locals to be employed in non-national enterprises.
146
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 Anonymous personal conversations, Freetown, March 2007 
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Unscrupulous actors, both local and non-national, wishing to engage in illegal 
activities such as arms or drugs smuggling, and money laundering could do so in an 
environment of impunity protected by the public authorities (Rose-Akerman, 2008, 
Transparency International, 2004). 
How citizens fit in 
Legal mechanisms for the ordinary public to challenge government were available. 
Complaints could be made through the Public Service Commission, the 
Establishment Secretary‘s Office, the President, the Courts, the Police, the Anti-
Corruption commission and the Office of the Ombudsman and enabling legislation 
abounded in respect of Constitutional provisions for citizens to sue government 
officials (Transparency International, 2004).  Despite the complex architecture and 
procedures involved in bringing about complaints, the public remained active 
although perversion of justice against the poor, and connivance to protect the rich 
and influential, gave the ordinary citizen little confidence in the system (Doig and 
McIvor, 2004, Transparency International, 2004). Lack of confidence was 
exacerbated by other severe restraints such as mass illiteracy and ignorance about 
citizens‘ rights, the dearth of financial resources, transport issues or fear of 
victimisation. A major issue was that the Office of the Ombudsman had no 
disciplinary or enforcement powers (Transparency International, 2004). 
In 2007 a survey conducted by the Search for Common Ground established 
that, across the country, less than 30% of the population had high levels of trust in 
their government to respond to protests about unjust laws; less women than men 
trusted their government - (SFCG, 2007: Figs. 47, 48). There were substantial 
differences across the country; with lows of 14% and 10% in Western Urban and 
Port Loko areas respectively, and highs of 39% and 46% in Bombali and Pujehun 
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respectively (ibid: Fig.47). An average of 36% of people had high levels of trust in 
the legal system itself but there were huge disparities across the country with very 
low levels of trust being recorded in the Western Urban and Kailahun districts (both 
19%), but 63% in Bombali (ibid: Fig.50). The knock on effect of a justice system 
which could not be trusted or relied upon also brought little confidence to a fledgling 
business community which legitimately expected legal protection for its various 
transactions.  This predicament made businesses vulnerable to political predation i.e. 
demands for payment in exchange for the trouble free licensing of businesses.
147
   
There is virtual unanimity among Sierra Leoneans that building confidence in 
the justice sector is an essential requirement of economic investment and 
growth, and hence for reviving opportunities for economic progress for Sierra 
Leoneans generally. (WB, 2004: 6).   
In the 2007 election manifestos no party had plans for judicial reform despite 
widespread local frustration at the overloaded and inefficient system and the fact 
that, with the exception of one,
148
 none of the TRC recommendation on judicial 
reform had been carried out.
149
 This was a major concern because lack of 
accountability in the reconstruction set an example for the future; especially cogent 
because the evolution of post-conflict accountability structures, was so strongly 
demanded by the TRC. 
Corruption: breaking the mould? 
The National Anti-Corruption strategy was first published in 2005, but a revision in 
2008 noted the following types of endemic and ongoing corruption (ICG 2008): 
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 See The Monitor, official Newsletter of the Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Programme, 
Vol.25, July 2007 available from www.slcmp.org, accessed on 21/01/09 
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i. bribery of public officials to obtain benefits, obtaining services (eg, prompt 
delivery) associated with a benefit, preventing others from sharing in a 
benefit and avoiding sanctions or punitive actions;  
ii. use of bureaucratic power for illegal seizure of public and private assets; 
iii. embezzlement of public funds by false accounting; and  
iv. preferential treatment of members of family and social networks in legal 
cases, the issuance of government licenses and permits, and the award of 
government contracts to private firms 
This revision following the withdrawal of support by the main donors in 2007 on 
account of the exceptional failures of the Commission to:  
 make any progress in reducing corruption – real or perceived, and 
 the deterioration of the Commission‘s institutional capacity despite good 
levels of funding and technical support, and  
 no progress on high-level prosecutions (DfID, 2007).     
This dramatic failure of the Commission warranted a closer investigation which 
revealed that general lack of reform in the justice sector had an impact on the 
Commission‘s activities (EU, 2007a, UN, 2007). For example, ‗the judicial system 
is in such a dilapidated state that a change of direction is urgently needed‘, 
‗corruption is rife‘ and ‗effective oversight mechanisms do not yet exist‘ 
(Transparency International, 2008, EU, 2007a: II.1.1). The chronic failures of the 
Commission were an indictment of the state of law enforcement and the justice 
system as a whole in particular, problems with the auditor general‘s office and the 
prosecution service (ICG, 2008, Cubitt, 2006, Thomson, 2007, DfID, 2007). The 
failure of the ACC was particularly damning as it represented the ‗flagship‘ 
programming of the main bilateral donor DfID and was the ‗political barometer‘ of 
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the government‘s pledge to greater probity in public life. So what went wrong when 
so much attention and resources were spent getting it right? 
The project of the Anti-Corruption Commission and National Anti-
Corruption Strategy were priorities of President Kabbah, dating back to 1998/99.
150
 
There were problems from the start; after only one year the head of the ACC 
complained about interference from government and the attorney general‘s 
reluctance to act on its recommendations.
151
 57 cases had been submitted to the 
attorney general‘s office but three-quarters had not been acted upon including the 
case of former minister of transport and communications Momoh Pujeh, who was 
arrested in November 2001 for illicit mining and the possession of conflict 
diamonds, but who did not face corruption charges until August 2002.
152
 By 2003 
and in response to ‗strong disappointment‘ over ‗slow progress‘, the Commission‘s 
head expressed frustration over ‗the rather lukewarm attitude of the judiciary, which 
after two years has yet to take a single matter of adjudication to a final conclusion‘. 
He also expressed frustration at ‗a level of disinterestedness‘ by Parliament.153 By 
October 2003 Momoh Pujeh was eventually convicted and sentenced to twelve 
months imprisonment, but won his appeal in the High Court, was acquitted and 
discharged.
154
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Non-nationals were appointed to the ACC in the roles of deputy 
commissioner, senior and principal investigating officers, but there was a very high 
turnover of staff mostly due to low morale and a sense of not ‗getting anywhere‘.155 
Despite various protestations and pledges by the president, the ACC was not 
independent but accountable to the attorney general who made the decisions on 
prosecutions. This favoured those who were part of the ‗status quo‘; often the well 
connected who got their convictions overturned on appeal (ICG 2008). This ‗fuelled 
suspicion that the governing elite were primarily interested in protecting its own‘ 
(ibid) but the problem for the ACC was that it had been set up with no independent 
prosecuting powers and was therefore reliant on a higher authority. The British 
government brought in two expatriate judges with the power to outvote the attorney 
general but this produced no improvement in high level convictions. By 2005, the 
conscientious and frustrated head of the ACC was removed from office. His 
replacement immediately dispensed with the ‗task and coordinating group‘ and other 
working systems set up by external staff. Over a five year period, the Commission 
was only effective for around six to nine months.
156
   
There was great confusion within the Commission as to exactly what to 
investigate. Rather than acting as a Commission for high level investigations it 
operated more like a ‗quasi police unit‘, being strongly influenced by British models 
of policing with many investigators but with no clear template for investigation; for 
example, ‗what was the actual criteria, what offences were you going to investigate, 
which people, over what duration of time‘.157 In short; there was no real 
understanding of investigative doctrine. In addition to this fundamental shortcoming, 
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the Commission failed to embrace capacity building efforts. This was reflected in 
the dearth of recording procedures witnessed by new external staff arriving in 2006 
amid local unwillingness to create computer records. Although there were indicators 
that lower level staff were happy to work with donors who provided support, 
development, mentoring, training, and generally exchanging ideas, senior level staff 
‗don‘t want your views or they don‘t want to be transparent and don‘t want proper 
engagement on how investigations should be run or how their organisations should 
be managed‘. Consequently, no ‗footprint‘ was left of capacity building efforts by 
the donor community.
158
 Indeed, the famous ‗under-spend‘ of the ACC was 
primarily due to the commission simply not undertaking the necessary investigations 
and ‗sitting around doing nothing‘ – this view from a non-national senior staff 
member of the ACC. The view of ACC external staff was that local working ethics 
and culture were not compatible with European norms and that change was not 
wanted. Requests to interview local staff at the Anti-corruption Commission were 
met with outright hostility. 
The year of 2006 was something of a watershed for the ACC as far as 
funding was concerned. With the help of the WB, EC, ADB and DfID, the GovSL 
published an Improved Governance and Accountability Pact (IGAP) which included 
a commitment to increase the number of significant ‗public interest‘ prosecutions by 
the ACC (GovSL, 2006b) but the subsequent under-spend of over three quarters of a 
million pounds suggested no hope of progress for 2007 (DfID, 2007). Despite the 
promises of the IGAP, small but positive achievements during 2005 were negated or 
reversed including strategic planning, tasking and co-ordinating (ibid). Notions of 
‗accountability and transparency‘ threatened vested interests in government 
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ministries, departments and institutions and were therefore ignored (Soloman, 2007). 
Despite repeated promises by the President for a renewed anti-corruption drive,
159
 it 
was not until 2005 that the government launched its Anti-Corruption strategy. The 
new problem post-war was that although corruption had become very much part of 
the public awareness, convictions at high level remained elusive (TIRI, 2007). 
Democratisation appeared to have only cleared the first hurdle because by 
2007 the promise of accountable government and a leadership with integrity 
remained unfulfilled aspirations. This made mass participation in the elections rather 
a shallow exercise. In the post-war era of reconstruction, the opportunities for 
corruption without such safeguards were enormous (AAPPG, 2006: 16, Branch and 
Cheeseman, 2009). Indeed, the combined impact of increased aid flows and dearth 
of oversight mechanisms meant that bad practice was solidified rather than reformed 
and far from acting as a counter-balance for government excesses, the judiciary 
appeared to have enhanced their proliferation (Jabbi and Kpaka, 2007). This was 
extraordinary given the many warnings and threats on flows of aid if the government 
didn‘t sharpen up its act (ICG, 2008). Corruption remained a serious problem for 
stability, as did lack of respect for and manipulation of the rule of law (Soloman, 
2007, Jabbi and Kpaka, 2007, ICG, 2007, DfID, 2007). 
There are several explanatory variables for the failures in accountability 
mechanisms: 
 lack of capacity and integrity in key democratic institutions – parliament and 
the justice sector 
 low priority for reform by both donors and national government 
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 continuing patronage practices and lack of commitment to the ‗good 
governance‘ project on the part of political elites (not necessarily at lower 
management levels) 
 minimal social capital to push for change from inside 
 
5.3 - TRANSFORMING THE CULTURE POLITIQUE – THE ROLE OF CIVIL 
SOCIETY 
The expanding talk of civil society is not immune to muddle and delirium. 
There are even signs that the meaning of the term ‗civil society‘ are multiplying 
to the point where, like a catchy advertising slogan, it risks imploding from 
overuse. (Keane, 1998:  36) 
Civil society was a key institution of democratic polities and a central tenet of 
democracy promotion efforts because it was believed that it could act as a counter 
balance to government; an additional institution of accountability to compliment 
national elections and an independent judiciary. Peacebuilding research concluded 
that positive outcomes would be more likely and consolidation of peace more 
effective if multiple local actors at multiple levels were involved in the process 
(Reychler and Paffenholz, 2001, Crocker et al., 2001, Lederach, 1997, Paffenholz, 
2009). A vibrant civil society therefore became associated with liberal peace 
theorising and peacebuilding missions evolved to include civil society peacebuilding 
initiatives. These involved the training and capacity building of a wide range of local 
actors including NGOs, associations, religious entities, and business or grass roots 
organisations (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006, Richmond and Carey, 2005).  
The Lomé Accord thus mandated local civil society to participate in the 
consulting and implementing bodies connected with both the peacebuilding mission 
and longer term development (GovSL, 1999: Articles VI, VII and XXV), the aim 
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being to improve the links between government and society through the promotion 
of ‗low politics against high politics‘ and by educating the populace to scrutinise the 
state (Pouligny, 2006: 168, Paris, 2004). Underlying this belief was the assumption 
that there existed a natural community known as civil society, a community which 
had a ‗passionate attachment‘ to the notion of nationhood (Young, 1994: 32). This 
assumption is contested here.  
The belief that a natural and united society existed in post-conflict environs 
helped define the liberal peace as practiced in state reconstruction, and the 
consequential search for an innate civic community gave donors a ‗direct 
engagement in social reconstruction‘ which had previously been outside their sphere 
of influence (Mac Ginty, 2008, Hearn and Robinson, 2000, Clapham, 1996).  
Peace missions trying to identify what post-war ‗civil society‘ was found this 
task rather difficult (Paffenholz, 2009). The tendency was to look for structures 
similar to those in modern western societies and to promote an urban, English 
speaking, westernised construct at the expense of traditional sources of power and 
counsel (Mamdani, 1996, Hearn and Robinson, 2000, Mac Ginty, 2008: 52). This 
missed the variety of different forms of natural representations in societies such as 
Sierra Leone (Pouligny, 2006, Kasfir, 1998), and the danger was that a new 
exclusive platform was being created which could marginalise wider participation 
(Belloni, 2008, Hearn and Robinson, 2000). This was because the involvement of 
NGOs in conflict transformation went ‗hand in hand‘ with the professionalization 
and commercialisation of peace work – described as the ‗NGO-isation‘ of social 
protest (Orjuela, 2004), or the ‗taming of social movements‘ (Kaldor, 2003). 
Support to civil society peacebuilding initiatives was therefore deeply problematic. 
It led to the ‗colonisation of space‘ by international actors which in turn led to the 
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disempowerment of local communities and the empowerment of local elites who 
were often linked to the political establishment through their kinship networks 
(Paffenholz, 2009:70). There is cause for concern when insensitive distributions of 
post-conflict support may reinforce social antagonisms (Anderson, 1999)  
Further problems associated with using civil society for the peacebuilding 
project included the ‗skewing‘ of local priorities in the direction of interventionist 
agendas; the temporal and therefore unsustainable nature of donor support; the 
increased opportunities for profiteering both for local politicians and the 
bourgeoisie; and the ‗blurring‘ of government and societal realms through ‗special 
privileges‘ given to CSOs which agreed to toe the line (Belloni, 2008). From the 
evidential base, there are indications that all these concerns, and more, were 
substantiated in Sierra Leone. 
Although there was a wide literature on the contested nature of civil society, 
its complexity and cultural specificity (Carothers, 1999, ICG, 2004, Belloni, 
2008:186, Keane, 1998, Whaites, 2000), interventions prevailed which focused on 
this concept as an institution for democratisation and the consolidation of peace.  
The purpose of the following analysis is to examine the character and 
consequences of civil society support in Sierra Leone, and the nature of the 
emerging ‗civil society‘ vis-à-vis its ability to represent the interests of the broader 
citizenry (Gramsci, 1971; Fatton, 1992; Keane, 1998). The aim is to indentify 
interpretations of the concept which had resonance with grass roots communities 
and which contested the language of civil society in Freetown whose interlocution 
was Westernised. The question is posed: what form of civil society would be 
successful in changing the culture politique in Sierra Leone?  
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Building a strong society 
Local participation and ownership encouraged, financed and 
sponsored by outside donors is limited in its capacity to create 
domestic social capital and ownership of the peace process (Belloni, 
2008:202) 
Official documents were littered with references to the role of civil society in the 
good governance project, often linked to the vocabulary of human rights, poverty 
and public oversight, and the importance of having civil society at the table in peace 
and development negotiations (DfID, 2008, EU, 2007a, GovSL, 2002, GovSL, 2001, 
TRC, 2004, World Bank, 2006). Despite this, support to civil society was one of the 
‗Cinderellas‘ of governance reform (Thomson, 2007), receiving minimal funding 
from the main bilateral and multilateral donors, and usually through INGOS and 
accountable grants (DfID, 2008).
160
 In the 1990s, democracy assistance to non-state 
actors was mainly focused on urban based NGOs, predominantly English speaking 
and elite led who prescribed to and promoted democratic values (Hearn and 
Robinson, 2000, Thomson, 2007).   
In post-conflict Sierra Leone, the number of CSOs reached epidemic proportions 
– over 500 by 2007 (TIRI, 2007), and some were created to serve as local 
implementing partners for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activities in 
the immediate post-war era (Europa, 2007). On Main Motor Road into Freetown 
many individuals and groups had taken advantage of the new opportunities for 
employment or enterprise the civil society ‗ticket‘ offered; a multitude of 
organisations in buildings large and small representing various interest groups 
including youth, women, and peace, lined the route into the capital. This 
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mushrooming of CSOs was helped by both the government‘s new tolerance of a 
civic voice and also donor support which made resources available for pet projects 
including democratisation, peacebuilding and gender. The government‘s gesture 
towards democracy also involved encouraging ‗the setting up of NGOs to compete 
against each other‘.161 This created a civil society too fragmented and weak to be 
effective.  In many cases, organisations had overlapping interests. For example: 
 
 the Association of War Affected Youths for Social Awareness and 
Community Development,   
 the Youth Movement for Peace and Non-Violence and  
 Youths for Sustainable Peace and Development in Sierra Leone   
 
Among the CSO‘s there were larger and influential networks or ‗umbrella‘ groups 
such as the Coalition of Civil Society and Human Rights Activists (representing 150 
organisations), the Network Movement for Justice and Development (NMJD),
162
 the 
Women‘s Forum, and the Civil Society Movement (CSM), some with a long history 
of activity in the country. The CSM, a high profile organisation based in Freetown, 
was famous for its interventions to negotiate peace with armed groups in the bush 
through its various member groups.
163
 Despite this multitude of CSOs, civil society 
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was mostly ineffective in holding government to account and the new flagship 
project of the British Government established in 2005 aimed to address this 
‗malfunction‘.   
Enhancing the interface between civil society and the state to improve poor 
peoples‘ lives (ENCISS) was a project set up by DfID in 2005 with a mandate quite 
similar to the already well established (in 1988) local organisation NMJD.
164
 
Launched with a budget of £5 million and a life of between three to five years, 
ENCISS was modelled on similar projects in ‗other countries‘ but garnered little 
support locally. Locals argued that the initiative was ‗never evaluated by civil 
society as a need‘ nor the conceptual framework shared with them; that ‗people were 
not allowed to buy into the agenda‘ which some felt was ‗imposed‘ upon them, and 
that this created strong resistance to it.
165
 ‗ENCISS is nothing but a white 
elephant‘.166 The animosity may have been influenced by the government‘s 
successful manipulation of the project which was originally designed to strengthen 
the demand side of governance not the supply side (ICG, 2008).
167
  This hostility 
was problematic because without a public ‗buy in‘ the project‘s participatory 
credentials were essentially nullified.
168
 Local respondents felt that, because they 
were not consulted, the project misunderstood local needs, and some felt that it had 
                                                                                                                                         
played a pivotal role in the peace negotiations they were slow to act as the war took hold, 
possibly because of their concentration in the Freetown area which was virtually untouched by 
the war until the mid 1990s, report by Conciliation Resources,  Sandi, R. and Fortune, F. (2005)  
Building links and sustaining momentum: reflections on track two roles in Sierra Leone accessed 
on 03/10/07 from http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/engaging-groups/sierra-leone.php  
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‗closed windows‘ for other avenues of funding.169 Three years on, the project was 
making little progress in Freetown although things were better in the provinces. The 
project failed to develop an effective strategy for state-society engagement and 
donors admitted that ‗greater attention at an earlier stage might have improved 
efforts to support the demand side of governance‘ (DfID, 2008, ICG, 2008). The 
analysis which follows involved consultations with various local CSOs to gain a 
deeper insight into their capacity to challenge or influence government, their 
relationship with donors, and the externally driven social engineering which was 
taking place in their country. 
The evidential base 
‗Civil society remains Freetown-centric, with limited ability to hold those in 
power to account. (EU, 2007a:10) 
‗There is little organised civil society that is not donor driven‘ anonymous staff 
member at ENCISS cited by ICG (2008) 
Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with representatives from a total of 
fifteen separate CSOs. The CSOs were chosen partly because of their credentials as 
organisations whose activities were linked to democracy, for example the Campaign 
for Good Governance, but also because of logistics during fieldwork i.e. their 
accessibility, availability and willingness to take part in the research, results of 
‗snowballing‘ activities and also, in one instance, pure chance. Most organisations 
contacted were willing to talk, there were some which didn‘t respond to messages 
but this could have been due to workload - the LAWCLA for example. The only 
respondent which refused access was the gatekeeper of the ACC who was very 
hostile to the research and requests for interview. The respondents represented an 
                                                 
169
 Personal interview with anonymous respondent, Freetown, March 2007 (C18) 
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eclectic group of local organisations and were not the subject of random sampling. 
They included two unions, two professional associations, one religious group and 
ten local organisations with democracy, HR or gender mandates. Several issues 
emerged as a result of this interview process, the most prominent being the practice 
of ‗skewing‘. 
Working the donors – skewing 
All organisations receiving adequate
170
 funding and/or technical assistance for their 
projects from external donors, had either activities directly of interest to externals 
(e.g. 50/50 Group),
171
 or had learnt how to ‗work‘ the donors by writing professional 
proposals in line with donors‘ agendas.172 There was a general consensus around the 
necessary ‗bureaucracy‘ and ‗politics‘ of bidding for funds; ‗you have to have some 
rapport between you and the people there‘.173 This had an impact on the type of 
activities local organisations could get involved in ‗some organisations just follow 
the trend ... they have priority issues but have to leave them out because they know 
what the donors are interested in‘,174 – democracy, human rights, youth, women, for 
example – and this criticism was also directed at the PRSPs themselves. ‗The 
country has to formulate strategies in a particular way which actually doesn‘t make 
sense to ordinary folks because they [the policies] are outside their sphere of 
existence‘.175 Liberal democracy itself was in a ‗parallel cosmos‘ for many locals 
                                                 
170
 ‗Adequate‘ is taken to mean enough funding to undertake some of the activities of concern to 
the organisations themselves. 
171
 A well established NGO set up to ensure 50/50 representation of men and women in 
government; gender equality is a key priority among the donor community and is also of great 
concern to locals, particular women. 
172
 6/6 respondents noted that they had learnt how to write the ‗right‘ proposals to secure 
funding. 
173
 Personal interview with anonymous CSO respondent, Freetown, 15/01/07 (C9) 
174
 Personal interview with Valnora Edwin, Campaign for Good Governance, Freetown, 
17/11/06 
175
 Personal interview with Janet Ebo, project director ENCISS, Freetown, March 2007 
 255 
 
whose lives continued as before, mostly dictated by the constraints of their poverty 
and traditional elites.  ‗Civil society work that is going on right now is mostly donor 
driven because the funds determine the issues‘ and intermediary INGOs had their 
favourites because ‗they secure funding for themselves through it.  Once there is 
money around the process people will [engage with the programming] but that 
doesn‘t mean it will have any value in the outcome‘.176   
Of those organisations who had not learnt how to work the donors, did not 
wish to work them or did not have the capacity to do so, very little support was 
coming their way other than ‗remnants‘ from other projects.  For example, the Sierra 
Leone Market Women‘s Association (SLMWA) had no capacity to bid for funding 
(despite its activities being directly relevant to the peace promises of Lomé and 
global agendas for peacebuilding and development, and its historic role in successful 
peacebuilding) but was assisted by CGG which redirected some of its own 
resources; for example, a small amount of office space.
177
 SLMWA had influence 
with large numbers of women across the country and the technical communication 
strategy used for mobilising this impressive group was ‗word of mouth passed 
around the markets‘.  The respondent said that she could not access funds direct 
from donors because she was not good at writing proposals and because the donors 
‗don‘t know our face‘.178 Local people certainly knew her face and her organisation 
advocated on women‘s issues across the country. Their main project involved 
educating women up and down the country in basic literacy and numeracy so that 
they could open bank accounts, access loans and understand basic account 
management in respect of income and expenditure. High illiteracy rates were 
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 Anonymous interview with CSO in Freetown, 27/11/06 (C8) 
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 Personal interview with Marie Bangura of the SLMWA in Freetown, March 2007 
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 ibid  
 256 
 
preventing women maximising their income earning potential and were making 
them vulnerable to exploitation. Some small amounts of funding had been allocated 
from the Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP)
179
 which had enabled 
SLMWA to put together a handbook to train 25 market women in the Western area, 
but additional funds to expand the project up country were not secured. The 
impression gained from the activities of SLMWA was that the organisation was 
getting a lot done despite a dearth of resources and ‗without support from donors 
with agendas‘ which would compromise its work.180    
There were some incidences of ‗no strings‘ funding which came from 
international bodies to specific CSOs. The Council of Churches, for example, 
accepted support from donors whose conditions were aligned with the local project 
but the organisation also garnered unconditional support from global Christian 
organisations.
181
 
There were CSOs working independently such as the Civil Society 
Alternative Process (CSAP-SL) which was ‗not actually an organisation but a 
platform on which we get the voiceless to stand up and speak‘, but it appeared that 
the government did not like what the voiceless had to say and to some extent, neither 
did the donors.
182
  Independence was highly prized by the director of this small 
organisation. 
                                                 
179
 Justice Sector Development Programme ‗1.2 The Goal of the JSDP is the improved safety, 
security and access to justice for the people of Sierra Leone. The purpose is to support the 
development of an effective and accountable Justice Sector that is capable of meeting the needs 
and interests of the people of Sierra Leone, particularly the poor, the vulnerable and the 
marginalised.‘ Available from http://www.britishcouncil.org/jsdp-project-memorandum.pdf, 
accessed on 18/08/09 
180
 Notes from fieldwork journal, March 2007 
181
 Personal interview with Kenmoore Salia, Council of Churches Sierra Leone, Freetown, 
November 2006 
182
 Personal interview Freetown, March 2007 
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An interesting example of ‗remnant‘ support involved the very well 
established and respected Women‘s Forum of Sierra Leone. An interview with its 
director revealed that by the time funding got to her (in this incidence to monitor the 
implementation of the PRSPs) it had been filtered through DfID, CARE, and 
ENCISS – a long (and costly) accountability chain. Denis Bright, Minister for Youth 
and Sports commented that there was even more filtering through additional 
‗committees‘ within the donor system and that he had ‗made a critique of this 
overwhelming bureaucratic structure ... I still don‘t understand the necessity for 
it‘.183  Despite being an effective organisation, the Women‘s Forum got little support 
because it did not have full time staff. This was due to women, with their extra 
burdens, being unable to commit time to the project, especially when it was unpaid. 
But because of the lack of staff donors would argue ‗we cannot entrust you with the 
money, you are not used to playing with… money like that. Who is going to do your 
accounts?‘ The irony was that money was not available for institutional capacity 
building. 
The people don‘t want to know what the donors want or don‘t want; all 
the people are interested in is a fair share of whatever they are entitled 
to (Rosalyn McCarthy, Women‘s Forum) 
Temporal – sustainability 
Another issue raised by some respondents was the sustainability of funding for their 
activities; the ENCISS project which had wasted a lot of time, money and resources 
simply in its set up, had an initial life span of three years when ‗this project should 
run for thirty‘,184 for example. Other CSOs operated ‗hand to mouth‘ with small 
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 Personal interview with Minister for Youth and Sport, Mr Denis Bright, Freetown, March 
2007 
184
 Personal interview with Jeannette Ebo, ENCISS, Freetown, March 2007 
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tranches of money or resources coming through sometimes on only six monthly time 
frames.
185
 Donor fatigue meant that eventually many CSOs could disappear, 
especially if they did not have flows of funding from their constituents to secure 
their local legitimacy (Pham, 2004). 
Social capital 
Strengthening civil society presupposed some degree of inherent social capital 
(Diamond, 1999), and interviews revealed that donors expected a certain amount of 
infrastructure and human capital within an organisation so that accountability could 
be secured and projects could have ‗integrity‘ before funding and other resources 
could flow. This necessarily excluded a lot of groups, such as the SLMWA, which 
had scarce resources and capacity, but which was representing grass roots interests 
and using local markets as communication channels rather than the internet. In this 
sense, ‗cherry picking‘ the CSOs meant that the  accountability nexus was aligned 
with donors rather than the communities that the CSOs served (Belloni, 2008), and 
‗professionalising‘ civil society involved redirecting crucial but scarce social capital 
from grass roots entrepreneurial activity.
186
 
Accountability nexus 
The skewed accountability nexus of externally driven CSOs did not help to 
consolidate democracy because civil society itself could not engage effectively with 
the government on accountability and policy deficits because they themselves were 
accountable to donors. Further, the government was accountable to the IFIs. This 
meant that the whole state/society relationship was systematically distorted in favour 
of external actors, and that neither was accountable to citizens. Attempts at 
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 Personal interview with Charlie Hughes, Forum for Democratic Initiatives, Freetown, March 
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state/society debates delivered through national radio were called to a halt as heated 
exchanges between knowledgeable civil society members and rather ignorant public 
officials resulted in acute embarrassment for the government. Many ministers and 
MPs held office out of patronage and therefore had ‗no particular value‘ to the 
populace and were no match for educated and committed civic society members.
187
 
Yet the failure of this excellent platform for debate illustrated the impotence of civil 
society to really engage with their government. 
A further fracture in the accountability chain was the civil society/broader 
society relationship. CSOs were ‗professionalised‘ as a result of increased and 
externally accountable resources which isolated them from the constituencies from 
which they had ‗derived both their legitimacy and dynamism‘ (Pham, 2004). Many 
became ‗top-down, Freetown-centred institutions dominated by the competing 
agendas of their leaders [and donors] rather than representing concerns on the street‘ 
(ibid).  
The new generation of CSO democrats could not be criticised for their 
enthusiastic response to donor agendas especially when there was some degree of 
confluence with local needs, but they were not the people to bring about radical 
reform of government and economic planning and did not represent the ‗new 
opposition‘ in the absence of any parliamentary oversight. Indeed, government 
ministers were somewhat dismissive of civil society as a democratic institution, 
failing to turn up at well organised national consultations with CSOs on issues such 
as African Union and NEPAD initiatives.
188
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 Personal interview with Charlie Hughes, Forum for Democratic Initiatives, Freetown, March 
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 See Press Release from Civil Society Alternative Process Sierra Leone (CSAP-SL) (2005) 
and available from http://www.nmjd.org/press%20releases/Press%20Statement%20(CSAP-
SL)%202005.pdf, accessed on 18/08/09 
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Profiteering/privileges 
International donor agencies consider civil society to be a benign realm separate 
from the state but there was evidence to show that this was not the case. ‗Some 
people in civil society used their position to garner favours from government‘; this is 
‗an utter violation‘ of the role of civil society.189 ‗Civil society is sycophantic 
because they have to survive‘. ‗People have spiders in their cupboard and cannot be 
outspoken for fear of the anti-corruption commission… which hangs like a sword of 
Damocles‘ over certain civil society activists‘.190  In some cases the same personnel 
worked for different CSOs.
191
 Far from being watchdogs, there were concerns that 
CSOs themselves had become part of the state apparatus and uncritical of the 
government (Pham, 2004). Under the patronage of the incumbent‘s vice-president, 
some ‗NGO elite‘, made up of local professionals, rose to prominence as managers 
of post-war reconstruction despite their dearth of relevant experience (ICG, 2008). 
Despite the undoubted success of indigenous civil society in the political history of 
Sierra Leone, the modern ‗civil society‘ had little impact as a mechanism to hold 
government to account or improve its performance.
192
  Because of this, the ‗illiberal‘ 
culture of political elites was allowed to prevail and flourish through the perversion 
of civil society.  
The evidential base indicates that CSOs in Sierra Leone spent too much time 
pleasing the donors on issues which were not grass roots driven and therefore with 
little local legitimacy, rather than rebuilding and mobilising their fractured 
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 Personal interview with anonymous respondent, Freetown, March 2007 (C9) 
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 Personal interview with Charles Margai, PMDC, Freetown, March 2007 
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 Personal interview with anonymous respondent, Freetown March 2007 (C9) 
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 It must be noted here that civil society played a very important role in democratic elections in 
the country; educating and sensitising voters on their political and civil rights, and working hard 
for peaceful, free and fair elections through monitoring and observation activities.  The NEC 
accredited 35 local organisations for this project – National Elections Watch (NEW) and the 
Council of Churches notable among them, see EUROPA (2007)  
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communities. At the same time the ‗professionalization‘ of civil society absorbed 
much of the country‘s social capital and channelled it towards the demands of the 
external constituency instead. Whilst funds were directed towards competent 
proposal and report writing exercises by professionalised CSOs, grass roots 
initiatives for peace and development were sidelined. The donors themselves held 
several assumptions: that such organisations were representative of the broader 
citizenry and could effectively challenge government on their behalf; that they were 
capable of mobilising ordinary citizens to demand better government; that they 
themselves were committed to democratic principles in their own internal 
organisation; and that they represented the needs and priorities of society‘s 
politically and economically marginalised (Hearn and Robinson, 2000:244). 
If civil society had failed in its tasks, was there a possibility that the broader 
citizenry could do the job instead? Civilian resistance was part of the political 
history of Sierra Leone and there remained a strong culture of group membership in 
the country, particularly the rural areas. In a survey, around 75% of respondents said 
they were members of one or more groups especially in the rural villages (IRCBP, 
2008b). These groups were not recognisable as the standard westernised version of 
NGOs because they were mostly informal in nature. The most well supported groups 
were religious groups with around 44% of respondents saying they were members; 
the average was lowest in Freetown (36%). Twenty nine per cent of respondents 
belonged to traditional society groups, 27% to women‘s groups and 23% to youth 
groups. There were also good levels of membership of farming and fishing groups, 
and school groups, with credit/savings groups being mostly patronised by women 
(ibid). These important grassroots groups should not be ignored as potential peace 
constituencies (Lederach, 1997). Mobilised, they could form a useful counterbalance 
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for political excess, especially at the local level where representation and 
accountability were brought into sharp relief by horizontal collective interests within 
and across wards.  
The motor-bike renters‘ association was an example of a grass roots group capable 
of effective ‗horizontal collective action‘ against heavy handed policing.  Supported 
by women traders (their main customers) riders used strikes and court actions to 
push for a fairer system and more inclusive society (Richards et al., 2004: 36). 
Student unions remained a strong group for change in the post-war era pushing 
through a change of policy during registration for the elections of 2007 to allow 
members from up country to return home to register.
193
 Grass roots women‘s groups, 
as already explained, were also successful in lobbying government for legislative 
change. 
A more useful definition of civil society as far as democratisation was 
concerned was therefore the horizontal, often interest based, grass roots associations 
who were a more legitimate representation of the broader citizenry, not dependent 
upon outside funding and the conditionalities attached to that, but formalised in an 
organic way. This definition of civil society gives the notion of participation and 
inclusivity some logic. There was already a functioning and strong civil society in 
Sierra Leone but not the type recognised by the liberal peacebuilding project which 
was artificially constructed to build the peace. 
in the final analysis, our interest in civil society and its potential will only be of 
use if it brings meaningful long-term change for the poor (Whaites, 2000) 
 
                                                 
193
 Telephone interview with Hassan Yarjah, President Student Union, University of Sierra 
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5.4 - MAKING ELITES DO THE RIGHT THING – IS THERE A CULTURE 
POLITIQUE?  
West African states failed to ‗establish institutions that are capable of 
constraining and outlasting the individuals who occupy their offices‘ (Jackson, 
1990: 22 and cited in Kandeh 2004b) 
The Commission holds the political elite of successive regimes in the post-
independence period responsible for creating the conditions for conflict (TRC, 
2004: para 18) 
There is no option but to address bad governance and corruption head on. It 
would not be an overstatement to say that the survival of the nation depends on 
the success of society in confronting these issues (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 3, 
Recommendations: 207).   
A democratic political culture was clearly essential for consolidating post-war 
democracy (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982, Lumumba-Kasongo, 2005, Ottaway, 2003, 
Taylor, 2007). Without consolidation, the rise of an ‗illiberal democracy‘ was 
possible which would challenge the appropriateness or relevance of the liberal 
model in Sierra Leone, and also the wisdom of cross-culture normative transfer of 
western ideas on social power relations (Zakaria, 1997, Ake, 1993). Yet, despite all 
the programming, legislation (Table 22, below) and concerted efforts by locals, the 
Sierra Leonean political elite remained wedded to their culture of patrimony and 
corruption.  
‗Traditional patterns of patronage and gift giving persist and… political power 
remains the surest route to wealth in the post-conflict period with its influx of 
aid‘ (Rose-Akerman, 2008).  
‗Good governance‘, according to any definition, remained elusive, yet patronage 
was not the exclusive domain of political elites and their CSO compatriots. There 
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was a similar culture among interventionists themselves who directed funds through 
a variety of different intermediaries in the long chain of aid delivery. This could also 
be described as a form of patrimony, albeit more transparent and ‗official‘. The issue 
still remained, was there a local political culture which could not be changed? 
Table 22 – ‘Good Governance’ legislation 
New legislation concerning the agenda for Good Governance 
The Audit Services Act 1997 
The Anti-Corruption Act 2000 
The Bank of Sierra Leone Act 2000 
The Income Tax Act 2000 
The National Commission for Social Action Act 2001 
The National Social Security and Insurance Trust Act 2001 
The Independent Media Act 2002 
The National Revenue Authority Act 2002 
The National Commission for Privatisation Act 2002 
The New Revised Civil Service Code 2004 
The Local Government Act 2004 
The Government Budgeting and Accountability Act 2004 
The Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone Act 2004 
 
The debate about corruption, political will and bad practice taps into the wider 
argument that Africa was unsuitable for democratisation. It was the case that neo-
patrimonialism remained the only institutionalised model on the continent not 
weakened by external interventions (de Walle, 2005, Fatton, 1992, Barongo, 1983, 
Zakaria, 1997). Because colonial legacies of indirect rule and divisive ethnic 
practices prevailed, multi-partysm became an institutional façade to attract foreign 
aid (Diamond, 1989).  Certainly, it is true that reciprocal practices were central to 
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politics in Sierra Leone and that economic decisions were often likely to be 
‗embedded in the relations of affection‘ (Hyden, 1990: 254). Traditional politics 
such as these rather stymied the democratic process but Sierra Leoneans themselves 
are ambivalent towards corruption:   
Battling corruption is not as simple as monitoring projects and improving 
documentation. It is a deep cultural phenomenon that will entail 
revolutionizing approaches and social norms. (Brima Karl Samura) 
194
 
It is a societal problem. It is the mentality of the people. They need to 
understand what corruption really is. This information should be ritual in the 
schools, in the universities – so that children should be able to tell policeman 
that they see taking a bribe ‗don‘t do that‘; and they will have to justify what 
they are doing. [original emphasis] (Denis Bright, SLPP Minister for Youth 
and Sport) 
A survey of attitudes confirmed that corruption was viewed as a general feature of 
life often necessary to access basis services, and carry out normal business when 
holding public office.
195
 In a survey conducted in 2000, the majority of respondents 
(around 94%) indicated that corruption was rampant in most government 
departments and government agencies.
196
 43% of respondents from a group of 
public officials admitted that members of the public had to pay bribes to access 
services from their institutions and over 60% of public service users confirmed that 
they had paid bribes (Konteh et al., 2002). This culture was not confined to domestic 
activities, foreign investors were commonly asked for bribes to secure licences, 
permits or public services (ibid: 2). After decentralisation, 48% of respondents said 
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 See The Monitor, official Newsletter of the Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Programme, 
Vol.31, October 2008 available from www.slcmp.org, accessed on 21/01/09 
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 GovSL National Anti-Corruption Strategy (2005) cited by Thomson (2007:21) 
196
 Source - Anti-corruption Survey (Sierra Leone) 2000. National Reform Secretariat, Freetown 
cited in Governance and Corruption Survey at 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/206579/sl_gacreport.pdf 
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they expected local officials to take all or most of the project money, 26% said they 
expected them to take a little money but do a good job and only 9% had complete 
confidence in the integrity of their officials (IRCBP, 2008). 
Western ideals of transparency and democracy in the exercise of political 
agency is absent in the day to day normal functioning of Sierra Leonean society. 
Openness and honesty are generally considered to be undesirable qualities, 
bordering on idiocy, in a society where ‗ambivalence‘ is highly prized as a political 
tool (Ferme, 2001). The ‗verbal artistry‘ evident in elite rhetoric in contemporary 
Sierra Leone represents the cultural and historic value put on ambiguity. Ferme 
describes this as a ‗cultural idiom of indirectness‘ where ‗the effective use of 
ambiguity has been - and continues to be - more productive that the pursuit of social 
ideals of transparency‘ (Ferme, 2001: 2). This notion of ‗neo-patrimonialism‘ 
condones ‗natural abuse‘ of the system (Therkildsen, 2005).  
This ambivalence extended beyond the reach of the state because the large 
amounts of reconstruction funding fed into the patronage system attracted limited 
admonishment by the international community. Despite substantial evidence of 
continued and blatant bad practice, donors did not withdraw funding or hold elites to 
account. Flows were ‗delayed‘ but not suspended. The EC delayed, but did not 
withhold, flows over concerns about procurement practices and stability of the 
macro-economic framework. Instead, the government was offered and received a 
25% bonus incentive for renewed commitments to good governance.
197
 In the 
modern age where elites engage on an international stage with global actors and 
depend upon the international system to support national recovery, democratic 
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principles are widely understood and commitments are made to them. Neo-
patrimonialism is as much a bad habit as a culture politique.   
5.5 - CONCLUDING STATEMENT 
At first glance, post-war democratisation appeared to have gained real traction but, 
in the outcome it was a shallow exercise on several counts. In the absence of any 
effective mechanisms of accountability, the ambition to bring meaningful 
democracy to Sierra Leone was futile even though free, fair and peaceful multi-party 
elections were remarkably efficient in changing government and a great success for 
the country and its partners. Although space for participation grew considerably, the 
result of concerted efforts by the international community and locals to embed 
political tolerance and security into the body politic, participation was stifled by the 
weakness of political parties, a dysfunctional judiciary and inutile parliament, and 
‗bad attitude‘ among governing elites. A ‗co-opted‘ civil society represented the new 
entrepreneurs in the reconstruction project, somewhat detached from their grass 
roots base and the needs of the local community. The positive advances were 
therefore overshadowed by the delusory nature of democracy being constructed in 
the country. Without a responsive government and a truly collaborative relationship 
between citizen and state, the democratisation project was in danger of losing 
legitimacy. Participation without representation, or accountability, was not 
dissimilar to the political process of old.  
What was different in the post-war era, however, was the decentralisation of 
government. Although this development was still in its infancy, there was some 
evidence to suggest that bringing government closer to the people gave them an 
improved sense of ownership and increased their levels of tolerance for poor 
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performance. This was because the demand side of government was stimulated, and 
localised elites brought meaning to accountability. Decentralisation also brought 
more opportunities for women to engage in politics, and locals greatly welcomed the 
opportunity to use their own skills and knowledge in community initiatives for 
development under the RRI. Prevailing patrimonial practices, however, meant that 
devolution of authority and resources opened up further opportunities for corruption, 
and co-option of the restored chieftaincy system resurrected tensions of old and 
created new friction among local elites vying for supremacy in the provinces. 
Continuing bad practice both centrally and locally was a blatant perversion of the 
peacebuilding project, but the culture politique was not likely to change because 
there was little political will to change it. The process appeared to have produced 
politicians and officials who generally continued to serve themselves, not the 
general populace, and this was illustrated by the re-emergence of the kind of 
political violence reminiscent of the past (White, 2000: 84, Kandeh, 2002, 
Christensen and Utas, 2008). What exactly was it about Sierra Leone that suggested 
multi-party liberal democracy could work well? 
The politicisation of ethnicity through multiparty politics – which had failed 
dramatically in the past – added to the multiple fractures already of concern for the 
nation building project. Multi-party politics necessarily involved ‗elite 
fragmentation‘ and winner-takes-all scenarios, rather than collaborative relationships 
across ethnicities to secure a durable peace. Efforts to reign in executive excess 
through the ACC and through new legislation were outstandingly unsuccessful. This 
was because the system of patrimonialism required weakened accountability 
mechanisms, not strong ones, and an informalised state to accommodate bad 
practice (Branch and Cheeseman, 2009).   
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Liberal democracy in the context of post-war Sierra Leone did not conflate 
well with local conditions, local culture or local need and serious issues about 
accountability were present at every level, both domestic and international. The 
behaviour of elites, historic structures and weak institutions contrived to strangle and 
subvert the progress of democracy, whilst democratisation made little impact on the 
ideals of ownership and participation by the masses.  
Chapter five has challenged the rationale of conflating democracy with 
interventionist politics because of the potential distortions an external constituency 
has on national responses to local citizenry. This issue does not help the central 
challenge of accountability in government. Chapter six now presents an analysis of 
the impact of post-conflict reforms on the social dimensions of recovery to 
determine how the new state faired in reinventing its relationship with the populace 
and constructing a new social contract. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE NEW STATE AND ITS CITIZENS 
Between the ambitions of the elite and the survival strategies of the masses, the 
state often appears to survive essentially as a show, a political drama with an 
audience more or less willing to suspend its disbelief.  (Holsti, 1996:145) 
Chapters three, four and five have challenged the wisdom of imposing externally 
constructed solutions for building peace and a new state because of their inflexibility 
to address the central challenges for peace locally, and because they impose an 
unmanageable burden on a weak state with few resources.  
If the newly constructed state was not working well in terms of local 
objectives for peace – failing to redistribute resources, create jobs, or consolidate 
democracy, for example – what did this mean for the general populace who were 
expecting some form of peace dividend from the reconstruction project? What did 
the reforms do for the new relationship between the state and its citizens, 
particularly the most vulnerable and marginalised groups? We now know that the 
country‘s political and war history prescribed a radical change post-conflict in both 
leadership behaviour and governance performance to secure the best chance of 
durable peace, so how did the reforms play out in terms of peoples‘ expectations and 
experiences after the war? What happened to the local priorities for peace? 
 The purpose of chapter six is to tackle these questions and throw some light 
on the possible longer term impact of Sierra Leone‘s programme of structural 
reforms, and explore alternative systems which might be better suited to local 
conditions and the local challenges for peace. The first section explains the nature of 
the new political process and how it affected the previously problematic relationship 
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between the state and its populace. In particular, the focus is on participation, 
representation and human rights to explain how marginalised groups were brought 
into the political process and how their interests were served. Section 6.2 analyses 
the nature of the new state to determine the impact of new structures on governance 
objectives as far as people were concerned, and there follows an analysis of what 
alternative governing structures would perhaps do a better job. Finally, there is a 
discussion about the possible consequences of structural reform on longer term 
peace in the country and the chapter then returns to the notion of the so called 
‗liberal peace‘ to analyse its usefulness as a template for recovery after war. 
 The concluding statement brings the work together to summarise the 
arguments and the central issues. Here is a reminder of the local priorities for peace: 
Figure 21 – The ‘framework for peace’ 
 
6.1 THE NATURE OF THE POST-WAR POLITICAL PROCESS 
Repairing state/citizen relations 
This work has thus far evidenced that what Sierra Leone needed for post-war 
recovery and the consolidation of peace was good government, not a disconnected 
notion of ‗good governance‘ constructed from outside. This supports one of the 
central arguments in this thesis that solutions for a peaceful nation cannot be 
predetermined external to the locale. The preoccupation of the international 
Good leadership and good governance 
Economic 
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community in the reconstruction was to associate free and fair elections and the 
accompanying accoutrements of democracy with ‗good governance‘ - but this did 
not equate to effective, efficient, or accountable government in the outcome. This 
remained a challenge for longer term peace. 
Representation 
The return to multi-party democracy was a welcome development for local 
citizens and a great advantage for the international community because elections 
legitimised the government it was doing business with. Elections did not legitimise 
the political process, however, because of the absence of any effective mechanisms 
for representation or accountability, mechanisms taken as a given in a functioning 
democratic polity. This failure was particularly pertinent given the inherent 
behaviour of the political elite, who could not be trusted. What use was 
representative democracy or changes of government when there were no 
mechanisms to control the conduct of the political elite, whoever got into power? 
The country‘s ineffective institutions - parliament, political parties, civil society and 
the judiciary – made notions of representation rather delusory. Failures to address 
the archaic and dysfunctional justice system in particular consolidated the common 
sense of prolonged injustice and persistent detachment of the general populace from 
politics. Nation building was to be about ‗the rule of law rather than the rule of men‘ 
(Ignatieff, 2003: 113), but what people got was the continued rule of men who could 
not be trusted.  
Representation was an issue in the presence of a very powerful external 
constituency which tended to smother the local voice. Exporting the country‘s 
wealth did not help ensure that poor and marginalised mining communities received 
their fair share of revenues from diamond extraction, for example (although it is 
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acknowledged that capacity issues and the decisions of local elites were also 
significant factors in this). Local citizens were somewhat squeezed out of the 
political sphere by more powerful representations. Local and global elites, and local 
and global structures, determined that ordinary citizens were once again left without 
a state which was responsive to their needs.  
Justice 
This sense of helplessness and injustice compounded the negative 
experiences of ordinary people which they had experienced during the difficult years 
of the previous APC regime. Where were the new mechanisms to heal the historic 
cleavage between state and society, and to conjoin the political domain with the 
social? How could the relationship between state and citizens be reconciled when 
justice was elusive to the majority, when elites were not accountable and there was 
no real chance of changing the culture politique any time soon? Securing durable 
peace with no access to justice, the central human right, was deeply problematic 
(Abraham, 2004b, Cheru, 2002: 218). It cannot be stressed strongly enough the 
importance of justice for longer term peace and stability in Sierra Leone. For a 
population which had experienced mass abuse of human rights throughout the war 
and indeed throughout independence history – by fellow citizens and its own 
government – this was the most fundamental of rights for citizens who had accepted 
a peace deal which included blanket amnesties for the perpetrators of mass crimes 
committed against them. Without a functioning justice system, what was to stop 
further abuse by criminals who knew they could get away with it because impunity 
was their reward (TRC, 2004)? 
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Civil society 
Not only had citizens little control over their elected representatives once in 
office, their part in the decision making process appeared to be somewhat distorted 
by the agenda for reconstruction being imposed from outside. There was some 
evidence of this in the activities of the ‗revived‘ civil society whose representations 
reflected some degree of co-option into donors‘ agendas - not necessarily their own, 
or not necessarily those of the broader citizenry. This was a predetermined definition 
of what the public good should be that was brought in from outside and worked 
around in discussions with the local stakeholders.  
The advances in political rights and civil liberties (Table 23) were stymied 
by the character of the government in office and the realities of ordinary life. 
Table 23 – Progress on political rights and civil liberties in Sierra Leone (selected 
years)  
 
 2002 2005 2009 
Political Rights 4 4 3 
Civil Liberties 5 3 3 
 
Freedom House scores political rights and civil liberties on a scale of 1-7 where 1 equals most free and 7 equals 
least free: data sourced from Freedom House, 
http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=166&year=2002, accessed on 28/08/09 
 
 Multi-party democracy 
To add to this distortion, empirical evidence suggests that the model of democracy 
which was advanced in the post-war period might even have been an impediment to 
sustainable peace. This was because multi-party politics constituted a contest 
between competing elites whose modus operandi was to marshal block votes 
through regional or ethnic ties and other patrimonial systems – in the style of old - 
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the purpose being to capture the benefits of state office for the advantage of 
themselves and their supporters. It is the case that political ethnicity, or 
patrimonialism, ‗softens the state‘ - not strengthens it. This is because the state 
becomes ‗malleable‘ when governing elites make compromises to look after their 
clients (Kandeh, 1992: 83). After the elections of 2007, for example, 80% of the 
bureaucracy was changed in order to put in place civil servants sympathetic to the 
APC with all the negative consequences of lost skills, lost knowledge and expertise, 
some of which had been built up through external support in the post-war re-build as 
part of ‗capacity building‘ (World Bank, 2009). ‗Speaking the same language‘ was 
an important pre-requisite for holding office at all levels; when the new 
administration took over President Koroma appointed his first cousin Edmund 
Koroma to head the Finance Ministry and his elder sister Admire Koroma as a major 
government contractor.
198
 
This was a throwback to colonial practices; an elitist, higher strata, winner 
takes all conceptualisation of democracy which had little respect for egalitarian 
principles. In the outcome, multipartyism was not the mechanism for inclusivity as 
multiple fractures remained, and some deepened. Previously marginalised groups 
such as intellectuals, labourers, rural communities and grass roots workers, students, 
women, and the youth continued to struggle for a voice and yet the most salient new 
fracture emerging from the democratic process was that of ethnicity. This was a sop 
to disguise the real method of doing politics – patronage. ‗Crossing the floor‘ 
remained a common practice – not usually the norm in ethnically divided societies. 
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The multiplicity of discontent was submerged beneath phantom ethnic politics but 
tangible class alliances. 
This scenario had not changed from the situation in the immediate 
independence period when political parties aligned around regional or class ties, not 
the issues associated with effective multi-party democracy more commonly found in 
the industrialised nations where groups associate around other interests. Not only 
were the cultural and historic conditions in the country somewhat inhospitable to the 
formation of western type party politics, but the post-war conditions and dearth of 
all resources meant that the construction of a true multi-party polity was unlikely 
anyway. Weak institutions, elitism in politics, a fragile economy and lack of 
accountability mechanisms, corrupt politicians and low levels of development meant 
that party politics was perhaps most likely to result in winner takes all privatisation 
of the state (Makinda, 1996).  
Local people were not going to get good government this way because they 
remained disconnected from the levers of powers instead of being the nation‘s 
political powerhouse themselves. The issue for peace was that multipartyism was 
emerging as a catalyst for ethnic tensions as new fractures were accommodated in 
the model for reconstruction as well as the old, and political elites remained wedded 
to their traditional networks of support and cronyism. After the change of 
government in 2007, the cabinet, bureaucracy and security sector were 
systematically realigned with the governing party in similar ways of the Margai, 
Stevens and Momoh regimes (Alie, 2006: 24).  
Healing Society 
The issue of reparations illustrated the attitude of political elites to the citizens who 
elected them to govern. The Lomé Accord promised a Special Fund for War Victims 
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(Article XXIX) and this was recommended by the TRC-R, but by 2009 this had still 
not materialised. The National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA) started up as 
a government ministry in 1996, and in 2006 was appointed as the implementing 
agency for reparations (Alie, 2008). By December 2008 the government‘s 
reparations program was yet to start and, by 2009, war victims were still 
complaining and deeply resentful that the perpetrators of the mass atrocities were 
better off than they were (Sesay and Suma, 2009).
199
 In February 2009 war victims 
signed up to receive their reparations from a new tranche of money allocated to the 
United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, a sum of $3 million, which had been granted by 
the international community in the absence of commitment by the national 
government to set up the Special Fund. This involved indignity and trauma for the 
victims who had photographs taken of their wounds and had to recount the terrifying 
incidents which they had experienced.
200
 Women who had been gang raped or 
worked as bush wives or sex slaves or had been subjected to other sexual violence 
would have particular difficulties going through this process yet women were 
acknowledged as the group that suffered the most as a result of the conflict and their 
welfare was to be a priority in the peacebuilding project (Lomé, Article XXXIII (2)). 
In the outcome, the interests of this group were generally ignored.
201
  
The political economy of peace came at a high price for some local citizens 
because the issue of reparations was ‗no longer of prime concern for economic 
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 March 2008. Available from 
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reconstruction‘ (Castillo, 2008: 25). Despite claims by government that they were 
addressing the issues, amputees were ostracised and stigmatised by their 
communities and this made the long wait for reparations even more distressing and 
humiliating (Ovadiya, 2009).
202
 The process was not designed to support the very 
people who bore the brunt of the violent excesses perpetrated during the war (King, 
2006, Amnesty International, 2009, Sesay and Suma, 2009), and there were reports 
of victims being antagonised by their attackers who considered themselves to be 
immune from justice because they had benefited from the crimes they had 
committed, in many cases receiving access to education, cash, tools, or training.
203
 
Ex-combatants were assisted by the national government and international 
community through DDR programming which started less than six months after the 
signing of the Lomé Accord, yet their victims remained ignored nine years on. 
National reconciliation involves the equal redistribution of resources and 
effective mechanisms for grievances and reparations for violence (Castillo, 2008: 
270), yet there were virtually no mechanisms for transitional justice despite strong 
recommendations by the TRC. Given the weaknesses of the TRC as a mechanism 
for reconciliation and forgiveness, its longer term recommendations for justice and 
reparations were of paramount importance for sustainable peace (Sesay, 2007). 
the ‗primary cancer‘ in our case may be and was and will always be grave 
social injustice and the desperate desire to deprive the less fortunate in 
society…whilst the ‗secondary infection‘ is the …savage conflict which has 
eroded and deprived victims‘ knowledge of good and evil. Learning to uphold 
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and administer justice fairly and fearlessly is the major therapy to that trauma 
(Momoh, 2002: 25) 
In the post-war, abuse against women continued with around 67% being the victims 
of domestic violence in 2008. There were even fears that the incidence of rape was 
higher in peacetime than during the war and often involved ex-combatants (IRIN, 
2009, IRIN, 2008). Rape is stigmatised in Sierra Leone, usually blamed on women 
and girls themselves for ‗provoking‘ the men, but often rape is committed by 
‗father‘ figures; teachers, uncles, or community leaders.204 Very high levels of 
teenage pregnancies contribute to the low levels of girls in secondary education and 
although sexual violence against women and girls prevailed on a very serious scale 
in the post-war, this group experienced persistent barriers to justice (Dale, 2007). 
This was not helped by the fact that rape is not generally considered a serious crime 
in Sierra Leonean culture; there is no such thing as rape in marriage for example, 
and most perpetrators get away with their crimes. Just 13 out of 896 alleged 
attackers received a conviction in 2007 (IRIN, 2008). These cultural attitudes 
towards women were somewhat influential in by-passing the needs of women and 
girls involved in the conflict in the DDR programming, and their stigmatisation, and 
also the difficulties they faced being reintegrated to their communities or making a 
living (Coulter, 2009). 
Despite the rhetoric on gender equality and the Gender Laws passed in 2007: 
women face extensive legal and de facto discrimination, as well as limited 
access to education and formal employment. Women‘s status under customary 
law is equal to that of minors… Sierra Leone‘s maternal mortality rate is the 
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highest in the world and a recent UN study found that there were just six 
obstetricians in the entire country. 
205
  
Women‘s representation in government remained weak and there was little evidence 
to suggest that the legal position of females in political and social life would be 
improved given the government‘s history on implementing reform (EU, 2007). 
Reforms to the electoral system had not improved the number of female candidates 
nominated in the elections of 2007, for example, when only 11% of political party 
candidates were women (EU, ibid). Despite the promises made by government to 
support women, in the outcome, there was little evidence to show that this was the 
case. 
It is doubtful whether the PRSP projects have really contributed to addressing 
women‘s longer-term poverty needs. This is because of inadequate provision of 
funds to serve the majority of poor women. With regard to micro-credit, 
interest rates are high and many women do not access the funds.  
Even though gender issues were included in the planning process of the PRSP, 
they were approached in a fragmented manner in the body of the PRSP which 
deals with priorities and budgetary commitments. 
206
 
New legislation to protect children was enacted in the post-war period including the 
Anti-Human Trafficking Act (2005) and the Child Rights Act (2007) but in 2008 the 
International Committee on the Rights of the Child urged the government to act 
upon and implement this legislation (CRC, 2008).
207
 Reports on child labour in the 
mining industry suggested that the government was not taking child protection 
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seriously despite the terrible consequences of a ‗lost generation‘ of children and the 
country‘s historic legacy of mass child abuse (TRC, 2004: Vol.2, Chapter 3, 
Recommendations: 377-379). Child labourers in alluvial diamond mining were a 
persistent feature in the post-war, living and working in difficult and often 
dangerous conditions, exploited for their labour with little reward for themselves or 
their families (Boas and Hatloy, 2006). Yet little action was taken by government 
against the individuals who employed children to work in the mines.
208
 This was 
described as ‗a major post-conflict problem and a threat to social stability‘ by the 
NMJD which monitored mining activities.
209
  
The rehabilitation and reintegration of former child soldiers was not a great 
success story either. Mostly marginalised from the DDR because of the stigma 
attached to child combatants and the ‗mismanagement‘ and ‗false promises‘ of the 
process itself, many children missed out on any benefits this may have brought them 
and the situation was particularly acute for girls. This meant that children often 
reverted to a life of crime or prostitution (Denov, 2005). Former child combatants in 
Sierra Leone are now the youth of the nation. 
Post-war programmes did not succeed in adequately addressing the 
challenges and concerns of the country‘s youth, and this group was still to be given a 
meaningful voice ten years on from the Lomé Accord. The rural youth, for example, 
remained exposed to archaic traditional practices and would possibly never have a 
meaningful voice as long as they remained poor and unemployed. Given the ease of 
recruitment by rebel forces and government forces of disenfranchised youth in the 
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city and the countryside, this was a serious failing by both government and their 
external supporters, and remains a challenge for sustainable peace. A ministry for 
Youth and Sports was set up but there were no consultations between the 
government and the youth to find out what the priority areas in youth rehabilitation 
programmes should be; although skills training schemes were made available such 
as carpentry and tailoring, etc. they were not necessarily the preferred areas for 
youth empowerment or employment (Sesay, 2007: 51/52). The impact of 
unemployment on youth is often hunger, disease, and a return to anti-social 
behaviour (Machel, 1996) and, in the outcome, youth initiatives failed to capture or 
convince hard-core ex-combatants who preferred to be recruited by unscrupulous 
elites for election ‗campaigning‘ (Christensen and Utas, 2008). Ex-combatants were 
also recruited as bodyguards and security advisers in the new government (ICG, 
2007). There remains the question of whether or not economic liberalisation can 
prevent a net financial loss for ex-combatants in peace time (Keen, 2008). Certainly 
there were problems reintegrating certain members of the armed factions back into 
their communities and, again, little support was offered to women and girl ex-
combatants (Sesay and Suma, 2009; Peters, 2006; Coulter, 2009). The problem 
wasn‘t helped by the dire economic situation and the failures in job creation, and 
there were concerns that lack of employment opportunities could result in a renewed 
‗zero-sum‘ mentality among ex-combatants who failed to recognise any benefits of 
peace such as improved livelihoods, education, housing, health or food security 
(Cheru, 2002: 207, Steenkamp, 2009) 
There remained great injustices after the war; large disparities between rural 
and urban populations, marginalised groups such as women, youth and the disabled, 
and an emerging threat of the politicisation of ethnicity. In sum, the new political 
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process had failed to contribute to the nation building project by helping to heal the 
wounds of its troubled society, by securing the interests of marginalised groups, and 
by building a relationship of trust between the new state and its citizens. 
Peace and reconstruction are best achieved by addressing social injustices ‗it 
encompasses the entrenching of respect for human rights and political 
pluralism and the elimination of economic injustice‘ (Cheru, 2002) 
Given the evidence presented above, the post-war priority to protect and 
respect Human Rights seems to have largely been ignored. The setting up of a 
Human Rights Commission was promised in the Lomé Accord for no later than 90 
days after the signing of the Agreement but eventually materialised in 2006 and was 
operationalised in 2007.
210
 The experiences of many citizens strongly support the 
findings that the area of Human Rights was a ‗Cinderella‘ of reform even though 
this was a crucial priority for peace. Despite increased political tolerance, peoples‘ 
experiences living day to day lives in Sierra Leone were hardly different from those 
of the pre-war; for women, things had deteriorated. Structural violence - extreme 
economic inequality, discrimination and denial of basic rights (including jobs) 
remained the norm (Galtung, 1969). So far, the framework for peace seemed to be as 
remote an aspiration as it was at the onset of war as the challenges for peace 
remained. 
6.2 THE NATURE OF THE POST-WAR STATE 
This work has evidenced that what Sierra Leone needed for post-conflict recovery 
and consolidation of peace was contextually specific different governance, not a 
notion of ‗good governance‘ based on existing structures and western ideals which 
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had not worked in the past. Rebuilding existing structures, albeit with a new focus 
on decentralisation, meant that the characteristics which defined the new state were 
quite similar to those of the old, in this case weak, dominated by predatory elites, 
disconnected from the populace, under-developed and unevenly developed, over-
centralised with an economy based on extractive industries and weak agricultural 
policies, and decision making constrained by global actors and global structures.  
In sum, the shape and nature of the post-war state was unnervingly similar to 
that of the pre-war. Power remained too centralised, with marginalised rural areas 
and disenfranchised groups. Politics remained elite led and the economy remained 
centred on primary resource extraction - the profits from which were mostly 
exported. The impact of modern politics and liberalising economics on the new 
relationship between state and most citizens was hardly noticeable. It must be 
remembered that the successes of the liberalising reforms - new and open political 
space, and greatly enhanced civil and political freedoms - raised expectations among 
the populace that the relationship would indeed noticeably change.  
The problem with promoting and imposing a set of liberalising reforms 
within existing structures of governance is that it produces a narrow and myopic 
conceptualisation of a peaceful state with little room for creative thinking about 
alternative governing structures or political processes. Too many assumptions are 
made. For example, the notion of ‗good governance‘ is premised on a unified state, 
with adequate capacity, with functioning institutions, an hospitable political culture, 
and an economy which could integrate into the global system. Sierra Leone was 
therefore not an obvious candidate for this package for reconstruction. To many 
citizens living in Sierra Leone, especially in the rural areas, the state is quite 
irrelevant in their day to day lives because they generally have to fend for 
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themselves in very basic ways instead of relying on state support; the most simple of 
tasks like getting to market, for example, or accessing potable water.  
In the absence of important pre-requisites for liberal democracy, would a 
different model be more appropriate when constructing the new state? A model 
which could perhaps support local priorities and address the challenges for building 
peace? 
A new, new state 
Chopra and Hohe argue that citizenship can only have meaning if local 
communities and their power holders are integrated into central government 
structures but this is a lengthy process, more challenging in post-conflict environs 
(Chopra and Hohe, 2004: 245-246). In the meantime, during transitions, elections 
take place allowing patrons and their cronies to get into power (ibid). ‗Sequencers‘ 
might argue that national elections and central institution building should be delayed 
whilst mechanisms for genuine popular participation are built at the local level. 
Strengthening the grass roots first might foster a degree of downward accountability 
and legitimacy so essential for the peace. This type of participation would be 
meaningful for Sierra Leoneans because it would cultivate a participatory form of 
governance more relevant to their histories and local power structures although fresh 
thinking would be required in terms of how to absorb traditional leadership into the 
new structures rather than them being part of the constellations of entrenched 
patrimonial power (Jackson, 2007, Fanthorpe, 2005, Meyer, 2007).  
The divide between central institutions and citizens in Sierra Leone remains 
enormous, so what systems could more effectively target and absorb marginalised 
groups into the political process in a form of holistic integration (Chopra and Hohe, 
2004). How could the social contract be reconstructed and solidified to prevent 
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uneven shares of resources and the marginalisation of certain groups, and help to 
ensure a sustainable peace (Addison and Murshed, 2001); a social contract which 
would treat ‗all individuals equally and give [opportunities] to develop their 
capacities securely‘ (Held, 1996: 57 citing, Rousseau, 1968: 60)?  It is possible that 
the average citizen in Sierra Leone is not ‗as interested in all the decisions made at 
national level as [s]he would be in those made nearer home‘ (Pateman, 1970: 110), 
so could more localised governance do better in generating confidence among 
marginalised groups and the general electorate, even when things weren‘t going so 
well in terms of service delivery or development?  
Some evidence from the data suggests that this may be so. Maintaining peace 
at the community level would impact on national security because involving the 
whole community, including traditionally excluded groups such as women and 
youth, is key to sustaining the peace (Hanson-Alp, 2007), especially when they are 
backed up with targeted resources. Bringing a participatory and genuinely inclusive 
form of governance into the locale would give people a sense of ‗something 
happening‘, even if progress was slow and the challenges great. This form of 
governance, prioritised from the beginning, could function alongside re-emerging 
state institutions but would be more relevant for local people. 
Greater participation in decision making at the local level might also have 
the benefit of radically changing the context of national politics; for example, greater 
accountability of local councillors to their communities may have the effect of 
increasing confidence among the electorate and the participation of grass roots 
community groups would bring horizontal accountability to governance (Richards et 
al., 2004). This could transfer to the national level. When governance is close to the 
populace and more accessible to them, political skills tend to improve among grass 
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roots organisations and local power holders. Citizens become better placed to judge 
the performance of their representatives on both local issues and national issues and 
this has a positive effect on politics emerging at the national level (Held, 1996: 269 
citing, Pateman, 1970). It would also assist in breaking down the urban/rural 
disparities and inequalities by weakening politics at the centre and empowering local 
representatives. Perhaps this would help the reconstruction of the social contract to 
prevent uneven shares of resources, the urban elite bias, and the marginalisation of 
certain groups, and this would help support the local priorities for peace (Addison 
and Murshed, 2001). This egalitarian redistribution could enhance the nation 
building project because there would be greater potential to reallocate resources and 
prevent the sense of injustice among rural communities and marginalised groups. 
Infrastructure into the provinces may also improve because power holders would be 
based there and links to rural areas would become more important to legitimise 
government and support new governance structures.  
This work has argued that statebuilding is not peacebuilding unless something 
radical changes in the structure of the state. Real commitment to local governance 
and a move away from the centre is one possible change; a switch to non-partisan 
democracy is another. There are bad memories of single party governance in Sierra 
Leone after the model of politics as imposed by the previous APC regime. Yet, 
considering the façade of multi-party politics in the country and the potential it had 
to ignite tensions, perhaps a different one party system, or no-party system, would 
help more in the short to medium term by encouraging a sense of common purpose 
among all citizens, and their representatives. 
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Giving citizens a stake in governance 
Earlier evidence indicated the realities of life in post-war Sierra Leone for ordinary 
citizens and the attitude of many political elites towards the average voter. The 
economic situation in the country was a major contributing factor to this 
unsatisfactory interpretation of democracy because mass unemployment in the 
formal sector meant that the majority of the citizenry did not actually have any 
monetary investment in the state through their taxation. Why should government 
respect their wishes when they were not contributing to national coffers like the 
donors were? ‗No representation, no taxation‘ worked in reverse here when looked 
at from the government‘s point of view. This was a serious consequence of 
unemployment and the structure of the national economy, and a worrying dynamic 
for democracy because the lack of citizen ‗buy in‘ meant reduced legitimacy of their 
claims on government.  
Liberalising the economy brought growth but no jobs. This was a major 
challenge for the post-conflict reconstruction. Not only was the wealth of the 
country being exported in debt repayments but taxation opportunities were stymied 
by high unemployment and low private investment. Peace was compromised by 
such large numbers of people with nothing in particular to do but brood over their 
predicament. Among this group were previous child soldiers, skilled in warfare and 
terrorising tactics, psychologically disturbed and traumatised, and living with 
diminished expectations (Denov, 2005).  
Post-war job creation seemed to be a challenge too huge to overcome and 
theorising about positive correlations between growth and economic opportunities 
was acutely inaccurate, and the dearth of employment opportunities took its toll on 
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the process of reintegration of ex-combatants where it mostly failed to provide 
sustainable livelihoods (Klem and Douma, 2008, Denov, 2005). 
 Although liberalisation was in its infancy and capacity was low, there was 
no evidence from the data that this method of economic restructuring would bring 
about jobs any time sooner or later because the environment for private investment 
so was unattractive and IFI demands to contract the state constrained any public 
initiatives to create employment. This was so when the new APC regime of 2007 
reclaimed agricultural land for extensive new rice fields to try and reduce expensive 
imports and reduce the costs for local people when the global economy contracted. 
The labour used for this important public initiative was free of charge from Pademba 
Road prison. This gives some indication of the extent to which government was not 
free to plan and fund its public initiatives. The choices of political elites were 
severely constrained by the inflexible model for reconstruction.  
Credit must go to international efforts to restructure the national instrument 
for collecting taxes. Reform of the National Revenue Authority and other bodies 
was successful in stabilising the national economy and getting good revenue flows 
through to the treasury. As noted earlier, these revenue flows could have been 
greatly enhanced with more employment in the formal sector and increased private 
investment but still the point of this success was to export the country‘s wealth not 
reinvest it for job creation. Something was working well in the statebuilding 
enterprise, but it was not to the benefit of local people. 
The question is, even if national wealth was kept within the state rather than 
redirected for debt servicing, could political elites be trusted to redistribute and 
invest it properly? After all political elites liked repaying debt: ‗the more we pay 
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back, the more we get in loans and grants‘.211 The evidence suggests that 
international actors could do more in holding corrupt elites to account. Political 
elites were desperate for help in recovery and in no position to challenge strong 
efforts to secure their good behaviour. Where was the close monitoring of aid? Was 
it alright to pay vast loans straight into national coffers when reports of corruption 
had never been more widespread? Was it helpful to believe ‗good intentions‘ for 
‗good government‘ when track records clearly showed that funds and other 
resources went missing? Some initiatives to correct this lack of oversight such as 
PETS resulted in substantial improvements in resource delivery to DMCs (DfID, 
2006).  
The international community made a profound impact in stabilising the 
country and got a lot right in the immediate post-war securitisation and this shows 
there can be coherence and commitment as well as conflict and contradiction in 
post-conflict programming (Luckham, 2004). 
6.3 THE MODEL OF RECONSTRUCTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR 
PEACE  
The model for reconstruction did not support the local priorities for the longer term 
peacebuilding project because it was inflexible and centred on international 
benchmarks for ‗good governance‘ and development. According to Ghali, 
peacebuilding should be ‗action to identify and support structures which will tend to 
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict‘ (Ghali, 
1992:II); yet the way forward for Sierra Leone did not appear to be the structures of 
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free markets and liberal democracy and all the accoutrements thereof because the 
challenges for peace remained largely unaddressed. 
Post-liberal peace? 
 Economy 
The claim of the so called ‗liberal peace‘ - that peace, democracy and free markets 
are a viable combination - is discredited in this work because peace in Sierra Leone 
involved more than the absence of war and the presence of security, it involved a 
positive peace which did not come about through the programme of reforms 
undertaken (Galtung, 1969). Even though liberalising reforms in the country were 
relatively in their infancy, they would not work for positive peace because initial 
observations indicate that already vast swathes of the population were excluded from 
the process and many of its benefits. The political economy of peace had come at a 
high price for many citizens whose own priorities were somewhat sidelined 
(Castillo, 2008:25): ‗Trickle down‘ simply had not happened nor was it likely to 
happen any time soon. This was because the success of the national economy in the 
global marketplace rested on ‗coherent long-term strategic action... and the 
construction and maintenance of a dense web of ‗intermediate‘ institutions… and 
sufficient social protection for the poor that the market… does not itself provide‘ 
(Castillo, 2008). This web of institutions – banks, financial services, technical 
services, training and infrastructure – was in short supply in Sierra Leone and 
combined with the inhospitable environment for investment, full liberalisation of the 
economy was not a viable ambition. 
 Democracy  
Liberalisation of the body politic also failed to produce a meaningful 
participatory process and, conflated with interventionist politics, gave the demands 
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of the external constituency preference over the needs of local citizens. Most states 
in the global system are subject to influence by external forces, this is a necessary 
component of globalisation, yet such interference by powerful global actors in 
fragile and emerging democracies can do nothing to legitimise the actions of 
government in the eyes of the electorate. The ‗liberal peace‘ as promoted by its 
supporters is something of an oxymoron. Liberalising activities in Sierra Leone did 
not support priorities for peace and may have contributed to renewed tensions in 
terms of frustrated democracy, increased vulnerability to poverty and increased 
shadow activity that market liberalisation often brings (Pugh, 2005) . 
Capacity 
The wish list attached to the liberalising agenda was unrealistic in the 
extreme, and the reconstruction strategy should have taken into account realistic 
prospects for international aid by focussing on the local need. Faced with such low 
capacity the Sierra Leone state had no chance in achieving the promises it made for 
post-conflict assistance. Precious resources, in particular human resources, were 
requisitioned for activities directed from outside. Capacity remained critically low 
despite a plethora of ‗capacity building‘ activities by external agents. This wasn‘t 
helped by the fact that donors tended to use their own contractors and experts for 
reconstruction activities thereby missing good opportunities to build sustainable 
capacity among locals. It was imperative for the success of the statebuilding 
enterprise to build the capacity of governance by transferring skills and knowledge 
to local people at all levels. 
There are several important points to make about the so called ‗liberal peace‘ 
orthodoxy for peacebuilding and reconstruction in Sierra Leone. 
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1. Mythical peace 
The evidence from Sierra Leone suggests that the ‗liberal peace‘ was a rhetorical 
construct whose key components – market liberalisation, democratisation, civil 
society transformation – were promoted and implemented in a patchy manner which 
advantaged international institutions and agendas over the local community. It was 
an incomplete peace which prioritised certain policies and the sequencing of others 
to protect outside interests and not the interests of the people who had lived through 
the war. A more accurate conceptualisation would be liberal peace lite (Mac Ginty, 
2008b:158, Ignatieff, 2003). The model‘s credentials for peacebuilding are strongly 
contested here. Some restructuring worked very well: securitising the country‘s 
territory, stabilisation and growth in the national economy, and along with free, fair 
and peaceful elections, these developments were very positive for short term 
stability and this advantage must be emphasised. Progress seemed to stop there, 
however, as the consolidation of democracy and the redistribution of resources 
remained as elusive as they had been before the war.
212
 Equity and justice, 
representation and accountability, HR, the rule of law and equal opportunities, were 
the aspirations of the masses but were not prioritised in the statebuilding enterprise 
and the longer term peacebuilding project failed to gain much traction because the 
underlying structural problems were still in place. The challenges for peace therefore 
remained. Those who benefited most from the peacebuilding were those who had 
benefited from state resources and the privileges of office in the past. Once again the 
masses were marginalised and the continuance of structural violence was not a good 
prospect for future stability (Steenkamp, 2009; Galtung, 1969). The ‗liberal peace‘ 
                                                 
212
 See UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, More must be done to consolidate peace in Sierra 
Leone, Un News Centre, 3
rd
 September 2009, available from 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=31934&Cr=sierra+leone&Cr1=, accessed on 
04/09/09 
 294 
 
as a rhetorical construct appeared to be for someone or some purpose but not that of 
the local community and its peacebuilding plan (Cox, 1981; Chesterman, 2004; 
Paris, 2002). 
2. Ownership 
The model for reconstruction claimed local ownership because it was more about 
inclusive processes than about policies yet deals were done between local and global 
elites following a set template for poverty reduction which was really about debt 
servicing; even poverty reduction was subsumed within the central goal of servicing 
debt (Cheru, 2007). 
This was problematic because external ‗political pedagogy‘ could warp the 
traditional sense of legitimate politics and this had the effect of reducing ‗local 
ownership‘ credentials still further (Zaum, 2007). Stakeholder meetings were 
constrained by templates for peace (or rather development) that had already been 
agreed. Local ‗consultations‘ took place on a design which could not feasibly be 
delivered. Somewhere along the line the local priorities for peace - a simple and 
focused local strategy for recovery - morphed into an enormous and inappropriate 
reconstruction challenge which was focussed on economic growth for poverty 
reduction. This was a hugely ambitious project which could never have been fully 
and successfully implemented given the capacity of the state and the half hearted 
commitment of both local and global actors. It is argued elsewhere that the origin of 
‗off the shelf‘ policy is not usually a detriment to its successful implementation. 
More important is the political will and intellectual conviction of key domestic 
policy-makers or ministries to institutionalise external policy measures with broad 
community support (Morrissey, 2001, Killick et al., 1998), and yet poor capacity for 
implementation in itself meant that the GovSL could not truly own their pro-poor 
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strategies whether they were relevant for peacebuilding or not (Booth, 2003: 48). 
The unrealistic wish lists for reform meant that the ‗liberal peace‘ was not doable in 
Sierra Leone even if it was desirable. 
3. Statebuilding was not peacebuilding 
This work has argued that peacebuilding became statebuilding in the reforming post-
war project. This involved the reconstruction of institutions to replicate those which 
were previously dysfunctional and which had collapsed; the reinstatement of global 
and local power relations which had nurtured discontent in the past, and the 
engineering of society in the image of developed western states. In Sierra Leone, 
statebuilding could not be peacebuilding unless something radical changed in the 
structures of governance and their relationships which each other. The model for 
reconstruction was not viable because it was premised on crucial misconceptions 
about the nature of the Sierra Leonean state and its ability to change and adapt to a 
western model of statecraft which had historically been so disastrous.  
This narrow view of how post-conflict states should be rebuilt assumes that the 
debate is closed on peacebuilding paradigms; that it involves statebuilding for ‗good 
governance‘ and development, through growth. This is not the case; the jury is still 
out on appropriate models of peacebuilding because the ‗scientific perfection‘ of 
known strategies just does not seem to be working (Richmond, 2006). Interventions 
sometimes ‗reinvent the causes of war‘ or ignore them; bad government and 
ineffective governing structures were the causes of war in Sierra Leone but this point 
seems to have been overlooked in the reconstruction enterprise, if not the rhetoric 
(Keen, 2008: 188). To know what peace might look like is to know what must be 
achieved and also what must be avoided in the reconstruction (Richmond, 2006). 
The Fukuyaman certainties of the post-CW era, however, profoundly affected the 
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search for alternative solutions in unique states like Sierra Leone with unique 
challenges for peace. A more open and creative debate on what peaceful societies 
really look like will take as a starting point the cultural, historical and social 
conditions unique to each situation.  
4. Mythical democracy 
A further line of argument is that the political process in Sierra Leone looks like 
liberal democracy but in reality is not. Elections do not democracy make and yet 
post-conflict domestic politics in the country are lauded as a fine example of liberal 
democracy at work in Africa. How can this be so when the electorate cannot control 
their government? Representative democracy also cannot operate when controlled 
by an external constituency whose influence penetrates every aspect of day to day 
governance and society. Globalisation has meant that all states are enmeshed in this 
somewhat asymmetrical relationship with the international system but for fledgling 
democracies emerging from violent conflict, outside influence does little to repair 
the deeply problematic relationship between citizens and their state.  
This is because the irony of peacebuilding is that often coercion and 
sometimes even force is used to apply it; it looks like an expression of external 
interest rather than of external concern and responsibility. Further, it gives national 
governments very little room to act independently to serve their constituents by 
determining the pace or priorities of the ‗construction project‘ in a way that would 
ensure long-term peace, security and stability (Richmond, 2006, Sesay, 2007: 28).  
Exporting the country‘s wealth and exposing it to unpredictably external forces and 
a time of severe stress is also a bad idea and the policies for economic reconstruction 
have not worked for local people (Castillo, 2008:26). The effect of this when 
conflated with democratic elections is that people wonder what elites did with all the 
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money and why the new government cannot bring down the price of rice. 
Democracy brings with it high expectations, and perceptions of corruption can be 
distorted when people don‘t know that their government is paying high interests 
rates for their peace.  
What guarantee is there, however, that if the wealth stayed in the country it 
would reach its proper target? What sort of economic restructuring policies and 
strategies would work better than those that have failed? Some suggestions have 
already been made above, but it remains the case that given the country‘s track 
record on economic management certain assurances had to be made that governing 
elites would put their accounts in order and deliver on their commitments to the 
financial institutions. Is it necessary, however, for the IFIs to keep those repayments 
considering the severe lack of capacity at all levels of governance and the desperate 
need of the country for development? Would it be possible to redirect debt 
repayments away from central government and back into communities through the 
new and strong local governance structures, where their representatives are more 
accountable to the populace and can make autonomous decisions on priorities? 
6.4 - ANALYSIS  
In the outcome the post-conflict reconstruction was generally lacking in its scope to 
support the local challenges for peace witnessed by the experiences of the local 
people outlined above. Important groups: women, the youth, the disabled and 
children remained on the margins despite ‗gender mainstreaming‘ and other similar 
initiatives to bring about more pluralism and more egalitarianism in Sierra Leone‘s 
modern politics. Human rights were sidelined as an issue and the majority of the 
populace remained in deep poverty with no formal employment and no prospects for 
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change. Rural areas were, on the whole, neglected by the centre and ill-served by 
‗competitive elitism‘ at the local level. The day to day realities for ordinary Sierra 
Leoneans remained much as they had before. 
The argument has been made here that different governance structures were 
required to secure good government in post-conflict Sierra Leone. What this would 
involve was fresh, creative thinking about models for reconstruction based on a 
sound knowledge of the country‘s history and its post-war needs. What would help 
address the challenges for peace? Rather than a loose and intangible notion of ‗good 
governance‘, Sierra Leone required good government (people) and different 
governance (structures).  
The success of government and the post-conflict reconstruction was 
measured on indicators of development which were then matched up with 
outsourced ‗good governance‘ objectives (House of Commons, 2006). These had 
little to do with local priorities for peace and rather beg the question, who was the 
peacebuilding for?  
This enquiry has evidenced that, although creditable aims in themselves, the 
goals and objectives of the MDGs and the ‗good governance‘ ambitions were 
somewhat disconnected with the major imperative for sustainable peace in Sierra 
Leone, namely the construction of a cohesive, united and single nation state, with 
common goals, with equal participation, with effective representation, with 
accountable government and with an egalitarian share of the country‘s wealth. These 
were the promises made at Lomé and the recommendations of the TRC Report.  
This research has allowed some light to be thrown on the location of the 
departure between local goals for peacebuilding and generic global ambitions for 
poverty reduction. The disconnect was revealed at the point of commitment by the 
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GovSL to the IFIs in the PRSPs. Therein lay a serious dichotomy in the 
conceptualisation of peace resulting in inappropriate policy formation and 
implementation. This was because the PRSPs contained lengthy lists of promises 
and commitments for broad reaching reform in line with liberal democratic models 
of governance found in the developed world. These were overambitious 
commitments which placed an unacceptable burden on the recovering state which 
was suffering from low capacity at all levels and operating in a very challenging 
post-conflict environment. Many of the commitments were only loosely connected 
to the pressing concerns of local people in respect of consolidating the peace, and 
securing reconstruction support involved a Poverty Reduction Strategy which re-
focussed government‘s attention and resources on external priorities for recovery. 
The political economy of peace therefore nullified the claim that the new 
local/global partnership had any genuine credentials for local ownership despite the 
new and acclaimed process of inclusivity and consultation associated with PRSPs. 
The preoccupation with indicators of development, such as MDGs, missed 
the point that peacebuilding was a development plus challenge in Sierra Leone 
(Castillo, 2008). It involved the consolidation of peace which must be prioritised 
over everything else. For example, policies had to account for the reconstruction of 
destroyed economic assets: infrastructure, agricultural land, industries, ports, and the 
wealth of human capital which left the country during the war or which did not 
survive it. All these challenges placed extra burdens on the recovering economy. 
Peace-related programmes added further strains: DDR, the return of refugees and 
IDPs, army and police reform, land rehabilitation, civil service reconstruction, extra 
burdens on the health service from the increased incidence of disability and 
psychological trauma. Add to this confusing and costly melee the task of attracting 
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foreign investment, loans and grants through a complex system involving PRSPs. 
The preoccupation of the PRSPs on shopping lists for development drastically 
constrained fresh thinking on pressing domestic issues.   
One intervention which appeared to gain some initial traction was 
decentralisation. The reaction of the citizenry to new local government and the 
opportunities decentralisation provided for local individuals and groups to make use 
of their own expertise in reconstruction was a clue to the type of restructuring which 
was positive and relevant. Initial attempts to decentralise governance indicated that 
it might help in the quest to build sustainable peace. There was evidence to suggest 
that this restructuring provided Sierra Leoneans with what they needed because 
being close to government, its challenges, constraints and failures, gave ownership 
to citizens who were more inclined to accept any failures as their own and show 
tolerance of slow progress. But this initiative was constrained by half-hearted 
implementation and lack of resources. It was also at the mercy of devolved 
corruption which threatened to undermine progress; decentralisation may have been 
used as a tool to consolidate power and maintain control on resources in the 
provinces. Given the history of politics in Sierra Leone, political elites were unlikely 
to give up power to the provinces voluntary and continuing centralised power and 
patrimonial practices endangered these reforms. Strong political will (both local and 
global) was required to rid local politics of this endemic scourge and to ensure that 
necessary resources were targeted and delivered for this important part of the 
peacebuilding project (Smoke, 2003; Vedeld, 2003; Crawford, 2008). This is where 
the international community, if committed, could make real inroads into holding 
political elites accountable by redirecting resources direct to local government, to 
local representatives who were more accountable to the citizens themselves. 
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In broader terms, a consensus on what to prioritise involving all stakeholders 
working from their own agenda would produce a more pragmatic approach to 
resource allocation when resources were in such high demand. This is not the same 
as ‗broad consultations‘ on the PRSPs. In peacebuilding, the yardstick for success in 
economic planning is different to normal development and not based on MDGs and 
resources need to be targeted to the specific challenges for peace. In post-conflict 
environs, the success of economic reforms is measured by the extent to which they 
contribute ‗to national reconciliation and the consolidation of peace thereby 
allowing the country to eventually enter the normal development path‘ (Castillo, 
2008:44). Post-conflict reconstruction is not normal development because it involves 
such an intrusive array of external interventions, what Duffield describes as the 
‗technology of counter-insurgency‘, and there is a need to break out of the enclosure 
of these scripted conversations in order to create a dialogue which is meaningful for 
peace (Duffield, 2007:215). 
6. 5 - CONCLUDING STATEMENT  
The international community had a unique opportunity to exert far reaching 
influence in the reconstruction of the Sierra Leonean state but a transformation did 
not occur as a result of grand scale social engineering from outside. The character of 
the state remained similar to that of the past as political elites continued to exploit 
their office for personal gain, and governance structures encouraged the perpetual 
marginalisation of certain groups. The failure to transform was due to ill informed 
conceptualisations of peace, of policy construction and of policy implementation 
which overlooked the unique context of the Sierra Leone tragedy. The role of local 
elites, local conditions, and local challenges added to the struggle to find solutions. 
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The country was an example of what could be achieved when support was 
coordinated towards a common purpose because stabilisation, demobilisation and 
disarmament, security sector reform and economic recovery had been successful. 
Yet these successes were not converted into a longer term and relevant 
peacebuilding plan. This was because liberal statebuilding emerged as the modus 
operandi for consolidating the fragile peace and the local project was subsumed, 
indeed sidelined, in favour of externally constructed, pre-determined targets 
associated with poverty reduction and development, codified in the MDGs. 
the institutional fabric to keep armed conflict within bounds over the longer 
term sometimes emerges from below as well as from above‘ ‗the interests of 
[war affected peoples] might be better served by reform of local government 
and justice than a reconstruction of the state (Richards, 2005 : 19 ; cited by 
Berdal, 2009}  
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CONCLUSION 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The central task in this research was to determine what Sierra Leone needed from its 
reconstruction project by investigating the war history and local priorities, and by 
analysing the model for reconstruction in terms of its ability to address the local 
challenges for peace. This work has achieved its objectives by deepening our 
understandings of the many challenges facing Sierra Leone in its quest to secure a 
durable peace, and also the challenges of its partners in their endeavours to build a 
stable state. The research has examined the many programmes of reforms which 
were set up in the reconstruction, their consequences for local people and their own 
peacebuilding plans, and has enabled a few proposals to be made about possible 
alternative models for governance which might be more helpful. 
What the country needed 
 The research found that what the country needed was good leadership and 
relevant governing structures which would give confidence to the local populace that 
the promises of democracy would not be compromised and that their interests would 
be served through genuine representations. These interests included improved and 
sustainable economic opportunities, especially for the largest group of unemployed 
– the youth of the country. They also included meaningful participation in the 
political process of former marginalised groups - and new interest groups – 
participation which would give them an effective voice and access to the levers of 
power. The sort of participation which would allow for a truly accountable 
government to the grass roots of society. The priorities included the respect for and 
the protection of human rights; in particular, access to justice and confidence in the 
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wider justice system, and provision for the victims of war. They also included a 
more egalitarian distribution of the country‘s wealth, in particular reallocation of 
resources to the most underdeveloped and marginalised rural areas of the country, 
and the most vulnerable in society. The historically problematic relationship 
between the government and the governed needed serious reform so as to secure a 
more responsive state and a more engaged citizenry. 
What was delivered 
Chapter 3 evidenced that Sierra Leone benefited from successful 
securitisation of the country - an imperative pre-requisite for all of the challenges 
noted above - a government which was legitimised through democratic elections and 
an economic structure which allowed healthy growth and successful servicing of the 
nation‘s debt. Trade liberalisation and macro-economic restructuring guaranteed the 
mechanism for debt servicing and the flow of aid; the reformed National Revenue 
Authority successfully converting inward tax and revenue flows into debt 
repayments. 
Security sector reform removed one of the most serious threats to human 
security - a problem since colonial times. In particular, the mass abuse of civilians 
by government troops during the war had left communities deeply fearful of the 
security services. The removal of this threat in the post-war years cannot be 
underestimated as a profound contribution to the wellbeing of Sierra Leoneans and 
their ability to exercise their political freedoms.  
In the outcome, healthy economic growth did not create greater job 
opportunities and former economically marginalised groups remained in deep 
poverty and at the periphery of society, as evidenced in chapter four. Promises for 
reduced poverty and food security failed dramatically with a high prevalence of 
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hunger and malnutrition remaining by 2009 (ActionAid, 2009). Re-emerging 
tensions among the disenfranchised youth meant new security threats including 
increased criminality and political violence as the country remained high risk on the 
state fragility index (Marshall and Cole, 2009). 
In chapter five it was argued that democracy turned out to be a rather hollow 
version of the form of governance so badly needed because accountability 
mechanisms were virtually non-existent. The GovSL had a central role to play in the 
longer term peacebuilding project but bad government continued and poor decisions, 
inefficient management and corruption abounded. The model for reconstruction, 
putting the state central in the poverty reduction enterprise, meant that governing 
elites benefitted most from the reforms. The international community therefore had 
an essential role to play vis-à-vis interventions to ensure better government. External 
actors were in the strongest position to demand better efforts by the government of 
the day but outward accountability – of government to external actors - appeared to 
be focussed more on efficiencies in the economy than fair play in the game of 
politics. In terms of human rights and access to justice these were areas neglected in 
the reconstruction and issues which remain challenging for the longer term 
peacebuilding project. 
The scope of reconstruction programming put huge strain on a weakened 
government with minimal capacity at all levels. Because of this, and the special 
circumstances and vulnerabilities of post-conflict Sierra Leone, liberalising reform 
was patchy and was unlikely to gain any real traction in terms of the stated aims of 
the ‗liberal peace‘ or indeed the priority concerns of the local populace. 
This work has argued that the model for post-conflict reconstruction in Sierra 
Leone lacked relevance and efficacy and that solutions to the local challenges could 
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not be successfully constructed from outside; the project was not owned by the local 
populace who remained marginalised from their political economy of peace and this 
was because the focus was on statebuilding for delivery of the MDGs whose 
objectives – most creditable in their aims – were not necessarily the most pressing 
concern for longer term peacebuilding locally. 
Questions raised from this research 
There are many questions which arise as a result of these findings which centre on 
the kind of state being constructed in Sierra Leone and the purpose it serves for the 
local challenges. 
If the model for international interventions was not best suited to support the 
local priorities for peace, who was the reconstruction for? If the purpose of the 
project went beyond the need for debt servicing towards an effective technology of 
security through development, why chose a model with a poor track record on 
delivering development? What, indeed, were the expectations of the reconstruction 
effort, and if the model for development and poverty reduction failed to deliver, 
what does this mean for the global project of liberalisation after conflict?  
If attempts at rebuilding the state went wrong, what are the implications for 
the next reconstruction effort or reconstruction efforts elsewhere? If the model is 
failing to address the local challenges, is it possible to reconstruct the reconstruction, 
and is there a will to do so? Is it too late to change the new state model and, if so, 
what fresh strategies might work better within the existing structures? 
How long will the absence of war be enough to legitimise bad government, 
or ‗good enough‘ governance, and how long will local people allow military security 
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to trump their human security?
213
 If not through another civil war, how will growing 
tensions next manifest themselves - through increased criminal activity, trafficking, 
exploitation or internecine violence, perhaps?  
DISCUSSION ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS 
The reason the solutions for post-war recovery matched rather badly with local 
priorities for peace was that the idea behind statebuilding was to reconstruct Sierra 
Leone in line with the wider global objectives of merging failed states into the 
global economy and promoting democratic regimes. This would allow the state to 
fulfil international obligations - the implementation of international treaties on issues 
such as Human Rights, for example – and also local obligations such as democratic 
governance. Sierra Leone, like all post-colonial, post-Cold War states in Africa, had 
a new relationship with the global system which involved its state apparatus being 
legitimised through the adoption of tried and tested western norms of societal and 
economic organisation. The focus on poverty reduction, growth and development 
provided the framework for cooperation between the emerging democratic state and 
the global financial institutions through the PRSPs. This was not a blue print owned 
by the local populace constructed to address their many challenges for peace. 
In terms of international objectives, however, the reconstruction plan was 
successful. Stabilisation of the national economy, export growth and improved 
revenue flows were stated objectives which were achieved. These successes were 
potentially hugely beneficial for the people of Sierra Leone but the proclaimed 
benefits of such reform – job creation, community development and a reduction in 
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poverty – failed to materialise in any significant way. This meant that a functioning 
economic sector had been constructed from outside but not necessarily for the 
benefit of local citizens. The reforms were successful enough, however, to persuade 
the IFIs to release essential resource flows because debt repayments were assured. In 
the outcome, there was little evidence to show that flows from the IFIs compensated 
ordinary citizens for the little direct benefit they were enjoying from their country‘s 
economic recovery. 
[the government] got 30 million and all of that 30 million is for the people of 
this district or for this project, but the 30 million is not spent in its entirety on 
the people of Sierra Leone because contractors are also paid and yet, in the 
final analysis we have to pay all the interest as if it is spent on us 
214
 
The emphasis in the reconstruction appeared to be on the ability of the state to fulfil 
its key international responsibilities first and its responsibilities to the local citizenry 
second. It is conceivable that this was the primary expectation of the reconstruction 
reforms and, if so, they proved to be successful. Democratic elections and 
institutional reform were also key objectives as was integration of the Sierra Leone 
economy into the international system. These ambitions were indeed realised. 
Ownership of the project was an issue. Interventionist politics played into the 
hands of local elites because having to be accountable to an external constituency 
rather let them off the hook locally. Sierra Leone citizens did not feature in the 
global politics going on external to the domestic domain and political elites seemed 
to benefit most whether or not they were committed to genuine liberalisation or 
‗good governance‘. It was imperative to give local people meaningful representation 
because failing to do so would perpetuate the tendency of governing elites to corrupt 
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the system – practices so despised by the populace in the run up to war. This lack of 
ownership is a new challenge facing the peaceful recovery of the country. 
Why would external elites wish to challenge a government, however, which 
had put its economic ‗house in order‘ and was servicing its debt? Why should the 
priorities for peace influence the new structures of governance when key objectives 
were being met? After all, any redirecting of precious state resources may just 
threaten the capacity of the government to sustain its debt repayments. 
The answer to these questions may be in one of the key objectives of 
statebuilding – restructuring the state for the effective delivery of development 
because the general failure of this objective in Sierra Leone might persuade 
international actors to re-engage with the debate on models for reconstruction. 
Achieving the MDGs and reducing poverty is important because, in the theory 
behind policy making, development remains closely linked to the security of not 
only local communities but also western ways of life, and the international order 
itself (Duffield, 2007, DAC, 1997, DfID, 2005, Solana, 2003). The widening of 
security threats to include those of human development is viewed as unproblematic 
in the policy literature and indeed quite progressive in that it reflects important 
international advances in humanitarianism after the Cold War. Development has 
thus become a ‗technology of security‘ (King and Murray, 2001, Mack, 2002, CHS, 
2003, HSC, 2005, Duffield, 2007:viii). Underdevelopment is believed to be a key 
threat which requires global interventions on the back of peacebuilding to improve 
peoples‘ lives and reflects a post-interventionist era of ‗development trusteeship‘, 
relevant for Sierra Leone because the risk of future armed conflict remains a 
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possibility and the risk needs to be contained.
215
 The focus on development in Sierra 
Leone is to counter the unintended consequences of market liberalisation where 
‗trickle down‘ does not benefit the local citizenry, but in the outcome citizens have 
not significantly benefitted from development either. Neither project appears to be 
working because development as a counter-insurgency mechanism is still elusive 
and growth has not brought jobs. 
It is at this point that we see the scope for re-conceptualising reconstruction 
for peace and development to address the local challenges in Sierra Leone. The 
evidence which has emerged from this enquiry suggests that the global 
preoccupation with development as a central component of counter-insurgency is 
somewhat delusory and misses the point of peace in Sierra Leone. The notion that 
security and development are natural partners is therefore challenged in this context 
because it is not development per se that Sierra Leone needs for continued stability, 
it is a sense of a unified nation, shared entitlement and good government. Given that 
these priorities were somewhat sidelined in international efforts to reconstruct but 
the need for development as a technology of security was not, why impose such an 
ineffective model in the reconstruction? There is little evidence to show that the 
reconstructed state in Sierra Leone will be any more effective at delivering 
development in the longer term as it has been in the short term. The focus is on 
development at the expense of peacebuilding yet it is conceivable that a different 
model for reconstruction may have the potential to address both. This is because a 
different model which re-shapes the state and which is intended to produce better 
development outcomes may also have a positive impact on the historic fractures and 
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inequalities being perpetuated by the existing status quo and which remain the 
central challenges for peace in the country.  
To do this, the discourse on reconstructing states for peace must take a leap 
of faith. The country, a prime example by all accounts of the ‗liberal peace‘ in 
action, is not quite a model of peacebuilding grounded in liberalising norms. 
Certainly, there is much superficial evidence to suggest that it is; democratisation, 
trade liberalisation, security sector reform, for example, but liberalisation in Sierra 
Leone is ‗patchy‘ and has been evidenced here as a deeply problematic working 
paradigm for peace. The PRSPs committed the Sierra Leone government to 
reconstruct the nation in a generic form identified as the ‗optimum model‘ by non-
local actors and it was at this point that the site of departure in the rhetoric was 
located - when peacebuilding became statebuilding for poverty reduction in the 
PRSPs and when the imperatives for peace became submerged in the vocabulary of 
development. The structures of governance had been predefined and elites had to 
work within them. Even if the emerging political elite had been committed to the 
project of nation building and serious about building a cohesive community with a 
common identity for peace, they would have been expected to do so within the 
confines of liberalising and pre-defined structures not necessarily best suited to the 
local challenges. The lack of debate in conceptual and policy circles denies the 
realities that the discourse on optimum reconstruction models is still on-going and 
that local actors are best placed to decide the priorities (Castillo, 2008).  
It is at this point that the originality of this work emerges as an important 
contribution because it has dug deep to retrieve historically and culturally relevant 
detail which can inform new conceptualisations of peace and suggest a better 
informed model for reconstruction which is relevant for Sierra Leone.  
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Accountability is a major challenge for stability in the country. It is essential 
that some mechanism or model is found to bring the broader citizenry into politics; 
to secure meaningful participation and representation and unequivocal 
accountability at grass roots level. Given the political history of Sierra Leone where 
the citizen has never had any meaningful role to play in governing themselves in an 
independent state, this is a major challenge for the country and its partners.  
External intervention had a major impact on the post-war political process 
and yet local politics remained deeply problematic. This was because a legitimate 
body politic required more than the coercive power of external benefactors; it 
required proper mechanisms to address the demands of the society it served 
(Chandler, 2006). Even though political fractures were widely understood to have 
been an influencing factor in state failure and conflict, these were yet to be 
addressed. Democratisation was not consolidated yet expectations from democracy 
within the local populace were enormous. 
The problem of ‗democracy denied‘ is that crushed expectations lead to more 
tensions. Being able to vote freely and being promised mechanisms to hold 
representatives accountable was a most welcome departure from the politics of the 
past where citizens were mere pawns in elite contests for state resources. But in the 
outcome, citizens remained pawns.  
Once state structures are in place, however, changes are costly and complex 
and risk destabilising the security environment. A faulty model is difficult to correct 
even if there is a will to do so. This reality emphasises the point of getting the 
structures right from the start.  
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Addressing the challenges for peace 
Given this predicament, what is needed is fresh thinking on new strategies 
which might work within the existing framework so as to produce effective ways to 
bring the populace in. This is not the same as consulting on PRSPs, which evidence 
shows is not useful or effective. This means a re-conceptualisation of the nation state 
in Sierra Leone based on sound local knowledge and sound understandings of local 
need. This re-conceptualisation might involve, for example, moving resources to the 
provinces through committed and well informed decentralisation programming, and 
deliberating on possible alternative and nuanced models of local governance which 
could work better with traditional authority. Targeted investment in infrastructure, in 
public and private enterprise across the country, and using national wealth for 
national projects in a committed and unambiguous way. This may result in strides 
forward in terms of employment opportunities. It cannot be stressed strongly enough 
how employment is a central key for successful peacebuilding in Sierra Leone. Not 
only will it improve human development, give people something to do and a sense 
of self-worth, but it will also give them a genuine stake in their government. The 
informal sector is a lifeline for the majority of Sierra Leoneans yet paying taxes 
through formal sector employment means that governing elites are more pressured 
to look inwards for their accountability (Boyce and O'Donnell, 2007). There is a 
mutual interdependence between post-conflict economic policies and peacebuilding 
strategies because the state is expected to provide economic opportunities and other 
peace dividends, whether through state sponsored enterprises or support to the 
private sector, and the primary objective of post-war economic policy is to create 
meaningful and sustainable peace dividends (Wennmann, 2007, Collier, 2005). 
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Reflections on methodology 
Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone was a huge and complex enterprise and this study 
focused on only a small, but very significant, part of that enterprise. The conclusions 
drawn from this limited focus are, however, justifiable because of the extraordinary 
degree of dependency of the Sierra Leone state on external intervention for recovery. 
The politics of peacebuilding – the macro-economic reforms and centrality of 
multiparty democracy – had clear implications and consequences for the trajectory 
of the peacebuilding mission and the shape of the new state.  
The elite urban bias of the primary data limited the scope of the study to 
identify more nuanced understandings of peace and the impact of interventionist 
approaches. What would have enhanced the work would have been primary data 
collected in rural areas from amongst grass roots communities. It must be noted, 
however, that local communities are quite used to being surveyed on all manner of 
issues relating to the post-conflict recovery of their country – from government 
questionnaires, to individual researchers – and ‗survey fatigue‘ is not uncommon. 
More beneficial would be an ethnographic study but the constraints of the research 
precluded this. 
The design of the study proved to be appropriate as large amounts of primary 
and secondary documentary evidence was available for analysis, but the flexibility 
of the design to include interview and observation added richness and nuance to the 
analysis of the documentation. In particular, the evidential base emerging from 
interviews with civil society was very enlightening and supported the central thesis 
unequivocally. Again, data from the provinces would have been very beneficial to 
give a complementary account of perceptions away from the capital and also to seek 
out grass roots interpretations of ‗civil society‘ within the broader citizenry. 
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Implications for theory 
The ‗liberal peace‘ as a useful or tangible framework for building peace was 
problematised from the beginning and the research findings support the proposal 
that this paradigm for reconstruction was somewhat illusory. The failures of the 
‗liberal peace‘ orthodoxy, so clearly disclosed in this study, raises profound 
questions about the ‗universal translatability‘ of the liberal state and the feasibility of 
external interventions to construct peaceful liberal entities from the cataclysm of 
war, at least as far as local citizens are concerned. The purpose of the ‗liberal peace‘ 
– to construct internationally recognised sovereign states – resulted in a negative 
peace for Sierra Leone; important in its own right, but not sufficient for longer term 
stability.  
Some of these themes feature in the evolving literature on peacebuilding 
where authors have identified the struggle to define what ‗local ownership‘ actually 
means. Where to start in the search for indigenous definitions of ‗political order‘ or 
how to identify the rightful ‗owners‘ of peacebuilding in complex societies, are 
deeply problematic challenges (Boege et al, 2009, Donais, 2009, Liden, 2009). 
These struggles, and others, appear so overwhelming that the absence of any 
theorising or viable alternatives leaves the ‗liberal peace‘ orthodoxy void of any 
serious and pragmatic challenge to its hegemony. Nevertheless, new themes are 
emerging. Hauge, for example, argues that Latin America has developed an 
alternative model of peacebuilding by de-linking certain components of the ‗liberal 
peace‘; democratisation has been deepened where economic liberalism has been 
rejected in favour of regional collaboration to support trade. This demonstrates ‗new 
ideas and hope… where the peacebuilding discourse [has] reached a point of fatigue 
and stagnation‘ (Hauge, 2009: 696). Chopra‘s research in the arid lands of Kenya 
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provides evidence of specific indigenous forms of justice for peacebuilding working 
as an effective substitute for the failures of security at state level, yet this empirical 
reality directly undermines the purpose of statebuilding as a proxy for peacebuilding 
as undertaken in international peace operations (Chopra, 2009). Here we see what 
might be identified as a legitimate local process for justice, culturally specific, but in 
direct contradiction to the stated aims of international statebuilding endeavours 
which include the rule of law as defined by international norms. This is a further 
dilemma for peace operations. Indigenous processes such as these weaken the 
central state, they do not strengthen it; a point taken up in detail by Boege et al in 
their engagement with the ‗fragile states‘ discourse and commentary on potential 
spoilers (in terms of building strong states) among traditional authority structures 
(Beoge et al, 2009). Local ownership of peacebuilding may indeed be desirable for 
the sustainability of security and longer term peace in war-torn environs - but how 
much ownership, and with whom? This has prompted a call for ‗politically 
hybridised‘ versions of peacebuilding involving perhaps an ‗international social 
contract‘ to protect the welfare and human security of local citizens (Liden et al, 
2009), or a ‗post-liberal‘ peace which engages at the level of the ‗every day‘ 
(Richmond, 2009c). In any event, there is a clear need to develop new ontologies 
and epistemologies of peace which could work better for local populations (Liden et 
al, 2009).  
The challenge is enormous in its complexity. Therefore improved 
understandings of what peace means in culturally specific environs is an important 
starting point and this work has therefore made a useful contribution. Its 
implications for on-going peacebuilding research and policy design in this area are 
many. They include; how to align PRSPs with peacebuilding; how to bring people 
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into the political debate; how to identify legitimate local ownership – if not political 
elites and reconstituted ‗civil society‘; how to understand the real challenges for 
peacebuilding and include locals as potential arbiters of successful solutions, and a 
wider debate about the structural challenges and constraints for delivering a positive 
peace. 
Implications for policy and future research 
The issue of peacebuilding as statebuilding has been raised in policy circles. It has 
been recognised that this paradigm is problematic and, in some cases, it is 
inappropriate to make results and outcomes oriented poverty reduction programming 
the central framework for post-conflict engagement. To compensate for the tensions 
that emerged from this process, ten ‗principles for good international engagement in 
fragile states and situations‘ were constructed by policy-makers (OECD, 2007). 
These reflected, among other things, the new focus on state-society relations in 
statebuilding projects and the need to align priorities with those of local actors 
(OECD, 2008: 8). An emerging policy paper from DfID signalled their intention to 
merge peacebuilding and statebuilding – both ‗highly complex political processes‘ – 
and target support to ‗integrated‘ programming. This was because there was 
‗growing evidence‘ that poverty reduction and the MDGs were not going to be 
achieved in post-conflict or fragile states without addressing the underlying causes 
of conflict (DfID, 2009, Barnes, 2009). Elsewhere, recognition was given to the 
possibility that international objectives in the short term should focus on 
peacebuilding to lay good foundations for making progress against the MDGs in the 
longer term (DfID, 2009). At the time of writing the multi-stakeholder ‗consultation‘ 
process, which claimed to monitor the implementation of the ten principles, was 
underway in Sierra Leone with a report due to be published in late 2009.  
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It was clear from the documentation that the new principles for international 
engagement in fragile states were to support existing dialogues, not to create new 
ones. The liberal peace orthodoxy remains strong despite its contradictions and its 
critics (Pugh, 2005), and despite the empirical evidence from Sierra Leone which 
shows that the paradigm was not very helpful vis-à-vis local challenges for peace.  
There is scope for further research into effective long term peacebuilding 
mechanisms and the optimum shape of the state for continued stability in Sierra 
Leone, and elsewhere. In particular, research is required into the effects of the 
political economy of peacebuilding on the creation of new livelihood opportunities 
for local people. Investigations into decentralisation models and nuanced alternative 
programming would be a useful addition to the literature as would enquiries into the 
relative merits of traditional and modern judicial mechanisms in terms of holding 
government officials, at all levels, to account and strengthening the grass roots 
voice. A new interpretation of civil society, which complements the local realities 
and engages with the wider citizenry – market women, young farmers, mineworkers, 
transport workers – would help identify alternative sites of state/society dialogue, 
and a full investigation into the most optimum role for traditional chiefs in the 
modern political process is an imperative. Finally, the regional dynamic cannot be 
ignored when considering stability in Sierra Leone; a wider regional study of 
transitions in Liberia and Guinea would help to determine the threat of external 
forces on the fragile peace in Sierra Leone. 
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APPENDIX 1 
LIST OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS – ALL BASED IN FREETOWN 
50/50 Group 
Campaign for Good Governance 
Church Council of Sierra Leone 
Civil Society Alternative Process of Sierra Leone 
Civil Society Movement 
Drivers‘ and General Workers‘ Union 
ENCISS 
Forum for Democratic Initiatives 
IPAM Student‘s Union 
Search for Common Ground 
Sierra Leone Association of Journalists 
Sierra Leone Bar Association 
Sierra Leone Market Women‘s Association 
Talking Drum Studio 
Women‘s Forum 
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APPENDIX 2 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS 
 
Semi-structured interviews based around the following questions: 
1. What does your organisation do to support local people? 
2. Have you had funding or other assistance from external donors with regard 
to your activities?  
3. (If so) Do you feel your objectives have been achieved with the help of 
donor funding? 
4. Are donor objectives similar to yours? 
5. How do you attract funding and are any of your proposals rejected? 
6. Do donors consult with you when planning programming in your area of 
work? 
7. How does donor support affect your relationship with other civil society 
organisations? 
8. What do you achieve without funding? 
9. What would you change with regard to democracy assistance programming 
and the relationship you have with donors to achieve your objectives? 
10.  How does donor aid alter the relationship between civil society and the 
state? 
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APPENDIX 3 
THE LOMÉ PEACE ACCORD 
The Lomé Agreement 
PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE AND THE 
REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE and THE REVOLUTIONARY 
UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE (RUF) 
Having met in Lomé, Togo, from the 25 May 1999, to 7 July 1999 under the auspices of the Current 
Chairman of ECOWAS, President Gnassingbe Eyadéma; 
Recalling earlier initiatives undertaken by the countries of the sub-region and the International 
Community, aimed at bringing about a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Sierra Leone, and 
culminating in the Abidjan Peace Agreement of 30 November, 1996 and the ECOWAS Peace Plan of 
23 October, 1997; 
Moved by the imperative need to meet the desire of the people of Sierra Leone for a definitive 
settlement of the fratricidal war in their country and for genuine national unity and reconciliation; 
Committed to promoting full respect for human rights and humanitarian law; 
Committed to promoting popular participation in the governance of the country and the advancement 
of democracy in a socio-political framework free of inequality, nepotism and corruption; 
Concerned with the socio-economic well being of all the people of Sierra Leone; 
Determined to foster mutual trust and confidence between themselves; 
Determined to establish sustainable peace and security; to pledge forthwith, to settle all past, present 
and future differences and grievances by peaceful means; and to refrain from the threat and use of 
armed force to bring about any change in Sierra Leone; 
Reaffirming the conviction that sovereignty belongs to the people, and that Government derives all its 
powers, authority and legitimacy from the people; 
recognizing the imperative that the children of Sierra Leone, especially those affected by armed 
conflict, in view of their vulnerability, are entitled to special care and the protection of their inherent 
right to life, survival and development, in accordance with the provisions of the International 
Convention on the Rights of the Child; 
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Guided by the Declaration in the Final Communique of the Meeting in Lomé of the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of ECOWAS of 25 May 1999, in which they stressed the importance of democracy as 
a factor of regional peace and security, and as essential to the socio-economic development of 
ECOWAS Member States; and in which they pledged their commitment to the consolidation of 
democracy and respect of human rights while reaffirming the need for all Member States to 
consolidate their democratic base, observe the principles of good governance and good economic 
management in order to ensure the emergence and development of a democratic culture which takes 
into account the interests of the peoples of West Africa; 
Recommitting themselves to the total observance and compliance with the Ceasefire Agreement 
signed in Lomé on 18 May 1999, and appended as Annex 1 until the signing of the present Peace 
Agreement; 
HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOWS: 
PART ONE 
CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES 
ARTICLE 1 
CEASEFIRE 
The armed conflict between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF is hereby ended with 
immediate effect. Accordingly, the two sides shall ensure that a total and permanent cessation of 
hostilities is observed forthwith. 
ARTICLE II 
CEASEFIRE MONITORING 
1. A Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (hereinafter termed the CMC) to be chaired by the United 
Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (hereinafter termed UNOMSIL) with representatives of 
the Government of Sierra Leone, RUF, the Civil Defence Forces (hereinafter termed the CDF) and 
ECOMOG shall be established at provincial and district levels with immediate effect to monitor, 
verify and report all violations of the ceasefire. 
2. A Joint Monitoring Commission (hereinafter termed the JMC) shall be established at the national 
level to be chaired by UNOMSIL with representatives of the Government of Sierra Leone, RUF, 
CDF, and ECOMOG. The JMC shall receive, investigate and take appropriate action on reports of 
violations of the ceasefire from the CMC. The parties agree to the definition of ceasefire violations as 
contained in Annex 2 which constitutes an integral part of the present Agreement. 
3. The parties shall seek the assistance of the International Community in providing funds and other 
logistics to enable the JMC to carry out its mandate. 
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PART TWO 
GOVERNANCE 
The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF, recognizing the right of the people of Sierra Leone to 
live in peace, and desirous of finding a transitional mechanism to incorporate the RUF into 
governance within the spirit and letter of the Constitution, agree to the following formulas for 
structuring the government for the duration of the period before the next elections, as prescribed by 
the Constitution, managing scarce public resources for the benefit of the development of the people 
of Sierra Leone and sharing the responsibility of implementing the peace. Each of these formulas (not 
in priority order) is contained in a separate Article of this Part of the present Agreement; and may be 
further detailed in protocols annexed to it. 
Article III Transformation of the RUF into a Political Party 
Article IV Enabling Members of the RUF to Hold Public Office 
Article V Enabling the RUF to Join a Broad-Based Government of National Unity Through Cabinet 
Appointment 
Article VI Commission for the Consolidation of Peace 
Article VII Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and 
Development 
Article VIII Council of Elders and Religious Leaders. 
ARTICLE III 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUF INTO A POLITICAL PARTY 
1. The Government of Sierra Leone shall accord every facility to the RUF to transform itself into a 
political party and enter the mainstream of the democratic process. To that end: 
2. Immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement, the RUF shall commence to organize 
itself to function as a political movement, with the rights, privileges and duties accorded to all 
political parties in Sierra Leone. These include the freedom to publish, unhindered access to the 
media, freedom of association, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and the right to mobilize 
and associate freely. 
3. Within a period of thirty days, following the signing of the present Agreement, the necessary legal 
steps shall be taken by the Government of Sierra Leone to enable the RUF to register as a political 
party. 
 344 
 
4. The Parties shall approach the International Community with a view to mobilizing resources for 
the purposes of enabling the RUF to function as a political party. These resources may include but 
shall not be limited to: 
(i) Setting up a trust fund; 
(ii) Training for RUF membership in party organization and functions; and 
(iii) Providing any other assistance necessary for achieving the goals of this section. 
ARTICLE IV 
ENABLING MEMBERS OF THE RUF TO HOLD PUBLIC OFFICE 
1. The Government of Sierra Leone shall take the necessary steps to enable those RUF members 
nominated by the RUF to hold public office, within the time-frames agreed and contained in the 
present Agreement for the integration of the various bodies named herein. 
2. Accordingly, necessary legal steps shall be taken by the Government of Sierra Leone, within a 
period of fourteen days following the signing of the present Agreement, to amend relevant laws and 
regulations that may constitute an impediment or bar to RUF and AFRC personnel holding public 
office. 
3. Within seven days of the removal of any such legal impediments, both parties shall meet to discuss 
and agree on the appointment of RUF members to positions in parastatals, diplomacy and any other 
public sector. 
ARTICLE V 
ENABLING THE RUF TO JOIN A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY 
THROUGH CABINET APPOINTMENTS 
1. The Government of Sierra Leone shall accord every opportunity to the RUF to join a broad-based 
government of national unity through cabinet appointments. To that end: 
2. The Chairmanship of the Board of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, 
National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD) as provided for in Article VII of the present 
Agreement shall be offered to the leader of the RUF, Corporal Foday Sankoh. For this purpose he 
shall enjoy the status of Vice President and shall therefore be answerable only to the President of 
Sierra Leone. 
3. The Government of Sierra Leone shall give ministerial positions to the RUF in a moderately 
expanded cabinet of 18, bearing in mind that the interests of other political parties and civil society 
organizations should also be taken into account, as follows: 
(i) One of the senior cabinet appointments such as finance, foreign affairs and justice; 
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(ii) Three other cabinet positions. 
4. In addition, the Government of Sierra Leone shall, in the same spirit, make available to the RUF 
the following senior government positions: Four posts of Deputy Minister. 
5. Within a period of fourteen days following the signing of the present Agreement, the necessary 
steps shall be taken by the Government of Sierra Leone to remove any legal impediments that may 
prevent RUF members from holding cabinet and other positions. 
ARTICLE VI 
COMMISSION FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE 
1. A Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (hereinafter termed the CCP), shall be established 
within two weeks of the signing of the present Agreement to implement a post-conflict programme 
that ensures reconciliation and the welfare of all parties to the conflict, especially the victims of war. 
The CCP shall have the overall goal and responsibility for supervising and monitoring the 
implementation of and compliance with the provisions of the present Agreement relative to the 
promotion of national reconciliation and the consolidation of peace. 
2. The CCP shall ensure that all structures for national reconciliation and the consolidation of peace 
already in existence and those provided for in the present Agreement are operational and given the 
necessary resources for realizing their respective mandates. These structures shall comprise: 
(i) the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and 
Development; 
(ii) the Joint Monitoring Commission; 
(iii) the Provincial and District Ceasefire Monitoring Committees; 
(iv) the Committee for the Release of Prisoners of War and Non-Combatants; 
(v) the Committee for Humanitarian Assistance; 
(vi) the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration; 
(vii) the National Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction; 
(viii) the Human Rights Commission; and 
(ix) the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
3. The CCP shall have the right to inspect any activity or site connected with the implementation of 
the present Agreement. 
4. The CCP shall have full powers to organize its work in any manner it deems appropriate and to 
appoint any group or sub-committee which it deems necessary in the discharge of its functions. 
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5. The Commission shall be composed of the following members: 
(i) Two representatives of the civil society; 
(ii) One representative each named by the Government, the RUF and the Parliament. 
6. The CCP shall have its own offices, adequate communication facilities and secretarial support 
staff. 
7. Recommendations for improvements or modifications shall be made to the President of sierra 
Leone for appropriate action. Likewise, failures of the structures to perform their assigned duties shall 
also be brought to the attention of the President. 
8. Disputes arising out of the preceding paragraph shall be brought to the Council of Elders and 
Religious Leaders for resolution, as specified in Article VIII of the present Agreement. 
9. Should Protocols be needed in furtherance of any provision in the present Agreement, the CCP 
shall have the responsibility for their preparation. 
10. The mandate of the CCP shall terminate at the end of the next general elections. 
ARTICLE VII 
COMMISSION FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF STRATEGIC RESOURCES, NATIONAL 
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 
1. Given the emergency situation facing the country, the parties agree that the Government shall 
exercise full control over the exploitation of gold, diamonds and other resources, for the benefit of the 
people of Sierra Leone. Accordingly, a Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, 
National Reconstruction and Development (hereinafter termed the CMRRD) shall be established and 
charged with the responsibility of securing and monitoring the legitimate exploitation of Sierra 
Leones gold and diamonds, and other resources that are determined to be of strategic importance for 
national security and welfare as well as cater for post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction, as 
provided for under Article XXVIII of the present Agreement. 
2. The Government shall take the necessary legal action within a period not exceeding two weeks 
from the signing of the present Agreement to the effect that all exploitation, sale, export, or any other 
transaction of gold and diamonds shall be forbidden except those sanctioned by the CMRRD. All 
previous concessions shall be null and void. 
3. The CMRRD shall authorize licensing of artisanal production of diamonds and gold, in accordance 
with prevailing laws and regulations. All gold and diamonds extracted or otherwise sources from any 
Sierra Leonean territory shall be sold to the Government. 
4. The CMRRD shall ensure, through the appropriate authorities, the security of the areas covered 
under this Article, and shall take all necessary measures against unauthorized exploitation. 
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5. For the export or local resale of gold and diamonds by the Government, the CMRRD shall 
authorize a buying and selling agreement with one or more reputable international and specialized 
mineral companies. All exports of Sierra Leonean gold and diamonds shall be transacted by the 
Government, under these agreements. 
6. The proceeds from the transactions of gold and diamonds shall be public monies which shall enter 
a special Treasury account to be spent exclusively on the development of the people of Sierra Leone, 
with appropriations for public education, public health, infrastructural development, and 
compensation for incapacitated war victims as well as post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction. 
Priority spending shall go to rural areas. 
7. The Government shall, if necessary, seek the assistance and cooperation of other governments and 
their instruments of law enforcement to detect and facilitate the prosecution of violations of this 
Article. 
8. The management of other natural resources shall be reviewed by the CMRRD to determine if their 
regulation is a matter of national security and welfare, and recommend appropriate policy to the 
Government. 
9. The functions of the Ministry of Mines shall continued to be carried out by the current authorized 
ministry. However, in respect of strategic mineral resources, the CMRRD shall be an autonomous 
body in carrying out its duties concerning the regulation of Sierra Leones strategic natural resources. 
10. All agreements and transactions referred to in this Article shall be subject to full public disclosure 
and records of all correspondence, negotiations, business transactions and any other matters related to 
exploitation, management, local or international marketing, and any other matter shall be public 
documents. 
11. The Commission shall issue monthly reports, including the details of all the transactions related to 
gold and diamonds, and other licenses or concessions of natural resources, and its own administrative 
costs. 
12. The Commission shall be governed by a Board whose Chairmanship shall be offered to the 
Leader of the RUF, Corporal Foday Sankoh. The Board shall also comprise: 
(i) Two representatives of the Government appointed by the President; 
(ii) Two representatives of the political party to be formed by the RUF; 
(iii) Three representatives of the civil society; and 
(iv) Two representatives of other political parties appointed by Parliament. 
13. The Government shall take the required administrative actions to implement the commitments 
made in the present Agreement; and in the case of enabling legislation, it shall draft and submit to 
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Parliament within thirty days of the signature of the present Agreement, the relevant bills for their 
enactment into law. 
14. The Government commits itself to propose and support an amendment to the Constitution to 
make the exploitation of gold and diamonds the legitimate domain of the people of Sierra Leone, and 
to determine that the proceeds be used for the development of Sierra Leone, particularly public 
education, public health, infrastructure development, and compensation of incapacitated war victims 
as well as post-war reconstruction and development. 
ARTICLE VIII 
COUNCIL OF ELDERS AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS 
1. The signatories agree to refer any conflicting differences of interpretation of this Article or any 
other Article of the present Agreement or its protocols, to a Council of Elders and Religious Leaders 
comprised as follows: 
(i) Two members appointed by the Inter-Religious Council; 
(ii) One member each appointed by the Government and the RUF; and 
(iii) One member appointed by ECOWAS. 
2. The Council shall designate its own chairperson from among its members. All of its decision shall 
be taken by the concurrence of at least four members, and shall be binding and public, provided that 
an aggrieved party may appeal to the Supreme Court. 
PART THREE 
OTHER POLITICAL ISSUES 
The Part of the present Agreement Consists of the following Articles 
Article IX Pardon and Amnesty 
Article X Review of the Present Constitution 
Article XI Elections 
Article XII National Electoral Commission 
ARTICLE IX 
PARDON AND AMNESTY 
1. In order to bring lasting peace to Sierra Leone, the Government of Sierra Leone shall take 
appropriate legal steps to grant Corporal Foday Sankoh absolute and free pardon. 
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2. After the signing of the present Agreement, the Government of Sierra Leone shall also grant 
absolute and free pardon and reprieve to all combatants and collaborators in respect of anything done 
by them in pursuit of their objectives, up to the time of the signing of the present Agreement. 
3. To consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national reconciliation, the Government of 
Sierra Leone shall ensure that no official or judicial action is taken against any member of the RUF, 
ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or CDF in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as 
members of those organizations, since March 1991, up to the time of the signing of the present 
Agreement. In addition, legislative and other measures necessary to guarantee immunity to former 
combatants, exiles and other persons, currently outside the country for reasons related to the armed 
conflict shall be adopted ensuring the full exercise of their civil and political rights, with a view to 
their reintegration within a framework of full legality. 
ARTICLE X 
REVIEW OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION 
In order to ensure that the Constitution of Sierra Leone represents the needs and aspirations of the 
people of Sierra Leone and that no constitutional or any other legal provision prevents the 
implementation of the present Agreement, the Government of Sierra Leone shall take the necessary 
steps to establish a Constitutional Review Committee to review the provisions of the present 
Constitution, and where deemed appropriate, recommend revisions and amendments, in accordance 
with Part V, Section 108 of the Constitution of 1991. 
ARTICLE XI 
DATE OF NEXT ELECTIONS 
The next national elections in Sierra Leone shall beheld in accordance with the present Constitution 
of Sierra Leone. 
ARTICLE XII 
NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION 
1. A new independent National Electoral Commission (hereinafter termed the NEC) shall be set up 
by the Government, not later than three months after the signing of the present Agreement. 
2. In setting up the new NEC the President shall consult all political parties, including the RUF, to 
determine the membership and terms of reference of the Commission, paying particular attention to 
the need for a level playing field in the nations elections. 
3. No member of the NEC shall be eligible for appointment to political office by any government 
formed as a result of an election he or she was mandated to conduct. 
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4. The NEC shall request the assistance of the International Community, including the UN, the OAU, 
ECOWAS and the Commonwealth of Nations, in monitoring the next presidential and parliamentary 
elections in Sierra Leone. 
PART FOUR 
POST-CONFLICT MILITARY AND SECURITY ISSUES 
1. The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF, recognizing that the maintenance of peace and 
security is of paramount importance for the achievement of lasting peace in Sierra Leone and for the 
welfare of its people, have agreed to the following formulas for dealing with post-conflict military 
and security matters. Each of these formulas (not in priority order) is contained in separate Articles of 
this Part of the present Agreement and may be further detailed in protocols annexed to the 
Agreement. 
Article XIII Transformation and New Mandate of ECOMOG 
Article XIV New Mandate of UNOMSIL 
Article XV Security Guarantees for Peace Monitors 
Article XVI Encampment, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
Article XVII Restructuring and Training of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces 
Article XVIII Withdrawal of Mercenaries 
Article XIX Notification to Joint Monitoring Commission 
Article Notification to Military Commands. 
ARTICLE XIII 
TRANSFORMATION AND NEW MANDATE OF ECOMOG 
1. Immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement, the parties shall request ECOWAS to 
revise the mandate of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone as follows: 
(i) Peacekeeping; 
(ii) Security of the State of Sierra Leone; 
i. Protection of UNOMSIL. 
i. Protection of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration personnel. 
2. The Government shall, immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement, request ECOWAS 
for troop contributions from at least two additional countries. The additional contingents shall be 
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deployed not later than 30 days from the date of signature of the present Agreement. The Security 
Council shall be requested to provide assistance in support of ECOMOG. 
3. The Parties agree to develop a timetable for the phased withdrawal of ECOMOG, including 
measures for securing all of the territory of Sierra Leone by the restructured armed forces. The 
phased withdrawal of ECOMOG will be linked to the phased creation and deployment of the 
restructured armed forces. 
ARTICLE XIV 
NEW MANDATE OF UNOMSIL 
1. The UN Security Council is requested to amend the mandate of UNOMSIL to enable it to 
undertake the various provisions outlined in the present Agreement. 
ARTICLE XV 
SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR PEACE MONITORS 
1. The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF agree to guarantee the safety, security and freedom 
of movement of UNOMSIL Military Observers throughout Sierra Leone. This guarantee shall be 
monitored by the Joint Monitoring Commission. 
2. The freedom of movement includes complete and unhindered access for UNOMSIL Military 
Observers in the conduct of their duties throughout Sierra Leone. Before and during the process of 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, officers and escorts to be provided by both Parties 
shall be required to facilitate this access. 
3. Such freedom of movement and security shall also be accorded to non-military UNOMSIL 
personnel such as Human Rights Officers in the conduct of their duties. These personnel shall, in 
most cases, be accompanied by UNOMSIL Military Observers. 
4. The provision of security to be extended shall include United Nations aircraft, vehicles and other 
property. 
ARTICLE XVI 
ENCAMPMENT, DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION 
1. A neutral peacekeeping force comprising UNOMSIL and ECOMOG shall disarm all combatants 
of the RUF, CDF, SLA and paramilitary groups. The encampment, disarmament and demobilization 
process shall commence within six weeks of the signing of the present Agreement in line with the 
deployment of the neutral peacekeeping force. 
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2. The present SLA shall be restricted to the barracks and their arms in the armoury and their 
ammunitions in the magazines and placed under constant surveillance by the neutral peacekeeping 
force during the process of disarmament and demobilization. 
3. UNOMSIL shall be present in all disarmament and demobilization locations to monitor the process 
and provide security guarantees to all ex-combatants. 
4. Upon the signing of the present Agreement, the Government of Sierra Leone shall immediately 
request the International Community to assist with the provision of the necessary financial and 
technical resources needed for the adaptation and extension of the existing Encampment, 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme in Sierra Leone, including payment of 
retirement benefits and other emoluments due to former members of the SLA. 
ARTICLE XVII 
RESTRUCTURING AND TRAINING OF THE SIERRA LEONE ARMED FORCES 
1. The restructuring, composition and training of the new Sierra Leone armed forces will be carried 
out by the Government with a view to creating truly national armed forces, bearing loyalty solely to 
the State of Sierra Leone, and able and willing to perform their constitutional role. 
2. Those ex-combatants of the RUF, CDF and SLA who wish to be integrated into the new 
restructured national armed forces may do so provided they meet established criteria. 
3. Recruitment into the armed forces shall reflect the geo-political structure of Sierra Leone within 
the established strength. 
ARTICLE XVIII 
WITHDRAWAL OF MERCENARIES 
All mercenaries, in any guise, shall be withdrawn from Sierra Leone immediately upon the signing of 
the present Agreement. Their withdrawal shall be supervised by the Joint Monitoring Commission. 
ARTICLE XIX 
NOTIFICATION TO JOINT MONITORING COMMISSION 
Immediately upon the establishment of the JMC provided for in Article II of the present Agreement, 
each party shall furnish to the JMC information regarding the strength and locations of all combatants 
as well as the positions and descriptions of all known unexploded bombs (UXBs), explosive ordnance 
devices (EODs), minefields, booby traps, wire entanglements, and all other physical or military 
hazards. The JMC shall seek all necessary technical assistance in mine clearance and the disposal or 
destruction of similar devices and weapons under the operational control of the neutral peacekeeping 
force. The parties shall keep the JMC updated on changes in this information so that it can notify the 
public as needed, to prevent injuries. 
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ARTICLE XX 
NOTIFICATION TO MILITARY COMMANDS 
Each party shall ensure that the terms of the present Agreement, and written orders requiring 
compliance, are immediately communicated to all of its forces. 
PART FIVE 
HUMANITARIAN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC ISSUES 
1. The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF\SL recognizing the importance of upholding, 
promoting and protecting the human rights of every Sierra Leonean as well as the enforcement of 
humanitarian law, agree to the following formulas for the achievement of these laudable objectives. 
Each of these formulas (not in priority order) is contained in separate Articles of this Part of the 
present Agreement 
Article XXI Release of Prisoners and Abductees 
Article XXII Refugees and Displaced Persons 
Article XXIII Guarantee of the Security of Displaced Persons and Refugees 
Article XXIV Guarantee and Promotion of Human Rights 
Article XXV Human Rights Commission 
Article XXVI Human Rights Violations 
Article XXVII Humanitarian Relief 
Article XXVIII Post War Rehabilitation and Reconstruction 
Article XXIX Special Fund for War Victims 
Article XXX Child Combatants 
Article XXXI Education and Health 
ARTICLE XXI 
RELEASE OF PRISONERS AND ABDUCTEES 
All political prisoners of war as well as all non-combatants shall be released immediately and 
unconditionally by both parties, in accordance with the Statement of June 2, 1999, which is contained 
in Annex 3 and constitutes an integral part of the present Agreement. 
ARTICLE XXII 
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REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS 
The Parties through the National Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction 
agree to seek funding from and the involvement of the UN and other agencies, including friendly 
countries, in order to design and implement a plan for voluntary repatriation and reintegration of 
Sierra Leonean refugees and internally displaced persons, including non-combatants, in conformity 
with international conventions, norms and practices. 
ARTICLE XXIII 
GUARANTEE OF THE SECURITY OF DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES 
As a reaffirmation of their commitment to the observation of the conventions and principles of human 
rights and the status of refugees, the Parties shall take effective and appropriate measures to ensure 
that the right of Sierra Leoneans to asylum is fully respected and that no camps or dwellings of 
refugees or displaced persons are violated. 
ARTICLE XXIV 
GUARANTEE AND PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
1. The basic civil and political liberties recognized by the Sierra Leone legal system and contained in 
the declarations and principles of Human Rights adopted by the UN and OAU, especially the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, shall 
be fully protected and promoted within Sierra Leonean society. 
2. These include the right to life and liberty, freedom from torture, the right to a fair trial, freedom of 
conscience, expression and association, and the right to take part in the governance of ones country. 
ARTICLE XXV 
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION 
1. The Parties pledge to strengthen the existing machinery for addressing grievances of the people in 
respect of alleged violations of their basic human rights by the creation, as a matter of urgency and 
not later than 90 days after the signing of the present Agreement, of an autonomous quasi-judicial 
national Human Rights Commission. 
2. The Parties further pledge to promote Human Rights education throughout the various sectors of 
Sierra Leonean society, including the schools, the media, the police, the military and the religious 
community. 
3. In pursuance of the above, technical and material assistance may be sought from the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights and other 
relevant international organizations. 
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4. A consortium of local human rights and civil society groups in Sierra Leone shall be encouraged to 
help monitor human rights observance. 
ARTICLE XXVI 
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
1. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission shall be established to address impunity, break the cycle 
of violence, provide a forum for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell 
their story, get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation. 
2. In the spirit of national reconciliation, the Commission shall deal with the question of human rights 
violations since the beginning of the Sierra Leonean conflict in 1991. 
This Commission shall, among other things, recommend measures to be taken for the rehabilitation 
of victims of human rights violations. 
3. Membership of the Commission shall be drawn from a cross-section of Sierra Leonean society 
with the participation and some technical support of the International Community. This Commission 
shall be established within 90 days after the signing of the present Agreement and shall, not later than 
12 months after the commencement of its work, submit its report to the Government for immediate 
implementation of its recommendations. 
ARTICLE XXVII 
HUMANITARIAN RELIEF 
1. The Parties reaffirm their commitment to their Statement on the Delivery of Humanitarian 
Assistance in Sierra Leone of June 3, 1999 which is contained in Annex 4 and constitutes an integral 
part of the present Agreement. To this end, the Government shall request appropriate international 
humanitarian assistance for the people of Sierra Leone who are in need all over the country. 
2. The Parties agree to guarantee safe and unhindered access by all humanitarian organizations 
throughout the country in order to facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance, in accordance with 
international conventions, principles and norms which govern humanitarian operations. In this 
respect, the parties agree to guarantee the security of the presence and movement of humanitarian 
personnel. 
3. The Parties also agree to guarantee the security of all properties and goods transported, stocked or 
distributed by humanitarian organizations, as well as the security of their projects and beneficiaries. 
4. The Government shall set up at various levels throughout the country, the appropriate and effective 
administrative or security bodies which will monitor and facilitate the implementation of these 
guarantees of safety for the personnel, goods and areas of operation of the humanitarian 
organizations. 
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ARTICLE XXVIII 
POST-WAR REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
1. The Government, through the National Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction and with the support of the International Community, shall provide appropriate 
financial and technical resources for post-war rehabilitation, reconstruction and development. 
2. Given that women have been particularly victimized during the war, special attention shall be 
accorded to their needs and potentials in formulating and implementing national rehabilitation, 
reconstruction and development programmes, to enable them to play a central role in the moral, 
social and physical reconstruction of Sierra Leone. 
ARTICLE XXIX 
SPECIAL FUND FOR WAR VICTIMS 
The Government, with the support of the International Community, shall design and implement a 
programme for the rehabilitation of war victims. For this purpose, a special fund shall be set up. 
ARTICLE XXX 
CHILD COMBATANTS 
The Government shall accord particular attention to the issue of child soldiers. It shall, accordingly, 
mobilize resources, both within the country and from the International Community, and especially 
through the Office of the UN Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict, UNICEF and 
other agencies, to address the special needs of these children in the existing disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration processes. 
ARTICLE XXXI 
EDUCATION AND HEALTH 
The Government shall provide free compulsory education for the first nine years of schooling (Basic 
Education) and shall endeavour to provide free schooling for a further three years. The Government 
shall also endeavour to provide affordable primary health care throughout the country. 
PART SIX 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT 
ARTICLE XXXII 
JOINT IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE 
A Joint Implementation Committee consisting of members of the Commission for the Consolidation 
of Peace (CCP) and the Committee of Seven on Sierra Leone, as well as the Moral Guarantors, 
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provided for in Article XXXIV of the present Agreement and other international supporters shall be 
established. Under the chairmanship of ECOWAS, the Joint Implementation Committee shall be 
responsible for reviewing and assessing the state of implementation of the Agreement, and shall meet 
at least once every three months. Without prejudice to the functions of the Commission for 
the Consolidation of Peace as provided for in Article VI, the Joint Implementation Committee shall 
make recommendations deemed necessary to ensure effective implementation of the present 
Agreement according to the Schedule of Implementation, which appears as Annex 5. 
ARTICLE XXXIII 
REQUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT 
The parties request that the provisions of the present Agreement affecting the United Nations shall 
enter into force upon the adoption by the UN Security Council of a resolution responding 
affirmatively to the request made in this Agreement. Likewise, the decision-making bodies of the 
other international organizations concerned are requested to take similar action, where appropriate. 
PART SEVEN 
MORAL GUARANTORS AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT 
ARTICLE XXXIV 
MORAL GUARANTORS 
The Government of the Togolese Republic, the United Nations, the OAU, ECOWAS and the 
Commonwealth of Nations shall stand as Moral Guarantors that this Peace Agreement is 
implemented with integrity and in good faith by both parties. 
ARTICLE XXXV 
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT 
Both parties call on the International Community to assist them in implementing the present 
Agreement with integrity and good faith. The international organizations mentioned in Article 
XXXIV and the Governments of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, Mali, Nigeria, Togo, the United Kingdom and the United States of America are 
facilitating and supporting the conclusion of this Agreement. These States and organizations believe 
that this Agreement must protect the paramount interests of the people of Sierra Leone in peace and 
security. 
PART EIGHT 
FINAL PROVISIONS 
ARTICLE XXXVI 
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REGISTRATION AND PUBLICATION 
The Sierra Leone Government shall register the signed Agreement not later than 15 days from the 
date of the signing of this Agreement. The signed Agreement shall also be published in the Sierra 
Leone Gazette not later than 48 (forty-eight) hours after the date of registration of this Agreement. 
This Agreement shall be laid before the Parliament of Sierra Leone not later than 21 (twenty-one) 
days after the signing of this Agreement. 
ARTICLE XXXVII 
ENTRY INTO FORCE 
The present Agreement shall enter into force immediately upon its signing by the Parties. 
Done in Lomé this seven day of the month of July 1999 in twelve (12) original texts in English and 
French, each text being equally authentic. 
Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah  
President of the Republic of Sierra Leone 
Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh  
Leader of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone 
His Excellency Gnassingbé Eyadéma  
President of the Togolese Republic Chairman of ECOWAS 
His Excellency Blaise Compaore  
President of Burkina Faso 
His Excellency Dahkpanah Dr. Charles Ghankey Taylor  
President of the Republic of Liberia 
His Excellency Olusegun Obasanjo  
President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
His Excellency Youssoufou Bamba  
Secretary of State at the Foreign Mission in charge of International Cooperation of Cote d'Ivoire 
His Excellency Victor Gbeho  
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Ghana 
Mr. Roger Laloupo  
Representative of the ECOWAS Special Representative 
Ambassador Francis G. Okelo  
Executive Secretary of the United Nations 
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Secretary General Ms. Adwoa Coleman  
Representative organization of African Unity 
Dr. Moses K.Z. Anafu  
Representative of the Commonwealth of Nations 
ANNEX 1 
AGREEMENT ON CEASEFIRE IN SIERRA LEONE 
President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and Rev. Jesse Jackson met on 18 May 1999 with Corporal Foday 
Saybana Sankoh, under the auspices of President Gnassingbé Eyadéma. At that meeting, the question 
of the peace process for Sierra Leone was discussed. 
The Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone 
(RUF), 
– Desirous to promote the ongoing dialogue process with a view to establishing durable peace and 
stability in Sierra Leone; and 
– Wishing to create an appropriate atmosphere conducive to the holding of peace talks in Lomé, 
which began with the RUF internal consultations to be followed by dialogue between the 
Government and the RUF; 
– Have jointly decided to: 
1. Agree to ceasefire as from 24 May 1999, the day that President Eyadéma invited Foreign Ministers 
of ECOWAS to discuss problems pertaining to Sierra Leone. It was further agreed that the dialogue 
between the Government of Sierra Leone and RUF would commence on 25 May 1999; 
2. Maintain their present and respective positions in Sierra Leone as of the 24th of May 1999; and 
refrain from any hostile or aggressive act which could undermine the peace process; 
3. Commit to start negotiations in good faith, involving all relevant parties in the discussions, not 
later than May 25 in Lomé; 
4. Guarantee safe and unhindered access by humanitarian organizations to all people in need; 
establish safe corridors for the provision of food and medical supplies to ECOMOG soldiers behind 
RUF lines, and to RUF combatants behind ECOMOG lines; 
5. Immediate release of all prisoners of war and non-combatants; 
6. Request the United Nations, subject to the Security Councils authorisation, to deploy military 
observers as soon as possible to observe compliance by the Government forces (ECOMOG and Civil 
Defence Forces) and the RUF, including former AFRC forces, with this ceasefire agreement. 
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This agreement is without prejudice to any other agreement or additional protocols which may be 
discussed during the dialogue between the Government and the RUF. 
Signed in Lomé (Togo) 18 May 1999, in six (6) originals in English and French 
For the Government of Sierra Leone 
Dr. Alhadji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah  
President Of The Republic Of Sierra Leone 
For the Revolutionary United Front Of Sierra Leone 
Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh  
Leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
WITNESSED BY: 
For the Government of Togo and Current Chairman of ECOWAS 
Gnassingbé Eyadéma  
President of the Republic of Togo 
For the United Nations 
Francis G. Okelo  
Special Representative of the Secretary General 
For the organization of African Unity (OAU) 
Adwoa Coleman  
Representative of the organization of African Unity 
US Presidential Special Envoy for the Promotion of Democracy in Africa 
Rev. Jesse Jackson 
ANNEX 2 
DEFINITION OF CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS 
1. In accordance with Article II of the present Agreement, both parties agree that the following 
constitute ceasefire violations and a breach of the Ceasefire Agreement: 
a. The use of weapons of any kind in any circumstance including: – 
(i) Automatic and semi-automatic rifles, pistols, machine guns and any other small arms weapon 
systems. 
(ii) Heavy machine guns and any other heavy weapon systems. 
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(iii) Grenades and rocket-propelled grenade weapon systems. 
(iv) Artillery, rockets, mortars and any other indirect fire weapon systems. 
(v) All types of mine, explosive devices and improvised booby traps. 
(vi) Air Defence weapon systems of any nature. 
(vii) Any other weapon not included in the above paragraphs. 
b. Troop movements of any nature outside of the areas recognized as being under the control of 
respective fighting forces without prior notification to the Ceasefire Monitoring Committee of any 
movements at least 48 hours in advance. 
c. The movement of arms and ammunition. To be considered in the context of Security Council 
Resolution 1171 (1998). 
d. Troop movements of any nature; 
d. The construction and/or the improvement of defensive works and positions within respective areas 
of control, but outside a geographical boundary of 500m from existing similar positions. 
f. Reconnaissance of any nature outside of respective areas of control. 
g. Any other offensive or aggressive action. 
2. Any training or other military activities not provided for in Articles XIII to XIX of the present 
Agreement, constitute a ceasefire violation. 
3. In the event of a hostile external force threatening the territorial integrity or sovereignty of Sierra 
Leone, military action may be undertaken by the Sierra Leone Government. 
ANNEX 3 
STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE AND THE REVOLUTIONARY 
UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE ON THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND 
NON-COMBATANTS 
The Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) have agreed to 
implement as soon as possible the provision of the Ceasefire Agreement which was signed on 18 
May 1999 in Lomé, relating to the immediate release of prisoners of war and non-combatants. 
Both sides reaffirmed the importance of the implementation of this provision in the interest of the 
furtherance of the talks. 
They therefore decided that an appropriate Committee is established to handle the release of all 
prisoners of war and non-combatants. 
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Both the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone decided 
that such a Committee be established by the UN and chaired by the UN Chief Military Observer in 
Sierra Leone and comprising representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), UNICEF and other relevant UN Agencies and NGOs. 
This Committee should begin its work immediately by contacting both parties to the conflict with a 
view to effecting the immediate release of these prisoners of war and non-combatants. 
Lomé – 2 June 1999 
ANNEX 4 
STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE AND THE REVOLUTIONARY 
UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE ON THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN 
ASSISTANCE IN SIERRA LEONE 
The parties to the conflict in Sierra Leone meeting in Lomé Togo on 3rd June 1999 in the context of 
the Dialogue between the Government of Sierra Leone (GSL) and the Revolutionary United Front of 
Sierra Leone (RUF): 
Reaffirm their respect for international convention, principles and norms, which govern the right of 
people to receive humanitarian assistance and the effective delivery of such assistance. 
Reiterate their commitment to the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement signed by the two 
parties on 18th May 1999 in Lomé. 
Aware of the fact that the protracted civil strife in Sierra Leone has created a situation whereby the 
vast majority of Sierra Leoneans in need of humanitarian assistance cannot be reached. 
Hereby agree as follows: 
1. That all duly registered humanitarian agencies shall be guaranteed safe and unhindered access to 
all areas under the control of the respective parties in order that humanitarian assistance can be 
delivered safely and effectively, in accordance with international conventions, principles and norms 
govern humanitarian operations. 
2. In this respect the two parties shall: 
a. guarantee safe access and facilitate the fielding of independent assessment missions by duly 
registered humanitarian agencies. 
b. identify, in collaboration with the UN Humanitarian coordinator in Sierra Leone and UNOMSIL, 
mutually agreed routes (road, air and waterways) by which humanitarian goods and personnel shall 
be transported to the beneficiaries to provide needed assistance. 
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c. allow duly registered humanitarian agencies to deliver assistance according to needs established 
through independent assessments. 
d. guarantee the security of all properties and of and goods transported, stocked or distributed by the 
duly registered humanitarian agencies, as well as the security of their project areas and beneficiaries. 
3. The two parties undertake to establish with immediate effect, and not later than seven days, an 
Implementation Committee formed by appropriately designated and mandated representatives from 
the Government of Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, the Civil Society, 
the NGO community, and the UNOMSIL; and chaired by the United Nations Humanitarian 
coordinator, in co-ordination with the Special Representative of the Secretary General in Sierra 
Leone. 
The Implementation Committee will be mandated to: 
a. Ascertain and assess the security of proposed routes to be used by the humanitarian agencies, and 
disseminate information on routes to interested humanitarian agencies. 
b. Receive and review complaints which may arise in the implementation of this arrangement, in 
order to re-establish full compliance. 
4. The parties agree to set up at various levels in their areas of control, the appropriate and effective 
administrative and security bodies which will monitor and facilitate the effective delivery of 
humanitarian assistance in all approved points of delivery, and ensure the security of the personnel, 
goods and project areas of the humanitarian agencies as well as the safety of the beneficiaries. 
Issued in Lomé 
June 3 1999 
ANNEX 5 
DRAFT SCHEDULE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT 
1. ACTIVITIES WITH SPECIFIC TIMING: 
DAY 1 
Signing of the Peace Agreement 
Amnesty 
Transformation and new mandate of ECOMOG 
The Government to grant absolute and free pardon to the RUF leader Foday Sankoh through 
appropriate legal steps 
Request to ECOWAS by the parties for revision of the mandate of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone 
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Request to the UN Security Council to amend the mandate of UNOMSIL to enable it to undertake the 
various provisions outlined in the present Agreement; 
Request to the international community to provide substantial financial and logistical assistance to 
facilitate implementation of the Peace Agreement. 
Request to ECOWAS by the parties for contributions of additional troops. 
Transformation of the RUF into a political party. 
RUF to commence to organize itself to function as a political party. 
Encampment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). 
Request for international assistance in adapting and extending the existing DDR programme. 
Withdrawal of mercenaries 
Supervision by Joint Monitoring Commission 
Notification to Joint Monitoring Commission Communication by the parties of positions and 
description of all known warlike devices/materials 
Notification to Military Commands 
Communication by the parties of written orders requiring compliance 
DAY 15 
Enabling members of the RUF to hold public office, and to join a broad-based Government of 
National Unity through Cabinet appointments 
Removal by the Government of all legal impediments 
Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP) 
Creation of the Commission to implement a post-conflict reconciliation and welfare programme 
Mandate of the Commission to terminate at the end of next general elections Jan–Feb 2001 
Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development 
(CMRRD) 
Ban on all exploitation, sale, export, or any transaction of gold and diamonds except those sanctioned 
by the CMRDD 
DAY 22 
Enabling members of the RUF to hold public office 
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Discussion and agreement between both parties on the appointment of RUF members to positions of 
parastatal, diplomacy and any other public sector for a period of fourteen days 
DAY 31 
Transformation of the RUF into a political party 
Commission for the management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development 
(CMRRD) 
Transformation, new mandate, and phased withdrawal of ECOMOG 
Necessary legal steps by the Government for the registration of the RUF as a political party 
Preparation and submission by Government to the Parliament of relevant bills for enabling legislation 
commitments made under the peace agreement 
Deployment of troops from at least two additional countries 
DAY 60 
Completion of encampment, disarmament and demobilization 
Restriction of SLA soldiers to the barracks and storage of their arms and ammunition under constant 
surveillance by the Neutral peacekeeping Force during the disarmament process 
Monitoring of disarmament and demobilization by UNOMSIL 
DAY 90 
Human Rights Commission 
Creation of an autonomous quasi judicial national Human Rights Commission 
Request for technical and material assistance from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
the African Commission on Human Rights and Peoples Rights and other relevant organizations 
Creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Elections 
Establishment of a new independent National Electoral Commission (NEC) in consultation with all 
political parties including the RUF 
Request for financial and logistical support for the operations of the NEC 
Request for assistance from the international community in monitoring the next presidential and 
parliamentary elections in Sierra Leone 
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DAY 456 
Human Rights Violations 
Submission by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of its report and recommendation to the 
Government for immediate implementation 
II. ACTIVITIES WITHOUT SPECIFIC TIMING: (SHORT/MEDIUM/LONG TERM): 
1. Ceasefire monitoring 
(Ceasefire Agreement signed on 18 May 1999) 
Establishment of a Ceasefire Monitoring Committee at provincial and district levels 
Request for international assistance in providing funds and other logistics for the operations of the 
JMC 
JMC already established and operational 
2. Review of the present Constitution 
Establishment of a Constitutional Review Committee 
3. Mediation by the Council of Elders and Religious Leaders 
Appointment of members of the Council by the Interreligious Council, the Government, the RUF and 
ECOWAS 
4. Timetable for the phased withdrawal of ECOMOG 
Formulation of the timetable in connection with the phased creation and deployment of the 
restructured Armed Forces 
5. Security guarantees for peace monitors 
Communication, in writing, of security guarantees to UN military observers 
6. Restructuring and training of the SLA 
Creation by the Government of truly national armed forces reflecting the geo-political structure of 
Sierra Leone within the established strength. 
 
 
